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From the editors of this volume
Current volume of Sign Systems Studies is reflecting two remarkable 
events that took place in 2004.
First, this was the establishing of Jakob von Uexküll Archive fo r  
Umweltforschung and Biosemiotics at the University of Hamburg, 
accompanied with an international conference “Signs and the Design 
of Life —  Uexkiill’s significance today” held for the inauguration of 
the Archive in Hamburg in January 2004 (see a detailed review by T. 
Rüting in the end of this volume).
Second, there was the meeting “Cassirer, Lotman, Uexküll: Be­
tween biology and semiotics of culture”, held in Tartu in May 2004. 
This has been organised by John Michael Krois from the Humboldt 
University of Berlin (at that time the first Emst-Cassirer-Professor at 
the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in Social Sciences) 
together with the Department of Semiotics of Tartu University.
Most of the papers of the current volume were presented in one of 
these conferences. The volume altogether has been prepared in colla­
boration with Hamburg University, particularly its Jakob von Uexküll 
Archive fo r  Umweltforschung and Biosemiotics}
Although there has been some mentioning of Jakob von Uexküll’s 
work in several papers published in Sign Systems Studies earlier, this 
is the first case to devote a focused attention to his works. This can be 
seen as a follow-up to the special issue of Semiotica vol. 134(1/4), 
2001, that has been entirely devoted to the interpretation of Jakob von 
Uexküll’s legacy and role in semiotics.
We also thank Han-liang Chang from the National Taiwan Univer­
sity, who has organised the translation of a 1943 paper by J. and T. 
Uexküll into English and provided it for publication here.
Kalevi Kull 
Torsten Rüting
1 The related projects were also SF0181789s01 and ETF5230.
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Semiotics and Jakob von Uexküll’s 
concept of umwelt
John Deely
Center for Thomistic Studies, University of St Thomas 
3800 Montrose Boulevard, Houston, TX 77006, U.S.A. 
e-mail: deelyj@stthom.edu
Abstract. Semiotics, the body of knowledge developed by study of the action 
of signs, like every living discipline, depends upon a community of inquirers 
united through the recognition and adoption of basic principles which 
establish the ground-concepts and guide-concepts for their ongoing research. 
These principles, in turn, come to be recognized in the first place through the 
work of pioneers in the field, workers commonly unrecognized or not fully 
recognized in their own day, but whose work later becomes foundational as 
the community of inquirers matures and ‘lays claim to its own’. As semiotics 
has matured, the work of Jakob von Uexküll in establishing the concept of 
Umwelt has proven to be just such a pioneering accomplishment for the 
doctrine of signs, and in this paper I trace out some of the lines of 
development according to which UexkülPs concept came to occupy its central 
place in semiotics today.
Nature may be compared to a composer who listens to his own works 
played on an instrument o f his own construction. This results in a 
strangely reciprocal relationship between nature, which has created 
man, and man, who not only in his art and science, but also in his 
experiential universe, has created nature. [...] The formula o f the 
reciprocal relationship between man, who must, in his self-world, create 
nature, and nature, which has brought forth the human species, requires 
us to consider the relationship between sign processes in nature and in 
language.
T. von Uexküll 1992: 281,282
In speaking about one of the central concepts from the work of Jakob 
von Uexküll, namely, the concept of Umwelt, I will be addressing the 
matter not from the point of view of a scholar who has been steeped in 
the original writings themselves of Uexküll, but from, as it were, an 
ecumenical point of view,1 from the point of view of the unmistakable 
influence that Uexküll has exercised over approximately the last 
quarter-century on the development of theoretical semiotics in the 
United States. So I present to you a snapshot from what Sebeok hoped 
would develop into “a program for the amalgamation of main trends” 
(Sebeok 2001: xvii) in the development of semiotics as we crossed the 
threshold of the 21 st century.
12 John Deely
1. Jakob von Uexküll as cryptosemiotician
The American who should be standing before you to speak on this 
matter today is Thomas A. Sebeok. Professor Sebeok would have 
rejoiced in this occasion, and would even have attached to it, I dare 
say in the tones of German philosophy, a world-historical importance. 
My own acquaintance with and interest in the work of Jakob von 
Uexküll stems directly from my long association with Sebeok, 
beginning indeed about seven years prior to his influential identi­
fication of Uexküll as a “cryptosemiotician” and “neglected figure in 
the history of semiotic inquiry” (Sebeok 1979).
Now the concept of a cryptosemiotician is very interesting. It 
names that considerable group of intellectuals whose work is intrin­
sically semiotic, but who themselves have or had no awareness of 
semiotics as a distinct perspective with a paradigm of its own. As a 
consequence o f the very nature of their work, these thinkers would 
benefit enormously were they to become aware of semiotics and the 
vantage it affords. O f course, the achievement of an explicitly semio­
tic consciousness is possible only for present and future workers of the 
mind. The only alternative available to past workers — those who are 
dead by the time semiotics became established — is that their work be 
taken up anew among the living to be reclaimed and re-established 
from within the perspective of the doctrine of signs. This is the task of 
semiotic historiography, as Sebeok put it, to “assess the contributions
Cf. Sebeok 1976; 1977.
of a host of ‘neglected’ giants”, among whom Jakob von Uexküll 
ranks foremost among the modems.
By the^time I made my own attempt to lay out the “basics of 
semiotics”, it was clear to me that Uexküll was “the single most 
important background thinker for understanding the biological 
conditions of our experience of the world in the terms required by 
semiotic” (Deely 1990: 120). His concept of Umwelt is at the center 
of this importance. So what I would like to speak to you about this 
morning is how I came to this assessment of the importance of 
Uexküll for semiotics today, and how my understanding of semiotics 
has influenced my understanding of the concept of Umwelt.
2. Sebeok’s introduction of Uexküll 
to the Semiotic Society of America
I was together with Sebeok in Tampa, Florida in 1975, as the secretary 
of the committee charged with drafting a Constitution for the Semiotic 
Society of America (SSA), and with him in 1976 when the SSA held 
its first Annual Meeting as officially incorporated under United States 
law. At the 7th Annual Meeting held in Buffalo, New York, Sebeok 
brought to the occasion as a plenary speaker Jakob’s son, Thure von 
Uexküll. Thure addressed the meeting on “Semiotics and the Problem 
of the Observer”. It is some measure of the significance of the 
occasion, certainly a sign of the import that Sebeok attached to it, that 
this presentation by Thure was published not only in the Semiotics 
1982 Annual Proceedings volume (T. v. Uexküll 1987a), but was 
published also in Semiotica under Tom’s editorship.3 In addition, 
Sebeok organized for the meeting a Plenary Session on the theme of 
“the role of the observer”.4 As one of Sebeok’s younger associates, I 
had the privilege at that occasion of meeting Thure von Uexküll in 
person. I am quite sure that the occasion did not have for him at the
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2 Deely 1990, described by Sebeok at the time (on the book’s flyleaf) as “the 
only successful modem English introduction to semiotics”.
3 T. von Uexküll 1984. In this Semiotica publication, p. 195, the Buffalo SSA 
7th Annual Meeting is incorrectly reported as the 10th Annual Meeting.
4 Williams 1987 was presented in this session; no others prepared their remarks 
for publication.
time the same importance it had for me, and I doubt even that he 
would remember the meeting.
In the Spring of the following year, 1983, Sebeok proposed that 
he and I, working together with Thure von Uexküll and Martin 
Krampen, should write what he called a “Semiotic Manifesto”. This 
document aimed to declare and to show to the intellectual world at 
large that semiotics provides a new paradigm on the basis of which 
(an interdisciplinary framework within which) the long overdue 
reintegration of the natural and human sciences could be wrought. To 
this end, two additional collaborators were eventually brought on 
board; and the final text of our “manifesto” was published in a 1984 
issue of Semiotica under the title “A Semiotic Perspective on the 
Sciences”.5 One of the beliefs animating this “manifesto” was that 
semiotics achieved a level of intellectual synthesis capable of showing 
that the “multifarious, stale oppositions of realism and idealism” in 
philosophy were the offspring of a dichotomy misbegotten in the first 
place.
Perhaps I should not have been surprised, as I was as the time, 
that precisely from this presemiotic philosophical opposition defini­
tive of modernity in philosophy sprang the one near-acrimonious ex­
change among the co-authors of the then in nuce semiotic manifesto.
14 John Deely
2a. A technical point concerning sensation
Jakob von Uexküll had received his main philosophical formation, I 
take it, from the German writings of the Master of the Modems, 
Immanuel Kant. I, quite the contrary, had received my main formation 
in philosophical thought from the Latin writings of Thomas Aquinas 
on Aristotle. Between these two masters there is one principal divide. 
It concerns a very technical point in the matter of how one is to 
interpret the activity of so-called external sense. For Kant, the intui­
tions of sense are already perceptual cues to which the organism in 
responding gives formation according to its own basic constitution — 
in the human case, the joining to sensory intuition of a-priori forms of 
understanding. The concepts of the understanding yield to “the 
unknowable”, however (according to Kant), in two instances: if I try
5 See Anderson et al. 1984.
to extend my intellectual knowledge beyond the intuition of sense to 
the stimulative source of the content of that intuition, I hit the wall of 
the Ding-an-sich as unknowable; or, again, if I try to extend my 
intellectual knowledge beyond the giving of structure to sense percep­
tions, I hit the wall of the Noumenon as likewise unknowable.6
The position of Aquinas is more subtle than this, in a way that 
leaves abundant space for what is unknown, but no space at all for 
what is unknowable (according to the common medieval maxim: ens 
et verum convertuntur, omne ens est verum).
The position of Aquinas as ruling out the concept of “unknow­
able” as a legitimate category of understanding, equally on the side of 
things and on the side of concepts, requires a prescissive distinction 
between sensation (as the action of the environment upon the animal 
body objectifying certain aspects only of the surroundings) and the 
higher-level perceptual response to that stimulus (wherein the “data” 
of sensation, never atomic but already a complex and multiple net­
work of naturally determined sign-relations, wherein differentiations 
of light reveal also shapes, positions, and movements, etc., are further 
structured into objects of experience). It is here in the active 
perception of objects that the animal classifies them, as Sebeok so 
often put it, as to be sought (+), to be avoided (-), or to be safely 
ignored (0). The human understanding adds to these objects of 
perceptual experience so classified perceptually — to the Umwelt as a 
whole, let us say — a “relation of identity”, or “relation of the object 
to itself”, which does no more than sever the exclusive link of the 
perceived objects to the perceiver, but which by this very fact allows 
the objects to be considered instead (in the terms of Aquinas) as 
beings (this is a very different matter than “neutral or 0 objects”) — 
entities which may or may not have an internal structure or consti­
tution independent of their relevance to me as an animal among other 
animals. In instituting rational investigation of objects experienced, 
the human animal soon enough discovers that not all objects reduce to 
our experience of them, although some objects do indeed so reduce.
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6 Hence Kant’s famous formula (1787: 75): “Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, 
Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind” — “Concepts without percepts are 
empty; percepts without concepts are blind.” Extended commentary in Deely 
2001b; see in particular the Index entry for “Unknowability” and “Unknowable”, 
p. 1009.
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The question of “which is which” within experience becomes the story 
of science, literature, and philosophy.
2b. The coextensiveness of communication and being
In this way of considering the matter, there is no “unknowable” in 
principle, only many “unknowns” in fact. That there are, in principle, 
“unknowns but no unknowables” was also the view of Sebeok and 
semiotics (in contrast to semiology,7 as to all the aspects of intellectual 
life influenced by Kant’s distinctive epistemological thesis), as Petrilli 
and Ponzio so nicely summarized the matter in their recent biography 
of Sebeok (which had the good fortune of appearing before Tom’s 
final illness settled on in earnest):8 “Communication and reality, 
communication and being, coincide”, ens et verum convertuntur.
In other words, astonishingly, the postmodern interpretive horizon 
at the heart of semiotics — a horizon abandoned by modem philo­
sophy, but never wholly by modem science (which only added to it 
the notion of reality as socially constructed, in addition to the 
medieval ens reale notion of reality as given in advance of human 
action) — depends upon the truth of a medieval conviction that ens et 
verum convertuntur, “communication and being are coextensive”, as 
Petrilli and Ponzio put it in Sebeok’s behalf. But from this formula, it 
seemed to me (as to Peirce9), that semiosis itself, the action of signs, 
could be traced also in the inorganic realm prior to and apart from 
(indeed as preparatory for) the advent of organisms as well as within 
and among living things. That “Umwelt-theory draws the line between
7 See Deely 2001b: Chapter 16. On the question of terminology alone as such, 
see Deely 2003a; 2004.
8 Petrilli, Ponzio 2001: 54. Jakob von Uexküll learned a lot from Kant, and may 
not have conceived of the Umwelt without the stimulus of Kantian philosophy. 
Yet it remains the case that “a science that embraces natural systems of signs 
alongside and before the human system of signs” not only “breaks down our 
traditional division into natural sciences and human sciences” and is the shortest 
route to overcoming “many of the misinterpretations” of Jakob von Uexküll’s 
Umwelt theory, as his son Thure points out (T. v. Uexküll 1987a: 3); such a 
science, semiotics by name, is also incompatible with the Kantian Critique o f 
Pure Reason, if it is true that communication and being coincide.
9 See Deely 1996 for full discussion.
animate and inanimate nature” rather than “between nature and man”10 
ä la the modem philosophers seemed to me no less a mistake, for 
inanimate nature is still nature, and nature in a sense presupposed to 
and essential as a context for the dimension of organisms, living 
things^ as such. The fact that plants as such do not even have Um- 
welts does not help to understand why a distinction that seems quite 
unessential to the theory should be regarded as necessary to or entailed 
by it. It was my unresolved disagreement with Sebeok, unfortunately, 
for by the time I realized its dimensions he was no longer with us, or 
at least not sufficiently so to leave his own final response.12 The 
“central preoccupation” of semiotics may be, ä la modernity, exactly 
as Sebeok said, “an illimitable array of concordant illusions”; but 
“its main mission”, as he went on to say,14 is “to mediate between 
reality and illusion.” Let us put the matter this way. For Aquinas, the 
species-specifically distinctive awareness of the human animal is the 
awareness of being, which includes illusions (under his rubric of entia 
rationis, where fall logical relations as well), yes, but also the whole 
realm of nature. For Kant, by contrast, as for the modems he 
synthesized, precisely this ens reale is what passes ‘under erasure’.
Once I had come to look on the situation of semiotics today in this 
light, I realized also that not only was semiotics in its essence 
“postmodern”, because it brought this world of nature back out from 
under the erasure in which modem philosophy had placed it, but so 
was Sebeok himself, malgre lui, postmodern in his understanding of 
things (Deely 2001c). Petrilli and Ponzio, in their recent study of 
Sebeok’s work (which, as I said, had something of his endorsement), 
capture the postmodern essence of the way of signs as Sebeok 
envisioned it exactly: “there is no doubt that the inner human world, 
with great effort and serious study, may reach an understanding of 
non-human worlds and of its connection with them” (Petrilli, Ponzio
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10 Thure von Uexküll 1992: 284: “The Umwelt-theory draws the line not 
between nature and man, but between animate and inanimate nature. The 
structural laws which it postulates as nature-plans, and which are analogous to the 
structural laws of linguistics, are applicable only to living organisms.”
11 Cf. Krampen 1981; Deely 1987.
12 1 refer to our e-mail correspondence around the American Thanksgiving 
holiday in 2001. See the further discussion below, p. 11 to end of essay.
13 In his Presidential Address to the Semiotic Society of America, Sebeok 1984: 
77-78.
14 Ibid.
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2001: 20). Unknowns, yes, in abundance. Unknowables, no, at least 
not in principle.
2c. The status of objects as perceptible
But to get back to the one misunderstanding in the generation of the 
manifesto. That all animals in perception organize and classify objects 
as +, or 0 was well agreed among all the participants. But the 0 
objects, the Gegenstände, what status do they have in the Umwelt? 
Thure von Uexküll suggests that they have no status at all, that they 
“do not exist” for the nonhuman animals, and I would not doubt that 
in this he expresses exactly his father’s view as well. I am not so sure. 
I think that the animals often —  I think of the so-called “higher” 
animals, those able to Team from experience’, that is15 — have an 
awareness of the “zero-object”, in that “zero” here does not mean 
‘non-existent for awareness’ but rather ‘something that may be in 
awareness neither as to be sought nor to be avoided but simply as to 
be safely ignored’. And in this +. - ,  0, perceptual classification, of 
course, the animal can be mistaken! I do not think that the awareness 
of neutral objects is what characterizes the semiosis of the human 
animal, anthroposemiosis, but rather the awareness of any object and 
every object under the guise of being, ‘that which is’, to be sorted out 
as mind-dependent or mind-independent (for “being is said in many 
ways”, as Aristotle early noticed).
Thus, where Uexküll in his original work speaks of the subject-object 
dichotomy, a split very comfortable in modem thought, I, coming from 
my Latin background, did not and do not find the dichotomy comfortable 
at all. This discomfort went back to my student days reading the Latin 
commentaries on Aristotle. It was, if not the first, certainly one of the first, 
times that I went to the room of my then-professor, eventual doctoral 
dissertation advisor, and after that life-long friend, the Dominican friar 
Ralph Austin Powell, that I posed to him the idea that Kant, in his Kritik 
der reinen Vernunft, had precisely confused what was true of sense 
perception prescissively distinguished from sensation as such (namely, 
that it introduced into the organization of objects the needs and desires of 
the animal’s subjective constitution as an organism) with what ought to be
18 John Deely
15 Deely 1971.
said rather of understanding or “reason” (namely, that it was capable of 
investigating the objects of perception according to what they are and 
require to be as they are both within and apart from the perception of 
human animals).
What distinguished human understanding from animal perception 
in that case would be precisely that sense perception is completely 
biologically determined. Perception arises from sensation as a need to 
structure objectivity, and perception returns to sensation with the 
objects structured. Understanding, by contrast, begins from the world 
of perceived objects, exactly so, but by presenting those very objects 
in a biologically underdetermined way, namely, as not only +, 0, 
but also as having an intrinsic determination involved with but not 
wholly reducible to their appearance as 0.
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2d. Objects as intelligible
As involving sensations at their core, the perceived objects necessarily 
involve something of the physical environment in its physical being, 
proximally depending upon the type of animal body involved, it is 
true, but in a selective rather than interpretive fashion.16 As involving 
perception, this core is further structured and presented as objective in 
a species-specific way — interpreted, that is, according to the 
constitution or ‘nature’ of the particular animal which is perceiving. 
But as further involving understanding, the actually perceived objects 
are presented rather as actually intelligible, that is to say, as objects 
able to be investigated according to the being they have as involving 
subjects in their own right, as involving a world of things manifested 
within objectivity but extending in some ways (ens reale) and not in 
other ways (ens rationis) beyond the objectivity constitutive of 
experience as a whole. The Latins put this well: “aliae enim sunt 
divisiones entis in esse rei, aliae in genere scibilis”.17
For this picture, the “subject-object” split of modem philosophy, 
where the subject is one kind of being in its own right, and the object 
quite another, will not do. As has so often proved to be the case in
16 See Deely 2001b: 341-357, esp. 435-347.
17 Poinsot 1632: 149/44—46, and passim: “for the divisions of being in the order 
of physical existence are one thing, while divisions in the order of the knowable 
are quite another”. Cf. also Cajetan 1507.
semiotics, a trichotomy is here necessary. For there is in the world of 
experienced objects not only what exists as known — namely, the 
object as such. There are also elements within the objects which 
human experience tells us exist whether or not any organism is aware 
of them — things, let us call them, these aspects of objects which may 
happen to be known but which can exist also apart from the 
awareness. And both of these are distinct from (even when factually 
coincident with) the so-called “signs” whereby one thing, one object, 
one element within awareness, points or leads to another awareness. 
For signs in this sense can belong to either order. Clouds, for example, 
as signs of rain exist as signs in the experience of many animals. But 
clouds have a connection with rain, not only one that is revealed in 
that experience but also one that is knowable in that same experience 
as going beyond that experience; whereas flags have a connection to 
country nowhere but within the experience of human animals.
You can see, in these terms, that Jakob von Uexküll’s “subject” 
belongs to the world of things, but that his “objects” involve a con­
fusion or mixture, an amalgam, even, of objects and things. You can 
see further that the Umwelt is an exclusively objective world, not 
because it does not involve things, but because it involves things only 
in known aspects.
2e. Language as modeling system and exaptation
The Innenwelt is subjective; it is the modeling system not only species- 
specific to each variety of animal, but also intrinsic to each individual of 
whatever variety. But the Umwelt is objective, a public realm within 
each species yet between all individuals of that species and, to some 
measure (if never completely), public even across some species. The 
human Umwelt is first of all an animal Umwelt, a species-specific 
objective world, but it is based on a biologically under-determined 
Innenwelt or modeling system. This modeling system, the species- 
specifically human Innenwelt, Sebeok came to call 8 “language” in the 
root sense, in contrast to the common (mis)use of the term “language” 
to mean what is in reality the exaptation of language to communicate 
and to constitute linguistic communication as the species-specifically
20 John Deely
18 Sebeok 1984, 1986a, 1987, 1987b; cf. 1978, 1981, 1981 a, 1981 b.
human communicative modality. I may mention that this distinction 
between language as a modeling system and language as a commu­
nicative exaptation also explains why Baer (1987: 203) said that, “from 
Sebeok’s biological vantage point”, the thesis “of the linguistic media­
tion of the world does not entail acceptance of the position that the 
linguistic model should dominate semiotic analysis”.19
This biological underdetermination of the human modeling 
system introduces into the Umwelt the “relation to itself’ (or of 
“objects to themselves”), and by so doing presents the perceived 
objects as actually intelligible.20 That is, the objects of awareness 
become, perceived as beings, susceptible of being investigated 
according to whatever intrinsic constitution they may have subjecti­
vely speaking (and this whether ultimately a being of the order of ens 
reale, ens rationis, or some mixture of the two as a socially 
constructed reality, such as the witches of Salem; for, remember, 
“being is said in many ways”). By this measure what was a closed 
Umwelt becomes “open”, not in the sense that the organs of sensation 
or perception are any different, but in the sense that the Umwelt 
becomes permeable to the physical environment explorable as an 
order of things that involves also physical structures that (unlike 
perceived objects) remain in some ways indifferent to the kind of 
animal perceiving it (if not fo r  the animals perceiving it).
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19 This is an important point I have developed elsewhere (Deely 1980; further in 
1994); but here let me remark simply that, for want of understanding the semiosic 
context of linguistic communication, linguistic philosophy as it developed in the 
English-speaking world after Russell and Wittgenstein (early or late), which one 
would prima facie regard as a natural ally of semiotic development, proved on the 
contrary to be a natural enemy of semiotic understanding (Deely 2003: Part I).
20 So we have from semiotics the answer to the question posed by Heidegger on 
the last page of Being and Time (1963: 437): “Why does Being get ‘conceived’ 
‘proximally’ in terms of the present-at-hand and not in terms of the ready-to-hand, 
which indeed lies closer to us? Why does this reifying always keep coming back 
to exercise its dominion?” For Ready-to-hand is the manner in which objects exist 
within an animal Umwelt. Human beings are animals first of all, but they have 
one species-specifically distinct feature of their Innenwelt or modeling system 
brought to light in the postmodern context of semiotics Professor Sebeok, namely, 
the ability to model objects as things. Thus the human modeling system or 
Innenwelt includes the ability to undertake the discrimination within objects of the 
difference between what of the objects belongs to the order of physical 
subjectivity (“ens reale") and what belongs wholly to the order of objects simply 
as terminating our awareness of them (“ens rationis"). Cf. Deely 200 Id: 724-725.
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If. The species-specifically human Umwelt
I suggested to Sebeok, on a number of occasions, and in some 
extended correspondence we had on the point, that we semioticians 
ought to take a cue here from Edmund Husserl and the late-modern 
phenomenologists by calling the human Umwelt in its species-specific 
sense rather a Lebenswelt. While he sympathized with the suggestion 
and recognized the utility for a name for what distinguished the 
Umwelt in the case of the human animal from the Umwelt as common 
to all the other kinds of animals, his experience with the Nazis in the 
Word War II period (an experience which was extensive) made him 
always associate the term “Lebenswelt” with the distasteful Nazi 
speech about “Lebensraum”, and by reason of this distasteful 
association in his own Innenwelt, as far as I could guess, Sebeok could 
never bring himself to accept “Lebenswelt” as a synonym expressive 
of the human Umwelt in its species-specific sense.
In any event, for purposes of our “manifesto”, I suggested along 
the above lines that Uexküll’s term “Umwelt” ought best to be 
translated as “objective world”, in contrast with the notion of the 
physical environment common to all life forms. Note that this idea of 
the physical environment common across the Umwelts is a species- 
specifically human hypothesis that, exactly as Thure von Uexküll 
reported,21 “belongs to a realm which passes all sensoric conception”, 
even though, as Aquinas would insist, just such an environment is 
partially included, precisely objectively — as cognized or ‘known’ in 
the perceived world of objects — as something of which the animal is 
in a limited sense aspectually aware. I hope you can see in this 
extended context, now, why I proposed (and in my own writings have 
stuck to) this rendering of Umwelt as “objective world”: for the 
objective world is not opposed to the subjective world tout court, and 
in fact partially or aspectually includes something of that very 
subjectivity through sensation.
However, this extended context here provided existed at the time 
reported only between Sebeok and me, not even between me and the 
other collaborators on the manifesto manuscript, Thure von Uexküll in 
particular. Hence, when my proposal in written lines reached Thure
21 Thure von Uexküll 1987a: 7. Thure von Uexküll 1984 reads here: “belongs to 
a realm that goes beyond all sensory conceptions.”
via Sebeok, Thure rejected it vehemently and — as I recall the note of 
response passed on to me by Sebeok — almost with acrimony. At the 
time I was at my then-home in Dubuque, Iowa, and Sebeok was in 
New York for some professional affair. It was evening when I 
received his note which sided with Thure in rejecting out of hand my 
proposed translation for “Umwelt”. I was furious. I picked up the 
phone at once and dialed Tom’s hotel, and he happened to be in. 
“How can you take sides on this matter without even discussing it 
further?”, I demanded to know. Tom, in his manner (it was a lengthy 
phone conversation), patiently pointed out to me that we are dealing 
here with Jakob von Uexküll’s son, who has a right to be considered 
primus inter pares when it comes to how we should express his 
father’s work, even in English; and that it was further important that 
we not let our collaboration founder on an unnecessary point, which 
even I, as a brash young professor then, had to concede. So we 
dropped the matter for the purposes of our manifesto, and, under the 
collaborative genius of Tom’s guiding hand, the text came eventually 
to a successful conclusion. The manifesto stands to this day as a 
clarion call for a new paradigm and a new perspective, the paradigm 
and perspective proper and indigenous to the doctrine of signs, which 
I did not yet then see22 as quintessentially postmodern. I have since 
come so to see the doctrine of signs as just that, in unmistakable 
terms — at least so far as philosophy is concerned within intellectual 
culture as a whole.
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22 Cf. Deely 1982: 3, “Objectives”: “All previous semiotic ‘theories’ [...] be they 
Greimasian, Saussurean, Peircean, Poinsotian, have come to the study of signs late 
in the day, on the basis of a thoroughly worked out system of concepts, a 
‘pre-existing philosophical paradigm’. To this prejacent paradigm, then, their 
subsequent notions of signification were referred and required to conform. The 
coming of age of semiotic as a perspective in its own right requires exactly the 
reverse. It can have no paradigm of philosophy given in advance. Beginning with 
the sign, that is, from the function of signs in our experience taken in their own 
right (semiosis), it is the task of semiotic to create a new paradigm — its own — 
and to review, criticize, and correct so far as possible all previous accounts of 
experience in the terms of that paradigm.” Cf. “Conceptual Revolution” in Sebeok 
2001: xix-xxiii.
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3. “The Dominican tradition”
Over the years, right up to his last book,23 Sebeok would occasionally 
refer to “the Dominican tradition” within semiotics. The reference 
always mildly annoyed me, especially as he would never explain it 
when asked (I tried) but afterward continued to insist on the reference 
in subsequent publications. This tradition, in his last enumeration of 
protagonists,24 is the semiotic tradition stemming “from Aristotle, 
then, via Aquinas, Poinsot, and Maritain,” extends through “engaged 
contemporaries like Herculano de Carvalho, Beuchot, Deely, and 
others.”
A Dominican tradition stemming from Aristotle seems a little 
odd; but it is true that Aquinas, Poinsot, and Beuchot are Dominicans, 
and that I was one for four years. But what about Maritain, Carvalho, 
and “the others”? In any event, it is true that Aquinas cannot be well 
understood apart from Aristotle; that Aquinas and Poinsot are by far 
the largest-looming figures in this pantheon; and that Maritain, who 
regarded Poinsot as among his foremost teachers, was the greatest 
easily of the 20th century’s self-styled followers of Aquinas (the 
“neothomists”25). So the name Sebeok chose for this subtradition 
within his semiotic ecumenism is not without its justifiability,26 even 
if it has puzzling aspects. And there is no doubt that, given the lineage 
Sebeok assigns, that this is the evolving standpoint from which I came 
to semiotics, to the reading of Uexküll, and to the interpretation of the 
expression “Umwelt”.
And, thinking from that point of view, it has always struck me as 
one o f history’s ironies that Jakob von Uexküll, the great inconscient 
pioneer of zoösemiosis, took his original inspiration for the animal 
Umwelt, precisely a world of percepts without concepts (if we regard 
concepts as the species-specifically human products of Vernunft), 
from the Kantian theory of mind.
23 Sebeok 2001: xvii-xviii.
24 Ibid.
25 With the caveat entered in Deely 2001b: 342n200.
26 And here I might note that a well-known German Thomist never mentioned 
by Sebeok, as far as I know, namely, Josef Pieper, made a central use of Uexkiill’s 
Umwelt concept in one of his most famous books (Pieper 1998: 80-97, esp. 81- 
84).
In a wholly logical world, I thought, the study of the purely 
perceptual intelligence of animals might rather have been an 
inspiration for the jettisoning of Kantianism when it came to the 
philosophy of the human mind.27 For the human mind is like the mind 
of any animal in consisting of a modeling system; but it is unlike the 
mind of any other animal —  at least on this planet —  in being biolo­
gically underdetermined in what it models, that is to say, in possessing 
“language” in Sebeok’s sense.28 Hence the human Innenwelt can 
represent things not only on the basis of sensation and as sensed 
objects are perceptually given, but as intelligible as well, i.e., able to 
be investigated and studied on the hypothesis that they have an 
internal constitution or “essential structure” of their own which may 
look like nothing we have ever seen or could see with the eyes of our 
animal body.
A subjectively determined objective world which is that and 
nothing besides, nothing more, makes perfectly good sense within the 
framework of a Kantian philosophy of mind. Indeed, we may say that 
Kant did more to make that phenomenon, the animal Umwelt so far as 
sense-perception is concerned, thinkable than did any thinker before 
him. But, within that same framework of his philosophy, there is room 
neither for a universe of things in contrast to objects, nor for a Way of 
Signs leading “everywhere in nature, including those domains where 
humans have never set foot.”29 Yet along a way of signs in just this 
sense is where semiotics leads us, and gives us the means integrally to 
explore. The choice is not between holding “that signs are nothing but 
rather dry and boring linguistic concepts that have to do only with 
syntax and grammar” or recognizing “the exciting fact that signs are in 
reality magic formulae whose creative power changes our world and 
ourselves” (T von Uexküll 1982: 12). To pose the matter in the terms of 
this either/or is already to have accepted the modem idealist/realist
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27 Consult “Jakob von Uexküll” in Deely 1990: 119-124; and compare the 
discussion of the relation of understanding to sense intuition in Poinsot 1632a: 
Book II, Questions 1 and 2, and in Deely 2002.
28 See n. 19 above.
29 Emmeche 1994: 126; staying silent for the moment on the question over 
which Sebeok turned conservative, the question of whether semiosis is co­
terminus with the emergence of life, or whether there is not indeed a broader 
origin in which semiosis must be seen as coterminous with the physical universe 
tout court, see Nöth 2001.
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opposition as something unsurpassable; whereas semiotics has its 
point of departure in a standpoint superior to both. (Among the proto- 
semioticians,30 Poinsot was the first explicitly to point this fact out; 
but of course his work in this regard was unknown till quite late in the 
20th century, and it is not widely known even as we gather here in 
Hamburg today.)
4. The postmodern synthesis in semiotics
We start out from the fact that things can be understood which can 
neither be sensed nor perceived without the understanding, such as the 
fact that Michael Miller in five days from today will become the 
titular Archbishop of Vertara. We start out from the fact that among 
the things which can neither be sensed nor perceived without the 
understanding are signs, in contrast to sign-vehicles. For I think it is 
not too much to say that the single most important upshot of semiotic 
developments in the 20th century has been the realization that, strictly 
speaking, nothing that can be seen with the eyes or heard with the ears 
is in the technical sense a sign, but rather and only a sign-vehicle. This 
sign-vehicle owes its being as such first of all not to anything in its 
physical, material, or subjective constitution32 as much as to its place 
within a triadic relationship. It is this triadic relation which constitutes 
the sign as such and as a signifying whole, and that relation has this in 
common with all other relationships, triadic or not, namely: that it can 
be neither seen nor touched in its suprasubjective being as relation, but
30 Sebeok called “protosemioticians” the pioneers or founding figures of 
semiotics as such, that is, those thinkers who first undertook consciously (in 
contrast to his “cryptosemioticians”) the struggle to establish the essential nature 
and fundamental varieties of possible semiosis.
31 Poinsot 1632: Book I, Question 1, 117/18-118/18, esp. 117/28-118/9. Seethe 
discussion in Deely 1988.
But of course physical constitution will be involved where it is a question of 
any natural signification, by reason of what Poinsot analyzed as the irreducible 
element of “transcendental relation” which permeates the realm of nature and ens 
reale, just as ontological relation permeates semiosis whether involving ens reale 
or ens rationis.
only understood; so that the animals other than human use signs 
without the possibility of knowing that there are signs.33
Objectified things can be seen and touched. Objectified things can 
be related, and are perceived (granted, sometimes mistakenly) as 
related. And, if they are related in a certain way, perceived things — 
that is to say, rather, objects — can be seen to function as signs. But 
their being related in a certain way is what makes them appear as 
signs, not anything about their being as objects, or even as things. We 
call objects related in that certain way “signs”. But, if we are 
sufficiently sophisticated semiotically, we well know that what in 
ordinary language are called signs are in fact but sign-vehicles, and 
that what are signs in their very being are only the triadic relationships 
under which the sign vehicles occupy temporarily the position of 
“standing for” something other than themselves “to” some third, be it 
an organism or not, an observer or only some prospective observer 
under conditions not yet prevailing.
Now it is true, as Thure von Uexküll (1984: 187) says, that a sign 
“is a unit with several elements that are functionally related to each 
other and to the whole”, similar in this respect to cause and effect. But 
to say that these elements have none of them “any significance by 
themselves” is to go one step too far, for it erases the profound diffe­
rence between conventional and natural sign. For the three elements 
involved in a given sign may themselves be subjective structures able 
to be objectified independently o f the particular signifying. They will 
then become mere objects in their own right, signified, it is true, but 
not as sign-vehicle and interpretant in the case supposed. Yet, whether 
natural or conventional, a sign consists as such in a triadic relation 
whose elements or ‘parts’ are determined by their position and role 
within the relation: the one in the foreground of representing another 
than itself is determined to be the representamen or sign-vehicle; the 
one in the position or role of being the represented other is determined 
to be the object signified; and the one in the background of that object 
for or to which the other-representation is made is determined to be 
the interpretant. And yet further still, each of these three elements can 
shift place with the other, becoming then (so far as the signification is
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33 This is why I have proposed “semiotic animal” on several occasions (most 
recently Deely 2003b) as the postmodern definition of human being, to replace the 
modem definition of res cogilans.
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concerned) no longer sign-vehicle but object, or interpretant, etc., in 
the famous “semiotic spiral”.34
Yet, in the animal case, it is the natural sign (or ‘sign-vehicle’) 
that carries the burden of the signifyings, not because entia rationis, 
mind-dependent relations of signification, are not involved (they are), 
but because the animal’s survival depends on getting right the manner 
in which the physical environment is incorporated into its world of 
objects, its Umwelt, when it comes to food, sex, and danger.
F ran c is  Jacob, in a passage Sebeok was fond of citing, liked to 
point out that there is what I would call an “animal realism” which 
philosophers can ill-afford to ignore:
No matter how an organism investigates its environment, the perception it gets 
must necessarily reflect so-called “reality”35 and, more specifically, those 
aspects of reality which are directly related to its own behavior. If the image 
that a bird gets of the insects it needs to feed its progeny does not reflect at 
least some aspects of reality, there are no more progeny. If the representation 
that a monkey builds of the branch it wants to leap to has nothing to do with 
reality, then there is no more monkey. And if this did not apply to ourselves, 
we would not be here to discuss this point. (Jacob 1982: 56)
Never mind for the moment Kant. Aquinas would say that the per­
ception necessarily reflects so-called “reality”, i.e., something true 
about the world of things as constituting a physical environment upon 
which all living things depend (even though different ones upon 
different parts and in different ways), because in sensation the action 
of the sensible upon the sense guarantees that the material the 
perception has to work with is rooted in the reciprocal reality (the 
transcendental relation) of organism and physical surroundings. The 
ontological and triadic relations which turn all this physical interaction 
and subjective actions and reactions into a semiotic web36 sustaining 
objectivity (which is the Umwelt of any given animal) come from 
both sides, from the animal mind and from nature, to the sole end of 
the animal surviving at the least, flourishing if possible. The animal 
cares not a whit if it be the sun that moves round the earth or the earth
34 Diagram in Deely 1985: 321; 2001a: 28; 2003: 164.
35 Here precisely in the Latin sense of ens reale, the physical environment in its 
properly subjective being.
-6 To use the expression Sebeok 1975 fashioned from his reading of Jakob von 
Uexküll.
round the sun. We humans know now that the former relation is an ens 
rationis, the latter an ens reale. Neither can be directly perceived as 
relations (only the sun and stars and their apparent movement relative 
to the animal perceiving), yet both are functionally equivalent within 
the objective world of animals for purposes of environmental orien­
tation. That is why animals can perceive related objects and sign- 
vehicles as objects, but they cannot come to know that there are signs; 
for signs consist strictly and essentially in relations of a certain kind, 
while relations of no kind can be perceived as such by sense. Yet what 
the Umwelt is above all is a lattice and network of ontological rela­
tions between organism and environment, elevating the latter to the 
level of the animal’s awareness, and organizing it according to the 
animals need and desires, even hopes.
The environmental niche beloved of North American biologists is 
a physically reductionist conception by comparison to the Umwelt. 
Uexküll’s work in biology provides the clearest proof yet of the error 
of nominalism in philosophy in denying reality to relations except as 
fashioned by human thought.37 For if  that were true, neither Umwelts 
nor animals could be in the first place.
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5. Labyrinthine entwined issues yet to be resolved
My good friend Sebeok died with the issue unresolved between us as 
to whether semiosis is coextensive with or exceeds the biosphere.38 
Nonetheless, we were well in agreement, by that point, that, as far as
37 For the details on nominalism so defined I must refer the present reader to 
Deely 2001b.
38 Deely 2001 a and 2001 d.
39 December 21, 2001, was Sebeok’s last day. Just six months earlier, in the 
framework of the June 12-21 Imatra meeting of the Nordic-Baltic Summer 
Institute for Semiotic and Structural Studies, I had the privilege to make an oral 
presentation of my paper on Umwelt (Deely 2001), which had been written under 
the prompting of Kalevi Kull for his monumental Uexküll Special Issue of 
Semiotica (Kull 2001), to an audience of which Tom Sebeok was a member. In 
the months subsequent, I was gratified to have him refer several e-mail inquirers 
to me as an “expert” on the concept of Umwelt. I took the referrals less as a 
tribute to my German than as an expression of his satisfaction, for the purposes of 
the ongoing development of semiotics, with the articulation the concept had 
received in that paper and session.
the understanding of earthly life goes, and presumably life as well 
anywhere in the physical universe, “prospects for a viable comprehen­
sive synthesis of the doctrine of signs, a new paradigm if you will, 
loom on the horizon in 2001 under the banner of biosemiotics (a.k.a. 
the Jakob von Uexküll ‘tradition’)” (Sebeok 2001: xviii). The advent 
of this paradigm, he continued,40 “under the more restricted German 
label of Umweltlehre, that is, the study of modeling, was far from an 
epiphany. Quite the contrary, it took well nigh a century to season.” 
That century was the 20th century, modernity’s last. As we enter 
postmodemity’s first full century in the clear, this “fleshing out of a 
number of labyrinthine entwined issues” may be expected to occupy 
more and more of our intellectual culture as semiotics comes into its 
own, forming the center of gravity for the postmodern epoch of 
philosophy.
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Семиотика и понятие умвельта Якоба фон Юкскюлла
Семиотика, т.е. наука, которую развивает изучение знаковых про­
цессов, зависит (как и любая другая живая специальность) от содру­
жества исследователей, которых объединяет признание и примене­
ние основных принципов, составляющих основу исследовательской 
работы. Эти принципы осваиваются прежде всего благодаря работам 
пионеров этой специальности, которые в свое время могли быть 
непризнаны, но впоследствии приобрели известность вместе с созре­
ванием содружества исследователей, которые признают их своими. 
В ходе становления семиотики именно понятие умвельта Якоба фон 
Юкскюлла стало таким путеводным понятием для учения о знаках. В 
данной статье рассматриваются те пути развития, которые привели к 
тому, что концепция Юкскюлла заняла центральное место в совре­
менной семиотике.
Semiootika ja Jakob von Uexkülli omailma mõiste
Semiootika, s.o. teadmiste kogum, mida arendab märgiprotsesside uuri­
mine, sõltub (nagu iga teinegi elus eriala) uurijate kogukonnast, keda 
ühendab uurimistöö alus- ja juhtmõisteid moodustavate põhiprintsiipide
5
34 John Deely
tunnustamine ja rakendamine. Need printsiibid võetakse omaks eelkõige 
selle eriala pioneeride tööde kaudu, mis ilmumise ajal võisid tunnustuseta 
jääda, kuid mis saavad rajavateks koos uurijate kogukonna küpsemisega, 
kes nad omaks kuulutavad. Semiootika küpsedes on Jakob von Uexkülli 
omailma mõiste osutunud just niisuguseks teerajajaks märgidoktriinile. 
Käesolevas artiklis vaadeldakse neid arenguteid, mille läbi Uexkülli kont­
septsioon haaras oma keskse koha tänapäeva semiootikas.
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Abstract. This paper aims to give an insight into developments that con­
tributed to the significance of the work of Jakob von Uexküll and stresses the 
importance of his occupation in Hamburg. A biographical survey pays tribute 
to the implication of the historical pretext and context. A scientific survey 
describes findings and ideas of Uexküll that proved important for the 
development of biology and the cognitive sciences. In addition, this paper sets 
out to reject the common notion that Uexküll’s concepts were ideas of a 
purely theoretical and philosophical character. It confirms that in fact the 
central aims of his work were to sustain the empirical method in biology and 
to give biology a sound epistemological basis. Some examples show how 
historical and theoretical developments converged at Uexküll’s Institut fiir 
Umweltforschung in Hamburg and ignited a productive research activity.
1. Introduction
Realisation o f  ideas in Hamburg
At the age of 61 Jakob von Uexküll (1864—1944) came to work and 
teach at the University of Hamburg. In April 1925 he was employed 
as “ Wissenschaftlicher Hilfarbeiter" (scientific assistant worker), “a 
position almost comically beneath a man of his years and experience” 
(Harrington 1996: 35). However, at the end of the year he was 
appointed Honorarprofessor. For Uexküll these were the first paid 
positions in his career, and it seems that his long lifespan as an 
independent biologist was both an expression and guarantee for the 
creativity o f his mind. Uexküll’s career in Hamburg can be taken as a
demonstration of the unbroken vigour of his mind and his creative­
ness. He founded the Institut fiir Umweltforschung and Hamburg 
became the place where the wealth of his ideas and his original ideas 
about biological research, summarised in his Theoretische Biologie 
(1920a), could be realised within an academic institution for the first 
time. Uexküll turned out to be a talented director and manager, who 
mastered the obstacles of bureaucracy and deficiency in inter-war 
Germany. His winning personality and intellectual spirit attracted and 
motivated scientists of different educational backgrounds and origins 
to take part in research at the institute. Besides teaching, supervising 
students and co-workers, and managing the institute, Uexküll found 
time to unfold his creativity and published many books that made his 
insights popular and won him fame.
In Hamburg Uexküll (Fig. 1) put into action his continuous striving 
for a sound foundation of biology in epistemology and experimen­
tation. In his publications from around 1900 Uexküll had already 
emphasised that biology had gone astray into speculation and had to 
win back the experimental method from physiology. This was after 
more than ten years of thorough studies on the physiology of in­
vertebrate animals in the laboratories of Wilhelm Kühne (1837-1900) 
in Heidelberg and Anton Dohm (1840-1909) in Naples, where Uex­
küll had introduced innovative experimental technology like the 
cinematograph. Uexküll’s promotion of the experimental method in 
biology went hand in hand with a revision of its epistemological 
foundations. In his second book, Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere 
(1909), he simultaneously criticised the positivistic idea of scientific 
progress and of progress in evolution. He dedicated a whole chapter to 
the problem of “the observer” —  the main problem of epistemology in 
science. According to Uexküll, studying the biology of animals 
provided basic insights into the process of investigation itself.
However, not until the mid-twenties did the Institut fü r Um­
weltforschung become the place where Uexküll’s Theoretische Bio­
logie was used for heuristic orientation by a larger group of scientists 
for the first time. Uexküll’s original concepts were the guidelines for 
research in the Institut fü r  Umweltforschung and his theoretical 
thoughts structured the explanation of its results. The number of 
students and researchers at the institute grew rapidly and by 1934 
more than 70 papers had been published. Nevertheless, Uexküll’s 
ideas were not acknowledged unanimously by his colleagues in the
36 Torsten Rüting
History and significance o f Jakob von Uexküll 37
faculty and the Institut for Umweltforschung barely survived the death 
of its founder. It was finally closed in 1960 — as early as the 1970s 
this was regretted as being untimely, since new institutions for the 
investigation of the so called Umweltproblem, “environmental 
problem”, were to be founded anew.
Figure 1. Jakob von Uexküll celebrating his 70th birthday in his institute 
in Hamburg.
Significance o f  Uexküll to 20th and 21st century thought
In the eyes of contemporary biologists, Uexküll often appeared arro­
gant, and his sharp tongue provoked tensions and incomprehension; 
his unfamiliar ideas were rejected and he himself was labelled a 
vitalist, anti-evolutionist or mystic (e.g., by Goldschmidt 1956). How­
ever scholars in different fields of science and the arts, like psycho­
logy, anthropology, philosophy, linguistics, architecture and literature, 
have recognised the resourceful significance of his challenge (for a
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detailed list see Kull 2001). Most notably Uexküll’s approach 
influenced the development of the Organismic Biology and System 
Theory of Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1901-1972) and the ethology of 
Konrad Lorenz (1903-1989) and Nico Tinbergen (1907-1988) 
(Schmidt 1980).
The topicality and inter-disciplinarity of Uexküll’s ideas has been 
demonstrated at several conferences over the last decade. A special 
issue of the journal Semiotica (vol. 134, 2001) brought together the 
contributions of scholars from linguistics to cybernetics and molecular 
biology, who explored the legacy of Uexküll in their fields of 
research. In addition to the rise of the “semiotic turn”, the renewed 
interest in Uexküll’s works has been explained as coinciding with a 
“trend from temporal (evolutionary, genetic, “vertical”) biology 
towards spatial (organismic, genomic, “horizontal”) biology” (Kull 
2001: 4). Uexküll’s agenda is seen as “a main contribution to the 
‘developmental’ or ‘epigenetic’ trend in the biology of the recent 
centuries; a lineage involving scholars like Karl Ernst von Baer, 
d'Arcy Thompson, Hans Spemann, Hans Driesch, Conrad Hal 
Waddington, Brian Goodwin, Rene Thom, Robert Rosen and Stuart 
Kauffman” (Stjemfelt 2001: 79).
The significance of Uexküll’s writings is also demonstrated in the 
recent works of philosophers. Peter Sloterdijk (2004) acknowledges 
Uexküll’s conception of Umwelt and his critique of metaphysics as 
being relevant for the description of the ethical crisis immanent in the 
processes of modem society and globalisation. Giorgio Agamben 
(2002) discusses the relevance of Uexküll to the development of 
modem philosophy and ideology in the sense of bioethics. The 
historian of science Anne Harrington (1996) recently described 
Uexküll in the context of holistic thought in interwar Germany.
2. Biographical survey
Youth in the Baltic aristocracy
Jakob von Uexküll was bom on the manor of Keblaste (Mihkli) in 
Estonia on the 8th of September 1864. He was the fifth child in an 
aristocratic German-Baltic family. His mother Sophie von Hahn was 
from Kurland. His father Alexander von Uexküll had broad interests. 
During his young years as a geologist he had explored the natural
history of the Urals. Between 1875 and 1877 the family went to 
Germany were Jakob attended the Gymnasium in Coburg. In 1877 his 
family returned to Estonia were his father had been appointed mayor 
of Reval (now Tallinn). Jakob was sent to the Domschule, whose 
rector was at that time the father of the future Gestalt-psychologist 
Wolfgang Köhler. In 1884, on completing his Abitur, Uexküll studied 
zoology in Dorpat (now Tartu). He graduated with the academic 
degree Kandidat der Zoologie (candidate of zoology) and during his 
life never took another academic examination. At first attracted by the 
materialistic and deterministic world view, Uexküll became critical of 
the simplistic explanations of the Darwinists. One of his teachers in 
Dorpat was Julius von Kennel (1852-1939), whose speculations about 
the ancestral lines of animals left Uexküll dissatisfied with the science 
of biology (G. v. Uexküll 1964: 35ff).
From experimental physiology to a new conception o f  biology
In 1890 Uexküll went to study physiology in Heidelberg at the 
physiological laboratory of Wilhelm Kühne (1837-1900), who had 
been bom in Hamburg. He introduced himself to Kühne as “deserter 
from biology” and worked and studied in this famous laboratory for 
more than a decade. Uexküll thought that physiologists had refrained 
from speculation and that their experimental methods could serve to 
renew biology. He specialised in the fields of muscle and neuro­
physiology, and from 1892 to 1903 he regularly spent many months of 
the year in Naples at the famous Zoological Station of Anton Dohm 
(1840-1909).
Uexküll adapted the methods developed by Kühne for frogs to the 
investigation of marine animals. He aimed to reveal the principles 
underlying the muscular movements and reflexes of sea urchins, 
brittle stars, peanut worms and octopuses. He designed several devices 
for the observation and recording of the physiology and behaviour of 
animals (Mislin 1978). In 1899 he went to Paris to study in the 
laboratory of the physiologist Etienne Jules Marey (1830-1904), the 
master of the “graphical method” for the recording of body move­
ments and one of the pioneers of the cinema. Marey had constmcted a 
camera for chronophotography that produced the first short “movies” 
of moving animals. Uexküll bought himself a camera and used the 
Chronophotographie method for studying the details of, for example, 
the movements of starfish and the flight of dragonflies and butterflies.
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Together with his colleagues in Naples, Albrecht Bethe and 
Theodor Beer, Uexküll produced an influential paper (Beer, Bethe, 
Uexküll 1899) that attacked the use of anthropomorphic terminology 
in sensory physiology and proposed a new “objective” terminology, 
substituting ,for example, seeing with photoreception or smelling with 
stiboreception. This paper turned out to have a broad impact on the 
development of behaviourism in the US and on the reflex concepts of 
Pavlov and Bekhterev in Russia (Harrington 1996: 42).
After a conflict about his application for a position at the Zoo­
logical Station, and the rejection of this by Dohm, in 1903, Uexküll 
went to marine research laboratories in Berck sur mer, Monaco, 
Roscoff and Biarritz. He married the German countess Gudrun von 
Schwerin. Their daughter Dana and sons Thure and Gösta were bom 
in 1904, 1908 and 1909.
In 1907 Uexküll was given an honorary doctorate by the Univer­
sity of Heidelberg for his studies in the field of muscular physiology, 
especially for his discovery that excitation is facilitated to flow 
towards the stretched muscle (Uexküll 1904a; 1904b). This finding, 
known as Uexküll’s law, proved to be useful in orthopaedics (Kull 
2001: 5). In 1913 Uexküll applied for the post as head of the newly 
founded Kais er-Wilhelm-Institute fo r  Biology, but he was rejected by 
most of the biologists there (Sucker 2002: 136-151). But with the help 
of influential persons on the board of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesell- 
schaft, Uexküll’s idea of establishing a “Flying Aquarium” was 
supported with 10,000 Marks. Having been used to carrying his 
equipment from place to place, Uexküll had developed concepts and 
devices that allowed him to do research outside the established 
institutions and without a fully equipped laboratory. According to his 
plans the aquaria of zoological gardens all around Germany could 
house small laboratories that would give the opportunity for 
occasional scientific research on a great variety of subjects (Sucker 
2002: 136f). But with the beginning of World War 1 such plans lost 
priority.
World War One and political publications
Uexküll did not restrict himself to scientific publications. He 
expressed his active engagement in the social and political sphere in
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the media. This revealing public engagement has to be described in 
the context and under the significant influence of the First World War.
Before WW1 Uexküll had only published in the general interest 
press to popularise biology and his ideas about it. During WW1 and 
its aftermath, he started to write articles on political and social matters 
as well, and produced nearly 100 popular pieces on politics, morals, 
and spirituality before his death. The beginning of WW1 was greeted 
by Uexküll with patriotism. He and his family stayed on a family 
estate in Pomerania. As Balts they had Russian passports, but they 
were received well in Germany. Uexküll ascribed holy ideals to the 
German family, which for him was the true elementary unit of the 
nation. In 1915 under the title “Volk und Staat” he wrote in the 
magazine Die Neue Rundschau:
Why did even foreigners staying in Germany have the impression that this war 
was a holy war? Because German family life suddenly revealed itself before 
all the world, because the holy fire of idealism that had illuminated and 
warmed individual homes shot up toward heaven like a single mighty flame. 
(Harrington 1996: 55)
Uexküll hailed idealism as a holy feeling for unity and responsibility, 
which, according to him, were the fundamentals of harmonic national 
association. And he ascribed this idealism mainly to a German type. 
This ethnocentristic is well documented in his correspondence with 
the philosopher and writer Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1855— 
1927). Uexküll was deeply disappointed when England, supposed to 
be a Germanic nation, sided against Germany. In a letter to 
Chamberlain on August 11, 1914, he wrote:
How does England come to make common cause with these culture-hating 
bandits? Genuine human culture can be sustained only through England and 
Germany together. (Harrington 1996: 55)
The Englishman Chamberlain had become a German by choice. He 
had studied physiology and biology, turned to philosophy and married 
Richard Wagner’s daughter Eva. He won the friendship of Kaiser 
Wilhelm and later that of Adolf Hitler. The relationship between 
Uexküll and Chamberlain, especially the fact that Uexküll edited 
Chamberlain’s book Natur und Leben (1928) was often taken as an 
argument to prove a close connection between Uexküll and Nazi-
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ideology. When trying to understand the development of Uexküll’s 
worldview, one has to see his life in its context and have a closer look 
at the relationship to Chamberlain. The Uexküll-Chamberlain 
correspondence has been analyzed by Schmidt (1975) and she 
describes some of the anti-semitic sentiments shared by the writers. 
But Schmidt also cites from a letter that Uexküll wrote to the widow 
of Chamberlain in 1933: “Not purity of race, but purity of ideas, 
Chamberlain demanded from the Germans” and Chamberlain’s motto 
could be summarised as “ reverence for the personality, be it arian or 
Jew, is the highest Demand” (Schmid 1975: 127). Though Uexküll 
tried defend Chamberlain from Nazi-protagonists claiming him for 
their movement, and though Hitler and his clique were not 
sympathetic to him, the Baltic aristocrat blamed the parliamentary 
system for the crisis in Weimar Germany and as many German 
conservatives saw a last hope in Hitler. In the second edition of 
Staatsbiologie Uexküll expressed his aspiration that Hitler would save 
Germany from the avarice of international capitalistic forces. (Uexküll 
1933:78)
The nationalistic mindset of Uexküll had developed during WW1. 
In 1914 Uexküll urged Chamberlain to call on his countrymen to 
support Germany, but like many Germans Uexküll changed his mind 
quickly when England failed to come to its senses. The English and 
their culture became his main target, his object of contempt, to whom 
he projected all his dissatisfaction with the state of development of 
human relations. Here he found the opposite of his ideals. In the 
English mind he discovered “an irresponsible consciousness” which 
he identified to be the counterpart of the German Gewissen, that made 
the Germans so superior in matters of morality. Uexküll expanded his 
critique of Darwinism from biology to politics. In his article “Darwin 
und die englische Moral” of 1917, on more than 25 pages Uexküll 
declared Darwin’s doctrine to be ungrounded and false, but he said it 
reflected very much of Darwin’s own thought about the behaviour of 
his fellowmen: Darwin truly describes their inferior morals and their 
brutal market ethics. Uexküll concluded:
The German imperative of Kant requires every individual to be an auto­
nomous lawgiver on moral issues. In contrast , Darwin exonerates the
individual from this responsibility with his English imperative. [...] Darwin’s
position can be briefly summarised in the following way: the bigger the herd,
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the higher the morality) [...] From the English character, there is no way to 
pure humanity — but many ways to its opposite. (Uexküll 1917: 229)
Uexküll gave examples to demonstrate how cruelly and irresponsibly 
the English had treated the people under their rule; e.g., that they let 
starve to death one million people in Ireland and nineteen million in 
India. These acts of cruelty could, according to Uexküll, never be 
performed or tolerated by their ideal counterpart, the Germans; his 
sons would learn how much their father had erred in his blind 
nationalism.
Uexküll concluded that the English expand their capitalistic system 
and use their monopolistic trade in order to force the rest of the world 
into slavery. He even accused the British of being so cunning as to 
make the world blame the Jews for the results of British politics. 
According to him, this was possible because England dominated 
international public opinion with its newspapers and was able to 
extend its influence into all countries who had adopted parliamentary 
democracy. Thus, parliamentary democracy, “the rule o f the crowd”, 
was the dangerous foe of real democracy which could be established 
only by German idealism (Uexküll 1917: 242),.
The alliances of the western democracies, and most of all that of America with 
Russia, whose medieval methods, not least concerning the Jews, seemed to be 
amoral to Uexküll. He wrote: “Thousands of Jews are being tortured and 
burned in Russia. That is well known in America, but they continue their dirty 
trade of arms with Russia.” (G. v. Uexküll 1964: 101)
After the war had begun to drag on and its disastrous consequences 
had become clear, Uexküll came to see hope only in biology. The poet 
Rainer Maria Rilke, who had been a friend of the Uexküll family since 
1904, turned to the scientist in 1917 to take some lessons in biology. 
Rilke wanted to find relief from his depression in the science of 
organic life and its harmonic. Uexküll reassured Rilke’s notion, that a 
new era was near and went on:
The war of minds has begun.[...] in this battle biology will be the leader, 
because she has to fight with physics and chemistry, who up to now have 
filled the armoury of man. (G. v. Uexküll 1964: 123)
Later, in 1921, after his Theoretical Biology had been published and 
well received, Uexküll wrote to Chamberlain: “I have noticed that the
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biological mode of expression is more attractive to our contemporaries 
than the abstract philosophical” (Harrington 1996: 56).
Uexküll had recognised that the language of biology helped him to 
popularise his views of law and order in politics. It gave him powerful 
metaphors to naturalise his worldview in the general interest press.
During WWI and the Russian revolution the Uexkülls and other 
Baltic-Germans lost most of their property in the Baltic states, which 
they had hoped would be annexed and integrated into the Reich. 
Uexküll compared the German republic to a corrupt organism that 
accepted its own dismemberment. He described the turmoil in Russia 
following the October revolution of 1917 as the deterioration of a 
giant amoeba into a blob of rotting protoplasm. As early as November 
20th 1917 he wrote in a letter to Chamberlain:
In Russia the long awaited moment has come, the protoplasm of the giant 
amoeba is fully in the process of decomposition, and it is no longer possible to 
stop this natural process. Senseless pillage and murder are on the increase 
[...]. (Harrington 1996: 57)
With the end of the war and the defeat of Germany foreseeable, 
Uexküll became more and more convinced of the necessity of a strong 
state. Only this could, according to him, stop the “putrefaction of the 
nation”.The holy idealism of the German family seemed to be 
destroyed, and bereft of their elementary relations the individuals were 
no longer able to autonomously associate into a harmonious political 
organism. The greed of the masses to seize power had to be restricted 
by a mighty government. He worked out a whole metaphoric 
description of society at large, his Staatsbiologie, Biology o f  the State 
(Uexküll 1920b).
After he had lost most of his possessions during WWI and the 
Russian Revolution Uexküll could no longer pursue his research in the 
far off laboratories in France and Italy. But the restrictions might have 
helped to bring Uexküll to sift through and summarise the results of 
many years of work and in 1920 his Theoretische Biologie was 
published. In 1921 the thoroughly revised edition of Umwelt and 
Innenwelt der Tiere was published by Julius Springer. In 1924 
UexküH’s 60th birthday was celebrated by his disciples and friends 
with the publication of a jubilee edition of Pflügers Archiv fu r  die 
gesamte Physiologie (Bd. 205) containing 19 papers of authors from 
all over the world. But still Uexküll yearned to see the fruitful
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development of his ideas put into action in practical research. His art 
of experimenting, investigating and observing could find continuity 
only in a laboratory supervised by himself.
Realisation o f  an institution and an intellectual school in Hamburg
In 1913 Otto Cohnheim (1873-1953), who had admired Uexküll ever 
since he had been supervised by the latter in Naples and Heidelberg, 
had been called to head the Physiological Institute of the Eppendorf 
Hospital in Hamburg. Cohnheim became famous for his research on 
enzymes, respiration and the physiology of UV-light. He changed his 
Jewish name into Kestner in 1917. In 1919, when the University of 
Hamburg was founded and the hospital in Eppendorf became an 
institution within the university, Kestner became Ordinarius of 
physiology. In this position he was allowed to nominate people for the 
Nobel Prize and he did not hesitate to suggest Uexküll twice. Kestner 
also used his good contacts to the administration of the university and 
the head of the zoological society in Hamburg to find his teacher a 
place.
The old zoological garden in Hamburg, which had been founded 
and headed by the famous Alfred Brehm (1829-1884) from 1863 to 
1866, had suffered during WWI and the period of inflation in 
Germany. It could no longer compete with the new zoo of Carl 
Hagenbeck (1844-1933). However, it was decided to keep some of its 
attractions. One of them was the aquarium, which had been built in 
1864 under the supervision of William Lloyd. Lloyd had constructed 
the aquarium at the London world fair exhibition. By introducing new 
architecture, illumination and technologies he helped to sustain 
temperature and water quality and made the aquarium more attractive 
to the public. After having built the aquarium in Hamburg he went to 
Naples to build the aquarium inside Dohm’s station.
In the 1920s the aquarium in Hamburg had been neglected for 
years and needed to be revived. Cohnheim suggested that Uexküll was 
the right man for the job and Uexküll got his first paid position as 
scientific assistant in charge of the reconstruction and reorganisation 
of the aquarium. Moreover, he was given the opportunity to use the 
aquarium as a research station. Starting a Laboratorium fü r  Umwelt­
forschung in a kiosk adjacent to the aquarium in 1925, Uexküll 
managed to found the Institut fü r  Umweltforschung in 1926. The 
institute flourished into a vital research centre and until 1934 produced
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more than 70 papers under the direct supervision of its head (Kühl 
1965; Hünemörder 1979). Konrad Lorenz visited the institute in the 
1930s and dedicated his monograph “Der Kumpan in der Umwelt des 
Vogels” (Lorenz 1935) to Uexküll.
Intellectual “Umwelt” in Hamburg
The University of Hamburg was not one of the old established 
institutions. Founded in 1919 with democratic aspirations in the young 
German Republic it soon became known for its liberal spirit and for 
the support of unconventional and interdisciplinary scientific develop­
ments. It gathered a circle of scholars that became very influential for 
the development of 20th century thought. The Philosopher Ernst 
Cassirer (1874—1945) had founded the Philosophical Seminar and 
became head of the university in 1929. Elaborating his neo-Kantian 
ideas, Cassirer looked for the foundations of epistemology and his 
ideas belong to the classics of semiotics. His Philosophy o f  Symbolic 
Forms (1923-1929) was meant to found a theory of meaning to 
understand the creation of reality by human culture. Cassirer made 
himself familiar to contemporary psychological and neuro-physiolo- 
gical research and was closely connected to the Psychological Institute 
of the university founded and headed by William Stem (1871-1938). 
According to Uexküll’s wife, in 1931 Cassirer commented on a 
lecture which Uexküll had given at the Congress of German 
Psychologists. Uexküll had described how dogs claim their territories 
by putting down scent marks. Cassirer reminded the audience that 
Rousseau had condemned to death the first man who had erected a 
fence and claimed the territory for himself. Cassirer explained that 
after the Uexküll’s lecture it had become clear that this execution 
would not have been sufficient — in order to prevent privatisation, the 
first dog would have to have been killed. The same lecture of Uexküll 
had provoked another kind of scholar. Josef Goebbels, later Hitler’s 
Minister of Propaganda and Culture, wrote an article that described 
Uexküll as a representative of the German professors who follow 
ridiculous occupations instead of giving the German Volk a feeling for 
its “real responsibilities” (G. v. Uexküll 1964: 168f).
In the second chapter of his “Essay on man” (1944), entitled “A 
clue to the nature of man: the symbol”, Cassirer referred to Uexküll
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and his description of the functional cycle as a clue to the 
understanding of meaning in biological terms. But he came to explain 
that man by developing a symbolic system inside the cycle is more 
detached from nature than animals, and is by this qualitative 
innovation to be distinguished from animals (Heusden 2001).
Cassirer worked in the Psychologische Institut of the University of 
Hamburg in close cooperation with William Stem (1871-1938), who 
had taught in Hamburg since 1916 and was one of the universities 
founding fathers. Stem developed his “Differentielle Psychologie” 
(1911), as an attempt to integrate biomedical sciences into the 
philosophical, ethical and social framework of contemporary 
psychology. The epistemological approaches at his institute centered 
around the concept of the person and his subjective experience. New 
experimental methods were established and the laboratory of the 
Institute was built up consequently. Stem’s со worker Heinz Wemer 
(1890-1964) became famous for developing an organismic approach 
to developmental psychology and language which tried to counter the 
“geometic-technical model of communication”. Wemer put forward 
an integrating model of human perception, development and meaning 
in language (Nehrlich 1992). In the second edition of his book 
Einführung in die Entwicklungspsychologie (Wemer 1933: 39), 
Wemer refers to the latest experiments performed in cooperation with 
Uexküll’s laboratory, especially the work of the psychologist Emanuel 
Sarris on the dog’s ability to understand human language (Sarris 1931; 
in Uexküll’s Nachlass several offprints and Werner’s Einführung in 
die Entwicklungspsychologie (1926) with dedications to Uexküll 
document the contacts between the scientists).
A closer alliance developed between Uexküll and the philosopher 
and historian of science Adolf Meyer (1893-1971) or Meyer-Abich as 
he named himself after 1945, after adding the name of his wife to his, 
who was a prominent representative of holism in Germany. He had 
studied philosophy in Göttingen with Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) 
and in Jena with Rudolf Eucken (1846-1926). He came to Hamburg in 
1921 to take care of the natural sciences at the State- and University- 
Library. In 1925 Meyer-Abich was the first to get an interdisciplinary 
Habilitation for “Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften und 
Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften” in Germany. Following the 
Neokantian trend of the time, his thesis Logik der Morphologie was a 
critique of biological epistemology. After getting acquainted with the
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work and person of Jakob von Uexküll and Hans Driesch (1867— 
1941), who had been bom in Hamburg, Meyer in his second 
monograph Ideen und Ideale der biologischen Erkenntnis (1934) 
treated the conflict between vitalists and mechanists. Together with 
Uexküll, Meyer gave a number of seminars on the philosophy of 
science. Meyer-Abich taught in Hamburg until 1969 and became one 
of the founding fathers of the Institute of the History of Science 
(Institut fiir Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften, Mathematik und 
Technik), which today looks after the Jakob von Uexküll Archive. In 
spite of the apparent success and creativity of the Institut für  
Umweltforschung, Uexküll had to struggle hard for the survival of the 
institute for several reasons. He himself was beyond the regular age of 
retirement. His chair was essential for the institute, but only his 
reputation could convince officials to prolong his employment. The 
established zoologists questioned the legitimacy of Umweltforschung 
and refused to examine Uexküll’s disciples. Many of them went to the 
university of Kiel instead, where animal psychologist Wolfgang von 
Buddenbrock (1884—1964), Ordinarius of zoology until 1936, and his 
successor Adolf Remane (1898-1978) acknowledged the discipline of 
Umweltforschung. Uexküll and his assistant Friedrich Brock (1898- 
1958) had to fight hard before Brock, after his habilitation in Kiel in 
1938, could be nominated successor to Uexküll in 1940. Uexküll, 
aged 75, set off to retire on the island of Capri, but went on discussing 
and propagating scientific and philosophical aspects of his approach to 
biology. Some of his unfinished bio-philosophical works could be 
published after Uexküll’s death in 1940 by his widow and his son 
Thure (Uexküll 1944; 1947; 1949; 1950).
3. Scientific survey
Biology as epistemology
Uexküll’s ideas decisively contradicted the mainstream of thought in 20th 
century science. When confronted with his writings, it helps to remember 
their history and to recognise the central theme of Uexküll’s scientific 
agenda: his philosophy of science and his concern for creating 
foundations for a renewed integration of biology and epistemology.
In the modem era, physical science attained a dominating role as a 
model for the production of all knowledge. The ideal of positivist
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objectivism was shaken before the turn of the 19/20th century, but, 
despite the findings of Einstein and Mach, biologists grounded their 
young science on mechanistic concepts and attempted to resurrect 
scientific realism in the fin-de-siecle world of increasing relativism. 
This conception of biology and epistemology was challenged by the 
physiologist Uexküll. He turned against objectivism and offered a 
subjectivist epistemology based on biology. His main concepts aimed to 
re-introduce the autonomous organism as subject into the life-sciences 
and at the same time to make subjectivity the object of the scientific 
method. Uexküll pointed out that all scientific investigation is an act of 
human subjects, ruled by biological processes not sufficiently explicable 
by physics. Thus, biology, not physics, should be the basis of all 
science. Uexküll focused on meaningful responses which enable every 
organism, humans included, to actively realise its own life-world —  it’s 
unique Umwelt. Consequently, scientists were subjects interpreting and 
constructing their objects. Besides this refutation of scientific 
objectivism, Uexküll’s concept of the universe as the creation of 
countless individual Umwelten challenged the idea of one universal 
objective world. Refuting reproaches of solipsism, Uexküll did not deny 
the existence of a physical world, but rejected the claims of its 
universally equal intersubjective significance and labelled them “meta­
physical”, However, Uexküll emphasised that intersubjective 
(interspecies) understanding is the central aim of biological 
investigation. In his research, called Umweltforschung, he explored the 
creation and interplay of the unique life-worlds of animals and 
independently developed an approach, labeled posthumously as 
“cryptosemiotic” (Sebeok 1979). This biology, conscientious of its 
subjectivity and the interdependence of organisms, provided him with 
arguments against the modem worldview, which he saw as being 
misguided by anthropocentrism, speculative Darwinian theories and the 
misuse of machine analogies.
Uexküll’s concepts were based on empirical physiological studies 
of the movements of invertebrate animals and developed under the 
influence of Kant’s philosophy.
Physiology, biology, Umweltforschung
Disappointed by his teachers’ speculative views on biology Uexküll 
found his field of mastery in physiology, especially of invertebrate 
animals. But he went on to broaden the scope of the science of living
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matter and did not give up trying to save the science of biology from the 
fundamental errors which he saw within it. In his first monograph 
Uexküll (1905a) had already assigned different roles to physiology and 
biology. Physiology should organise the knowledge about organic 
systems by looking for causalities. Having preserved the advantage of 
the experimental method, physiology should help to renew biology. In 
contrast to physiology, biology should empirically go beyond the 
investigation of causalities by exploring the laws that ensure the 
purposefulness (Zweckmässigkeit) of living matter. Therefore biology 
should study organisms not as objects, but as active subjects. This 
would mean a shift of focus onto the organism’s purposeful abilities that 
enable its active integration into a complex environment. Biology 
therefore had to deal with holistic units and to maintain a broader scope 
than physiology in order to grasp the interactive unity of the organism 
and the world actively realised by it. In order to describe this unity, 
Uexküll introduced the term Umwelt (Uexküll 1909). Umwelt as a term 
and concept became most significant in 20th century thought and it is on 
account of it that Uexküll is most frequently cited in contemporary 
literature (Sutrop 2001). In Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere (1909) he 
introduced the term Umwelt to denote the subjective world of an 
organism. For him Umwelt was the unique phenomenal world 
embracing each individual like a “soap bubble”. He stressed, that the 
individual organism is always actively creating it’s individual Umwelt 
and that this creative process is related to meanings determined by the 
animal’s internal states, needs, design (Bauplan) etc. These interrelated 
factors that determine the process of the creation of Umwelten were the 
subjects of the scientific investigation called Umweltforschung.
The discovery o f  negative feedback control in organisms
At the beginning of the 20th century, Uexküll recognised the impor­
tant role of negative feedback control in organisms. He used the 
concept of the Funktionskreis (functional cycle) to illustrate behaviour 
as a regulated process. Uexküll’s models can be seen as the prede­
cessors of cybernetic models. Recently Uexküll has been discussed as 
a pioneer of cybernetics and artificial intelligence studies (Lagerspetz 
2001; Emmeche 2001; Roepstorff 2001).
In 1904 Uexküll formulated a law of neuro-motor regulation 
(Uexküll 1904a; 1904b). Uexküll’s law stated that ‘nervous excitation 
always flows towards the stretched muscles’. This law helped to
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explain how muscular tone and position maintenance is regulated in 
animals. Uexküll findings were useful in orthopaedics (Haupt 1913; 
Wieser 1959). The finding that the activity of the nervous system 
facilitates the contraction of stretched muscles and thereby counteracts 
and regulates the stretching of muscles can be considered to be the 
first formulation of the principle of negative feedback inside living 
organisms. In his Theoretische Biologie Uexküll developed these early 
cybernetic ideas and used little diagrams to illustrate them (Fig. 2; 
Uexküll 1920a: 201; 1928: 209).
Söicl fjauftger finbet i>ie $ontroIfe innerhalb baS ^örperž ftoTt. §icr; 
j'inb 3toci ^älle 311 unterfdjeiben: enttoeber toirb bte ’Setoegung ber 
(£ffeftorenmu§fern Ьигф befonbere fenfible Tterben rc3tpicrt, toie ba3 
betfolgenbe б ф етд  3cigt. Ober её toirb Me ben effef-
torifd^cn ‘Slerben übertragene (Erregung Ьигф befonbere зеп*гаГе 
4^ e 3eptoren зиш Seil oufgefangen unb bem “SZterforgan 3ugefüf)rt 
>—Q O j -» SHefe Жезе^огеп bilben ba£ 3entrale 6 inne£organ t>on 
ijelmfjottj, Ьаё anatomifd^ поф böllig im 3>unfeTn liegt.
Figure 2. Little diagrams in the text illustrating a description of feedback 
and reafferent control (Uexküll 1920: 201).
These figures already show the now familiar outline of feedback loops 
and may be seen as their early graphical representations before the 
science of cybernetics had been inaugurated. However, Norbert 
Wiener developed his ideas in the 1940s, when he was working on 
servomechanisms for anti-airplane guns and compared problems of 
automatic-steering mechanisms to problems of neurology in order to 
explain failures in goal directed movements, which Arturo 
Rosenblueth had presented to him (Rosenblueth et al. 1943; Wiener 
1948; Lagerspetz 2001).
As one can read in the text to Fig. 2, Uexküll postulated that there 
are two ways that information about muscle movements is fed back 
into the afferent side of the nervous system: (1) from receptors for the 
movement of the muscles (hypothetical movement- or stretch 
receptors), (2) from central receptors (udas zentrale Sinnesorgan” of 
Helmholtz) that take up a part of the excitation sent to the efferent 
nerves and make it available to information processing in the afferent
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net of nerve cells. This second control principle was inaugurated by 
Holst and Mittelstaedt at the end of the 1940s as ''iReajferenzprinzip,'> 
(Holst, Mittelstaedt 1950).
Overcoming the reflex-concept by the functional cycle
Since his early work on the movements of the brittle star in 1904, 
Uexküll had tried to work out a more general concept to explain the 
control of behaviour in moving animals. By developing the functional 
cycle Uexküll tried to extend the concept of the reflex arc. In the second 
edition of Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere, Uexküll replaced the 
chapter on reflexes written in 1909 with a chapter on the functional 
cycle (Uexküll 1921). A section about “Die Funktionskreise” had 
already been included in the first edition of Theoretische Biologie 
(Uexküll 1920a). Uexküll had illustrated his description of the new 
concept with little schemes inside the text (Uexküll 1920a: 116-117; 
Fig. 3, 4.) Most notably, Uexküll already had described the principle of 
reafferent control by feedback of motor commands and graphically 
represented it in another early scheme (Fig. 3): an inner cycle, “Neuer 
Kreis”, stands for a connection within the nervous system, which 
ensures the direct flow of information from the Handlungsorgan, which 
generates the impulses for the effectors to the Merkorgan, which is 
processing it together with information from the sensory system. 
Uexküll already recognised that this embodied self-reference not only 
serves to control movements, but is a central prerequisite for a coherent 
perception of the world (Uexküll 1920a: 117). The enduring relevance 
of this idea can be seen in its place in current neuro-scientific concepts 
of embodied cognition (Kelso 1995; Rizzolatti et. al 1997).
gieut 4.
Figure 3. Functional cycle with reafferent cycle (Uexküll 1920a: 117).
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According to Uexküll, the modelling of functional cycles should help 
to conceptualise the functional organisation of behaviour as an 
ongoing process of regulation. It represents the animal organism as a 
subject that is integrating objects into its Umwelt: this process is 
depicted as a closed loop of interactions. A modem description of the 
ongoing process in English terms was tried by Figge (2001). The 
following attempt uses his terms and some of the terminology 
introduced by Urmas Sutrop in Fig. 4.
Merkwelt
Merkorgan
Wirkorgan
Merkmalträger
Wirkmalträger 
f  Effektor
Rezeptor
Gegengefüge
Wirkwelt
Sense world
Sense net V :~—\ \  Carrier of a feaiure
Internal world Object Opposite structure
Effect net
Carrier of an effect 
Effector
Effect world
Figure 4. Funktionskreis or functional cycle with German and English 
terms (Uexküll 1921 and Kull 2001, translated terms by Urmas Sutrop).
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The organism’s nervous system is equipped with receptors and sense 
nets (Merkorgane), effectors and effect nets ( Wirkorgane). The sense 
net is able to discriminate and represent particular features of the 
organism’s Umwelt. The representation produced by a distinct 
receptor unit is called Merkzeichen, which can roughly be translated as 
“feature sign”. The effect net is tuned to produce muscle impulse 
patterns and to stimulate effector cells thus producing an effector sign 
(Wirkzeichen). If a particular quality of an object in the organism’s 
Umwelt stimulates the cells of the peripheral receptors, the 
corresponding sense net produces a feature cue (Merkmal) for the 
object, which is assigned to its original feature display on the object 
(Merkmal-Träger). The sensation, for example, of a huge green shade 
in the sense net is processed together with simultaneously produced 
feature-signs indicating space and time (Lokalzeichen, Moment­
zeichen) and recognised as a perceptual cue, which is assigned to a 
tree outside. The effect net is connected with specific peripheral 
effectors. The activation of specific cells of the effect net orchestrates 
the cells of peripheral effectors, and when this effector acts upon an 
object, then the effect sign (W irkmal) as a functional cue is displayed 
on or by the object (Wirkmal-Träger). The functional cue effected on 
the object transforms the state of perception of this opposite structure, 
thus erasing the original cue. This change leads to the perception of a 
new cue which starts a new cycle of sign production, which is attuned 
according to feedback and reafferent input or by other signs within the 
internal world of the organism.
Uexküll used the interaction of the female tick with a mammal to 
exemplify his description of behaviour as a pre-designed chain of 
interconnected functional cycles (Uexküll, Kriszat 1934: 7). The 
glands on the skin of mammals are carriers of the feature (Merkmal­
sträger), butyric acid, which stimulates the tick’s receptor cells. The 
corresponding sense net produces a feature sign (Merkzeichen), which 
is used as a cue (Merkmal), assigned to the mammal. The central 
processing in the sense net induces (and Uexküll stressed that it was 
not known how) the corresponding structures of the effect net, 
innervating the muscles of the tick’s legs: the tick detaches herself 
from the twig she is hanging on and lands on the mammal, thereby 
putting an effector cue onto the hairs she is touching. The hairs are 
thus carrying the feature for the next cue received and turned into the 
feature cue of hairiness, which is assigned to the mammal and at the
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same time has “erased” the olfactory sign, so that a new cycle has 
started. The cue of hairiness induces the effect web to orchestrate the 
movements for crawling through the mammal’s hair until the tick 
reaches bare skin, which “erases” the cue of hairiness and leads to the 
perception of the thermic cue of body temperature which induces the 
movements of drilling into the skin, where blood is the cue for the 
next cycle of sucking. Internal receptors produce signs of saturation 
that induce the tick to leave the skin, to drop, and to lay her eggs.
The example of the tick was advantageous because just a few 
cycles are needed to describe the ticks behaviour and because 
experiments had revealed that a few cues (butyric acid, hair and body 
temperature) were sufficient to induce the corresponding behaviour 
and link one cycle to another. Uexküll said that the Umwelt of the tick 
was simple or “poor” in comparison with the Umwelt of mammals, but 
“poverty” of the Umwelt is a prerequeisite for the ensured success of 
the ticks behaviour (Uexküll, Kriszat 1934: 8).
4. Umweltforschung in action — some examples
The researchers coming to the Institut fü r Umweltforschung of the 
University of Hamburg came from different faculties of science and 
often brought their subjects with them so that the works produced 
were very heterogeneous. There was no model organism and the 
subjects covered a broad range of scientific questions. There were 
works on the physiology of muscles, sense organs, body movements 
and works on different aspects of behaviour and communication in 
animals, performed with different animals from cockroaches to snakes 
to dogs. Since the institute was founded as part of the aquarium of the 
zoological garden, and Uexküll was a specialist for the behaviour of 
marine animals, these were among the first subjects to be investigated.
Sensory physiology— the basis fo r  “Umweltforschung”
Thure von Uexküll explained: “The approach of Umweltforschung 
aims to reconstruct creative nature’s process of creation”. It can be 
described as “participatory observation”. “This method of observation, 
in the sense of Uexküll [...] means first of all ascertaining which of 
those signs registered by the observer are also received by the living 
being under observation” (T. v. Uexküll 1987: 149). Essential for this
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was the investigation of the capacity of the sense organs. Sensory 
physiology had to pave the ground for further research into the 
problem of access to the Umwelt of animals. This basic research could 
only reveal a first outline of the realisable Umwelt of the animal. 
However, by investigating the animal’s ability to perceive and 
discriminate different physical stimuli, Uexküll tried to get initial 
indications of their significance for the animal’s behaviour — first 
ideas about the signs that possibly constitute the animal’s Umwelt. For 
Uexküll this was the basic methodology to analyze the “subjective 
space” (der subjektive Raum) of the animal (Uexküll, Brock 1927; 
Uexküll, Kriszat 1934).
Uexküll and his assistant Friedrich Brock tried to give the reader a 
vivid demonstration of the results of basic Umweltforschung in the 
new laboratory and published illustrations of the different Umwelten 
of different living beings (Fig. 5). Normal photographs presented the 
human Umwelt. By using grids with different pitches of the matrix, 
the resolution of the compound eye of a fly (Musca) or the eye of a 
mussel (.Pecten) was emulated. The pitch of the raster was 
corresponding to the frequency of sensory elements within the eyes of 
the animals. These dots were called “Sehorte” —  visual locations in 
the visual space. In order to eliminate the artifacts of the grid, aquarell 
paintings of the supposed Umwelten were produced. However these 
peaces of art were based on scientific grounds and were later 
reproduced in the famous Stroll through the Umwelten o f  animals and 
humans (Uexküll, Kriszat 1934). The pictures helped to make 
conscious to the reader how differently humans and animals perceive 
the world they share. They thus served as a method for intersubjective 
and interspecies understanding — as the first fascinating steps into the 
Umwelten of other organisms.
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A street in a town, 
seen through the 
eyes of a human
The same street 
seen with the eyes 
of a fly
The same street 
in the eyes of a 
mussel
Figure 5. Illustrations of the different visual Umwelten of a human, a fly 
and a mussel (Uexküll, Brock 1927).
Uexküll explained that the optic world is constructed out of 
elementary units that correspond to the sensory cells. The cells’ 
position in the eye corresponds to the site in the optic space (Sehraum) 
and in his cryptosemiotic language he talked of local signs 
{Lokalzeichen). The number of receptor cells limits the number of 
sites and thus the amount of, or complexity of, signs to be perceived.
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Thus it can be predicted that the complexity of the optic sense world 
(Merkwelt) of the snail or fly is much smaller in comparison to the 
human visual space. Uexküll exemplified that this was the reason why 
a fly could not detect a spider’s web before it was trapped (Uexküll, 
Kriszat 1934: 21).
The Umwelt o f  the fighting fish
Hans Wemer Lißmann, who later continued his career in Cambridge 
and became famous for his pioneering investigations on fish 
electroreception (Lissmann 1951), under Uexküll’s supervision started 
to investigate the behaviour of the Fighting Fish (Lißmann 1932).
In order to identify the physical features that function as signs of 
rivalry, Lißmann made extensive use of the concept of a dummy. He 
could count the attacks that were elicited by dummies with different 
body marks. He thereby assessed their significance as signs 
(Merkzeichen) in the functional cycle of rivalry (Fig. 6). Lißmann’s 
method of analysis of behaviour was a forerunner of the famous 
studies of the behaviour of the stickleback which Nikolas Tinbergen 
performed some years later and described as a method for the 
“objectivistic study of the innate behaviour of animals” (Tinbergen 
1942).
Lissmann was also a pioneer of the so called mirror image stimu­
lation (MIS) (Rowland 1999). In order to study the specific perception 
of time, the Moment or Momentzeichen, as Uexküll called it, Lißman 
used the agonistic behavior of the Fighting Fish Betta spledens. Today 
we would say, he went to determine the “flicker fusion frequency”. 
Lissmann constructed an ingenious apparatus and conducted an 
experiment that was hence used to test the perception of time or 
movement for visual signaling in other species:
By requiring subjects to view their mirror image through evenly spaced slits in 
a rotating wheel, Lissmann in effect presented subjects with a series o f still 
images in more or less rapid succession. As the male began to ‘interact’ with 
its mirror image, Lissmann slowed the wheel until the male ceased to react to 
its mirror image. At this point the separate views through the slit no longer 
followed each other soon enough to fuse into a moving image and probably 
appeared to the fish as a succession o f still frames o f its mirror image. 
(Rowland 1999: 291)
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Figure 6. Diagram showing the frequency of aggressive reactions to 
dummies with different signal cues (Lißmann 1932: 89).
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This method had been developed in the institute in cooperation with 
Gerhard Brecher. In his Dissertation on the “Development and biolo­
gical significance of the subjective unit of time” (Brecher 1932) he 
applied it to humans, snails and, with the help of Lissmann, to the 
Fighting Fish. The experiments were continued and refined in the 
institute by Beniuc (1933).
The hermit crab and changes in the significance o f  a sea anemone
Friedrich Brock (1898-1959) investigated the symbiotic relation of 
the hermit crab (Pagurus arrosor) with the sea anemone (Actinia 
sagartia) (Brock 1927). Brock, who worked in the stations in Naples 
and on the island of Helgoland, found out that a complex interplay of 
the two different animals was necessary before the crab could find the 
right anemone, induce it to leave its place and let itself be planted onto 
the crab’s shell, where it would serve as protector against octopuses, 
while the anemone would profit from the leftovers of the crabs meals.
Brock tried to identify the specific stimuli that were sent out and 
interpreted as signs to start specific behavioural acts. His works show 
that the concepts of Uexküll were very useful as conceptual or 
heuristic tools for the description of this interspecific symbiotic 
animal behaviour.
Brock showed that according to the conditions, different inter­
action schemes could be described as belonging to different functional 
cycles. The requirements or the needs of the animal were of prime 
importance for how the crab would interpret the signs emitted by the 
anemone which then would make it its predominant ‘object of desire’.
The results of Brock were also published by Uexküll in the popular 
Stroll Through the World o f  Animals and Men (1934) to illustrate the 
change of meaning in the Umwelt of the subject. Fig. 7 shows three 
different situations and demonstrates the change of meaning of the sea 
anemone Actinia to the hermit crab:
(1) Upper row (Fig. 7): if the crab inhabits snail shell without an 
anemone, an anemone is seen as a welcome partner for symbiosis. The 
anemone is “hugged” and forcefully persuaded by rhythmic drumming 
to loosen its hold and then put upon the crab’s house.
(2) Middle row: if the crab is naked it will try to use the anemone 
as substitute for the protecting shell.
(3) Lower row: if the crab is already in symbiosis with anemones, 
then it interprets the appearance of another anemone as a welcome 
prey and starts to feed on the animal.
History and significance o f  Jakob von Uexküll 61
Farbbild l  Seerose und Einsiedlerkrebs
Figure 7. The interaction of the hermit crab and the sea anemone, 
changing according to change in meaning (Uexküll, Kriszat 1934: 55).
Brock could show that the significance of the signs emitted by 
anemones changed according to the crab’s needs. The perceived signs 
are marked with different meanings: depending on the subject’s needs 
they are either made a part of the protection functional cycle or of the 
food cycle. Uexküll (Uexküll, Kriszat 1934: 55) wrote of the different 
“tones” of the percepted image (Merkbild) changing with the situatio­
nal significance.
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Dogs, human language and the effect world (Wirkwelt)
The last example is the work by Emanuel Sarris (1931), “Sind wir 
berechtigt vom Wortverständnis des Hundes zu sprechen'’’ (“Can we 
talk about the dog’s understanding of words”) which was published in 
the journal Zeitschrift für angewandte Psychologie. The communi­
cation between humans and animals was of special interest to Uexküll 
and these were the works that came the closest to linguistics in the 
sense of a semiotic discipline.
Sarris trained his dogs to react to command sentences in two 
different languages, German and Greek. By reducing the commands to 
words orjust parts of words, Sarris tried to show that dogs understand 
the meaning of words. The dogs jumped on a chair, when he said 
“chair”. But he also found out that they would jump on a sofa or small 
table if the chair was not to be seen. With his methods Sarris was able 
to demonstrate how complex the cognitive and even analytical 
abilities of dogs are. He stated that dogs could indeed recognise words 
out of a mixture of sounds and assign meaning to them. “But the 
understanding of words by the dog is always appropriate to the dog’s 
Umwelt” (Sarris 1931: 126).
When asked about the biological approach to language by the 
German linguist Heinrich Junker in 1937, Uexküll explained the 
context in which the experiments of Sarris were to be understood and 
the meaning that they could have for linguistics:
My main interest in language as a means o f communication between man and 
animal is in connection with the means o f communication that animals have 
among themselves. As means o f communication, animals use sequences of 
movements as well as o f sounds, the knowledge o f  which is innate in animals. 
[...] Many animals have the ability to distinguish sounds or sequences of 
sounds as secondary cues o f perception —  Pawlow could show that dogs, that 
were accustomed to hearing the sound o f a bell before getting food, reacted by 
salivation already at the sound o f  the bell alone. Pawlow called this a 
‘conditioned reflex’. The same effect can be obtained by saying the word 
‘meat’. Still, from this one cannot conclude that the dog understands the word 
meat. The experiments carried out by Dr. Sarris at the Institut für 
Umweltforschung are a different matter. A dog was trained to jump upon a 
chair at the command 'chair'. When the chair was removed and the command 
was repeated the dog jumped up on anything a dog could sit upon. We express 
this as follows: certain objects have for a dog a ‘sitting tone’. The word ‘chair’ 
for the dog is not the name o f a thing [einen bestimmten Gegegenstand] but of 
a performance [eine Leistung]: to sit. To me this seems a fundamental feature
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A room as a 
human Wirkwelt, 
with objects 
of a sitting-, an 
eating-, a 
dringking and a 
reading-tone
The same room 
as a Wirkwelt of 
a dog, showing no 
reading tone
The same room as 
a flies Wirkwelt, 
showing even no f ^  special sitting-tone
-  Ш
Figure 8. The different Wirkwelten (effect worlds) of a human, a dog and 
a fly (Uexküll, Kriszat 1934: 56-58).
o f language as a means o f communication between human beings as well. The 
spoken word, a certain sequence o f sounds as carrier o f sense and meaning, 
relates primarily to performances and not to things [nicht auf einen 
bestimmten Gegenstand]. I have taken up the parts o f your questions that were 
closest to me personally. Linguistics proper is far from me —  but 1 am 
convinced that you are on the right path towards making it a biological 
science. (Uexküll 2001: 445^446)'
In his Stroll Through the World o f  Animals and Men (Uexküll, Kriszat 
1934: 57f) Uexküll used the experiments of Sarris to demonstrate the 
difference of the Umwelten of humans and animals. He makes clear 
that the difference is due to the difference in the effect world 
(Wirkwelt) of animals. The difference of the worlds of a dog, a fly and 
a human are simply illustrated by three drawings of a room with the 
furniture and things in it coloured differently according to the different 
meanings the animals ascribe to the objects — according to the 
different use the animals and the human make of the objects the 
objects bear a different “performing-tone” (Wirkton), which is shown 
as a different colour in the original pictures (Fig. 8).
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5. Concluding remarks
These examples of the work done in the Institut für Umweltforschung 
represent just a small part of the diversity of works performed, but 
they show that Uexküll’s Umweltlehre and his Institute provided a 
roof under which many different researchers, approaches and 
disciplines could gather and work creatively. Interdisciplinarity was 
also fostered by the fact that Uexküll’s Umweltlehre helped to find a 
common language. And this language and the approach of Umwelt­
forschung countered contemporary reductionistic trends in the 
analysis of animal and of human behaviour. These are aspirations that 
fit well into the objectives of Biosemiotics today (Schult 2004).
Transcending machine metaphors. Uexküll— the first biosemiotician
It has been shown that the attempt to substantiate Kant’s philosophy in 
biology helped Uexküll to precede the cybernetic approach, the bio- 
semiotic explanation and modem conceptions of cognitive psycho-
1 German version in T. v. Uexküll (ed.) 1980: 297-298.
logy. Uexküll had developed his ideas directly from his research on 
the physiology of movements and the observation of behaviour. His 
agenda had been to demonstrate the difference between the living 
organism’s autonomous organization and the predetermined mecha­
nisms of the machines of his age. In contrast to Norbert Wiener, who 
loved to describe biological functions in mathematical terms, Uexküll 
avoided mathematics and discovered a semiotic language appropriate 
to embody Kantian philosophy with observations in biology. So 
Uexküll followed an independent path before the cybernetic approach, 
and, since his language and methods were developed to explain the 
fantastic regulation of animal movement and behaviour, it was fruitful 
in ethology. It allowed Uexküll and his readers to envision a multitude 
of different functional cycles corresponding to and sustaining the 
animal within its Umwelt, enabling it to relate to prey, to enemies, to 
sexual partners, to different objects and media. But it also paved the 
way for a cybernetic view. With the appearance of the new techniques 
of computing and the wonderful automatic machines themselves, the 
acceptance of technical metaphors in biology increased. The emerging 
image of multiple types of different and interrelated closed control 
loops could explain body movements and also induced new ways of 
imagining, illustrating and calculating the complexity of interrelations 
of organisms and their environment in modem ethology and ecology 
(Lagerspetz 2001). But it seems that thereby one of the main aspects 
and advantages of Uexküll’s theoretical thinking was left behind — 
the semiotic description and analysis of life.
However Uexküll was a pioneer of the semiotic approach in biology. 
In 1977 the hungarian-american linguist Thomas A Sebeok (1920— 
2001) discovered Uexküll to be a “neglected figure in the history of 
semiotics” and celebrated Uexküll as one of the “Masters of the sign” 
(Sebeok 1979). Already at the beginning of the 20th century Uexküll 
had recognised that the fascinating abilities and behaviour of animals 
are based on sign processes — the perception and transmission of 
signs onto which meaning is marked according to their significance. 
He had therefore introduced terms like Merkzeichen, Wirkzeichen, 
Lokalzeichen, Momentzeichen, and Merk- und Wirkmal.
The special issue of the journal Semiotica dedicated to Jakob von 
Uexküll in 2001 termed Uexküll “a starter and pioneer of the semiotic 
approach in biology in the twentieth century” (Kull 2001: 1). The 
editor stressed the fact that decades before semiotics was applied to
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biology, Uexküll had already commenced studying organisms as 
subjects at the center of sign processes (Kull 2001; 1999). Uexküll 
was recognised by Semioticians after his death. After meeting Sebeok, 
Uexküll’s son Thure von Uexküll, a famous physician who had 
inaugurated psychosomatic medicine in Germany, started to explain 
his fathers biology as a semiotic concept (Uexküll 1979; 1980; 1981). 
He stated that “one can truly understand his [Jakob’s] terms only, if 
one sees them on the background of a theory of signprocesses and 
makes clear to oneself, that Umweltlehre is a science of signs sent and 
received by living beings” (Uexküll 1980: 292). The recognition of 
the semiotic character of Uexküll’s approach implies the fact that a 
biologist, who was not familiar with linguistics, Peircean, Saussurian 
or any other semiotic approach, was able to develop an elaborated 
terminology and concept for studying sign systems in the animal 
world. The historical perspective shows that Uexküll developed this 
approach also as an alternative to the mechanistic and reductionistic 
trends in biology that he encountered at the beginning of the 20th 
century.
Uexküll s significance today
According to Uexküll, biology should focus on the organism’s 
abilities to integrate itself into a complex environment, of which it is a 
part and which is constantly created by it. He called this investigation 
of the communicative unity of the organism and the world sensed by it 
i,'Umweltforschung’\  His ideas, terms and models became influential 
and innovative in the development of science and the humanities in 
the 20th century. Thure von Uexküll’s (Uexküll 1980) interpretation 
of his father’s writings in semiotic terms shows convincingly how the 
new concept could make biology a meaningful (bedeutungsvolle) 
science, able to serve as a unifying paradigm for other sciences, like 
medicine, psychology, economy, ecology and sociology. This 
Uexküllian interpretation also makes us to acknowledge that our 
cognition and epistemology are developed in close interdependence 
with our technological imaginations that have a growing significance 
in our world. It demands not not to lock up ourselves in these circles 
of meanings and to open up our senses for the significance of other 
life forms in order to sustain a rich life in a rich world:
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As long as we use technical models in biology without being fully aware that 
by applying these models we just imply that nature performs according to the 
projected human requirements and guidelines, we are “blind to the 
significance (bedeutungsblind)” as Jakob von Uexküll expressed it. We are 
incapable o f putting up questions about the origin and legitimacy o f our own 
needs nor are we capable o f asking about the origin and legitimacy o f  the 
needs o f other living beings. We also cannot investigate the ways in which the 
needs o f the different living beings on this planet are dependent on each other. 
(T. v. Uexküll 1980: 42 -43)2
Uexküll described the universe as a creation of countless individual 
life-worlds and thus challenged the idea of one universally valid 
world. According to him the idea of the universal world was a “meta­
physically” constructed worldview (Sloterdijk 2004: 249), which by 
globally expanding the reality of one life-form is blinding it from 
acknowledging the significance of the reality of other life-forms. 
Uexküll emphasised that inter-subjective (inter-species) understanding 
is a central aim of scientific investigation. His science of life is 
making us responsible for our decisions to acknowledge or to ignore 
the worlds of our fellow organism. So Uexküll became influential - 
not only for the development of modern ecology and ethology, but 
also for the development of post-modern philosophy. It provides for 
an substantial ethical viewpoint in a globalised world -  a viewpoint 
that transcends our presumptuousness and reminds us, that accepting 
autonomy and diversity helps creating sustainable interrelations. Jakob 
von Uexküll Jr. (this volume), Jakob von Uexküll’s nephew, who 
founded the Right Livelihood Award in 1980, is encouraging people, 
who take this viewpoint and act responsible to it.
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Якоб фон Юкскюлл и его институт в Гамбурге: 
история и значение
Цель статьи — показать, какие исторические процессы привели к 
признанию работ Якоба фон Юкскюлла, и подчеркнуть важность 
гамбургского периода Юкскюлла. Краткий биографический обзор 
позволяет выявить роль его предшественников, исторического пре- 
текста и контекста. Научный обзор описывает результаты исследо­
ваний Юкскюлла и идеи, которые оказались важными в развитии 
биологии и когнитивных наук. В статье также опровергается вы­
сказываемый иногда тезис, будто идеи Юкскюлла были чисто теоре­
тического или философского характера. Утверждается, что главной 
целью его работ было сохранение эмпирического метода в биологии 
и снабжение биологии прочным эпистемологическим основанием. В 
статье предлагаются некоторые примеры использовании продук­
тивного сближения истории и теории в исследованиях Юкскюлла, 
проведенных им в стенах института в Гамбурге (Institut für Umwelt­
forschung).
Jakob von Uexküll ja ta instituut Hamburgis: Ajalugu ja tähtsus
Artikli eesmärgiks on pakkuda sissevaadet arenguisse, mis aitasid kaasa 
Jakob von Uexkülli tööde esiletõusule, ning rõhutada Uexkülli tegevuse 
tähtsust Hamburgis. Lühike biograafiline ülevaade toob esile ajaloolise 
eelloo ja konteksti osa. Teaduslik ülevaade knjeldab Uexkülli uurimis­
tulemusi ja ideid, mis osutusid oluliseks bioloogia ja kognitiivteaduste 
arengus. Lisaks püüab artikkel ümber lükata vahel esitatud arvamust, 
nagu oleks Uexkülli ideed olnud puhtalt teoreetilise või filosoofilise
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iseloomuga. Kinnitatakse, et tema tööde keskseks eesmärgiks oli empii­
rilise meetodi säilitamine bioloogias ning bioloogiale kindla epistemo- 
loogilise aluse andmine. Artikkel pakub mõningaid näiteid ajaloo ja 
teooria lähenemisest teineteisele ning selle tulemuslikust kasutusest Uex­
külli uurimistöödes, mis tehti Institut für Umweltforschung ’is Hamburgis.
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Uexküllian Planmässigkeit
Jesper Hoffmeyer
Institute of Molecular Biology, University of Copenhagen 
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Abstract. In strict opposition to the prevailing positivist conception o f  nature 
as senseless and deprived o f meaning Jakob von Uexküll claimed that a 
certain planmässigkeit was operative in nature. This idea however might be 
taken to mean that organic evolution is not itself a creative process but a 
gradual, if  majestic, unfolding o f Nature's own master plan. Such an idea 
would threaten to restore determinism in the center o f biological theory, and 
this would seriously contradict the vision o f biosemiotics shared by most o f its 
proponents. It lies at the heart o f biosemiotics and o f Peircean cosmological 
philosophy that indeterminacy is primary, that “habit taking” or interpretation 
are real processes in the world, and therefore that belief in the law o f  necessity 
is unfounded. It is suggested that Uexküllian planmässigkeit is in fact re­
concilable with a modem non-deterministic understanding. In a certain sense 
the Umwelten o f animals have indeed developed in accordance to a natural 
planmässigkeit, but this is a plan that incessantly traps life in certain strategic 
choices and in the same time diversifies the dimensionality o f  options for 
dealing with these choices, i. e. “the adjacent possible” in the terms o f Stuart 
Kauffman.
The problem of Planmässigkeit
The opening in Hamburg of Jakob von Uexküll-Archiv fa r  Umwelt­
forschung und Biosemiotik is one of those rare instances where fore­
sight and retrospection meets while both are still in need of each other. 
Jakob von Uexküll’s pioneering contribution to the study of life, his 
Umweltlehre, is still in need of clarification, and at the same time the 
biosemiotic reframing of biological theory, which owes so much to his
10
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work, has only recently taken its first serious steps and can still be 
fruitfully informed by the work of the pioneer. To create an institu­
tional framework for this kind of meeting place between historical 
writings and emerging new agendas in science is the principal purpose 
for an archive, and seen in this light the establishment of the Jakob 
von Uexküll archive in Hamburg in 2004 is timely indeed.
As is always the case when an institution like this is opened there 
are some risks to consider: Will the veneration one feels for the 
pioneer tend to bias critical enquiry? Will the modem perspective, in 
this case biosemiotics, tend to bias our evaluation of work done nearly 
a hundred years ago? And will the “Uexküllian” perspective, which 
the archive is supposed to throw on biosemiotics, tend to blind us 
from such areas in the field where a modem approach may require a 
paradigmatic distance from the old master? To counter such risks 
head-on from the beginning is clearly essential for the intellectual 
success of this new initiative.
I am not in a position to discuss these risks here, and I shall focus 
my discussion on only one particular aspect o f von Uexküll’s work, 
which to a biochemist like myself, trained in the very Anglo-Saxon 
tradition of contemporary molecular biology, is likely to provoke 
some discomfort. This aspect may shortly be labeled through a con­
cept upon which Jakob von Uexküll himself put very much emphasis, 
the concept of Planmässigkeit.
In the introduction to the English-language version of Streifzüge 
durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen, Thure von Uexküll 
tells us that his father, Jakob von Uexküll, saw mind “as an organ 
created by nature to perceive nature” (T. v. Uexküll 1992b: 281). And 
further:
Nature may be compared to a composer who listens to his own construction. 
This results in a strangely reciprocal relationship between nature, which has 
created man, and man, who not only in his art and science, but also in his 
experiential universe, has created nature. (T. v. Uexküll 1992b: 281)
In the preface to this same volume o f Semiotica, which he him self 
guest edited, Thure von Uexküll accentuates the point even further:
In Jakob von Uexküll’s view the task o f biology is the examination o f  
Planmässigkeit in nature, which means the examination o f the composition o f  
systems and o f the sign processes which produce and maintain them. For the 
positivistic understanding o f Science in his time, speaking o f  Planmässigkeit
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in nature meant inhibiting research. In von Uexküll’s view, however, research 
had to begin with the proposition that Planmässigkeit could be an aspect o f  
nature, for the presupposition that nature is meaningless and senseless is itself 
a metaphysical presupposition. (T. v. Uexküll 1992a: 277).
Now here comes my discomfort: the institution of such a plan inherent 
to nature might be interpreted as meaning that organic evolution is not 
itself a creative process but a gradual, if majestic, unfolding of 
Nature's own master plan, i.e. evolution would not figure as a real 
historical process in the sense that something happened through 
evolution which was not already determined beforehand. The idea of 
such a plan thus in a strange way restores determinism to the center of 
biological theory. Or to state it differently, in such a universe a wise 
demon might indeed tell fortunes in the cards. This however would 
seriously conflict with the vision of biosemiotics that I think most of 
its proponents share. For it lies at the heart of biosemiotics and of 
Peircean cosmological philosophy that indeterminacy is primary, that 
“habit taking” or interpretation are real processes in the world, and 
therefore that belief in the law of necessity is unfounded.
It is therefore a matter of great importance to analyze the nature of 
the teleological principle that Jakob von Uexküll invoked in his work. 
The automatism by which positivistic science quite automatically 
shies away from any suggestion of final causation in nature is indeed 
very unsatisfactory because it leaves such a heavy burden of expla­
nation on efficient causation as sole legitimate agency in the world. 
Not surprisingly several theoretical biologists recently called for an 
eventual return to a richer notion of causality in biology (Rosen 1991; 
Salthe 1993; Riedl 1997; Ulanowicz 1997). Mainstream biologists, 
however, consider the teleological nature of living entities and the 
processes they engage in to be only an “as i f ’ teleology or what they 
call teleonomy. In Darwinian explanations for the purposeful nature of 
adaptive traits one does of course make reference to the consequences 
of those traits for fitness, but, as has often been remarked, the 
consequences that explain the existence of adaptive traits are the 
consequences those traits have had', they are not the consequences that 
they will have or can have. And since the consequences precede the 
effects, no violation of the general scheme of efficient causation is 
implied.
In a sharp analysis of the debates on teleology in Darwinian expla­
nations the philosopher T. L. Short has nevertheless recently claimed
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that “Darwin’s use of ‘final cause’ accords with the Aristotelian idea 
of final causes as explanatory types — as opposed to mechanical 
causes, which are always particulars” (Short 2002: 323). Buried in this 
subtle formulation lies the presupposition that final causation, as the 
concept was originally conceived by Aristotle, is different from the 
“externalist” or vitalistic kinds of teleology which were ultimately 
implied rather by Plato's idea of a divine craftsman who creates things 
intentionally to satisfy the ends of his own.
Aristotelian teleology, by contrast, is “internal” or “immanent”. An organism's 
ends are not given to it by an external agent. It is that o f the organism itself, 
but not in the vitalistic sense that there is an agency within the organism that 
holds this end in some sort o f quasi-conscious intention. The end is “internal” 
to the organism because it is the organism's form. (Short 2002: 325-326)
It is also worth realizing that contrary to modern conceptions of final 
causation Aristotelian final causation does not imply simple human 
purposes such as desires or wants. In fact the desire, e.g. the desire to 
be healthy, is not the real final cause behind a person's acts, e.g. that 
he takes long walks. Rather, in this case, the desire to stay healthy is 
an efficient cause that not only precedes but also brings about the act 
of walking. What needs be explained is the reason for the concrete 
desire, and this reason, Aristotle says, is the general attractiveness of 
health: “It is health itself, as a general type of possible outcome, which 
explains —  by its attractiveness, hence, as a final cause — one’s 
desire for it” (Short 2002: 327).
Essentially, then, final causes, as Aristotle conceived them, are 
types o f  outcomes. As such they are potentialities, whether or not 
actualized, as for instance an acorn, whose 'destination' it is to grow 
into an oak, not into a birch or a salamander — but which, as is well 
known, most often doesn't grow at all. Furthermore, as types of 
outcome Aristotelian final causes are never particulars — in the future 
or in the past — and thus the term “backward causation” has nothing 
to do with final causes.
Based on this understanding of Aristotelian teleology Short can 
clarify his claim on Darwinian explanation in the following way:
What I am suggesting is that we take seriously the currently popular talk o f 
“selecting for” a property or type o f trait (Sober 1984). Taking it seriously 
means accepting that talk at its face value: it describes evolutionary processes 
as shaped by types o f  outcome and it explains outcomes by citing the types
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those outcomes exemplify. But a type o f outcome that explains its own 
exemplification is what translators o f Aristotle have named a “final cause”, as 
Darwin appears to have recognized. (Short 2002: 337)
Short's conclusion may come as a surprise to many scientist who have 
thought that Darwinian natural selection was the ultimate assurance 
against any supposed need for teleology in science. On the other hand 
it explains the otherwise quite contra-intuitive claim that purposive 
behavior would somehow ensue if only chance mutations and “blind” 
selective force worked long enough upon non-purposive systems. 
Natural selection is not blind, it searches types of outcomes, or in bio- 
semiotic terms:
Chance mutations are not selected because they are beneficial; they are 
beneficial because they happen to appear in a relational system which was 
already well prepared for them. That blind selection should be the sole cause 
o f evolution is one o f the mightiest fictions o f our time. Selection is never 
blind; it is always guided by the prior formation o f developmental and 
semiotic integration. (Hoffmeyer 2001b: 393)
Louis Pasteur put it very clearly in his famous: “Chance favors only 
the prepared mind”.
Teleology then does not in itself contradict a scientific under­
standing of the world or of evolution and biosemiotics is in fact deeply 
dependent on the acceptance of that kind of final causation which 
Charles Peirce described in the following terms
[ ...]  we must understand by final causation that mode o f bringing facts about 
according to which a general description o f result is made to come about, 
quite irrespective o f any compulsion for it to come about in this or that 
particular way; although the means may be adapted to the end. The general 
result may be brought about at one time in one way, and at another time in 
another way. Final causation does not determine in what particular way it is to 
be brought about, but only that the result shall have a certain general 
character. (CP 1.121)
Contrast this to Peirce's conception of efficient causation:
Efficient causation, on the other hand, is a compulsion determined by a 
particular condition o f things, and is a compulsion acting to make that 
situation to begin to change in a perfectly determinate way; and what the 
general character o f the result will be in no way concerns efficient causation. 
(CP 1.121)
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Natural laws operate like final causes when they are used as expla­
natory tools. As Lucia Santaella-Braga has explained, quoting Peirce:
A law is something general and for that reason, it is not a force. ‘For force is 
compulsion; and compulsion is hie et nunc. It is either that or it is no 
compulsion. Law, without force to carry it out, would be a court without a 
sheriff; and all its dicta would be vaporings’. Thus the relation o f  law, as a 
cause, to the action o f force, as its effect, is final, or ideal, causation, not 
efficient causation (CP 1. 213). [ ...]  Final without efficient causation is 
helpless, but efficient without final causation is worse than helpless, ‘by far, it 
is mere chaos; and chaos is not even so much as chaos, without final 
causation; it is blank nothing’ (CP 1. 200). (Santaella Braga 1999: 502)
Semiosis, or sign action, is always embedded in sensible material 
processes and for that reason has a dynamic side, that allows the 
communicative process to run, as well as a complimentary or me­
diating side. The first of these sides is governed by the compulsive 
force of efficient causation, the second expresses the controlling agen­
cy of final causation.
Much confusion in these matters stems from the lack of understanding 
of this intimate interplay between efficient and final causation. For 
example, as Short points out, a vital force is not, no matter how myste­
rious and goal-directed it is, a final cause; it is an efficient cause: “it is not 
itself a goal. It is not a type of outcome. It is a particular force that already 
exists” (Short 2002: 328). Thus the taboo against final causation has 
worked its way into our tacit thought patterns to such an extent that even 
the adversaries of scientific mechanicism, tried to counter it by reducing 
final causation to an efficient causative agency, a vital force. No wonder, 
then, that this attempt ended in ridicule. This however doesn't solve the 
problems which so disturbed the minds of the vitalists and of Jakob von 
Uexküll. In retrospect we may perhaps better see that the failure of 
thinkers such as Driesch and Bergson was due, at least to a large extent, to 
the fact, that thermodynamics was still at their time limited by the near­
equilibrium perspective, which was transcended by Ilya Prigogine only 
much later (Prigogine 1980). When these thinkers made their contribution 
to natural philosophy the second law of thermodynamics might well be 
understood as an implicit finality inherent in our universe, but the 
perspective was still that of an irreversible and destructive dynamic. The 
interpretation of the second law as a fundamentally constructive power 
and the alliance of this power with emergentist ideas based in non-linear 
dynamics and complexity theory had not yet any chance of being
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proposed (Brooks et al. 1989; Kauffman 1993; 1995; Salthe 1993; 
Depew, Weber 1995; Weber 1998). The sense of telos in nature had 
hardly any legitimate Lebensraum in science unless it disclosed itself in 
anti-Darwinian clothes. A contemporary reading of Jakob von Uexküll’s 
work should be aware of this state of affairs.
There is of course a tension in Uexküll’s writings between har­
mony and freedom. The more nature's composition is described as 
harmonious, the less freedom can be ascribed to it, for how could a 
perfect world be free to change — unless for the worse? A nature that 
listens to its own composition is not a metaphor that easily mingles 
with the idea of a deteriorating harmony. The contrapuntal duets, 
Uexküll’s famous vision of a Goethean reciprocity, such that the 
beetle is pea-like and the pea is beetle-like, tends, as Frederik Stjem- 
felt observes, to make the whole of nature fuse with meanings in such 
a way that all Umwelten marvelously fit each other locally. But 
Stjemfelt also points to a solution of this dilemma:
While the naturalized subjectivism tends to make it impossible to see beyond 
the horizon o f the Umwelt, the musical metaphor makes possible an inference 
to mend this problem. [...] The melody —  arch-example for the Gestalt 
theorists from von Ehrenfels, Stumpf, and the early Husserl onwards to the 
Berlin and Graz schools —  articulates an organized structure disconnected 
from the here-and-now o f physics and implying a teleological circle 
foreseeing the last note already by the intonation o f the first. Thus —  as 
Merleau-Ponty remarks [Merleau-Ponty 1995: 233] —  this metaphor makes it 
possible to see the life o f the individual organism as a realization, a variation 
o f the theme, requiring no outside vitalist goal —  a variation, we may add, 
which constitutes the condition o f possibility o f  the modification o f the 
animal’s system o f  functional circles and hence the acquiring o f new habits, 
possibly to govern evolutionary selection in Baldwinian evolution. [...] Music 
may be perfect, but it is far from always the case. (Stjemfelt 2001: 87-88)
Interpreting Uexküll’s work in this way, we can see that Planmässig­
keit does not imply a deterministic unfolding of a preordained order, 
and although the telos involved in Planmässigkeit is of course very 
different from Peirce’s vision of evolutionary cosmology, it is not 
necessarily antagonistic, either to Peirce or to modem day biosemiotic 
understanding.1
1 See also chapter 10 in Sebeok 1979.
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Let us now proceed to consider more concretely how “plan” and 
“goal” is connected in Jakob von Uexküll's biology. The example of 
different species of night moths reacting to audible danger signals is 
illuminating (Uexküll 1992). According to Uexküll all night moths 
respond to alarming sounds with a species specific reaction pattern. 
Species that are easily visible because of their light coloring invariably 
fly away upon perceiving a high tone, whereas species that have 
protective coloration alight in response to the same tone. The same 
sensory cue has the opposite effect, and Uexküll comments:
It is striking how the two opposite kinds o f action are governed by a plan. 
There can be no question o f  discrimination or purposiveness, since no moth or 
butterfly has ever seen the color o f its own skin. The plan revealed in this 
instance appears even more admirable when we learn that the artful micro­
scopic structure o f the night moth’s hearing organ exists solely for this one 
high tone o f the bat. To all else, these moths are totally deaf. (Uexküll 1992: 
352-353)
Even more instructive perhaps are the examples he gives from 
experiments on the behavior of grasshoppers and crickets (Fig. 1; 
Uexküll 1992: 353-354).
A female grasshopper is placed under a glass bell before a micro­
phone. When the grasshopper fiddles, the sounds will be transmitted 
to a loudspeaker just outside the glass bell, which is thick enough to 
stop any fiddling sounds getting through. When grasshoppers of the 
opposite sex are placed outside the glass bell these grasshoppers, as 
the experiment shows, direct their attention only to the loudspeaker, 
ignoring the grasshopper which can be seen fiddling in vain inside the 
bell. The partners make no advances whatsoever, the optical image 
being ineffectual.
As Uexküll explains, in this case:
[...] a specific receptor cue initiates a functional cycle, but, since the normal 
object is eliminated, the proper effector cue, which would be necessary to 
extinguish the first perceptual cue, is not produced. Normally, another 
receptor cue should intervene at this point and activate the next functional 
cycle. The nature o f this second receptor cue must be investigated more 
closely [...I. In any event, it is a necessary link in the chain o f  functional 
cycles which lead to mating. (Uexküll 1992: 354)
“Goal” and “plan” in Uexküll’s biology
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Figure 1. Grasshoppers in front of a loudspeaker (from Uexküll 1992: 353).
So, Uexküll explicitly rejects the notion of a goal to describe the 
behavior of these animals and instead prefers talking about a “coordi­
nation of the manifestations of animals” under the viewpoint of a plan. 
He does, however, admit that “perhaps later certain actions of the 
highest mammals may prove to be teleological actions, which in turn 
are dovetailed into the over-all plan of nature” (Uexküll 1992: 352).
However, in rejecting individual goals and also rejecting natural 
selection, one would indeed like to know how this plan of nature 
could actually be brought about at all, and how it manages to sustain 
itself. One might think that organisms would be able somehow to 
learn to do things they didn't do before, to acquire new habits or 
changed systems of functional cycles, but to the modem mind the why 
question, e.g. why would the animal learn this or that, does indeed 
seem to be in need of an answer. Or differently stated, the plan or final 
cause must have means at its disposal, efficient causalities. What are 
these? Where are they to be found?
I would submit that maybe Uexküll’s sharp rejection of any goal 
directed behavior in animals may hide a possible answer to this
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question. For illustration let me briefly dwell on an example which the 
German embryologist Hans Spemann once claimed was the direct 
cause for his life long occupation with embryology, the case of Sia­
mese twins in salamanders. Hamburger (1988) tells the story in The 
Heritage o f  Experimental Embryology, and I quote from there. The 
young Spemann working with salamander embryos conducted an 
experiment in which he constricted an egg without separating the 
blastomeres completely.2 He thereby obtained a strange animal with 
two heads, one trunk and one tail (Fig. 2). Much later (in 1943) he 
explained the importance he ascribed to this one experiment:
Such animals came to the stage o f feeding and it was now most remarkable to 
see how once the one head and at another time the other caught a small 
crustacean, how then the food moved through the separate foreguts to the joint 
posterior intestine [...]. It was probably irrelevant for the well-being o f the 
strange double creature which head had caught the food; it was o f benefit to 
the whole. Nevertheless, one head pushed the other away with its fore legs. 
Hence two egotisms in the place o f one, called forth by the spatial separation 
o f the anlagen. (Spemann 1943; quoted in Hamburger 1988)
Normally this “egotism” of an animal is taken for granted and it 
doesn't strike us as odd at all. But the case of an animal possessing 
two opposed “egotisms” immediately shows us how much in need of 
an explanation this property is. By the very failure to serve its 
ordinary purpose in these poor creatures, we are directed to the 
question what agency brings about “egotism” in normal organisms. 
What does this agency consist of? How could it be created in the first 
place? It is easy enough to say that organisms without an “egotism” 
would disappear because they would be expected to be outcompeted 
by organisms possessing this peculiar property, and that may indeed 
explain why “egotism” has survived once it happened to come about. 
But it doesn't explain what it is or how it works, and accordingly it 
doesn't account for the question of how it appeared — out of nowhere, 
i.e. out of non-egotistic systems? Must not Spemann's “egotism” be 
pushed backwards in time to the very first organisms on earth? Could 
there have been life-forms without this “egotism”?
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2 I am grateful to Scott F. Gilbert for directing my attention to Hamburger’s 
book for a comment on Spemann’s work on Siamese twins in salamanders.
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Figure 2. Siamese twins in salamanders.
But if this is so —  and I find it hard to see how one could deny it — 
then Spemannian “egotism” is an irreducible holistic property of life 
as such, for clearly “egotism” doesn't make any sense at levels below 
the whole organism. Thus to the extent single tissues or cells in 
multicellular organisms also posses a kind of “egotism”, which as a 
matter of fact they do (Buss 1987), then the higher level “organismic 
egotism” must normally be capable of inducing its objectives upon the 
lower level units (cancer and birth are well known exceptions where a 
lower level “egotism”, i.e. the interests of single tumor cells or the of 
foetal system respectively, win over the holistic “egotism”).
Now, the question is: what is the relation between Spemannian 
egotism and an individual goal? If the term goal is understood to refer 
to the conscious kinds of purposes to which we as human beings are 
so accustomed, then of course a goal is a very different thing from 
Spemann's egotism, but taken in a broader sense goals might be seen 
as far more widespread in nature. Even the chemotactic behavior of a 
bacterium swimming upstream in a gradient of nutrients reflects the 
holistic interest of the bacterial system in getting as much nutrient 
molecules as the receptor capacity allows for. Is not this interest a 
goal? All living systems have insides, or else are organized in such a 
way that somehow they produce activities aimed at sensing, catching, 
fleeing from, mating with ... something outside the system (Hoffmeyer 
1998; 2000; 2001a). In each case biochemistry or physiology may 
eventually fully explain the efficient causalities involved in these 
activities — as has for instance largely been done for bacterial chemo- 
taxis —  but this does not catch the holistic dimension: why is the
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system organized to carry out such a holistic intentionality, or 
“aboutness”?
To answer this question modem biology invariably invokes natural 
selection. Countless minute changes along thousands and even 
millions of generations gradually tuned all proteins in the whole 
organism to work as one integrated seemingly intentional system for 
the sake of survival efficiency. As already noted this hardly explains 
the appearance of “egotism” in the first place, but it does of course 
give an important —  though in this author's view by no means full — 
explanation for the concrete elaboration of the holistic intentionality 
acquired by each separate case of species.
We are thus not opposed to the idea that the efficient causality, the 
force, so to say, that brings about evolutionary change to a large extent 
may be accounted for in terms of selective processes acting upon the 
reproductive efforts of populations situated in a restricted space of 
solutions. But from a biosemiotic point of view this selection force is 
itself blind and only gets direction through the semiotic potential inhe­
rent to living systems. Organisms need their environments, and since 
these environments mostly consist of other organisms, an elaborate 
intra- as well as interspecific semiotic dynamic is established from the 
very beginning of life around organismic needs. Only because of this 
semiotic dynamic does the evolutionary process have direction and 
creativity. Explaining the holistic intentionality of organisms thus 
requires an historical account of the situatedness of the organism in 
question in the holistic semiotic dynamics to which it belongs. Holistic 
intentionality cannot just be explained reductively through an account of 
the selective tunings of myriad biochemical processes characteristic for 
the efficient operation of the individual self-interest considered in 
isolation from its biosemiotic historical roots.
And this is finally what brings us to von Uexkiill's Planmässigkeit. 
Individual organisms, grasshoppers, bacteria or human beings, do in 
fact have goals in the sense just outlined, but these goals are ir- 
reducibly bound to the whole biosemiotic setting. And as we shall see 
in the following paragraphs this biosemiotic setting of nature's indi­
vidual species is itself a product of endless diversifications of holistic 
patterns.
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Diversification as plan
I remember how as a young student of biochemistry I wondered why 
it is that textbooks always equated oxidative processes with exergonic 
or energy harnessing processes, whereas reductive process were 
always equated to endergonic or energy consumptive processes. The 
core of the matter is, of course, that oxidative processes are also 
always reductive processes, one component becoming oxidized at the 
same time as another component is reduced. In the paradigmatic case 
of animal respiration the oxidative process consumes oxygen that ends 
up as carbon dioxide, i.e. 2 atoms of oxygen (O) bound to one atom of 
carbon (C), but at the same time oxygen itself becomes reduced in that 
it goes from free oxygen in the air to chemically bound oxygen in 
carbon dioxide. This last aspect of the process, the reduction part of it, 
is always tacitly presupposed but is rarely explicitly mentioned, and 
thus tends to become forgotten by naive students.
At the other end of life, the photosynthetic activity of plants 
consists of a reduction of carbon dioxide to carbohydrate. As is well 
known, this process depends on the ability of the green plants to take 
up energy from solar radiation and use it for splitting water into 
oxygen and hydrogen in such a way that oxygen is set free to the 
atmosphere whereas hydrogen is used for reducing carbon dioxide to 
carbohydrates and all the other organic molecules making up plant 
material.
It was not until I saw how photosynthesis and respiration fitted into 
each other, that I realized the true character of this grand process, 
which is in fact the essence of biospheric chemistry on earth: see Fig. 
3. Seen from above, what takes place in the biosphere is nothing but 
the diversifications of the grand scheme, whereby solar energy drives 
the splitting of water into hydrogen and oxygen, whereas animals 
reunify these two constituents through the food chains, making sure 
that every bit of energy obtainable in the process is used up. As if — 
one might be tempted to say — the whole trick of animate nature is to 
disturb water so that oxygen and hydrogen are separated from each 
other, thereby introducing a kind of “longing” between them that 
drives the two atoms forward through their complicated pathways, 
leading in due time to an extinction of the longing through a reas­
sembling of the disturbed water molecule.
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A. Plant life:
6 H20  + 6 C 02 ==> CgH^Og + 6 0 2 
___________________________ PHOTOSYNTHESIS________
B. Animal life:
6 0 2+ QH^Og ==> 6 C02 + 6 H20  
RESPIRATION
C. Life
H20  ==> 2H + О = >  H20  
SUM
Figure 3. When the processes of respiration (A) and photosynthesis (B) 
are summed the diversity of biochemistry disappears under the overall 
process which simply consists in the molecular splitting and reassembling 
of water (C).
In Stuart Kauffman's recent book “Investigations”, an important part 
of the analysis turns on the question of the non-ergodicity of the 
universe, meaning that the universe never had the time it would have 
needed should its present state of affairs in any way be representative 
of its inbuilt possibilities (Kauffman 2000). The persistent movement 
of the universe into the “adjacent possible” precludes its ever reaching 
a state that depends on statistical likelihood. In stead the universe is 
historical, for “history enters when the space of the possible that might 
have been explored is larger, or vastly larger, than what has actually 
occurred” (Kauffman 2000: 152). And as Kauffman points out:
Even if  we consider the universe as a whole, at the levels o f  molecular and 
organizational complexity o f proteins and up, the universe is kinetically 
trapped. It has gotten where it has gotten from wherever it started, by what­
ever process or flow into a persistently expanding possible, but cannot have 
gotten everywhere, The ergodic hypothesis fails us here on any relevant 
timescale. More, the biosphere, and the universe as a whole, may well be
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kinetically trapped into an evermore astonishingly small region o f the entire 
space o f the possible it might have reached. Stated otherwise, the set o f actual 
small molecules and large molecules such as proteins that do exist now is 
presumably an increasingly tiny subvolume o f the total set that might have 
arisen by now in the biosphere or the universe since the big bang. (Kauffman 
2000: 145)
Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, then, the diversification of entities 
and processes occurring in the universe necessarily, according to 
Kauffman's analysis, goes hand in hand with an increasing load of lost 
opportunities, things that might have happened, structures that might 
have been formed but did not in fact happen or form. The point of the 
matter is that both of these trends, the trend toward increased diversity 
and the trend toward lost opportunities, are of an increasing dimen­
sionality. It is probably the most bold conjecture in Kauffman's book, 
a conjecture he argues persuasively for, that “our biosphere and any 
biosphere expands the dimensionality of its adjacent possible, on 
average, as rapidly as it can” (Kauffman 2000: 151). Kauffman is well 
aware, that this “burgeoning order of the universe” cannot be reduced 
to matter alone, to entropy (or the negation of entropy for that matter), 
to information, or to anything that simple. The propagation of organi­
zation and the subsequent growing diversification of the world is 
taken care of by autonomous agents and these agents are semiotic 
creatures. An autonomous agent may be defined quite rigorously 
according to Kauffman as an “autocatalytic system able to reproduce 
and able to perform one or more thermodynamic work cycles”, and in 
earlier work he has shown how such agents will be expected to self- 
organize given the kind of world our Earth system belongs to 
(Kauffman 1993). But, as explained in the present book, Kauffman is 
acutely aware that this definition leads to more intractable questions of 
“measuring” or “recognition”. For, if work is defined as “the 
constrained release of energy”, where will the constraints come from? 
At least it will take work to produce them, and this is not all:
Autonomous agents also do often detect and measure and record displace­
ments o f external systems from equilibrium that can be used to extract work, 
then do extract work, propagating work and constraint construction, from their 
environment. (Kauffman 2000: 110)
And this definitely brings us to the core of biosemiotics, and also 
poses the question of the origin of life in a new way which shall not, 
however, be further explored here (Neumann 1966; Pattee 1977; 
Hoffmeyer, Emmeche 1991; Hoffmeyer 1998; 2000; 2001a).
Returning to the discussion of water it should now be admitted that 
photosynthetic water splitting was not at all the original source of 
energy flow through biotic systems. Fermentation and redox processes 
involving inorganic materials, as well as photosynthetic processes 
departing from nitrogenous or ferrochemical compounds, considerably 
preceded the appearance of water splitting in the biosphere. The 
summative harmony indicated in figure 3 between photosynthesis and 
respiration also only established itself several billions of years after 
the origin of life, when sufficient stores of oxygen had been built up in 
the atmospheric system. This reflects the fact that photosynthetic 
water splitting, as well as the respiratory utilization of free oxygen, are 
both hard jobs to tackle from a biochemical point of view, and 
autonomous agents capable of carrying them out were not among the 
simplest kinds of autonomous agents to be invented. But, as we know, 
the problems were eventually solved and the successive diversification 
of the biosphere gradually came to reflect the efficiency of this 
particular energy flow scheme.
Whether the water splitting scheme may be said to represent the 
best available choice for a biotic energy flow scheme on earth, I do 
not know and it is probably not easy to know. Most biochemists 
would perhaps think that it was, but, as we all know, unexpected 
possibilities may often hold surprises. The question may not however 
be especially relevant to the biosphere anymore since a quite new 
dimension of the “adjacent possibles” were eventually realized in the 
middle of the animal kingdom, a dimension which slowly unfolded its 
potentials for hundreds of millions of years and has now with the 
human species finally expanded the range of energy sources available 
to living systems far beyond anything known before. We might call 
this dimension the neurosemiotic dimension of life. The whole work 
of von Uexküll focused on aspects of this dimension.
We can summarize the discussion so far by noting that the 
Umwelten of animals certainly have developed in accordance to a plan 
of nature, a plan that all the time traps life in certain strategic choices 
and at the same time diversifies the dimensionality of ways to deal 
with these choices. The Danes, having been trapped by historical
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incident to a shrinking nation (from a territorial point of view that is) 
have developed a dictum which strangely catches this aspect of 
evolution: “what is externally lost, shall be internally gained” said the 
Danes (to the extent that the educational system in Denmark was 
considerably strengthened as a strategy inside this perspective, it 
actually did work well for a century or more). What goes on in the 
biosphere seems to accord very much with this same fundamental 
principle: having lost a large majority of the options originally 
available for the evolutionary path, diversification nevertheless has 
expanded the field of future options by inventing radically new and 
sophisticated life strategies based on highly developed semiotic 
competences — not least, we shall claim, the strategy of experienced 
Umwelten — and this is why the biosphere has increasingly become a 
semiosphere (Hoffmeyer 1996).
The experienced semiosphere
Eliminativist philosophers have claimed that human experiences are 
epiphenomenal on brain activity, illusions, so to say, that strangely 
accompany our dealings with the world. We do not run because we are 
afraid of the attacking bear — to use the classical example — rather 
our fear is a registration of our own escape behavior. This under­
standing does of course save the materialist ontology from having to 
accord direct causal effects to mental phenomena, but it also leaves 
the phenomenological world as a complete mystery. What is the good 
of it? Why is it there? Since scientific theories themselves can only 
serve us to the extent that we can experience them, i.e. understand 
them, this eliminativist view of things is in fact quite paradoxical: only 
because we have a psychic life can we develop theories according to 
which psychic life is not for real.
To get rid of this absurd logic in a non-dualistic way we need to 
understand experienced life as both real and based on bodily 
existence. There is — biosemiotics will claim — nothing mysterious 
about the phenomenal world, for it is deeply embedded in bodily 
semiotics. Because human beings are highly organized unities of some 
50,000 billions of cells, each of which have a limited but real semiotic 
competence, the mystery of the experienced world has to find its 
solution by considering the kind of semiotic skills such unities might
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develop. An evolutionary account of experience does require us to 
accept that at least some big-brained animals do posses a rudimentary 
kind of an experienced Umwelt in the sense experienced Umwelten 
are known to ourselves. The main question then will be to identify the 
type of needs such an experienced Umwelt might satisfy better than 
any instinctive or reflex-based behavior would do. An additional 
question of course is how this ability for experiencing is rooted in the 
emotional brain. We shall suggest some possible answers to the first 
of these questions, whereas the latter question will only be slightly 
touched upon.
The key to our problem is to be found in the already mentioned 
holistic “egotism” of animals. We saw that the evolution of a holistic 
organismic intentionality (in the sense so clearly absent from Siamese 
twins in salamanders) required us to think of natural selection as being 
elaborated inside the constraints of situated ecosemiotic interaction 
patterns (called ecosemiotic motifs in Hoffmeyer 1997). Thus, for 
instance, mammalian species in general seem to master significantly 
more sophisticated ecosemiotic motifs than do reptilian species. The 
Swedish ethologist Sverre Sjölander has pointed out that while for 
instance a dog need not have a full picture of the hare all the time for 
hunting it efficiently, a snake will stop hunting its prey whenever it 
disappears from view (Sjölander 1995). The snake may well go on 
searching for the prey at the spot, where it disappeared, but it will not 
calculate the eventual path the prey may have taken. The dog on the 
other hand will proceed away, guided by an anticipation of where the 
hare would be expected to turn up next. “Thus it seems as if the 
representation or construct of the hare is 'running' in the internal world 
in a way corresponding to the actual hare in the actual world” writes 
Sjölander, so that “the sense organs are just used to correct the repre­
sentational happenings and not to create them” (Sjölander 1995: 3). In 
the snake, on the contrary, hunting appears to be guided by a succes­
sion of quite independent sense modalities. Thus, striking of prey is 
governed by sight (or temperature sense organs); location of the struck 
prey is detected by smell, and the swallowing procedure is governed 
by touch. This lack of true intermodality in the snake makes it “hard to 
imagine that the snake can harbor some form of a concept of a mouse 
in its brain” (Sjölander 1995: 5). The snake apparently can not 
integrate its sense modalities to form a central construct.
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This does not necessarily mean that snakes are totally deprived of 
an experienced world, but if indeed they have experiences, these must 
be lacking in inner coherence and would certainly be very different 
from our own kinds of experiences. Snakes have survived well on 
Earth for a long time, and to the best of my knowledge are still doing 
fine in their distinctive niches, but it is indeed striking, as Sjölander 
observes, that the fanciful catastrophic schemes for explaining how 
reptiles were superseded by birds and animals presently adopted by 
most scholars do not account for why the reptiles did not just 
repopulate their old niches after the dust had settled down again in the 
aftermath of the catastrophe. Here the ability of birds and mammals to 
produce central internal constructs of their Umwelten does indeed 
offer an attractive alternative explanation for the fact that these 
taxonomic groups did ultimately become the successful groups among 
vertebrates.
A moving animal in a moving world is confronted with a perpetual 
need for making split-second choices of behavior. Such choices 
evidently will serve survival the best if they are based on some kind of 
anticipatory calculation which integrates inner body parameters such 
as emotional states, fatigue, hunger, memory into a range of external 
parameters as registered by the sense organs. As long as the animal is 
small and has a survival strategy based on simple activity schemes in a 
predictable range of challenges, these behavioral decisions may well 
be accounted for in terms of instinctive patterns of sensomotoric reflex 
circles. Such a direct connection between a stimulus and a cor­
responding behavioral act is perhaps what takes place in the snake, so 
that in its Umwelt there is indeed no mouse, but only things to be 
searched for, things to be stroked, and things for swallowing, whereas 
for animals dealing with more complex patterns of challenges a direct 
coupling of stimulus and behavior is no longer sufficiently flexible. 
Instead, the brained body as an holistic intentional unity must now 
make decisions based on split-second evaluations of unforeseeable 
events. Judging from the efficiency of modern computer programming 
in producing virtual realities, there is probably no a priori reason why 
brains could not have solved this problem by a sophisticated 
elaboration of the reflex circuit principle. But while computers are 
designed to obey strategies decided by the programmer, organisms 
had to develop designs obeying their own interests, and this is where 
the computer analogy may mislead us. Organisms must integrate their
life project into their calculatory potential. The body as flesh and 
blood therefore from the very beginning has to be part of the 
anticipatory and inventive brain models. We shall suggest this is the 
reason why nature invented the trick of producing an experienced 
holistic virtual reality, an internal icon more or less isomorphic in its 
properties with those parts of the real world that the animal could not 
safely ignore.3 The exciting (threatening, attractive etc.) aspects of the 
outer world in this way became internalized as inner threats, 
attractions etc., thereby assuring the necessary immediate emotional 
bias in all choices of action. The hard problem was not just to 
calculate the path of action but to make sure this path of action was 
the most relevant given the life project of the animal, and this is where 
the emotional apparatus enters the scene. The iconic inner experience 
works as a holistic marker focusing the enormous diversity of 
calculations upon a single path of action.
As Maxine Sheets-Johnstone has repeatedly pointed out, move­
ment is not just doing, it is also always sensing (Sheets-Johnstone 
1990; 1998). Millions of proprioceptive sense cells are distributed in 
our muscles throughout the body, perpetually measuring the tension 
between cell layers and sending messages thereabout to the brain. 
Brain models governing motoric activity anticipate the eventual 
signals they receive from proprioceptive organs, perpetually calibra­
ting their dynamics to the delayed response from tissues. Organisms 
model their own bodies as much as they model the outer world — or 
as Sheets-Johnstone puts it: “creatures know themselves” (Sheets- 
Johnstone 1998: 285) —  and they do so while their tissues are bathed 
in endocrine secretions, constantly updating their emotional response 
parameters to the experienced icons running in the brain. Sheets- 
Johnstone indeed suggests a natural history for proprioception tracing 
this kind of self-knowledge in movement right back to the chemotaxis 
in bacterial cells depending on flagellar movement. And since con­
sciousness is as Merleau-Ponty has explained (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 
160) not primarily an “I think that” but an “I can”, proprioception 
might be understood, as Sheets-Johnstone observes, as a kind of 
“corporeal consciousness”:
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3 John Deely pointed me to this very apt formulation o f the Uexküllian 
conception o f neutrality in the Umwelt (originally suggested by Thomas Sebeok).
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Corporeal consciousness thus evolved from its beginnings in tactility into 
kinesthesia, into a direct sensitivity to movement through internally mediated 
systems o f corporeal awareness, In effect, through all the intricate and 
changing pathways o f descent with modification, know thyself has remained a 
consistent biological built-in; a kinetic corporeal consciousness informs a 
diversity o f  animate forms. (Sheets-Johnstone 1998: 286)
It seems plausible to suppose that experiential life is not an either-or 
phenomenon, but a thing that comes in many grades and in a 
multitude of versions depending on the ecosemiotic motifs, which are 
most vital to the particular species. Furthermore, just like we ourselves 
are not aware most of the time of things around us, or even our own 
presence, other creatures' experienced life may also possibly appear 
only in distinct glimpses of “enlightened” activity, and very likely in 
most species only little connection occurs between such glimpses of 
awareness, even when they happen more or less contemporaneously. 
We also know that we can do lots of complicated kinds of work 
without even being aware of it, awareness being perhaps instead 
directed to chatting with friends or looking at TV. This shows us that 
experience is not necessary for doing routine work, and you can even 
sometimes get away with routine talking when your mind is on other 
matters (though usually this is immediately perceived and considered 
highly impolite). But the very fact that routine work can be efficiently 
effectuated without us being aware of it immediately poses the 
problem of why we are aware of anything at all. And obviously, the 
answer is that the experienced world is a tool for solving non-routine 
problems, or, in general, for dealing with events which could not be 
foreseen. And a certain capacity to deal with the unforeseen is 
probably a help for most organisms capable of moving, which in 
multicellular organisms implies the presence of a neurosemiotic 
control system. Lacking movement as part of their survival tool kit, 
plants most likely never developed experiential worlds, whereas a 
graded series of such worlds may well occur as glimpses of awareness 
throughout the animal kingdom. But only in mammals and birds do 
these phenomenal worlds operate on constructed virtual items 
behaving very much like things and creatures outside of the head. And 
only in the human animal are these constructs understood as 
constructs, i.e. as different from the things and animals they are 
supposed to represent in the real world.
Our virtual worlds are tools for survival and as such they remain 
constrained by the very same rules that are operative in the real world. 
One should not therefore believe that our virtual worlds, the Um­
welten, are all we have access to, and that the real world, the Ding an 
Sich, is unapproachable. On the contrary, the semiotics of corporeal 
life in any creature — ourselves included — does take part in the 
dance of ecosemiotic motifs, the local Planmässigkeit, which has been 
framing the evolutionary processes and has formed the particular form 
of the Umwelt of each species. The Umwelt must serve to guide the 
animal's activity in the semiotic niche, i.e. the world of cues around 
the animal (or species) which the animal must necessarily interpret 
wisely in order to enjoy life. The semiosphere, as I use the term, i.e. 
the totality of actual or potential cues in the world, is thus to be 
understood as an extemalistic counterpart to the totality of Umwelten. 
Together they form, in the term of Jakob von Uexküll, an unending set 
of 'contrapuntal duets'.
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“Плановость” Юкскюлла
В противовес преобладающему позитивисткому воззрению на при­
роду как на нечто свободное от значения, Якоб фон Юкскюлл 
утверждал, что определенная “плановость” в природе имеет место. 
Увы, данное утверждение можно понимать и как взгляд, в соответст­
вии с которым сама органическая эволюция не является созидающим 
процессом, а постепенным (но все же величественным) выявлением 
строительного плана самой Природы. Подобная идея может вновь 
способствовать утверждению в центре биологической теории детер­
минизма, что радикально противоречило бы биосемиотическому 
взгляду. Одним из источников как биосемиотики, так и космоло­
гической философии Пирса является мысль, что неопределенность 
первична, что “привыкание” или интерпретация являются реальны­
ми процессами природы, и поэтому вера в предначертанность не- 
обоснована. В статье утверждается, что “плановость” Юкскюлла 
можно сопоставить с современным недетерминистским пониманием. 
В определенном смысле умвельты животных действительно разви­
вались согласно природной “плановости”, но это такой план, кото­
рый беспрерывно держит жизнь в оковах определенных стратеги­
ческих выборов и одновременно разнообразит измерения условий 
этих выборов, т.е., согласно Стюарту Кауффманну, “сопутствующую 
возможность”.
Uexkülli ‘plaanipärasus’
Otsese vastandina valdavale positivistlikule looduse mõistele — loodu­
sele, mis on mõtteta ning tähendusest vabastatud — väitis Jakob von 
Uexküll, et teatud plaanipärasus on looduses toimiv. Seda võib paraku 
võtta kui vaadet, mille kohaselt orgaaniline evolutsioon ise pole loov prot­
sess, vaid on järkjärguline (ometi küll majesteetlik) Looduse enese 
ehitusliku plaani väljakoorumine. Selline idee võib kaasa aidata deter­
minismi taaspüstitamisele bioloogilise teooria keskmes, mis räägiks tõsi­
selt vastu biosemiootika vaatele. Nii biosemiootika kui Peirce’i kosmo- 
loogilise filosoofia lähtekohti on, et määramatus on esmane, et “haiju- 
mine” ehk interpreteerimine on reaalsed protsessid looduses, mistõttu usk 
ettemääratusse on põhjendamatu. Väidetakse, et Uexkülli plaanipärasus 
on kokkusobitatav tänapäevase mittedeterministliku arusaamaga. Teatud 
mõttes on loomade omailmad tõepoolest arenenud vastavalt looduslikule
plaanipärasusele, kuid see on plaan, mis lakkamatult hoiab elu teatud 
strateegiliste valikute kütkes ja ühtaegu mitmekesistab nende valikute 
tegemise tingimuste mõõtmelisust, s.t. “külgnevat võimalikkust”, Stuart 
Kauffmani järgi.
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Abstract. Jakob von Uexküll’s evolutionary views are described and analysed 
in the context o f  changes in semiotic and biological thinking at the end o f  
Modem age. As different from the late Modernist biology, a general feature o f  
Post-Modern interpretation o f living systems is that an evolutionary explana­
tion has rather secondary importance, it is not obligatory for an understanding 
o f adaptation. Adaptation as correspondence to environment is a communi­
cative, hence a semiotic phenomenon.
The typologies of the ages of understanding that Arthur Lovejoy 
(1964 [1936]) or Michel Foucault (1989 [1966]) have applied to 
biology and that John Deely (2001) has developed for a whole philo­
sophical thought on the basis of semiotic approach are attractive 
enough to try to use their models in interpretation of otherwise diffi­
cult or even controversial cases of biological thought.
What does it mean, no longer being able to think a 
certain thought? Or to introduce a new thought?
Foucault 1989 [1966]: 56
When we can once establish a music 
these simple examples will build its basis.
Uexküll 1937: 195
1 Wenn wir einmal eine Musiktheorie des Lebens werden aufstellen können, 
werden diese einfachen Beispiele die Grundlage bilden.
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Jakob von Uexküll’s views on biological evolution provide a good 
example of controversial interpretations. As a non-darwinian, he has 
been occasionally considered an anti-evolutionist. However, it may 
also be that the conclusions of such kind strongly depend on the 
typology of views applied, and thus in case if a non-darwinian evolu­
tionism is feasible and scientifically acceptable — and it evidently is 
feasible —  Uexküll’s role just changes, becoming an example of 
evolutionism of a special kind.2
A reason why it has been difficult to some interpreters to 
understand the Uexküll’s view, is due to the negligible role he gives to 
an evolutionary explanation.
This paper has two aims: (1) to review the evolutionary views of 
Jakob von Uexküll, and (2) to describe very briefly the distinction 
between the main types of evolutionism, particularly in the context of 
biosemiotic approach.
Evolutionism in biosemiotics
What happens to evolutionism, when the modernism is finished? 
When asking this, I am going to apply here John Deely’s (2001) 
principal division of the history of western thought into four ages -  
Greek, Latin, Modem, and Post-Modern -  to the history of natural 
sciences. The Modem age, accordingly, has lasted from the 17th to the 
20th century, and one of its characteristic features has been a belief 
into a possibility to improve the nature. Particularly in the 19th 
century, it took a form of a view about a self-improvement of nature -  
i.e., the progressive evolution.
The end of Modernism, as described by John Deely, is charac­
terized by the rise of semiotics. On the one hand, this is exemplified 
by works of Charles S. Peirce, on the other hand — as Deely empha­
sizes — via the concepts introduced by Jakob von Uexküll: “ [...] 
‘Umwelt’ [...] is a term singularly suitable to the needs of semiotics in 
arriving at the paradigm proper to itself’ (Deely 2002: 129-130).
This is a paradigm that can be best characterized by the metaphor 
of web, as used by Thomas A. Sebeok in the expression of “the 
semiotic web”, and as introduced by Jakob von Uexküll (1992: 327):
2 Uexküll’s views on evolution have been discussed recently also by Hoffmeyer 
(2004) and Chien (2004).
Uexküll and the post-modern evolutionism 101
“every subject spins his relations to certain characters of the things 
around him, and weaves them into a firm web which carries his 
existence” — the latter formulation being said by Deely (2001: 605) 
the ever best characterization for experience.
Thus, what happens with evolutionism when moving from Modem to 
Post-Modern, is that we leave behind the whole concept of life’s progress 
as expressed in the tree o f  life and instead understand the evolution as 
modifications in the web o f  life. This is an analogical step to the one that 
took place in the 17th century, when the Latin concept of the ladder of life 
was replaced by the tree of life (Lovejoy 1964; Kull 2003).
Uexküll identifies his views to the one that is opposed to the entire 
different worldview of the modernism, as he says: “We can indeed fix the 
date of the change [...]. It lies between Kepler and Newton” (Uexküll 
2001: 114). He explains: “Kepler suchte nach dem Plan — Newton nach 
der Ursache der gleichen Erscheinung. [...] Seit Darwin waren die 
Biologen eifrig bemüht, die Merkseite der Lebewesen zu unterschlagen 
und nur ihre Wirkseite zu beachten”3 (Uexküll 1937: 188-189).
Though, Uexküll’s views on evolution may look unusual —  rather 
these represent an old, pre-modem position. Here, a reference, e.g., to J. 
Deely’s (2001) analysis can be relevant, which demonstrates a series of 
similarities between the late Latin and Post-Modern approaches.
Uexküllian view on evolution is also a non-cartesian, and an 
ecological one. In this kind of biology, phylogeny does not serve (in 
most cases, at least) the role of an ultimate explanation of the design 
of structures. Instead, for the understanding why biosystems behave 
like they do, their holistic features, their systemic functioning, or, in 
other terms, the communicative mechanisms have to be discovered.
Neo-darwinian evolutionism (e.g., Dobzhansky et al. 1977) is 
modem. Also Lamarckian and Darwinian ones were modem. The evo­
lutionism of modernism is the evolutionism of progress. Ecologicity 
of neo-darwinism differs from the post-modem ecological view — an 
emphasis of the former is put on the Red Queen, on competition and 
the co-evolutionary race of survival, whereas the latter view interprets 
competition as a special case (imbalance) in symbiotic relationships.
The autogenetic view of biology, developed by Humberto Matu- 
rana and Francisco Varela (1980) in their work on autopoiesis, can be
3 Kepler searched for the plan, and Newton for the cause o f all manifest 
creation. From Darwin on, biologists have carefully tried to evade the perception 
o f living beings and have only noted their operation.
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seen, at least partly, similar to that of Uexküll, which was initially 
inspired by the Kantian view as applied to biological systems. 
Maturana and Varela (1980: 11) also state that “reproduction and 
evolution are not essential for the living organization, but they have 
been essential for the historical transformation of the cognitive do­
mains of the living systems on Earth.”
It would not be very easy to classify semiotics into evolutionary 
sciences, despite of the fact that at least its post-structuralist period 
deals much with diachronic aspects and historical discontinuities. Ch. 
Peirce’s description of the evolution of habits deals more with 
developmental continuities, however, it can hardly be taken as a 
serious model of evolution by a biologist describing the numerical 
mechanisms in the dynamics of allele frequencies in a population. 
Nevertheless, semioticians in any case do not deny evolution.
Indeed, the topic of evolution has not been entirely avoided in the 
writings about the semiotics of nature. Particularly those authors who 
support Peirce’s views, together with Ch. Peirce himself, speak about 
the growth and development of semiosis. There are for instance works 
by W. A. Koch (1992), F. Merrell (1992; 1996), W. Nöth (1994) etc. 
which touch the evolutionary levels of semiosis. However, they very 
rarely write anything specific about the possible mechanisms of 
evolution. For instance, a review paper by T. A. Sebeok (1997) 
entitled “Evolution of semiosis” refers to semiosis in different levels 
of biological organization without speaking about the evolutionary 
process itself or its mechanisms. Few exceptions, of course, exist (e.g., 
Deacon 1997; Heusden 2004; Kull 1992).
As a matter of fact, biosemiotics has been, from its very beginning, 
quite cautious in making evolutionary statements. In particular, the 
mechanisms of evolutionary change are rarely analyzed in these 
works, and the same can also be said about the biosemiotic writings of 
recent years. “Zumindest aber würde neben eine allgemeine Semiotik, 
wie wir sie heute kennen, eine allgemeine ‘Entwicklungssemiotik’ 
oder besser eine allgemeine genetische Semiotik als Forschungsgebiet 
und Theorienansatz treten, ähnlich, wie dies auch in der Psychologie 
oder ansatzweise in der Linguistik der Fall ist”4 (Bentele 1984: 11).
4 But at least besides general semiotics, as we know it today, a general 
‘developmental semiotics’, or better a general genetic semiotics as a scientific 
branch and theoretical field, will be established, in the same way as this has 
occurred in psychology or for instance in linguistics.
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The bioevolutionary topic in semiotics was occasionally analyzed, 
particularly one should mention the book by G. Bentele (1984), the 
works of H. M. Müller (1990; 1993), G. Witzany (1993), P. Bouissac 
(1993), several papers touching on semiotic aspects of evolutionary 
epistemology (Schult 1989; Hoffmeyer 1996) a.o. A remarkable paper 
in which a series of statements on the semiotic aspects of biological 
evolution is formulated, is the collective article by M. Anderson et al. 
(1990); e.g., they stress the importance of coevolution and symbiosis. 
Also, “communication begins with a decoder, not with the encoder, 
whether ‘intentional’ or not: This insight is particularly crucial to the 
understanding of evolution as a part of semiosis. Similarly, life is a 
result of one of the most interesting innovations with Gaia, namely, 
death” (Anderson et al. 1990: 762).
S. Salthe (1997) even considers that “semiotics has implicitly been 
a part of Darwinian concerns more or less from the inception of the 
discourse. Prominently, we have always interpreted adaptations in 
organisms as signs of their environment.”
Despite several exceptions, it can be concluded that the majority of 
biosemioticians have been quite critical toward the neo-Darwinian 
school of thought, appreciating considerably higher the views of the 
followers of Karl Ernst von Baer (Kull 1998). “Natural selection itself 
is but one of a number of semiotic processes involved in biological 
transformation” (Anderson et al. 1990: 756). If so, then it might be 
rather expected that biosemiotics will contribute to the ‘new synthesis’ 
(Hoffmeyer 1997; Odling-Smee 1994; Salthe 1993a), or to post- 
Darwinism (Ho 1989), if it comes about, of course.
A principal issue that makes a divide in the evolutionary ap­
proaches is the role assumed for the organisms. Either they are 
survival-machines automatically selected by the environment, or they 
are subjects of selection who create their life conditions together with 
themselves. The latter view has been expressed already by K. E. v. 
Baer, and by J. M. Baldwin (the concept of organic selection, Baldwin 
1896; Belew, Mitchell 1996; Tembrock 1990; Weber, Depew 2003), 
and in various aspects by L. L. Whyte (the concept of internal selec­
tion, Whyte 1965), E. Jablonka (the role of epigenetic inheritance, 
Jablonka, Lamb 1995; also Ho, Saunders 1979) and F. J. Odling-Smee 
(the role of niche construction, Odling-Smee et al. 2003).
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A general mechanism of non-selectional origin of evolutionary 
adaptation (i.e. a non-darwinian type of adaptive evolution) could 
briefly described as follows (Hoffmeyer, Kull 2003; Kull 1992; 2000).
Adjustment (or acclimatization, or adaptation) to environment is a 
process that is taking place as a physiological and behavioural one 
continuously, in all periods of organism’s life. This means certain 
slight changes in the organisms’ structure, including in the pattern of 
gene expression. In case of a permanent change of life conditions 
(either due to migration into a new location or a change of conditions 
in the locus), some of these changes may include almost all specimens 
of the population. Later, some of these adjustments can become 
irreversible in result of either processes of genetic drift or stabilizing 
selection, and thus an adaptation has turned into an evolutionarily 
fixed characteristic.
This sort of mechanism can be called semiotic, because it requires 
an activity of organisms in acclimatization, in recognizing and 
selecting their behaviour and their environment. And this is different 
from, or more general than the mechanism of natural selection that 
would necessarily require differential reproduction. And this is not a 
Lamarckian mechanism because it does not assume the inheritance of 
acquired characters.
Adaptation itself is neither physical nor evolutionary phenome­
non—  adaptation is a communicative, thus a semiotic phenomenon 
(of course having certain physical and evolutionary counterparts).
UexkiilPs view on evolution5
Uexküll retains a very special place in twentieth century biology. He 
was, in the beginning of the century, one of those who helped to found 
theoretical biology, and whose contribution was important in es­
tablishing it as a separate field of science (Uexküll 1913; 1920; cf. Alt 
et al. 1996). And at the end of the century, he has been the one whose 
views happened to be in the center of a (new) synthesis which heralds 
the start of post-Darwinian biology (after the long neo-Darwinian 
period), in a synthesis which generalizes evolutionary theory, in order 
to make mental phenomena a natural aspect of it (Hoffmeyer 1997).
5 An earlier version o f this analysis has been published in Kull 1999.
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As a tool of this synthesis, may serve semiotics. It may be interesting, 
therefore, to look more closely at this ‘Uexküllian tradition’.
Uexküll, when studying zoology and evolution at the lectures of 
Julius Kennel (1854—1939) at the University of Tartu, was initially 
fond of Darwinian explanations. However, when Kennel claimed that 
one can build a phylogenetic tree between any given pair of organisms 
or species, Uexküll saw in this a play and not serious science. Instead 
of zoology, he started to be interested in physiology (particularly of 
marine invertebrates), investigating how physiological mechanisms 
work in the natural conditions of living nature. He also moved away 
from the views of Ch. Darwin and E. Haeckel (G. v. Uexküll 1964: 
35-36).
In his Theoretische Biologie, Uexküll did not allocate much space 
to the problems of evolution — for him, evolutionary theory was not 
directly needed in order to build up a theory of living systems. Ac­
cording to G. Bentele (1984: 114), “die Konzeption, die von Uexküll 
entwickelt hat, [ist] nicht genetisch im Sinne von ‘entwicklungs­
geschichtlich’ ausgerichtet”6. Below, I will describe Uexküll’s evolu­
tionary views in more detail — this is a part of his approach which has 
usually received less attention, in comparison to his t/wwe/Mheory.
Uexküll’s approach to living systems is based (at least since the 
second edition of Theoretische Biologie, 1928) on the notion of Funk­
tionskreis —  ‘functional cycle’. According to this, all behaviour of 
organisms, all functions of a living body, are expressions of circular 
acts which include recognition of signs by receptors, actions as 
induced by these recognitions, and perceptions of the results of these 
actions.
Instead of H. Driesch’s entelechy, Uexküll used the notion of Plan 
(Uexküll 1929: 36; this is an interesting point, since it is similar to the 
step made by J. Woodger (1929) and J. Needham (1936), which 
replaced the rational part of entelechy by ‘organising relations’, or 
‘biological organisation’). Plan represents a spatial whole. “Unter 
Regel verstehen wir die Verknüpfung beliebiger Faktoren zu einer 
Einheit. Der Plan ist enger gefaßt und bedeutet bloß die Einheit räum­
licher Beziehungen”7 (Uexküll 1929: 36).
6 The conception developed by Uexküll is not genetic in the sense o f  ‘develop­
mental history’.
7 Under rule we mean the connection o f certain factors into a whole. The plan is 
more strictly defined and means only the whole o f spatial relations.
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Uexküll sees the functional cycle as an active Plan , the Lebens­
faktor, or Mechanisator, which is responsible for an organism’s func­
tions, including its growth and regeneration (Uexküll 1929: 39). “Die 
Funktionsregel selbst ist, die fähig ist, Gefüge zu formen”8 (Uexküll 
1973: 217).
Functional cycles are also a basis for the functioning of cells in 
tissues. “Die lebende Zelle ist der Träger eines eigenen Naturge­
setzes— sie ist ein Autonom. [...] Die lebende Zelle verhält sich 
äußeren Objekten gegenüber nicht als Objekt, sondern als Subjekf9 
(Uexküll 1931: 386).
Thus, Planmäßigkeit is characteristic to Bauplans. “Nicht aus 
Reflexen, sondern aus planvollen Funktionskreisen bestehen die 
Baupläne der Tiere, die zugleich Tier und Umwelt in einer sinnvollen 
Zusammenhang zueinander bringen”10 (Uexküll 1931: 389). “Die 
Planmäßigkeit des Körpergefüges und der Planmäßigkeit des Umwelt­
gefüges stehen einander gegenüber und scheinen sich zu wider­
sprechen”11 (Uexküll 1940: 7). Uexküll sees in this, also, a direct 
continuation of Baer’s views: “Das oberste Gesetz des Lebens, das 
alle Planmäßigkeit in der Zeit planmäßig zusammenfaßt, hat K. E. von 
Baer die ‘Zielstrebigkeit’ genannt”12 (Uexküll 1938: 144). This Baer’s 
term was, much later, replaced by the word ‘teleonomy’ (in order to 
make it acceptable for Darwinian school; cf. Mayr 1988).
Uexküll assumes that “jeder Merkplan einen bestimmten Wirkplan 
induziert”13 (Uexküll 1931: 389). Induktion is the type of interaction 
which is specific to interactions between subjects (whereas the object- 
object interaction is ‘mechanical’, object-to-subject is Reiz, and 
subject-to-object is Impuls; Uexküll 1931: 388). The connection 
between Merkplan and Wirkplan, as well as between subjects, is
The functional rule itself is that, which is able to form structures.
9 The living cell is the carrier o f its own natural law —  she is an autonome. [ ...]  
The living cell does not behave in relation to external objects as an object, but as a 
subject.
10 The Bauplans o f animals do not consist o f reflexes, but o f designed functional 
cycles, which bring both animal and Umwelt into a meaningful connection.
11 The plan o f the body structure and the plan o f the Umwelt structure face 
against and seem to contradict each other.
12 The highest law o f life, which connects all plan in time, has been named 
‘directedness’ by K. E. v. Baer.
13 Every sign plan induces a certain operation plan.
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komplementär (Uexküll 1931: 389); the latter means for Uexküll the 
relationship which is generated by Induktion.
Consequently, the form of organisms is not static, but generative. 
“Die Morphologie kann man kurz die Wissenschaft der Ent­
stehungszeichen nennen, denn ihre Aufgabe ist es, die Lebewesen 
nicht in funktionelle, sondern in genetische Bausteine zu zerlegen”14 
(Uexküll 1973: 226).
It is important to realize that Planmäßigkeit concerns not only 
spatial, but also temporal aspects of organization. “ [...] die Plan­
mäßigkeit nicht bloß das Nebeneinander der Organe im Raum, son­
dern auch ihr Nacheinander in der Zeit beherrscht”15 (Uexküll 1925:
7).
Uexküll follows Caspar Friedrich W olffs epigenetics, and sees the 
creation of new structures as a result of induction both in ontogeny 
and phylogeny. Consequently, he accepts the possibility of saltatory 
evolution, without the existence of all intermediate forms. These are 
similar to transitions from one motif to another in a musical score. 
“Obgleich auch bei Raupe und Schmetterling sowie bei Libellenlarve 
und Libelle die Motive grundverschieden sind, fällt es keinem 
Menschen ein nach Zwischengliedern zu suchen”16 (Uexküll 1943: 2).
Thure von Uexküll (1980: 59) described his father’s evolutionary 
views with the following words: “[...] Evolution [kann] nicht der Weg 
des Zufalls sein, der in einer linearen Zeit durch Versuch und Irrtum 
von unvollkommenen zu besser angepaßten Formen führt, sondern nur 
die Komposition einer großen Symphonie oder eines umfassenden 
Code, einer übergreifenden Planmäßigkeit, welche in den verschie­
denen Umwelten die gleichen Themata in wechselnder Differen­
zierung — aber immer gleicher Vollkommenheit —  variiert.”17
14 Morphology can be shortly defined as a science o f developmental signs, 
whose task is to deconstruct living beings, not into functional, but into genetic 
[generative, generic] elements.
The plan rules not only the arrangement o f organs in space, but also their 
arrangement in time.
16 In the same way that the motives basically differ for caterpillar and butterfly, 
and for dragonfly larva and dragonfly, so it is for human intermediate forms.
17 Evolution cannot be a path o f chance, leading in a linear time through trial and 
error from imperfect to better adapted forms, but rather the composition o f a great 
symphony or an extensive code, a far-reaching plan, which varies the same 
themes in different Umwelten —  in different degrees o f complexity, but always to 
the same perfection.
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The terms from music, which appear here, are not random examp­
les for Uexküll. He saw in them a possibility to express the holistic 
features of living systems. “Alles Körperliche läßt sich mit dem 
Messer zerschneiden — eine Melodie aber nicht”18 (Uexküll 1940: 
51). Over the years, the frequency of music metaphors grew in Uex- 
küll’s texts.
Uexküll distinguished between Anpassung (fitting) and Einpassung 
(matching), preferring the latter in the description of adaptations. He 
criticized the term Anpassung, which has been used to denote the 
adaptation of organisms to the environment (Umgebung) (Uexküll 
1973: 318). “An ihrer Stelle hat die Lehre von der überall gleich voll­
kommenen Einpassung zu treten, die dreifacher Art ist: 1. besteht eine 
Einpassung der Organe und Organteile, die den Körper bilden, in- und 
untereinander; 2. besteht eine Einpassung zwischen Körper und Um­
welt; 3. besteht eine Einpassung der Umwelten untereinander”19 (Uex­
küll 1927: 696). “Wohin wir schauen, erblicken wir [...] komple­
mentäre Einpassungen paarweise aufeinander abgestimmter Um­
welten”20 (Uexküll 1931: 391). According to Uexküll (1973: 319), “es 
gibt kein Mehr oder Weniger bei der Einpassung. Die Einpassung ist 
immer vollkommen, soweit die dem Tier zur Verfügung stehenden 
Mittel reichen.”21
This emphasis on the reciprocity of interactions in living systems is 
an important aspect in understanding Uexküll’s views. This concerns, 
for instance, his approach to the role of symbiosis: “man kann sagen, 
daß grundsätzlich alle Lebewesen zugleich selbstdienlich und fremd- 
dienlich sind”22 (Uexküll 1973: 322).
Uexküll highly appreciated the works of Gregor Mendel and 
August Weismann (Uexküll 1927: 694), but remarked that “so ist die 
theoretische Bedeutung der Mendelschen Entdeckung bis zum
18 All corporeal can be separated with a knife —  but not a melody.
19 Instead, a theory on the accomplished matching (complementarity) is deve­
loped, which includes three types: 1. the matching o f organs and their parts, which 
within and between each other make up the body; 2. the matching o f bodies and 
their environment; 3. the matching o f Umwelten.
20 Wherever we look, we see [ . . .]  the complementary matching o f  pairwise 
mutually harmonised (co-ordinated) Umwelten.
21 There is no more or less in matching. An adaptation is always accomplished, 
as far as it provides a tool for an animal.
22 It can be said that all living beings are at the same time both self-serving and 
else-serving.
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heutigen Tage noch nicht in ihrem vollen Umfange erkannt worden”23 
(Uexküll 1973: 221), and, noted particularly, that Mendel did not 
analyze the development of organisms (Uexküll 1927: 694). In the 
views of Ewald Hering and Richard Semon, Uexküll saw a certain 
support for Ernst Haeckel’s biogenetic law, the former, however, 
being unacceptable to Darwinists due to the vitalistic inclination of 
Semon’s approach (Uexküll 1927: 695).
Understanding the role of genes, he gives the following example. 
“Die Tatsache, daß sowohl kurzhalsige wie langhalsige Säugetiere 
sieben Halswirbel besitzen, beweist, daß die Mutation erst eingesetzt 
hat, nachdem die sieben Sprossen für die Halswirbel bereits fest ange­
legt waren. Eine von solchen Gesichtspunkten ausgehende Stammes­
geschichte wird aber erst dann möglich sein, wenn die Lehre von der 
sprungweisen Einpassung die Lehre von der allmählichen Anpassung 
verdrängt haben wird”24 (Uexküll 1973: 259).
It can be added that Uexküll’s view on species may be interpreted 
as quite close to the contemporary recognition concept of species 
(Paterson 1993; Kull 1992). “Ist die Grenze einer Art gegen die andere 
nur dadurch festgelegt, daß beim Aufeinandertreffen einer allzu 
großen Zahl von abweichenden Genen aus äußeren physiologischen 
Gründen bei der Kreuzung ein lebensfähiges Individuum nicht mehr 
erzeugt werden kann?”25 (Uexküll 1973: 265).
Uexküll leaves his evolutionary views unfinished. As H. Driesch 
(1921: 203) put it: “Warum ändert sich die Melodie? Wir wissen das 
nicht.” For a biosemiotician, this would give an insight to analyse 
the processes of evolutionary change in a way similar to the way one 
would analyse the development of music, sensu lato.
23 The theoretical meaning o f Mendel’s discovery is not yet fully understood.
24 The fact that both short-necked and long-necked mammals have seven 
cervical vertebrae, shows that the mutation first appeared, after the seven 
primordia for cervical vertebrae had already appeared. A phylogeny based on this 
view can be possible after a theory o f  saltatory matching has replaced the theory 
o f gradual fitting.
25 Is a species boundary in relation to some other species drawn only by the fact 
that the interaction o f a large number o f genes due to external physiological 
reasons does not produce a living individual?
26 Why does the melody change? We do not know.
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Concluding remarks
In a typology of views, both synchronic and diachronic divisions 
should be considered.
As synchronic, for instance, A. Lyubischev’s (2000) two great 
lines in the history of philosophy, the line of Democritos and the line 
of Plato, have been described. Similarly, the Darwinian and von 
Baerian biology. Or, why not, a physical versus semiotic biology.
As diachronic, the four ages in the history of philosophical thin­
king according to J. Deely, or the periodization A. Lovejoy introduced 
for interpretation of nature in the ladder-tree-web series. Or, the 
epistemes as described by M. Foucault.
One and the same opposition can also create both — the opposing 
views of contemporaries, and the periods of dominant view — like the 
epigenetic-preformist opposition in biology of many centuries.
Moreover, the typology would be deficient if we would not take 
into account the continualist views to science. This also has both 
synchronic and diachronic dimension. According to the ‘diachronic 
continualism’, the science, e.g., biology, or evolutionism, is either a 
cumulative orjust ever-changing set (or system) of knowledge, where 
the revolutions hardly occur. And according to a ‘synchronic conti- 
nualism’, we just have many versions of understanding simulta­
neously co-existing that do not possess a real hiatus required for 
different types to really exist.
All this considered, it would be attractive to make a more thorough 
inquiry of the fundamental turn in biological understandings that can 
be called ‘an end of modem biology’, or ‘a start of post-modem’.
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Юкскюлл и постмодернистский ЭВОЛЮЦИОНИЗМ
Взгляды на эволюцию Якоба фон Юксюолла рассматриваются на 
фоне тех изменений, которые имели место в семиотическом и биоло­
гическом мышлении с переходом от модернизма к постмодернизму. 
Одной из особенностей постмодернистских интерпретаций живых 
систем является второстепенность эволюционистских объяснений, в 
отличии от модернистской биологии, которая считала эволюцио­
нистское объяснение основным в объяснении биологии. Все же 
эволюционистское объяснение не является обязательным при 
объяснении, например, явления адаптации, так как в этом случае мы 
имеем дело с коммуникативным соответствием (между организмом и 
средой), т.е. с семиотическим явлением.
Uexküll ja uusajajärgne evolutsionismi
Jakob von Uexkülli evolutsioonialaseid vaateid analüüsitakse nende muu­
tuste taustal, mis on leidnud aset semiootilistes ja bioloogilistes aru­
saamades seoses üleminekuga modernismilt postmodernismile. Elussüs- 
teemide postmodernsete tõlgenduste üheks iseäraks on evolutsiooniliste 
seletuste teisejärgulisus, erinevalt hilismodemistlikust bioloogiast, mis 
pidas evolutsioonilist seletust bioloogia peamiseks seletusviisiks. Ometi 
pole evolutsiooniline seletus esmatarvilik näiteks adaptatsiooni seleta­
misel, kuivõrd adaptatsiooni puhul on tegu kommunikatiivse vastavusega 
(organismi ja keskkonna vahel), seega semiootilise nähtusega.
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Abstract. Like other sciences, biosemiotics also has its time-honoured 
archive, consisting, among other things, o f writings by those who have been 
invented and revered as ancestors o f the discipline. One such example is 
Jakob von Uexküll who has been hailed as a precursor o f  semiotics, 
developing his theory o f “sign” and “meaning” independently o f Saussure and 
Peirce. The juxtaposition o f “sign” and “meaning” is revelatory because one 
can equally legitimately claim Uexküll as a hermeneutician in the same way 
as others having claimed him as a semiotician. Such a novel temptation can be 
justified by Uexküll’s prolonged obsession with Sinn and Bedeutung since his 
first book in 1909. This paper attempts to reconstruct the immediate 
intellectual horizon o f Uexküll’s historicity, a discursive space traversed by 
his contemporaries Frege and Husserl, in order to see how Uexküll’s 
discussions o f  Zeichen and Gegenstand, Sinn and Bedeutung, were informed 
by other philosophers o f language, and to establish Uexküll as a pheno­
menological hermeneutician in the tradition o f  Husserl, Heidegger and 
Gadamer. To forestall and counter possible criticism that hermeneutics is 
primarily concerned with textual interpretation, while Uexküll is at most an 
interpreter o f animal life, the paper will discuss his unfinished parody o f the 
Platonic dialogue Meno, which is entitled Die ewige Frage: Biologische 
Variationen über einen platonischen Dialog (1943). It is through such textual 
practice that one witnesses the emergence o f an Uexküll who embodies at 
once the addressee exercising his understanding o f ancient texts as well as the 
second addresser recoding his explanation to another group o f targeted 
addressees. This textual practice already goes beyond the confines o f biology 
and in fact involves the linguistic pragmatics o f rhetoric and speech act.
Like other sciences, biosemiotics also has its time-honoured archive, 
consisting, among other things, of writings by those who have been 
invented and revered as ancestors of the discipline. One such example 
is Jakob von Uexküll. As to the people who “invent” him, they are 
either mediators of semiotic globalisation, like the late Professor 
Thomas A. Sebeok, or de facto  progenitor like Professor Thure von 
Uexküll. Since Sebeok’s seminal promulgation in Semiotica and his 
enthusiastic promotion, the legacy of Uexküll as another precursor of 
semiotics, who had worked independently of Charles Sanders Peirce 
and Ferdinand de Saussure, has become generally known to us. What 
is not known to us, as is the reality of human knowledge, is the fact 
that other people, each from her persuasion, and in her own way, may 
also legitimately claim Jakob von Uexküll. This not only shows the 
wide scope of Jakob’s knowledge, but also raises the thorny issue of 
conflict in interpretations. What I have in mind is hermeneutics, 
whose primary concern is the processing of meaning.
However, one does not invent her ancestor randomly because she 
is always already situated in her disciplinary tradition and can make 
claim only from within that context. Therefore, it is quite natural for a 
historian of biology like Erik Nordenskiöld to label Uexküll as a 
vitalist; Ernst Cassirer to stick to him the sobriquet of Neo-Kantian; 
Hans-Georg Gadamer to summon him to the camp of fellow pheno- 
menologists; and Sebeok to honour him as a founder of semiotics. 
Much as a biosemiotician claims Uexküll, a biohermeneutician like 
Sergey V. Chebanov can lay equally legitimate claim.
To label Uexküll as a hermeneutician, rather than the more accepted 
semiotician, is no easy task. There are several difficulties confronting us, 
but let me point out just two. First, hermeneutics deals with the theory and 
method of understanding, traditionally of text, and through the latter, the 
thought behind it or prior to it. Therefore, it involves the proper decipher­
ment of meaning, supposedly emitted from a source, and thus pre­
supposes continuity between addresser, encoded message, and addressee. 
The procedure of decipherment for what is behind the sign is quite 
different from the heuristics of semiotics, which is more concerned with 
system-specific functionality of sign, e.g., how does the sign process 
rather than what it means.1 Second, Uexküll deals, though not exclusively,
116 Han-liang Chang
It is no accident that I have evoked Paul Ricoeur. The French philosopher 
contrasts two kinds o f human understanding: one is immediate, non-program- 
matic, and subjective, or “Heideggerian” and “Husserlian”; the other is
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with the meaning of animal life rather than text. This categorial shift 
further raises the questions of validity in applying hermeneutics to nature, 
in textualising nature, and, above all, in begging the question of “meaning 
of meaning” to which the biologist addresses himself. Such questions are 
complicated by Uexkiiirs obsession with meaning, since his first book in 
1909, where he observes “each newly discovered fact [...] gain[s] sense 
[Sinn] and significance [Bedeutung]” (Uexküll 1985: 224; Uexküll 1909: 
7), all the way to Bedeutungslehre in 1940.2
methodical and programmatic and claimingly objective. Ricoeur traces this 
distinction to Dilthey’s distinction between understanding and explanation (in his 
words, “a German product”) and interprets the two procedures as hermeneutics 
versus semiotics (1974; 1990). Incidentally, Thure von Uexküll alludes to 
Dilthey’s distinction (1987: 153): “If science is understood as the attempt to 
identify the factors which determine the behavior o f  phenomena in relation to 
each other and toward man, then Dilthey’s famous distinction is no longer valid 
for a theory o f  signs. ‘Explaining’ (Erklären), which according to Dilthey is 
restricted to the natural sciences, becomes identical with ‘understanding’ 
( Verstehen), which he reserved for the human sciences.”
Uexküll’s semiotic project falls into the category o f Ricoeurian explanation in 
his assumption that all animal perception, action, reaction [behaviours] in relation 
to the external world can be explained in terms o f sign processing. The 
teleological nature o f his Bauplan is also interpretative. It parallels the Kantian 
concept o f purposiveness o f nature (Zweck, Zweckmässig), which “represents the 
unique way in which we must proceed in reflection on the object o f nature with 
the aim o f a thoroughly interconnected experience, consequently it is a subjective 
principle (maxim) o f the power o f judgment” (Kant 2000: 71).
While Manfred D. Laubichler alternates between biosemiotics and bio­
hermeneutics (Laubichler 1997a; 1997b), obviously finding it difficult to 
reconcile interpretation and description o f operational processes, Sergey V. Che- 
banov (1993) provides a better hermeneutic model o f interpretation processes (IP) 
in biology and life based on linguistic pragmatics. He prefers the discipline o f  
hermeneutics to semiotics in interpreting, for instance, the interactions o f sensible 
beings and living beings, called enlogue or quasi-dialogue (Chebanov 1993: 225). 
More importantly, he believes biosemiotics is a division o f biohermeneutics: 
“Now, while the hermeneulization o f humanitarian disciplines is being developed 
and some domains o f biosemiotics appear to be involved in it, I find sufficient 
reasons to call this trend ‘biohermeneutics’” (Chebanov 1993: 40).
2 In one o f  his first published book in 1909, Jakob von Uexküll had already 
used the two terms Sinn and Bedeutung together, reminding one o f Frege’s classic 
distinction. “If the organization o f the construction plan is placed at the focus o f  
research for every species, then each newly discovered fact finds its natural place, 
and only thus does it gain sense and significance” (Uexküll 1985: 224) (’’Wird die 
Ausgestaltung des Bauplanes für jede Tierart in den Mittelpunkt der Forschung
Our hermeneutic task is then two-fold: on the one hand, we need 
to reconstruct the conceptual and semantic horizon in which Uexküll’s 
usage of meaning and sign is embedded, and on the other, to carve out 
of his less read writings an image of textual hermeneutician. Re­
garding the latter less known aspect of Uexküll, I refer, in particular, 
to his unfinished parody of the Platonic dialogue Meno, which is 
entitled “Die ewige Frage: Biologische Variationen über einen 
platonischen Dialog” (1943). It is through such textual practice that 
one witnesses the emergence of an Uexküll who embodies at once the 
addressee exercising his understanding of ancient texts as well as the 
second addresser recoding his explanation to another group of targeted 
contemporary German addressees. This textual practice already goes 
beyond the confines of biology and in fact involves the linguistic 
pragmatics of rhetoric and speech act.
As I have pointed out, it is due to Thomas A. Sebeok’s unfailing 
effort of promotion that Jakob von Uexküll as a forerunner of 
semiotics has been accepted and rarely questioned. Although Uexküll 
developed his theory of sign and meaning independently of Saussure 
and Peirce, quite a few scholars have attempted to negotiate him with 
these two founders of semiologie and semeiotic. One of the attempts is 
to draw an analogy between biology and linguistics, using, as model, 
the dual structure of sign consisting of signifiant and signifie, and 
projecting it onto biological phenomena. In this regard, the most 
notable example is none other than Thure von Uexküll. Since the 
linguistic model has been challenged from time to time and even made 
obsolete among certain poststructuralist camps, a few attempts to 
appropriate Peirce have been made, especially the version to establish 
the Peircian link to biology.
Since human thinking is essentially model-bound, whether or not 
the Saussurian and Peircian applications are appropriate is a meta- 
theoretical matter not concerned here, but I am afraid that such 
applications fail to do justice to Uexküll as a forerunner independent 
of Saussure and Peirce. Specifically, the more we think of Uexküll in 
light of the Latinate sign and the Greek semeion, the less can we 
appreciate Uexküll in light of his own conceptual context and the 
tradition to which he belongs. Before addressing myself to the main
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gestellt, so findet jede neuentdeckte Tatsache ihre naturgemässe Stelle, an der sie 
erst Sinn erhält und Bedeutung”) (Uexküll 1909: 7).
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issues, let me mention in passing the terminological problem. For 
instance, the German word Zeichen has been translated, without much 
reflection, into sign in the English version of Theoretical Biology 
(1926) and in the long essay, “Theory of Meaning”, which constitutes 
the main body of the 1982 special issue of Semiotica. It is in the latter 
title that the English word meaning is used indiscriminately for the ill- 
defined Bedeutung. This probably accurate but misleading translation 
has not been clarified, as it should have, not least for its unavoidable 
entanglement, following Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), with Sinn, and to 
a lesser degree, with Zeichen and Vorstellung. Likewise, a key word in 
Uexküll’s system, Merk, which can refer to both mark and perceptual 
sign, as in Merkmal, has not received due attention by semioticians.
1. Sinn or Bedeutung: The Frege-Husserl-Uexküll complex
Anyone familiar with the philosophical context will have already 
detected the ghosts of Gottlob Frege and Edmund Husserl (1859— 
1938) haunting Uexkiill’s writings, maybe without his awareness.3 
I am not suggesting influence, a vague concept —  indeed a non­
issue— that had unfortunately plagued many a comparatist in the 
1960s-1970s. Instead of establishing points of contact showing 
positivistic rigour, we tend to bracket the issue and replace it with a 
more explanatory, albeit no less vague, intertextual space. A cliche 
runs like this: Embedded in her cultural Umwelt, a poet does not need 
to read a Petrarchan sonnet to write one. It is under a similar cultural 
milieu, which witnessed the birth and growth of a scientific discourse 
through the exchange, debates, and brainstorming of such great minds 
as Frege, Husserl, and Wilhelm Dilthey that Uexküll developed his 
theory of sign and meaning at the turn of the twentieth century.
3 Witness what the latter has to say: “Each general name is a sign for a general 
representation, and this, in turn, is a sign for any object that falls under the 
corresponding abstract concept [...]. Furthermore [...] we take any conceptual 
mark (Merkmal) —  so far as it serves, precisely, as a distinguishing mark —  to be 
a sign” (“Jeder allgemeine Name ist ein Zeichen für eine allgemeine Vorstellung, 
und diese wiederum ist ein Zeichen für jeden der Gegenstände, welche unterden 
korrespondierenden abstrakten Begriff fallen [...] Des weiteren gilt uns [...] jades 
begriffliche Merkmal, sofern es eben als Merkmal dient, als Zeichen”) (in 
German, Husserl 1970: 340; in English, Husserl 1994: 20-21).
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In the following, I will situate Uexküll in his immediate discursive 
context by evoking his contemporaries and predecessors Frege and 
Husserl. It is generally agreed that Uexküll’s major contribution to 
theoretical biology and semiotics lies in his theory of meaning, that is, 
theory of meaning in life, which can be called, as with his titles 
Bedeutungslehre (1940) and Der Sinn des Lebens (1947); it also lies 
in his reinstatement of the idealistic, subjective paradigm of biology. 
Now it is due to Frege’s renowned “puzzle” on the distinction 
between Sinn and Bedeutung that modem theory of meaning, in 
particular logical semantics, has come into being. And Husserl’s 
discussion of the subjective lived experience {Erlebnis) has given rise 
to the rich phenomenological tradition that includes Martin Heidegger 
and Hans-Georg Gadamer, all of whom have discussed the concepts of 
Dasein and Umwelt to different extent, with Gadamer explicitly 
evoking Uexküll in his masterpiece.4 In the pages that follow, I will
4 For Husserl’s discussion o f Umwelt and Vorstellung, see, for instance, his 
1934 essay, “Foundational Investigations o f the Phenomenological Origin o f the 
Spatiality o f  Nature” (Husserl 1982: 222-234). Here Umwelt is defined as “the 
surrounding world” (222). Heidegger devotes lengthy discussion to Umwelt in his 
Being and Time (Sein und Zeit 1927) (1963: 66ff, English, 1962: 93ff)- According 
to him, “That world o f  everyday Dasein which is closest to it, is the environment" 
(94). (“Die nächste Welt des alltäglichen Daseins is die Umwelf' (66).) For 
Husserl and Heidegger, the prefix o f urn suggests both “around”, as in Umsicht, 
and the more “intentional” preposition “for” as in Umgang. The two philosophers 
used the world Umwelt probably after Uexküll, and each with a Gegenentwurf, 
i.e., shifting the focus from animal world to human world. Kluge: Etymologisches 
Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache (2002: 24) gives the word’s 19th-century 
Danish origin, but identifies its conceptualization by Uexküll in 1909.
In Gadamer's Truth and Method the author alludes to Jakob von Uexküll and 
praises his alternative attitude to scientific study (Gadamer 1994: 451; 1986: 455): 
“[...] Thus, for example, the environmental studies (die Umweltforschung) o f  the 
biologist von Uexküll contrasted the world o f physics to a universe o f life 
composed o f the manifold living worlds o f plants, animals, and men. Such 
biological inquiry claims to overcome the naive anthropocentricity o f the earlier 
study o f animals by investigating the particular structures o f the habitats 
(Baupläne der Umwelten) in which living things have their being. Like animal 
environments (Umwelten) the human world is built o f elements that are available 
to human senses (menschlichen Sinnen). If ‘worlds’ are to be thought o f  as 
biological plans, however, this not only assumes the existence o f  the world o f 
being-in-itself that is made available through physics, in that one is working out 
the selective principles according to which the various creatures construct their 
worlds out o f material that “exists in itse lf’; it also derives the biological universe
briefly discuss Frege’s and Husserl’s use of Sinn, Bedeutung, and 
Zeichen to see how such concepts may have either informed or 
crisscrossed with Uexküll’s theory of “meaning” and “sign.”
According to Kalevi Kull’s bibliography (Kull 2001: 16), Uex- 
küll’s first essays were published in 1892.5 The same year saw the 
publication of Frege’s article on Sinn and Bedeutung in Zeitschrift für  
Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, and in the previous year, 1891, 
Frege and Husserl had had correspondence on the semantic issue 
involving common name or concept word, with particular reference to 
the terms that concern us here (Frege, “Letter to Husserl, 24.5, 1891,” 
in Frege 1997: 149-150). Most critics have suggested that Husserl’s 
use of similar concept was under Frege’s influence, though recent 
discoveries show that Husserl might have borrowed such terms from 
other sources. Very probably both Frege and Husserl had drawn upon 
identical materials, including contemporary logic, and were under the 
general influence of Kant. In 1890 Husserl published an article 
entitled “On the Logic of Signs (Semiotic)” [“Zur Logik der Zeichen 
(Semiotik)”]. The article is of historical importance. For one thing, it 
might have given birth to an alternative but aborted tradition of 
semiotics. For another, it anticipated Uexkiill’s concept of signs. A re­
reading of Husserl on sign may put Uexküll in a different perspective 
from semiotics.
It would be interesting to compare the three philosophers’ theories 
of meaning and sign. Incidentally, the title of one of Uexküll’s major 
writings, Bedeutungslehre, can mean both “theory of meaning” in 
general and “semantics” in particular. For all the profusion of signs 
throughout his work, Uexküll’s contribution to theoretical biology has 
much to do with his theory of meaning. In fact, it would be negligent 
not to presuppose some kind of discursive rapport between Uexküll 
and Frege and Husserl regarding their discussions of meaning. The 
relationship of the three thinkers can be represented as an inverted
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from the physical universe by a kind o f restyling, and it indirectly assumes the 
existence o f the latter. Certainly this constitutes a new kind o f inquiry. It is a line 
of research generally known today as behavioral biology. Logically it would 
embrace the human species as well.” In order to fully appreciate Gadamer's 
representation o f Uexküll and his approach to biology, one needs to situate the 
statement in the larger context o f philosophical hermeneutics.
5 Thure von Uexküll (1980: 403) identifies the two 1892 essays in Zeitschrift 
für Biologie 28 as 1891.
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pyramid (Fig. 1). Chronologically, Uexküll appears later on the vertex 
of this inverted triangle, the other two angles being occupied by the 
Husserl of “On the Logic of Signs (Semiotic)” dated 1890 (Husser- 
liana 12: 340-373), and the Frege of “On Sinn and Bedeutung” dated 
1892 (Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 100: 25- 
50). Both work anticipated Uexküll’s discussions of meaning and 
sign, dating from 1909.
Figure 1. Uexküll, Frege, and Husserl.
In the following I will briefly negotiate the Uexküllian theory of 
Bedeutung, the Fregean distinction of Sinn and Bedeutung, and the 
Husserlian concept of noematic Sinn. My purpose is to show how 
Uexküll’s use of terms, including the ubiquitous Zeichen, is very 
much concerned with the interpreted sense of hermeneutics. This 
applies to his interpretation of living organisms as well as his textual 
hermeneutics. For the latter, I will analyse one relatively obscure text 
which is a parody of Plato’s dialogue The Meno, co-authored by Jakob 
and Thure, and by so doing attempt to show another unknown Uexküll 
as a hermeneutician of classics.
But let me begin with Frege. The theoretical implication of Frege 
in modem semiotics is yet to be explored, although his legacy on 
analytical philosophy cannot be denied. Semioticians in general have 
avoided him probably because of the bias that semiotics and logic are 
incompatible. Whereas logic is concerned with truth and the procedure 
of its acquisition, semiotics is interested in exploring an “alternative” 
truth, not confined to referentiality. Even Peirce, who equates logic to 
semeiotic, asserts abduction as a privileged semiotic reasoning rather 
than induction and deduction.
Husserl 
(Semiotik 1890)
Frege
(Sinn und Bedeutung 1892)
Uexküll
(Umwelt und Innenwelt... 1909; 
Bedeutungslehre 1940)
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In his seminal essay on Sinn and Bedeutung, Frege begins by 
talking about equivalence as represented by algebraic equation. 
Following Kant, he argues that a = a is tautological or “analytic,” and 
a = b is more complicated and tricky than it appears. The latter gives 
rise to the thorny issue of name and reference, concept and object, or 
in semiotic parlance, signans and signatum, signifiant and signifie. In 
the first analytic equation, a and b as names are not equal but they can 
be made so because of their identical extension. Furthermore, if the 
extensions of two terms are identical, then there is no reason why the 
equation cannot be reversed to suggest that a and b as names are also 
equivalent. Therefore, in the purely nominal sense, there is an aporia 
in a = b and a ^ b .
Take Frege’s own example. The morning star (Morgenstern) 
refers to the planet Venus and the evening star (Abendstern) to the 
same planet. Now one could say that their references are identical, but 
the reverse is not true because the morning star Ф the evening star. 
From the point of view of logical semantics, the two Zeichen, each 
with its Sinn, share one Bedeutung. A naive conflation of semantics 
with semiotics would take the morning star as signifiant 1, and the 
evening star as signifiant 2, and the two signifiants share one signifie. 
But from the semiotic point of view, the morning star as Zeichen or 
sign already consists of an inseparable pair signifiant / signifie, the 
sensible and the intelligible. Put in Saussurian terms, the acoustic 
picture, i.e., the signifiant [abntjtdm] points to its semantic content of 
{Abendstern}, or signifie. Let us see how Frege defines the 
relationship of expression and content in his famous puzzle.
It is natural, now, to think o f there being connected with a sign (name, 
combination o f words, written mark), besides that which the sign designates, 
which may be called the Bedeutung o f  the sign, also what I should like to call 
the Sinn o f the sign, wherein the mode o f presentation is contained. (Frege 
1960:152)
(Es liegt nun nahe, mit einem Zeichen [Namen, Wortverbindung, Schrift­
zeichen] ausser dem Bezeichneten, was die Bedeutung [des Zeichens heissen 
möge, noch das verbunden zu denken, was ich den Sinn des Zeichens nennen 
möchte, worin die Art des Gegebenseins enthalten ist.]) (Frege 1892: 27)
Frege here seems to be suggesting a triad consisting of Zeichen, Sinn, 
and Bedeutung. But in fact, the Bedeutung is exterior to the Zeichen 
rather than interior of it, especially when it stands for a referent or 
object, whether be the Zeichen a proper noun or a common noun.
There is no such intrinsic semiotic relationship as among the Saus- 
surian signifiant and signifie or the Peircian representamen, object, 
and interpretant. But does Frege grant motivation to the relationship 
between Zeichen and Sinn and Bedeutung? It is not surprising that he 
doesn’t. Instead, he argues that the relationship between Zeichen and 
Bedeutung is arbitrary, and as such one cannot reverse Bedeutung to 
Zeichen because of the interference o f mode of presentation (Art des 
Gegebenseins) contained in the Sinn (Frege 1960: 152). Moreover, a 
Sinn may not point to a Bedeutung, insofar as the latter means a 
referent (ibidA53). Here Frege anticipates Saussure’s famous argu­
ment of the arbitrariness of the sign.
Frege has been much acclaimed by members of literary com­
munity because of his assertion that the Sinne of morning star and 
evening star are different, despite their shared Bedeutung. The poet, 
for one, is especially pleased for the license which enables her to 
relate the Fregean Sinn to the affective function of language 
expression. The same may not yet be true with the semiotician, as I 
have tried to demonstrate above, before she can clarify satisfactorily 
the conflation of semiotics and semantics in a statement as follows.
The regular connection between a sign, its Sinn and its Bedeutung is o f such 
a kind that to the sign there corresponds a definite Sinn and to that in turn a 
definite Bedeutung, while to a given Bedeutung (an object [einem 
Gegenstände]) there does not belong only a single sign. The same Sinn has 
different expressions in different languages or even in the same language. 
(Frege 1892)
The difficulty of the passage, especially the latter part, lies in linguistic 
and semiotic trespassing. Because of system-specificity, no identical 
Sinn can be shared by different expressions in different languages, nor 
can a Bedeutung as object subsume more than one sign.
We can agree with Frege on the following. Every word, phrase, 
proposition has a sense (Sinn) and its meaning and/or reference 
(Bedeutung). In the case of proper noun, such as Angela, it has a sense 
whether etymological or otherwise. We all know Angela is a female 
angel, but normally Angela also refers to an individual person. The 
person referred to is the word’s reference or referent and therefore its 
object. In this case Bedeutung refers to designation (Bezeichnung) 
rather than meaning. In the case of a common noun or in Frege’s 
words, “concept word,” the word has both a sense and reference
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(referent) but it does not have an object. Two kinds of relationships 
are involved here, one is subordination, and the other is subsumption. 
Since the verbal semantic of a word, namely Sinn, may lead to a 
concept and/or an object, one needs to discuss the intensional and 
extensional qualities of the concept and/or object. These relationships 
can be illustrated by Frege’s diagram in his letter to Husserl in 1891 
(Frege 1997: 149) (Fig. 2).
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proposition proper name concept word [common name]
i 1 1
Sinn Sinn Sinn
of the of the of the
proposition proper name concept word
(thought) [Gedanken]
i I i
Bedeutung Bedeutung Bedeutung object [Gegenstand]
of the of the of the falling under
proposition proper name concept word the concept
(truth value) (object) (concept)
Figure 2. Sinn and Bedeutung in Frege’s diagram — in his letter to 
Husserl in 1891 (Frege 1997: 149).
We can see from the diagram that the heart of the puzzle lies in the 
possible confusion of object and concept, both being represented by 
the ambivalent Bedeutung. Whereas the proper name “Angela” stands 
for the woman bearing that name despite its Sinn, a common name is 
seen by Frege as a concept word and stands for a concept rather than 
an object. I think Frege’s answer to Husserl is crucial to our under­
standing of Uexküll, as I will argue later.
About the same time when Frege coined the distinction, other 
people were talking about similar concepts in similar terms. Husserl, 
for one, used these terms in his early writings on arithmetic and logic, 
and later on his analysis of human experience in the world. To Husserl 
there is little distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung, and he had used 
them interchangeably.6 It is in the 1913 book Ideas that he proposes a
6 Although Husserl uses both words, he does distinguish Sinn and Bedeutung, 
holding the one to be sensory and the other mental and conceptual. Later he
distinction: Bedeutung refers to meaning at the conceptual level, and 
“more particularly in the complex speech-form ‘ logical' or ‘ex­
pressing’ meaning” while Sinn, in its more embracing breadth of 
application, refers to sense or “meaning simpliciter''' (Husserl 1931 
[reprint 2002: 346]). Husserl’s concept of language is more 
complicated because of its involvement with human psychical 
experiences and intersubjectivity. Before talking about Husserl’s 
concepts of noematic Sinn and content in relation to Uexküll, I will 
first allude to his 1890 essay on “semiotik”.
Very little about the semantic distinction is discussed here except 
that while Sinn represents the sensual aspect of expression, Bedeutung 
its conceptual aspect. When discussing the composite or indirect 
signs, Husserl does distinguish bedeutet from bezeichnet: “In the case 
of indirect signs it is necessary to distinguish: that which the sign 
signifies (bedeutet) and that which it denotes (bezeichnet). With direct 
signs the two coincide” (Husserl 2002: 23). In his later writings, 
however, Husserl retains only the pair of bedeuten /Bedeutung and 
extends Sinn to the totality of the noematic experience (Derrida 1982: 
162; see footnote 6).
We restrict our glance exclusively to “meaning” (Bedeutung), and “meaning 
something” (Bedeuten). Originally these words relate only to the sphere of 
speech, that o f  “expression.” But it is almost inevitable, and at the same time 
an important step for knowledge, to extend the meaning o f these words, and 
to modify them suitably so that they may be applied in a certain way to the 
whole noetico-noematic sphere, to all acts, therefore, whether these are 
interwoven with expressive acts or not. With this in view we ourselves, when 
referring to any intentional experiences, have spoken all along o f “Sinn” 
(sense), a word which is generally used as an equivalent for “Bedeutung” 
(meaning). We propose in the interests o f distinctness to favour the word 
Bedeutung (meaning at the conceptual level) when referring to the old 
concepts, and more particularly in the complex speech-form “logical” or 
“expressing” meaning. We use the word Sinn (Sense or Meaning simpliciter) 
in future, as before, in its more embracing breadth o f application. (Husserl 
1931 [reprint 2002: 346])
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observes: “Let us start from the familiar distinction between the sensory, the so to 
speak bodily aspect o f expression, and its non-sensory ‘mental’ aspect. There is 
no need for us to enter more closely into the discussion o f  the first aspect, nor 
upon the way o f uniting the two aspects [...]”.
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As can be seen from the last quotation, the writer’s main concern in 
the “Semiotik” essay is the nature and function of sign. According to 
Husserl, a Zeichen (that is, a symbolic or inauthentic sign) can 
represent an object (Objekt or Gegenstand) by virtue of a Merkmal, 
which is an intensional property, a distinguishing mark, a charac­
teristic of the object, and is itself a sign, as the author terms it, a 
Merkzeichen. (Husserl 1994: 20-21; 1970: 30-341). The idea of 
marking or noticing suggests the sign user’s conscious act upon an 
intended object, wherein lies the quality that catches his attention. 
Even here one already notices Husserl’s emphasis on the role of the 
perceiving subject — a theme which he develops in his subsequent 
works and which is congenial to Uexkiill’s concept of animal’s 
attitude towards its environment, albeit with a qualitative and species 
leap! But at the same time, Husserl believes that the characteristic 
which identifies an object for the perceiving subject and hence the 
sign that represents it is intrinsic to the object. This eclectic stance 
compromises his sign theory and makes it essentially transitive. One 
may recall in the opening of the essay his false distinction between 
authentic concept that does not need the mediation of signs and the 
inauthentic concept which can be represented only by signs.
Husserl provides a typology of signs to represent inauthentic 
concepts. It consists of half dozen pairs: (1) Extrinsic versus con­
ceptual signs, where the former is what Frege means by proper noun, 
such as the name, and the latter is noted for its distinguishing 
Merkmal', (2) univocal versus multivocal signs, an instance of the 
latter being the general name for a concept; (3) simple versus 
composite signs; (4) direct versus indirect signs; (5) identical versus 
non-identical, or equivalent versus non-equivalent signs; (6) con­
ventional versus natural signs; (7) formal versus material signs; (8) 
natural versus artificial signs. With minor revision, some of these 
categories actually address the Fregean distinction between proper 
name and common name. More importantly, they point to a common 
feature by virtue of which something can stand for, in Husserl’s word, 
“deputize” or act as “surrogate” something else (aliquid stat pro  
aliquo). What is it? Husserl believes there is homogeneity between 
sign and object in that they share identical property and/or the sign 
may give rise to psychical processes or activities leading to this
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property. The concept that sign and what it denotes or designates are 
homogeneous is a popular concept in traditional semiotics. Likewise, 
few of us would deny that the observer and the observed are homo­
geneous.
Husserl’s analysis of Zeichen, which he refers especially to 
symbolism in logic, includes no doubt language, and he believes that 
the linguistic sign as an instrument of inference carries corresponding 
psychical and symbolic aspects (Husserl 2002: 43). As an inauthentic, 
conventional, deputizing and surrogate sign system, language has only 
a secondary and subservient role to play, namely, “to serve as marks 
for remembering, as sensuous supports for psychical activities, as 
instruments of communication and conversation, and the like” (ibid. 
44). Although he concedes that “ [b]y far the largest part of symbolic 
representations and judgment processes rests upon language,” 
nonetheless he observes that “linguistic signs quite certainly were not 
invented for this purpose, but rather to enable people to interact with 
one another” (ibid. 45). Obviously, Husserl, like Uexküll, is not 
interested in language, but how does he talk about meaning?
The Husserlian equivocation of Zeichen and Merkmal parallels 
Uexküll’s later usage in his description of functional circle. He uses 
Sinn as two terms freely and interchangeably. Unlike Sinn in Frege, 
where it stands for meaning and only implicitly thought (Danken), for 
Husserl, Sinn is both a linguistic and perceptual entity, whose point of 
departure and return is human subjectivity. We use language to intend 
an object. This intentional use of language involves an act and its 
sense is what Husserl terms “noematic Sinn,” and the object intended 
by this consciously linguistic act is Objekt (intentional object) or
7 In virtue o f the fact that the deputizing signs (changing from moment to 
moment in relation to the same fact) either include in themselves, as a partial 
content, precisely the property upon which the momentary interest bears, or at 
least possess the aptitude to serve as the beginning or connecting point for 
psychical processes or activities which would lead to this property —  or even to 
the full concept involved —  and which we can arouse and produce wherever it 
may be required. If, for example, we are concerned with the concept o f a sphere, 
then, like a flash, there appears with the word the representation o f a ball, in 
which the shape along is specifically attended to. This accompanying represen­
tation, whose property crudely approximates to the intended concept and thereby 
symbolizes it, may then disappear once again, leaving only the word remaining. 
But its appearance nonetheless suffices in order to secure us in a confident grasp 
o f the subject involved. (Husserl 2002: 31-32)
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Gegenstand which actually refers to “objective meaning”. The pheno­
menological problem how to move from the immanent of conscious­
ness to the transcendent external world can be solved, suggests 
Husserl, by an analysis how an object comes to have meaning for 
consciousness, and how consciousness relates to the object. This 
procedure is called intentional analysis, or the analysis of the 
constitution of meaning.
There is continuity between the subjective consciousness, its use 
of language on the object in external world, one could say. Compared 
with Frege, who is interested in logic’s semantic procedure, Husserl is 
interested in the human subject’s experience in and relationship to the 
world in which he lives. This kind of relation of “consciousness to an 
objectivity” is a phenomenological problem, and the problem has its 
“noematic aspect”. Husserl asserts, “The noema in itself has an 
objective relation, through its own proper ‘meaning’” (Husserl 2002: 
360). The double nature of noema, with a nucleus and changing 
characters, enables the “meaning” of consciousness to transmit itself 
to the “object”, that is, its own object, whilst remaining the same 
(Husserl 2002: 360). In short, every noema has a “‘content,’ namely, 
its ‘meaning’ (Sinn) and is related through it to ‘its’ objecf’ 
(Gegenstand) (Husserl 2002: 361).
This kind of analysis of noematic Sinn (i.e., meaning-component 
of an act), of highlighting the act of meaning-giving, of attributing 
sense to an object, is what Paul Ricoeur identifies as the subjective 
paradigm of knowledge, traceable to Dilthey but without the latter’s 
scientistic pretension for objectivity. Whereas in Ricoeur’s historio­
graphy, the two procedures of understanding and explanation are 
curiously identified with hermeneutics and semiotics (1990), Uexküll 
does not separate understanding and explanation, but his interpretive 
project in terms of sign, Husserlian or otherwise, shows his attempt at 
blurring the distinction, and maybe that of Naturwissenschaften and 
Geisteswissenschften. Ricoeur, though apparently not aware of 
Uexküll, may find it difficult to attribute Uexküll to either category. 
The biologist’s project may be attributed to the category of 
explanation in his assumption that all animal perception and action in 
relation to the external world can be explained in terms of the 
operational procedure of sign processing. But at the same time, this 
Husserlian interest in Erlebnis, though of animal kingdom, including 
us homo sapiens and homo signans, and the teleological nature of his
17
Bauplan, not short of reminiscence of the Kantian purposiveness of 
nature (Zweck, Zweckmässig) (Kant 2000: 71), is hermeneutical and 
phenomenological.
I am aware this is not the occasion to rehearse Uexküll on sign. 
Some carping formalists may find his semiotics failing to provide a 
rigorous theoretical model, an analytical tool as discovery procedure, 
despite the fact that the functional circle is self-explanatory. It works 
perfectly well as a top-down hermeneutic perceptual model whilst 
short of bottom-up analytical instrumentality. Furthermore, his 
concepts of sign and meaning are elusive and vague. For this reason, 
he is sometimes criticized for being anthropocentric, in other words, 
of treating animals as human subjects. I would say it is here that 
Uexküll sees eye to eye with Husserl although one is concerned with 
animals, the other with human beings.
Uexküll can be said to have followed Husserl in affirming the 
subjective paradigm, e.g., living organisms’ intentional act on the 
objects of their environment. However, he does not care much about 
the Husserlian noematic Sinn, and less the Fregean verbal Sinn, but 
takes a cue from Kant and Johannes Müller to refer Sinn to the 
immediately sensational aspect, on both the physiological and 
psychological levels. As with Husserl, there is continuity between this 
sensational Sinn and the intended object. The articulation of this 
physio-psychological sense in language, i.e., linguistic Sinn and its 
transposition onto animals, is what he calls Bedeutung, as in “Bedeu­
tung des Gegenstandes” (1928: 86). Incidentally, the word came to be 
used rather late: the index to the second edition of Theoretische 
Biologie (1928) shows that the word Bedeutung is used only once 
(twice on the same page), compared with Zeichen for seven times, 
Sinneszeichen for eight times, and other Sinnes- prefixed words for 
forty times.
One critic has pointed out the close relationship between the 
Husserlian concept of intentionality via noematic Sinn and the 
Fregean concept of Bedeutung via Sinn. (McTintyre: 220). One may 
wish to extend this analogy by relating the Uexküllian Bedeutung to 
the Husserlian noematic Sinn, but before the Husserlian Sinn, there is 
the purely sensational, instinctual, and non-lingual Uexküllian Sinn. 
This transference from the sensational Sinn to the intended object 
constitutes the Bedeutung of Umwelt. Take a well-known example. 
The tick waiting for its mammalian prey (food-function), not
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“knowing” exactly what will appear next illustrates the Hursselian/ 
Uexkiillian “act” ’s non-specific “phenomenological content”. Further 
analysis of Uexküll’s cognitive and pragmatic universe in terms of the 
Husserlian Merkmal, Zeichen, content-qualities, horizon, etc., and the 
Heideggerian hermeneutic circle is beyond the scope of this paper, but 
will be provided in a sequel on another occasion. Now let me turn to 
the Platonic parody.
2. A biological parody: Uexküll as textual hermeneutician
Jakob von Uexküll annotates the title of his adaptation of Plato’s 
Meno in a footnote which reads as follows:
The reinterpretation o f Nature by biology, which will prevail in spite o f all 
obstacles, has brought our thinking closer to antiquity, giving us the chance to 
reinvigorate our perused terminology with the help o f the resources to be 
found in the thoughts o f the greatest minds o f mankind. The way to Plato thus 
being cleared, I perceived the idea to seek enlightenment on pressing biolo­
gical questions from the great Sage. As means to this end, I chose to make 
Socrates continue one o f his dialogues, with the adjustment o f giving him the 
knowledge o f our contemporary biological problems. Thus some kind o f  
interaction between the Ancients and ourselves is created, to our considerable 
benefit. (Uexküll, Uexküll 1943: 126)8
This apologia pro sua has profound implications for anyone familiar 
with the hermeneutic tradition of textual interpretation. There is no 
need to reiterate the commonplace that translation, following explana­
tion, is an integral part of textual hermeneutics. And in the modem 
tradition of philosophical hermeneutics since Heidegger — rather than 
Schleiermacher, the fusion of horizons has become a trendy notion, a 
critical term, that is, first articulated by Husserl but later refined by 
Gadamer and put to use in literary criticism by Hans Robert Jauss of 
the next generation.
Jakob von Uexküll’s interest in recontextualising classical texts is 
seen on many occasions. A more familiar case is the motto with which 
he prefaces the famous Bedeutungslehre booklet. The English 
translation has for mysterious reasons deleted the word “Motto” and 
the source: “Übersetzt von Karl Kindt, Platon Brevier. Karl Rauch
The translation was done by Edgar Vögel.
Verlag.” Maybe Professor Sebeok, as hermeneutician supervising the 
translation, did not find the information important for semioticians, 
but I believe it is indispensable to any serious Uexküll scholar, not 
only one who is interested in archaeology, and for that matter, a 
Uexküllian archive, but also for someone trying to establish Uexküll 
as a rhetorician and polemist. Before returning to the Meno variation, 
let me essay an exegesis of the Motto and the dramatic scene the 
writer sets for his audience and himself.
The Motto is taken from Plato’s late dialogue The Sophist which 
deals, among other things, with the problematic of representing truth, 
both by language and visual art. In a recent paper, I have discussed the 
issue of iconicity in the dialogue in relation to Peirce (Chang 2003). In 
a strong sense, the dialogue is a debate over the pros and cons of 
iconic sign, but this is not the occasion to rehearse it. The Motto 
Uexküll quotes is a transition in the dialogue at which point conver­
sation alludes to the myth of the Battle of Giants, which actually is a 
burlesque of the debate on the ontology of the universe by two camps 
of natural philosophers, the materialists and the idealists. It should be 
clear now why Uexküll uses this ancient fable inserted into the 
dialogue of The Sophist as his Motto. There is an analogy between the 
ancient fabulous debate and the current debate between the vitalists 
and mechanists. I am not saying Uexküll is a member of either camp, 
or for that matter, of any one of the four camps, past and present. But 
one should not fail to notice this dialogic answerability dear to 
Gadamer.
The interesting thing about the Motto is what immediately 
follows, that is, Uexküll’s dramatic point of attack that opens his 
discourse on meaning. His discourse opens as a Socratic defense, 
familiar to anyone who has read the early dialogues of Plato, simply 
called the Socratic Dialogues, after the protagonist, especially The 
Apology, Crito, and Phaedo. Jakob’s (or in literature we would say his 
persona’s) stance is exactly like that of Socrates who is accused of 
corrupting Athenian youths by preaching falsehood. I know very little 
German, but my informants, including a native German-speaking 
professor of linguistics originally from Humboldt University, have 
told me the stylistic difference in the original German version and the 
white-washed English translation. Why Jakob displays this kind of 
archaic martyr complex when summoned to the law court is beyond 
my comprehension and I believe any of my biologist colleagues is
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more competent than myself to hazard an answer. Given the tone, said 
much harsher in German, there is no denying that Uexküll is a fellow- 
traveller of ancient rhetors, and in this case, a Socrates-surrogate.
Now back to the “Eternal Question” dialogue. Jakob puts it mo­
destly in the footnote cited above that he has put biology into 
Socrates’ mouth. In the sense of disciplinary history, his observation is 
accurate, but there is no accident in this world of causality. Let me 
make and take another excursion. We all know Aristotle is a 
forerunner of life science, but nothing significant can be said about 
Plato and still less about Socrates. Let me prove that the historian is 
wrong.
According to Erik Nordenskiöld — a source for Cassirer, “Nature 
did not interest him [Socrates] in least; the streets of Athens were his 
haunt, he said, and neither trees nor stones had anything to teach him” 
(1935: 31). I think the author simply had not read enough —  his 
ignorance of Chinese botanical science long before Linnaeus’ classi­
fication is another example. I suspect that Jakob’s letting Socrates 
discuss biology is not groundless. This parody by the Uexküll’s is also 
prefaced by a Motto, taken not from The Meno, the dialogue to be 
parodied, but from The Phaedo. I am afraid that not many people know 
that it is in this farewell dialogue that Socrates makes a confession, not 
to committing crime of seduction, but to giving up biology in youth. 
Shortly before his drinking the poison, Socrates tells Cebes:
When I was young, Cebes, I had an extraordinary passion for that branch o f  
learning which is called natural science. I thought it would be marvelous to 
know the causes for which each thing comes and ceases and continues to be. I 
was constantly veering to and fro, puzzling primarily over this sort o f  
question. Is it when heat and cold produce fermentation, as some have said, 
that living creatures are bred? Is it with the blood that we think, or with the air 
or the fire that is in us? Or is it none o f these, but the brain that supplies our 
senses o f hearing and sight and smell, and from these that memory and 
opinion arise, and from memory and opinion, when established, that 
knowledge comes? Then again I would consider how these faculties are lost, 
and study celestial and terrestrial phenomena, until at last I came to the 
conclusion that I was uniquely unfitted for this form o f inquiry. (Plato, 
Phaedo 96a-c)
Socrates admits to being unable to study natural science, including life 
science, because, among other things, he cannot solve the mystery of 
origin, growth (96d) and causality (97d). Out of this Darwinian
frustration, he turned from “natural philosophy” to philosophy proper 
and eventually cost his life.
With this, we turn to the Uexküllian biological variations. The 
topic that launches the debate in The Meno is the Greek virtue of arete 
or excellence in worldly affairs, but, as I have argued elsewhere, 
Socrates’ main concern is the paradox of learning in life (Chang 
2002). Socrates’ interlocutor is Meno, follower of the famous sophist 
Gorgias. In the course of refuting Meno with his famous strategy of 
elenchos, Socrates turns to a slave boy of Meno’s, engaging him to a 
series of Q&A. Socrates uses geometry to test the slave boy’s 
immanent intelligence, and succeeds in demonstrating that human 
intelligence is an in-bom ability of inference, and it cannot be taught. 
Now it is immediately at this turning point to the original Platonic 
denouement that Uexküll inserts biology to prolong the torture of that 
hapless slave boy. Characteristically, Uexküll again makes a qualita­
tive species jump, this time from human immanent intelligence to 
animal instinct, as he is to develop in the space that follows. This 
echoes his shift, in theoretical writings, from Husserlian human con­
sciousness to animal cognition, both to him being immanent.
Our hermeneutic exegesis is not completed yet. There remains 
one final question on that eternal question of life: Why does Uexküll 
insert biology after geometry? The answer cannot be easier. Why? He 
is a biologist! But again we need to situate the question in Western 
disciplinary history. One recalls that Kant in Critique o f  the Power o f  
Judgment opens his “Analytic of the Teleological Power of Judgment” 
(5: 362, Kant 2000: 235) by geometry, and he praises Plato for the 
Greek philosopher’s knowledge of geometry (Ibid., 236). According 
to Cassirer, in Die Lebenslehre Uexküll juxtaposes geometry and 
biology. Since I have not been able to locate the original, let me quote 
indirectly from Cassirer:
The real analogue to the concept o f biological form is not to be found in the 
world o f material things or processes with which physics is concerned, but 
must be sought elsewhere, in the pure relationships o f  geometry and 
stereometry.
Structure is not a material thing: it is the unity o f immaterial relationships 
among the parts o f an animal body. Just as plane geometry is the science not 
o f the material triangles drawn on a blackboard with chalk but o f the 
immaterial relationships between the three angles and three sides o f material 
parts united in a body so as to reconstitute the structure in imagination. 
(Uexküll 1930: 9)
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Cassirer adds, “With that view the program of ‘idealistic morphology’ 
[proposed by Goethe] was being thoroughly resurrected” (Cassirer 
1950:200).
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Семиотик или герменевтик: Якоб фон Юкскюлл
Подобно другим наукам, биосемиотика также имеет свой истори­
ческий архив, в котором содержатся работы основателей дисципли­
ны. Одним из таких является Якоб фон Юкскюлл, которого называли 
первопроходцем семиотики, так как он, независимо от Соссюра и 
Пирса, развивал теорию знака и значения. Сопоставление ‘знака’ и 
‘значения’ при этом весьма существенно, ведь получается, что с 
равным основанием можно Юкскюлла считать как семиотиком так и 
герменевтиком. Такой новый подход оправдывается продолжитель­
ным интересом Юкскюлла к понятиям ‘смысл’ (Sinn) и ‘значение’ 
(Bedeutung), начало которого отражено в одной из его первых книг в 
1909 году. Данная статья пытается восстановить непосредственный 
интеллектуальный “исторический горизонт” Юкскюлла, то дискур­
сивное пространство, в котором находились его современники Гус­
серль и Фреге. В частности, предполагается выяснить, как повлияли 
другие философы языка на размышления Юкскюлла над знаком 
(Zeichen) и объектом (Gegenstand), смыслом (Sinn) и значением 
(Bedeutung), и как Юкскюлл (в качестве феноменологического 
герменевтика) вписывается в традицию Гуссерля, Хейдеггера и Гада- 
мера. Чтобы предотвратить возможную критику: мол, герменевтика 
занимается в основном текстовыми интерпретациями, в то время как 
Юкскюлл в лучшем случае интерпретирует жизнь животных, — в 
статье рассматривается неоконченная пародия Юкскюлла на диалог 
Платона “Менон” под названием Die ewige Frage: Biologische Varia­
tionen über einen platonischen Dialog (1943). Пример такой работы с 
текстом свидетельствует, что Юкскюлл одновременно является и 
адресатом, который занимается толкованием древних текстов, и 
адресантом, который записывает свои объяснения для следующей 
группы адресатов. Такой подход выступает за границы биологии, 
вступая в область риторики и лингвистической прагматики речевых 
актов.
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Samaselt teiste teadustega on ka biosemiootikal oma ajalooline arhiiv, 
mis sisaldab distsipliini eelkäijatena avastatud ja austatud inimeste töid. 
Üheks selliseks on Jakob von Uexküll, keda on nimetatud semiootika 
teerajajaks, kuna ta arendas Saussure’ist ja Peirce’ist sõltumatult märgi ja 
tähenduse teooriat. ‘Märgi’ ja ‘tähenduse’ kõrvutamine seejuures on 
tähendusrikas, sest ühtviisi põhjendatult võib Uexkülli pidada nii semioo­
tikuks kui hermeneutikuks. Taolist uudset seisukohta võib õigustada 
Uexkülli pikaajalise huviga mõistete ‘tähendus’ (Sinn) ja ‘osutus’ 
(Bedeutung) vastu, mis sai alguse tema ühest esimesest raamatust 1909. 
aastal. Käesolev artikkel püüab taastada Uexkülli vahetut intellektuaalset 
ajaloolist horisonti, diskursiivset ruumi, milles viibisid tema kaasaegsed 
Husserl ja Frege. Nii peaks selguma, kuidas olid Uexkülli arutlused, mille 
teemadeks märk (Zeichen) ja objekt (Gegenstand), tähendus (Sinn) ja 
osutus (Bedeutung), mõjutatud teistest keelefilosoofidest, ning kuidas 
asetub Uexküll fenomenoloogilise hermeneutikuna Husserli, Heideggeri 
ja Gadameri traditsiooni. Ennetamaks ja tõrjumaks võimalikku kriitikat, 
et hermeneutika tegeleb peamiselt tekstilise tõlgendusega, samas kui 
Uexküll on parimal juhul loomade elu tõlgendaja, käsitleb artikkel 
Uexkülli lõpetamata jäänud Platoni dialoogi Meno paroodiat pealkiijaga 
Die ewige Frage: Biologische Variationen über einen platonischen 
Dialog (1943). Niisugune tekstiga töötamine annab tunnistust Uexküllist, 
kes kehastab samaaegselt vanade tekstide mõistmisega tegelevat vastu­
võtjat ning teist saatjat, kes paneb kiija oma selgitused veel ühele vastu­
võtjate grupile. Selline tegevus ületab juba bioloogia piirid ning hõlmab 
retoorika ja kõneaktide lingvistilise pragmaatika.
Semiootik või hermeneutik? Jakob von Uexküll, taas
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Abstract. For Uexküll, biology is the science o f the organization o f  living 
beings. In the context o f Entwicklungsmechanik, he refers to Driesch’s and 
Spemann’s experiments on the development o f embryonic germ cells to prove 
that self-differentiating processes constitute organisms as natural objects. 
Uexküll focuses on the theory o f such self-differentiating processes or organi­
zations. The notion o f organization implies for him a “technique o f nature” 
that is capable o f structuring organic and inorganic material according to plans 
and rules. These plans and rules are part o f the overall order o f the world. As 
preformed sign systems or codes, they determine and regulate the develop­
ment and existence o f individual animal subjects in their specific Umwelten.
The universe is made out o f subjects and their 
Umwelten that are related to each other through 
function circles to form a plan-governed whole.
Uexküll 1928
1. Introduction
After various experiments on the nervous system and the initiation of 
correlated muscle movements of sea-urchins, jellyfishes, octopods and 
other invertebrates in Heidelberg and Naples, Uexküll published in 
1905 his first book: Leitfaden in das Studium der experimentellen 
Biologie der Wassertiere. The first chapter of the book focuses on 
“problems”. One of the main problems for experimental biologists is,
according to Uexküll, to explain the “connection that combines the 
operations (Leistungen) of all organs”, that is to say from the stimulus 
of receptor organs to their “answer” in effector organs (Uexküll 1905: 
9). Uexküll calls this connection a “reflex” or a “reflex arch”.
A reflex is a “chain of intercalated independent operations (Ein- 
zelleistungeny'> between the receptor and effector organs of a single 
organism. The reflex “passes” through a certain number of organs, and 
the reflex arch represents the totality of these organs. The “suc­
cession” of organs is always the same: receptor, nerve, center, nerve, 
effector. Each animal exists thus as a “well-ordered bundle of 
reflexes” (geordnetes Bündel von Reflexen), and experimental biology 
retraces their mechanisms (Uexküll 1905: 9). However, experimental 
biology has to explain “more” than these mechanisms because the 
“effectiveness” and “purposefulness” of reflex arches makes it “neces­
sary” to refer to a “construction plan” (Bauplan) (Uexküll 1905: 66- 
67). Only if biologists provide a theoretical basis for such a “plan”, 
does biology acquire the “foundation” (Grundlage) necessary to be a 
natural science on par with chemical physiology, chemistry and 
physics. Biological knowledge thus depends on both experimental and 
theoretical (or “analytical”) research (Uexküll 1905: 96).
Experimental biologists refer to explanations through descriptions 
and proofs, and theoretical biologists through definitions and their 
logical consequences. However, Uexküll thinks that a good scientist 
has to work in both ways. Scientific definitions must be in accordance 
with experimental proofs and descriptions, and experiments are 
performed according to questions that are themselves related to defini­
tions and their analytic context. But experiments cannot explain the 
correctness of definitions and their consequences. Rather, theoretical 
biology has to develop the explanatory framework within which 
experimental biology can be interpreted. Biology thus needs, after a 
sufficient set of experimental proofs and descriptions, first of all a 
theoretical “foundation” to become a natural science (Uexküll 1905: 
125-130). In an article of 1903 on the biological Bauplan of the 
worm-like Sipunculus nudus, Uexküll defines the general objective of 
“biological” research:
Biology is the science1 o f the organization o f living beings. Organization is called
the conjunction o f different elements according to a uniform plan for a common
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effect. Biology has thus to search in each living form (Gebilde) for the plan o f its 
construction and for the elements o f this construction. (Uexküll 1903: 269)
Uexküll’s answer to the problem of organismic “organization” is that 
“plans” can explain organismic order, while “mechanical” causation 
cannot; biologists have to discover these “plans” in nature, and bio­
logy is also “the science of the Planmäßigkeit of all living beings” 
(Uexküll 1928: 292). Explanations that refer to “plans” imply for Uex­
küll that there is something like a “technique of nature” (Naturtechnik) 
as a general principle for order generating processes in organic bodies.
The next sections reconstruct Uexküll’s notions of a “plan” and 
“technique of nature” (Naturtechnik). After some remarks on Uex­
küll’s epistemology in the second section, I will outline the experi­
mental settings of two “proofs” that Uexküll uses as standard refe­
rences to explain organic order. The difference between technical and 
mechanical biology is the theme of the fourth section. In the fifth 
section, I will focus on Uexküll’s general scheme of action. Finally, 
metatheoretical assumptions and analogies of order are discussed in 
the sixth section.
2. Uexküll’s epistemological claims
As for Kant, subjectivity means for Uexküll first of all that there is an 
agent that constitutes its own >reality<. However, Uexküll asks not 
only for possible forms of judgments, but also for the existential mode 
of the agent of knowledge. For him, explanations of this mode 
basically refer to “experimental research” in biology (Uexküll 1928: 
130). Such research is always performed by subjects, but biologists 
might be able to “minimize” and control subjective factors that are 
involved in the production of scientific knowledge:
Objective events ( Vorgänge) are in general regarded as events that occur 
among objects with no consideration for any subject. But we have to admit 
that we do not know such events, because it is always our own subject that 
observes the events, and this subject can never be eliminated (ausschalten). It 
can thus only be a question o f reducing the subjective accessories (Zutaten) to 
a minimum. (Uexküll 1926: 179)
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Uexküll thinks that scientists not only reduce “subjective accessories” 
in experiments, but even go one step further. He is convinced that 
experiments in biology “force” us to reconstruct a reality that we 
could not have “imagined” before, that is to say to rationalize consti­
tutive “factors” of other organized orders than ours, orders that are at 
the same time organized and organizing. If scientists reconstruct 
“plans”, they can switch from one “subjective” perspective to another, 
although they can only sketch very general aspects of these “worlds” 
and their agents, the “animal subjects”. It is thus Uexküll’s vision to 
glimpse into ’’worlds” that have no windows before biology takes 
form and to sketch the constitutive principle of natural subjects:
Kant thought o f causality as a part o f the constitutive activity o f  understanding 
(Verstand). However, Planmäßigkeit was for him a part o f the regulative use 
o f reason (Vernunft). One could thus have the impression that a plan could 
never be an integral part o f an object, but just an imagined (hinzugedachte), 
though necessary human rule. Driesch has examined this question in detail. 
He proved that Planmäßigkeit should also be a part o f the constitutive 
properties [o f objects]. This problem is thus removed (beseitigt). (Uexküll 
1928: 293-294)2
Uexküll claims that biological research changed the explanatory status of 
the regulative judgment. Kant could only refer to the facts of “descriptive 
natural scientists”.3 But experiments can “prove” that something is the 
“fact” beyond these descriptions. Biologists might be able to find 
scientifically a model of the natural constitution of knowing subjects and 
to enlarge this model to a common explanatory scheme for all natural 
subjects that are capable of “actions” or “acts”, although such an 
explanatory scheme of an organizing “factor of nature” is, in a strict 
sense, just an adequate scheme for “our” thinking:
Neither the construction plan nor the formation plan have anything to do with 
the real factor o f nature (Naturfaktor) that forces physico-chemical processes 
to take certain paths. Rule and plan are just the form (Form) through which
2 Cf. Uexküll 1931a: 385: “Epistemologically we can assume that we have two 
thought forms (Denkformen) at our disposal to connect (verknüpfen) the pheno­
mena o f the world with each other: First, the causality, that is to say the relation 
between cause and effect. Second, the Planmäßigkeit, that is to say the relation 
between the part and the whole.” See also Uexküll 1922: 137 and 1923: 60.
3 Cf. Uexküll 1923: 60.
From protoplasm to Umwelt 143
we recognize the effects o f this factor o f nature. The factor itself is totally 
unknown to us. (Uexküll 1921: 10)
Uexküll’s position between epistemological and ontological claims 
has thus something to do with “adequate” explanations of experi­
mental settings and descriptions of phenomena. For Uexküll, experi­
mental settings and descriptions of objects that belong to organisms 
“force us” to refer to a certain model of organismic order. These 
models are, for Uexküll, somehow out there in nature, but we cannot 
know for sure if they are >really< that what they seem to be.
Uexküll thus relates the deconstruction of the knowing subject to 
the “experimental investigation” of the order of organic bodies. For 
Uexküll, this investigation results first of all in the formulation of a 
new problem, the one of the regulation of cell development.
3. The regulation of cell development and 
its two experimental proofs
This section has two main parts. In the first part, I will reconstruct 
some aspects of the scientific environment that influenced Uexküll’s 
theory of organic development, which focused on two experimental 
“proofs”. In the second part, I will discuss Uexküll’s interpretation of 
these “proofs”.
Around 1900, research on the development of embryonic cells and 
discoveries of chromosome movements changed perspectives on the 
evolution, morphogenesis and hereditary factors of organic bodies. 
This change began already in the second half of the 19th century, and 
one of its main actors in the German context was Wilhelm Roux. Like 
Hans Driesch, he was a disciple of Ernst Haeckel.
In 1888, Roux killed one of the blastomeres of a two-cell-stage of 
a frog egg with a hot needle. The uninjured cell formed an abnormal 
gastrulation and developed into a cluster of cells that was interpreted 
as a half-embryo. The result of the experiment seemed to prove 
Roux’s theory of “determinants” (Determinanten) that are differen­
tiated after the cleavage of the primary germ cell, so that each 
cleavage changes the developmental potential of cells. This mosaic
4 See also Thure von Uexküll 1980: 149-151.
theory of determining factors in cleavage cells goes back to Weiss- 
man’s theory of the differentiation of germ cells.
Roux’s experimental setting initiated not only a series of new 
experiments to prove the mosaic distributions of determinants in 
cleavage cells. It also represented a shift in general interest from rather 
descriptive comparative mophogenetic studies to experimental re­
search. Roux called this research program “developmental mechanics” 
(Entwickelungsmechanik).
However, the reiterations of Roux’s experiment also resulted in 
new critiques. The development of the uninjured cleavage cell seemed 
to depend on the influence of the remaining dead cell. One of the main 
problems was therefore to separate the two first cleavage cells without 
killing both of them.
A group of scientists of the Stazione Zoologica in Naples focused 
on this problem. From 1898 to 1903, Jakob von Uexküll was the 
director of the center’s physiology department, but he also worked 
until 1900 with Wilhelm Friedrich Kühne at the university of Heidel­
berg. Hans Driesch began his work at the institute in 1891. In the 
same year, one of his colleagues, Curt Alfred Herbst, developed a new 
technique to separate the blastomeres of a sea-urchin egg in using 
calcium-free seawater.5
Driesch shook the embryos to separate the blastomeres, but he also 
used Herbst’s method.6 The isolated blastomeres developed not into 
Roux’s half-embryos, but into completely formed, albeit smaller sea- 
urchin larvae of Echinus microtuberculatus. In 1892, Driesch pub­
lished the results of his experiments in the Zeitschrift für wissen­
schaftliche Zoologie.7 He concluded that germ cells contain not a 
mosaic of determining factors that are separated mechanically during 
the cleavage, but regulative properties instead. These regulative pro­
perties in embryonic cells belong for Driesch to a “harmonious- 
equipotential system” that is active in cells of the blastula. Its forma­
tive or “prospective potential” changes during the cell development. 
Driesch thus distinguished between the “prospective” and the “actual 
potential” of cleavage cells. In his Philosophy o f  the Organic, which 
was published after his Gifford-lectures in 1909, he referred to a non­
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Spemann) in 1895. Endres laced the two cells o f the blastula.
6 Cf. Penzlin 2000: 444—446.
7 Driesch 1892.
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mechanical, “individualizing causality” that develops as a self- 
differentiating “entelechy” to explain the theoretical framework of 
regulative properties in embryonic cells.8
Hans Spemann also focused on the regulative properties of early 
cell developments. Spemann, a disciple of Theodor Boveri, worked 
first in Würzburg on the development and formation of lens cells. In 
1901, he began to use a new technique to transplant cell fragments 
from one embryo (the donor) into another embryo (the host) with a 
micropipette. After he went to Freiburg to take the chair of Franz 
Dorflein in 1919, Spemann performed various experiments to under­
stand the development of the amphibian nervous system. His main 
interest was to specify the moment in which embryonic cells loose 
their totipotent regulative properties. While there are only few visible 
differences between the cleavage cells of the blastula in amphibian 
embryos, these cells are slowly rearranged in the late gastrula phase to 
form three germ layers (ectoderm, mesoderm and endoderm). The 
determination of the fate of embryonic cells thus seemed to happen 
between the early and the late gastrula.
One of the first visible organ systems during gastrulation is the 
nervous system. Spemann and other investigators, such as Johannes 
Holtfreter, knew that detached or explanted parts of the presumptive 
neural tube cells from an early gastrula do not develop into neural 
tissue. However, presumptive neural tube cells of the late gastrula had 
that potential. Because the neural plate always appeared in a constant 
position, Spemann suggested that the invaginated cells at the dorsal lip 
(which form under normal conditions the roof of the achenteron 
directly beneath the neural tube cells) are able to determine the fate of 
ectoderm cells.
The crucial experiment to prove that there is something like a 
“differentiating” or “organizing center” in the gastrula of amphibian 
eggs was performed by Spemann and his doctoral student Hilde 
Mangold in 1924.9 They used two species of salamanders with a 
different pigmentation (the nearly white Triturus cristatus and the 
brownish Triturus taeniatus) to retrace the development of the dorsal 
lip cells that had been transplanted from the donor’s blastopore into
For Driesch’s theory o f self-differentiation and cell development see Mocek 
1998.
9 For a detailed description o f the experiment see Moore 1972: 265-274 and 
Fässler 1997.
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the opposite ventral ectodermis area of the host embryo in an early 
gastrula. Not only did the host’s blastopore invaginate normally, but 
the donor cells also developed into a small archenteron and later 
produced neural folds. The neural folds were composed of host cells. 
Under normal conditions, these host cells would have developed into 
an epidermis. In addition, the new folds occasionally almost formed 
an entire embryo.
Spemann interpreted this effect as an “induction” of an organizing 
center in the dorsal lip, and called this center an “organizer” {Orga­
nisator). After Spemann’s and Mangold’s experiment, it seemed that, 
in the early phase of gastrulation, presumptive ectoderm cells have an 
equal “prospective potential”, and that their fate depends on the 
influence of an “organizer” situated in the area of the dorsal lip.
Uexküll refers frequently to Driesch’s and Spemann’s experi­
mental “proofs”.10 However, these “proofs” are part of his own theory 
of cell development. He distinguishes three phases or “steps” 
(Schritte) during the development of embryonic cells: First, the “cell 
differentiation” (Zellteilung) of germ cells in the “mother cell” (Mut­
terzelle) or the “primary shoot” (Primärsproß), second “tissue diffe­
rentiation” (Gewebeteilungen) and third “organ formation” (Organ- 
bildung).n
Cell differentiation, tissue differentiation and organ formation repre­
sent, in general, the three basic steps of the organismic “Gefügebildung” 
(structure formation).12 Gefügebildung is the “temporal form” 
(Zeitgestalt) of organic bodies. During Geftigebildung, organic bodies 
develop gradually into a “close mechanism” that characterizes the 
“spatial form” (Raumform) of the adult organism (Uexküll 1922: 129). 
The temporal form always expresses a directional process or a “path” 
(Weg) that ends in the formation of a spatial form.13 Uexküll thinks that 
such a directional process is similar to a “technical process” that 
operates according to a plan. Each developmental phase that charac­
terizes the “temporal form” of the Gefügebildung could thus also be
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10 For references to Driesch and Spemann, cf. Uexküll 1920: 68-69; 1927: 12- 
14; 1928: 229-231 and 249-253; 1929a: 150-155; 1929b: 41-43; 1931a: 388; 
1937: 197 and 1938: 137.
11 Cf. Uexküll 1922: 144-156.
12 ‘Gefuge’ could be translated as “form” or “structure”.
13 Cf. Uexküll 1928: 244: “ [...]  each spatial relation in the body results from a 
specific process (formative process)”.
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interpreted as a “technical path” (technischer W eg)}4 However, only the 
organismic “plan” is itself “creative” (bildend) or “active”, while the 
technical “plans” of human machines are just “passive” representations 
of mechanical connections.15
For Uexküll, each cell differentiation is regulated by “partial 
plans” that depend on the general plan of the organismic “organi­
zation”.16 The Gefüge that results from the developmental process 
finally “inhibits” (hemmen) the process: “Gefüge inhibits the Gefu- 
gebildung”(Uexkü\\ 1922: 146-147).17 At the end of the tissue
formation, the Gefüge forms a functional unit of organs that interact as
18a “close mechanism”.
The Gefüge of the protoplasm and of the growing organism is thus 
at the same time a material Gefüge of visible structures and of 
“immaterial” plans that “induce” the Gefügebildung according to 
certain “rules”. This is the “technique of nature” that appears during 
organic development.19
Uexküll thinks that it is “impossible” for humans to “imagine” how 
immaterial plans could “act” on matter. However, he points, in a 
similar way to Kant in his Third Critique, to the possibility that 
phenomena of the Anschauungsraum “force” us to refer to plans and 
their “over-mechanical” faculty to produce temporal forms:
I wanted to show that [ ...]  the time forms are not problematic any more if  I 
take as a basis the Anschauungswelt instead o f the Vorstellungswelt, because 
they are a necessary consequence o f the Anschauungswelt itself. The 
Anschauungswelt encloses (beherbergen) a broader manifoldness than the 
Vorstellungswelt [ ...]  (Uexküll 1927: 25)20
14 Cf. ibid., p. 145.
15 Cf. Uexküll 1938: 58. “If the performance (Arbeitsleistung) o f machines is 
called ‘mechanics’ (Mechanik), but the construction and form generating process 
‘technique’, we can make a difference between the ‘mechanics o f nature’ and the 
‘technique o f nature’.” See also Uexküll 1929b: 39.
16 In some germs, however, specific groups o f cells or “secondary shoots” 
(Sekundärsprosse) differentiate very early. Uexküll calls them “mosaic germs” 
(Mosaikkeime). (Cf. Uexküll 1929a: 41.)
17 Uexküll (see also Uexküll 1905: 9) refers to experiments on lens formations 
and their interpretations by Bernhard Dürken and H. Wachs.
18 Cf. ibid., p. 149.
19 Cf. ibid., p. 155.
20 However, Uexküll does not always make a clear distinction between Vor­
stellungswelt and Anschauungswelt.
But the Anschauungswelt of modem science is different from the 
descriptions of Kant’s observer. Experimental research, “totally 
unknown in Kant’s epoch” (Uexküll 1923: 60), “proved” that there 
have to be self-regulative processes in nature. These “proofs” are 
related to the experiments of Driesch and Spemann. Uexküll needs 
them for two “facts”.
First, Driesch’s experiments on the development of sea-urchin 
embryos “proved” that the regulative factor in the germ is “inde­
pendent” from its material expression.
Only the experiment has clarified it. If, as has been assumed, there would be a 
germ Gefüge that is similar to the one o f the future body, it must be divided in 
half when the germ is divided in half, and both halves must produce two half 
animals. This is not the case: Half a germ always produces an entire animal, 
although o f  half height. This insight is due to Driesch who scattered the whole 
science o f  development (Entwicklungslehre). (Uexküll 1920: 68-69)
There is thus nothing “folded” or “tangled” (verwickelt) in the germ 
that could be seen by a comparative anatomist who searches “corporal 
forms”. Rather, the “lower anatomy of corporal forms” has to be 
replaced by a “higher anatomy of generating forms (Bildungsformen)” 
(Uexküll 1927: 23). The anatomy of generating forms must define the 
relation between immaterial plans and cell differentiation. But such an 
interaction cannot be explained by mechanical laws. Generating forms 
are temporal forms, and they appear as technical paths that produce 
order. There is a second experimental “proof’ that this dynamic 
process is regulated through different “organizing plans”:
Spemann could show that an >organizing center< appears in the beginning of 
the gastrulation o f Triton in the upper lip o f the blastoporus from which, as he 
says, emerge »differentiating currents< (.Differenzierungsströme) that impose 
on the hitherto undifferentiated cells o f the outer germ layer a new direction of 
formation (Gestaltungsrichtung). From cell to cell run new impulses, as I 
expressed it, to force a new technical path on them. (Uexküll 1929a: 157)21
The experiments of Spemann and Driesch thus force us to develop a 
new imaginative space of regulative processes. To define life cannot 
mean, as Uexküll highlights in his 1927 paper with the title Definition
148 Tobias Cheung
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impulse from matter in the most convincing way”.
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des Lebens und des Organismus, “to construct logical notions about 
the essence of life” (Uexküll 1927: 1). Rather, one has to “refer to” 
(darzulegen) and discuss the “scientifically examined experiences 
(wissenschaftlich gesichteten Erfahrungen) that characterize life”.22 It 
is “impossible” to reduce temporal to mechanical forms. But scientific 
modeling can get very far:
If the ideal that I have in mind, that is to say to confine the formation process 
(Formbildung) in the test tube, is reachable, cannot be said. But it is possible 
to come much closer to the problem if  one has found the right question. 
(Uexküll 1920a: 179)
The “right question” is for Uexküll the one that investigates the 
Planmäßigkeit of organic order. The answer to the question must be a 
scientific model that mediates between descriptions, experimental 
proofs and definitions.
4. From development to existence: the scientific model 
of organismic self-differentiation
The whole organism, the “cell”, for Uexküll is an autonomous unit, or 
an uAutonom','> (Zellautonom), as he calls it, with different prospective 
potentials.23 It is the “elementary organ” (Elementarorgan)24 of the 
organism, its “living module” or “building block” (Baustein)25 that 
“acts” according to its own “plan” as a “cell subject” (Zellsubjekt)26. It 
cannot “act” in a dead, but only in a “living organism”.27
Each cell contains a “nucleus” (Kern) and “protoplasm”. Along 
with the nucleus, the protoplasm represents the “matter of life” 
(Lebenstoff).28 No man-made machine uses “protoplasm” to structure
22 Uexküll 1927: 1. A similar argumentation can be found in the beginning of  
Technische and mechanische Biologie’ (Uexküll 1929a: 129).
23 Cf. Uexküll 1928: 177.
24 Cf. Uexküll 1928: 176.
25 Uexküll 1928: 177.
26 Cf. Uexküll 1929b: 41.
27 Cf. Uexküll 1929b: 41.
л  In the following paragraphs, I will use the word “protoplasm” in brackets if  it 
means protoplasm and nucleus.
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its units. Only organisms are self-regulative, and only organisms are 
made out of “protoplasm”.29
Research on the relation between the “protoplasm” and the orga­
nism is “basic” and necessary for any progress in biological know­
ledge.30 “Protoplasm” is for Uexküll “not a substance in the common 
sense, but a mixture (Gemenge) of substances in a state of perpetual 
metabolism”.31
Uexküll’s answer to the question whether “the physical laws of 
metabolism” or the “organization” of organisms could explain the “ori­
gin” of a “perpetual regeneration” in a self-regulative order is clear: the­
re must be a ruler that “coordinates” (regelt) the processes of formation 
and maintenance, and there must also be a ruler if these processes are in 
disorder. Without a ruler, processes could not be “harmonized”, they 
would “run out” (sich tot laufen) and end in disorder.32
There are two different general plans in all organisms: one for 
“formation processes” (Gestaltungsvorgänge) and one for “regene­
ration processes” (.Regenerationsprozesse) in the larger sense, that is 
to say processes that also include metabolism. The first one is the 
“development plan” (Entstehungsplan) or “active edification plan” 
(aktiver Erbauungsplan), and the second one is the “maintenance 
plan” (.Betriebsplan) or “active construction plan” (aktiver Bauplan).33 
While the development plan is the plan of the temporal path of the 
organism’s formation, the maintenance plan is basically a “perfor­
mance plan” (Leistungsplan)34 of a “functional unit” (funktionelle 
Einheit) 35 between organs:
Only if  the organism is entirely developed and its performance (Leistung) has 
begun, does the active construction plan that rules the regenerative processes 
take the place o f  the active edification plan. (Uexküll 1927: 22)
29 Cf. Uexküll 1927: 18 and 1928: 146.
30 Cf. ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Cf. Uexküll 1927: 18-21.
33 Cf. Uexküll 1929a: 42 and 1938: 135. Uexküll (1929: 39) also refers to the 
“active construction plan” as a “life factor” (Lebensfaktor) because “it maintains 
the corporal mechanism” constantly in its functional order.
34 Cf. Uexküll 1938: 135.
35 Uexküll 1922: 156.
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Both general plans are “active” because they initiate constructive 
processes. They are both — as an “edification manager” (Bauleiter) or 
as a “maintenance manager” (Betriebsleiter) — rulers of the cell 
subject. Uexküll calls the first one “organizator” (Organisator)36 and 
the second one “mechanizator” (Mechanisator)11. Both plans produce 
a passive “construction plan” of mechanical structures, but only the 
Gegengefüge of the “mechanizator” is a “functional unit” of organs. 
Each plan acts “independently” and is “blind” to the other.38 However, 
they are “correlative” because the Gefüge of the Bauplan is the 
Gegengefüge that inhibits the formative processes of the Er- 
bauungsplan.39 They “act” independently and yet in harmony as two 
plans that are necessary for organismic life. There is no functional unit 
without formation, and no temporal form exists without its repro­
duction in functional units. Within the limits of possible structural 
variations, reproduction is thus just the repetition of the necessary 
conditions of organic existence, from the Erbauungsplan to the 
Bauplan, and from the Bauplan to the Erbauungsplan.
If the “appropriate material” is available, the perpetual regene­
ration (metabolism) of the organism and the repetition of its two major 
plans — the formation plan and the construction plan — can produce 
“normal” results. However, malformations appear “naturally” because 
of the blindness of the partial plans to their overall plan. There might 
not be enough material or space for the proper development and 
functioning of parts, but other parts do not “adapt” to this situation. If 
such a problem occurs during the development of the organism, 
serious malformations can result because the Gegengefüge of the 
Bauplan cannot inhibit and “correct” developmental processes 
(Uexküll 1929a: 40-42).
That life is basically a dynamic and continuously repeated “big 
cycle” between Erbauungsplänen and Bauplänen, with short phases of 
deconstructions or “dissolutions”, becomes most visible in unicellular 
organisms or “protoplasmic animals” (Protoplasmatiere)40 Amoeba, 
infusoria, and especially paramecium and Plasmodium vivax, are for
36 Cf. Uexküll 1923: 58-59.
37 Cf. Uexküll 1929: 29.
38 Cf. Uexküll 1929a: 40-42. For the “blindness” o f plans, Uexküll refers to Curt 
Alfred Herbst’s experiments on the regeneration o f crayfishes (cf. Uexküll 1929a: 40).
39 Cf. Uexküll 1929a: 42.
40 Cf. Uexküll 1928: 148.
152 Tobias Cheung
Uexküll standard reference objects.41 These organisms cannot form a 
functional unit of different organs. Rather, formative and constructive 
periods succeed each other constantly during their life. Infusoria “form 
a vesicle around the nutrient drop and transform it successively into a 
gullet, a stomach, an intestine and finally into an anus” (Uexküll 1929b: 
73).42
In pluricellular organisms, and especially in higher animals, a 
single formative period is followed by a functional unit of various 
organs. However, in the beginning, there is just “protoplasm” that 
contains the “primary material” (Urmaterial) (Uexküll 1938: 141) of a 
“seemingly unlimited formative potential (.Bildungsmöglichkeit)” 
(Uexküll 1920b: 178).
In this primary material, “ferments” initiate “specific processes” that 
can express various “properties” (.Eigenschaften) of the “protoplasm” 
(Uexküll 1920b: 178). The ferments are released from the nucleus 
through “impulses”, but they “act” also as “stimuli” on the nucleus.43
The impulses always appear as “impulse systems”. They initiate 
the release of ferments, and this “act” is a non-mechanical or “im­
material” effect.44 Impulses thus “act” as “non spatial initiators of 
spatial processes” (Uexküll 1928: 245). Their influence on the proto­
plasm is not a physiological, but a “biological event” that expresses 
the “potential” of the “cell subject” and its “subject rule” {Subjekt­
regel) to develop into and exist as an organism.45 The “animal 
subject” represents “the new natural factor (Naturfaktor) that biology 
introduces''1 (Uexküll 1931a: 389). However, there are other “factors” 
that are active during the cell development.
“Factors” can be characterized by their “faculty to impose a 
formative process on a mechanical Gefüge” (Uexküll 1928: 245). 
Uexküll defines the role of genes as dependent “factors” of the cell 
subject. There are various versions in his texts of how they operate
41 Cf. Uexküll 1920a: 147-148; 1920b: 73; 1922: 133; 1929b: 39; 1931a: 387 
and 1938: 137-140.
4i For Uexküll’s analysis o f the different life periods o f Plasmodium see Uexküll 
1922:133.
43 Cf. Uexküll 1920b: 72-73.
44 Cf. Uexküll 1920b: 178.
45 Uexküll (1923: 60) also calls the “subject rule” the “idea o f the developing 
subject”. The impulse systems are the “imperatives” o f  this development. (Cf. 
Uexküll 1920a: 177.)
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during the formation processes. In an article from 1920, Uexküll 
pointed to the double role of genes to “act” as “corporal properties” and 
to “obey” impulses that “act” non-mechanically. Genes form “auto­
nomous elementary units” and are “probably situated in the coloured 
substance of the nucleus in the germ cell”. During the cell division, the 
genes are distributed among the new cells, and the “final cells accom­
modate (beherbergen) only genes that are necessary for the construction 
of their specific tools” (Uexküll 1920b: 72). Uexküll also identifies 
genes with specific units or “chromomeres” that “compose” the chro­
mosomes of the nucleus (Uexküll 1922: 140).46 Each “chromomere” or 
gene has a specific effect on the protoplasm and represents a “firmly 
circumscribed property” (fest umschriebene Eigenschaft) of the cell. 7 
Genes thus operate as developmental, regenerative and hereditary 
“factors”. They release different sequences of ferments according to 
sequences of impulse series or “act” themselves as ferments:
It is very instructive to combine the theory o f organizators with Mendel’s 
theory. Mendel found that there are developing structures (Anlagen) as 
autonomous factors in the germ o f living beings for their future properties. His 
theory says nothing about the way in which these factors reach their goal (sich 
durchsetzen). We know from recent research, especially from Morgan and his 
school, where we have to search for these >genes<, as these factors are called; 
they are situated in the chromatin stripes o f the nucleus o f the germ cell. In 
general, genes are regarded purely as matter. They are supposed to have the 
ability to act (wirken) as ferments when they enter into the protoplasm o f the 
cell body and to initiate certain processes [ ...]  It is clear that these initiations 
or >impulses< have to occur in the right combination and in the right 
succession to prevent all processes from becoming disordered. This is where 
Spemann’s theory o f organizators which rule the succession o f form 
generating processes through their law-making interventions comes into play 
(gesetzgebendes Eingreifen). (Uexküll 1923: 59)48
46 For the role o f the chromosomes as hereditary factors and during the mitosis, 
see Uexküll 1928: 241-247 and 296-301.
47 Uexküll 1922: 140. Uexküll refers also to Wilhelm Johannsen’s definition of 
the “genotype” to characterize the “members” o f a “race”. The “genotype” is for 
Uexküll more characteristic to identify the “race” than the “properties o f the 
developed body”, (ibid.)
48 For references to Morgan and Mendel see Uexküll 1927: 40, 1928: 240-247  
and 1938: 140.
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After the Gefüge of the Bauplan has been developed, the “role” of the 
genes ends. During the construction period, they only serve the 
regeneration of “destroyed or injured tools”.49 The “role” of the genes 
is thus very similar to that of the organizers which “dissolve” into 
partial organizers to control certain “germ areas” (Keimbezirke) until 
the end of the formative period.50 In a late article of 1938, Uexküll 
introduced a new organizing element, the “commander genes” (Ober- 
gene) (Uexküll 1938: 141-143). After the formation of the blastema, 
the commander genes “determine” the “activity” of the “obeying 
genes” (Untergene) to form specific tissues in certain cells (Uexküll 
1938: 143).
When the functional unit of the “cell machine” starts to work, the 
“nucleus” becomes the “autonomously ruling chemical center of the 
cell” (autonom regierendes chemisches Zentrum) (Uexküll 1928: 183). 
It releases various ferments that maintain the metabolism of the cell 
(Uexküll 1928: 183). As during the formative period, “impulse sys­
tems” initiate the release of ferments in groups and in certain sequences:
The autonomous center o f the cell is hit by a differentiated impulse, or, more 
correctly, by a differentiated series o f impulses that compel (veranlaßt) the 
nucleus to regulate the metabolism in the protoplasm in such a way that 
certain products are released into the body o f the cell. Together these products 
form a functioning mechanism. (Uexküll 1928: 183-184)
The “differentiated” or “regulated impulse series” that appears during 
the construction period results from the activity of the “mechanizator”. 
The mechanizator “makes a certain choice (Auswahl) within the 
bundle of ferments (Fermentbündel) [of the nucleus] [...] and forces 
the chosen ferments to appear in a certain succession” (Uexküll 1928: 
184). Missing products for metabolistic processes and products for 
regenerative processes are available from the “basic tissue” that 
extends itself through tiny “protoplasmic bridges” over the whole 
body of the organism (Uexküll 1928: 184-185).
In analogy to Johann Müller’s specific energy, Uexküll refers to 
“biological factors” to describe the “initiation” (Auslösung) of move­
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49 Cf. Uexküll 1920b: 73.
50 For the relation between partial organizers and “germ areas'” Uexküll refers to 
the experiments o f Hermann Braus (1867-1920) who worked with Hans Spemann 
in Würzburg. (Cf. Uexküll 1938: 141-142.)
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ments in cells and organs, especially of muscle contractions.51 During 
the construction period, “factors” are, in general, necessary to “start” 
and maintain the operational mode of the mechanic apparatus of the 
organism. They “act” through impulses, and Uexküll calls these 
impulses “performative impulses” (Leistungsimpuls) because they 
function as “signs” that mediate between the ruler and the mechanical 
movements (Uexküll 1928: 186-187). Uexküll thus integrates per­
formative impulses as “signs” into a general scheme of organismic 
“action”.
5. The general scheme of action: 
Self-regulation and the function circle
For Uexküll, each “action” (Handlung) can be described as a “com­
bined movement”52 that establishes certain “relations” (Beziehungen) 
between various agents. The relation is itself an “act” or an “effect”. 
One entity “acts” on or “effects” (wirkt) the other.53 Objects “act” on 
objects mechanically, objects on “subjects” through a “stimulus”, 
“subjects” on objects through an “impulse” and “subjects” on 
“subjects” through an “induction”.54
Inductions occur if “two complementary factors” are present, and 
if one “calls” (ruft) the other.55 Uexküll often refers to the induction of 
“lens formations” through presunp>tive retina cells that result in 
“complete functional units” of eyes. However, how the “call” acts on 
a “factor” or a “plan”, is unknown.
All relations in which “subjects” are involved are “biological”. 
There are three of them: stimuli, impulses and inductions. During the 
formation and construction period of the organism, stimuli, impulses
51 Cf. Uexküll 1928: 185-186.
52 Cf. Uexküll 1903: 276.
53 In the context o f perception and action, Uexküll (1931a: 389) also describes 
the relation between “action” and “reaction” as a “question and answer game”.
54 Cf. Uexküll 1931a: 388.
55 Cf. Uexküll 1931b: 331. Uexküll (1931b: 330) also describes induction as a 
“strange psychoid act” (merkwürdiger psychoidaler Vorgang).
56 Cf. Uexküll 1929b: 43 and 1931a: 389. In 1901, Spemann published an article 
on lens formation in the neural stage o f Rana jusca. He cauterized the 
presumptive retina cells and observed that the eye and the lens was missing on the 
operated side o f the tadpole.
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and inductions are related to each other through a processing scheme. 
This scheme is a variation of a reflex scheme and dates back to 
Uexkiill’s early works on the contraction of muscles in invertebrates.57 
However, the organism is not a “skillful intertwined bundle of reflex 
arches with perfectly built receptors and effectors in an autonomous 
machine that responds through its own operations to the influences 
(Einwirkungen) of the outer world” (Uexküll 1928: 147). Rather, 
Uexküll’s scheme involves a threefold relationship between reflex 
mechanisms, signs and subjects. Such a relationship is “organic” 
because relations depend on the intervention of the “subject” and are 
thus “indirect” instead of being “direct” in inorganic relations.58
Within an organism, Uexküll describes organic relationships in 
general as “individual function chains” (individuelle Funktionsketten) 
with three “links” (Glieder)-, “reception — conduction of stimuli — 
effect” (Rezeption — Erregungsleitung — Effekt) or “perception — 
regulation — action” (Merken — Steuern — Wirken).59
The relation between organisms is for Uexküll a relation of an 
animal subject to its Umwelt in which other subjects appear as 
objects.60 There is only induction between organisms if one organism 
uses “parts” of the other for its development and existence. Each 
organism thus always “acts” within its own function chain.
In such a function chain, stimuli can operate as “Merkzeichen” 
(perception clues), and “impulses” as <‘,‘Wirkzeicherin (action clues). 
Within the “world” that surrounds the subject, Merkzeichen become 
“Merkmale” (perception marks), and Wirkzeichen (as “products” or 
“effects”) “ Wirkmale” (action marks).61 Merkmale and Wirkmale 
constitute the “ Um welt’ of the subject. They are “set out” (hinaus­
verlegt) by the subject.62
As stimuli and impulses, perception and action clues play a 
performative “role” for the expression of the subject rule. The Wirk­
zeichen “extinguishes” or “destroys” (vernichtet) the Merkzeichen that
Cf. Uexküll 1903: 270.
Cf. Uexküll 1920b: 84.
Cf. Uexküll 1920a: 175.
For semantic implications o f Uexküll’s theory see Kull 1998.
Ibid.
Cf. Uexküll 1931a: 389.
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comes from the “object” or the Gegengefüge.63 A pattern or a “plan” 
of the animal subject corresponds to each perception clue, and this 
“Merkplan” (perception plan) with its Merkzeichen induces a comple­
mentary “ Wirkplan” (action plan) with its Wirkzeichen:
The perception plans induce in the action organ the action plans that are 
complementary to them, and the impulses o f the action organ carry out the 
right innervations. (Uexküll 1903: 390)64
Merkzeichen thus initiate, as “performative impulses”, Wirkzeichen 
through the intervention of a subject.65 Each organismic subject 
expresses itself through these relations.
If the subject is regarded as the center of its perceptions, it exists 
within an “UmwelttunneF in which its “U m w elt is made out of 
Merkzeichen and Wirkzeichen of the Gegengefüge of the surrounding 
objects.66 In this monadic Umwelttunnel, other organismic subjects 
can only “appear” as marks and clues.
Uexküll sketches various schemes of the relationship between 
Merkzeichen, Wirkzeichen and the subject. In an article of 1931, he 
calls this relationship a “function plan” and refers to the example of an 
ape and an apple (Fig. 1).
In a different version, that is often referred to, the inductive process 
is not indicated and the clues are generalized to “worlds” that seem to 
characterize the outside world of the “animal subject”. However, the 
scheme is somehow misleading because it is not clear what the inside 
of the “inner world” of the subject is. Uexküll calls this scheme a 
“function circle” (Fig. 2).
6? In the scheme o f the ape and the apple (Fig. 1), the “touch mark” ( Tast- 
merkmal) o f the apple is “extinguished” (ausgelöscht) through the “bite” o f the 
ape. For Uexküll the main problem o f “complicated actions” is to find the “right 
action mark” (richtige Wirkmal) that extinguishes the perception mark (Uexküll 
1931a: 389).
64 Cf. Uexküll 1931b: 331.
65 Cf. Uexküll 1928: 187.
66 Cf. Uexküll 1920a: 176; and 1928: 108. Instead o f Umwelttunnel, Uexküll (cf. 
1920a: 176) also uses the word “LebenstunneF (life-tunnel).
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Figure 1. Function plan of an ape that grasps an apple (Uexküll 1931b, 
reprinted in Uexküll 1980: 329.).
Merkwelt
Merkorgan
Wirkorgan
Rezeptor
Merkmalträger
Gegengefüge
Wirkmalträger
Effektor
Figure 2. Scheme of a function circle (from Uexküll 1980: 330).
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In the organismic world, function circles appear in different, more or 
less complex “organizations”. They extend from simple reflex arches 
to actions with multiple and interconnected reflex systems, and from 
unicellular organisms to men. In his Theoretische Biologie, Uexküll 
distinguishes between “instinct actions” (.Instinkthandlungen), “plastic 
actions” {plastische Handlungen), “experience actions” (Erfahrungs­
handlungen) and “controlled actions” (kontrollierte Handlungen) 
(Uexküll 1928: 305-307). The differences between them depend 
mainly on the faculty of the subject to initiate the same action with 
different Merkmale. Reflexive capacities (for example memory, 
experience or analytical skills) can establish new “secondary clues”.67 
Uexküll often refers to Pawlow’s experiments as a “proof’ for the 
plasticity of the Merkwelt,68
However, the “complementarity” of the Merkwelt and the Wirkwelt 
is a precondition for their regulation through an animal subject In this 
context. Uexküll often alludes to “life energies” (Lebensenergien) that 
express themselves in harmony.69 But he uses these terms only to 
point to an unknown “origin” of biological order. The best analogy to 
understand the origin of this order is, for Uexküll, the order that is
70produced through the composition of a melody or a symphony. 
Music thus comes into play when Uexküll wants to go beyond 
descriptions and proofs to sketch the “Planmäßigkeit of the world 
power that creates subjects” (Uexküll 1920b: 74).
6. The “composition” of the world and its melody
The Planmäßigkeit of the world is a “rule” to create order. Stimuli and 
impulses are “both expressions of the same self-acting cell dynamic” 
(Uexküll 1931a: 388), and this cell-dynamic expresses itself like an 
“I-tone” (.Ich-Топ). The I-tone is the “self-tone” (Eigenton) of the cell, 
and not a “tone of use” or “usefulness” (Nutzton) as in human 
machines (Uexküll 1931a: 386).
67 Cf. Uexküll 1903: 390.
68 Cf. Uexküll 1928: 169-171, 305-306; and 1931a: 388.
69 Cf. Uexküll 1920a: 176-177.
70 Uexküll refers to this analogy throughout his Bedeutungslehre. Cf. Uexküll 
[1934] 1956: 105-159.
Various receptor and effector cells are combined in “centers” that 
“direct” (leiten) the excitations in different “ways” (Bahnen). This 
“regulation” (Steuerung) is “influenced through the ‘mood’ (Stim­
mung) of the whole, which can change periodically” (Uexküll 1920a: 
175-176). The mood of the whole is “decisive” (ausschlaggebend) for 
the existence of “thresholds” that block excitation: “a low tension lets
• • 1* • 71the stimulus in, a high tension dims it”.
The I-tone of an organism that acts in its specific Umwelt is not the 
result of a gradual “adaptation” (Anpassung) in time (as “Darwin” 
thought) or of the influence of the environment on the individual 
development of an organism (as “Lamarck” thought), but of its 
“adjustment” (Einpassung)12:
We have to accept the fact that there are, on the one hand, the properties of the 
outer world that have no determining influence [on the development o f the 
germ], and that there is, on the other hand, the living germ that has no organs 
which could inform it about these properties. However, we can see that the 
germ produces with complete certitude certain anti-properties that are adjusted 
to a group o f certain properties in the outer world. (Uexküll 1928: 3 2 1)73
Organisms “fit” into their Umwelt through their receptor and effector 
organs as the “joints” (Fugen) and “tenons” (Zapfen) of a harmonizing 
plan.74 For Uexküll, it is a “wonderful fact” (wunderbare Tatsache) 
that “there are in the outer world certain properties (Eigenschaften) in 
a limited number, for which the animal must, if it is supposed to 
thrive, form certain anti-properties (Gegeneigenschaften) in its 
corporal construction that fit as joints and tenons into the outer world” 
(Uexküll 1928: 320). Each anti-property of the animal subject always 
fits into a “group of properties” in the Umwelt (Uexküll 1928: 321). 
Conversely, the Umwelt represents from the perspective of the subject 
the “complementary properties” or the “Gegengefüge” of its own 
properties.75
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71 Cf. Uexküll 1920a: 176 and 1931a: 391.
72 Cf. Uexküll 1928:317-321.
73 Cf. Uexküll 1928: 317-321. Uexküll thought that the impulse series can be 
“excited” (angeregt), but not “created” (gebildet) from external influences (Uex­
küll 1928: 313).
74 Cf. Uexküll 1920a: 176.
75 Cf. Uexküll 1920b: 76: “Each property o f a living being has its comple­
mentary property in the Umwelt to accomplish the relation (um die Beziehung voll 
zu machen)". See also Uexküll 1927: 20—21.
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Each “gene” is “interwoven” (verflochten) in the Planmäßigkeit 
of the animal subject, and each property that expresses the “gene” 
during the development of the animal subject also has a comple­
mentary property in the Umwelt of that subject. However, in “biolo­
gical relationships” properties of the subject can be “bound” to 
multiple complementary properties, and different subjects “use” (ver­
werten) these options individually to create “richer” or “poorer” 
Umwelten™ All Umwelten “fit” again into each other, although no I- 
tone “acts” for the expression of other I-tones. Organisms live in their 
proper “worlds”, and yet every “world” is part of a universal harmony 
in which an individual construction plan can appear as a variation of 
one of the same “species”:
It can be proved that, on the one hand, each organism has a different Umwelt 
to which it is adjusted with accuracy, and that, on the other hand, its relations 
to other organisms fit not only into [their] external properties but also into 
[their] construction plans. (Uexküll 1927: 21)
The unity of each organismic plan that integrates formation and 
construction plans corresponds to the unique role that the adult 
organism plays in the universal harmony of all plans, and the universal 
harmony depends solely on the Weltplan and its creator.77
Uexküll makes very clear that explanations of “biological rela­
tions” refer ultimately to metaphysical and religious assumptions or 
Weltanschauungen.78 However, a conscious choice of a Weltan­
schauung has to respect scientific descriptions and experimental 
proofs. For Uexküll, these descriptions and proofs tend rather to 
vitalistic than to mechanistic positions.79 In his technical biology, the 
“adjustment” of the animal subject to the common world of all orga­
nisms is the “goal” of its self-differentiation. Such a goal is not a 
“purpose” that depends on imagination, but the main “natural” 
property of the subject as an expression of its “plan”.80
According to this “plan”, receptor and effector organs fit into 
Umwelten as “joints” and “tenons”. But organic joints and tenons are
76 Cf. Uexküll 1920b: 85 and 1928: 320.
77 Cf. Uexküll 1931a: 391.
78 Cf. Uexküll 1927: 25, and 1923.
79 Cf. ibid., pp. 8-12. Uexküll also criticizes vitalistic positions (cf. ibid.).
80 Cf. Uexküll 1928: 320-321. See also Langthaler 1992: 75-92.
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not part of a clockwork with fixed mechanical relations. Rather, the 
“interweavement” ( Verflechtung) and relatedness of I-tones depend on 
the “autonomous center” of the organism, the nucleus, that “acts” like 
a “piano of ferments” (Fermentklavier) on which the impulse series 
plays for itself the “melody of formation” (Gestaltungsmelodie) and
the “melody of construction” (Baumelodie). Both melodies are part of
81the same “organismic symphony”. This baroque composition 
“regulates” the opposition between the double bass like “mood” (Stim­
mung) and the partial I-tones of organs and cells, the contrapuntal 
juxtaposition of Merkzeichen and Wirkzeichen in Umwelten and the 
complementarity of all organismic plans in inorganic environments.82
Uexküll was convinced that the manifold of Umwelten had 
increased during the phylogeny of organic bodies. This increase of 
new Umwelten and their subjects never happens for Uexküll 
“gradually”, but in “leaps” (Sprüngen). Changes of “parts” in the 
construction plan of organisms would destroy their “functioning”.83
In a similar way, Leibniz thought of the world as the production of 
a God who searched for the best rational criteria for variety in unity. 
The solution was a network of “ideal machines” that independently 
produce and reproduce themselves as “automatons”. The effect of 
their permanent reproduction is a growing variety in time according to 
a single rule that >governs< the relations between all automatons.
Within the manifold of Uexküll’s Umwelten, all organisms are, as 
in Leibniz’s monadic system, “equally perfect” as natural subjects 
that are able to exist, although the “adjustment” of higher organisms is 
more multifarious.84 There are thus “poorer” and “richer” Umwelten, 
and their richness depends on individual potentials to perceive and act. 
This potential is predetermined through the subject’s “plan” and does 
not depend on its reflexive faculties and cultural environments. How­
ever, it can only be expressed if the respective framework of the 
Gegengefüge is present.
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81 Cf. Uexküll 1903: 276; 1920b: 72-73; 1922: 140 and 1928: 172-173, 184, 
295-296. Uexküll also refers to a “melody o f impulses” (1928: 313) and a 
“melody o f metabolism” (1928: 296).
82 Cf. Uexküll [1934] 1956: 145-149.
83 Cf. Uexküll 1928: 290-291.
84 Cf. Uexküll 1920a: 177. For the role o f the double perfection o f  organismic 
order in the natural history and philosophy o f the 18th and 19th century, see 
Cheung 2001 and 2000b.
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UexkülFs technique of nature is a theory of organic order that refers to 
experimental settings in research fields that focus on reflex mecha­
nisms and cell development. Hans Driesch’s experiments on the 
prospective and actual potential of embryonic cells and Hans Spe- 
mann’s experiments on the induction of organizing effects represent 
for Uexküll two “proofs” for the existence of “immaterial factors” that 
“regulate” organismic development.
The temporal order of such a regulation can only be explained 
through an “active plan” and its impulse series that initiate the release 
of ferments. Ferments are stored and bundled in the “genes” of the 
nucleus that “act” as subordinated natural “factors” with specific 
“properties” within the cell. Activated through the impulse series, they 
release ferments which are necessary for the construction and 
deconstruction of the cells and for their development into a “close 
functional unit” of correlated organs. However, constructive and 
deconstructive processes “act” according to the same general scheme 
of “action”. As a “function circle”, this scheme can also be applied to 
the relation between the organism and its Umwelt of Merkzeichen und 
Wirkzeichen. The “big question of the future” is thus for Uexküll, “if it 
will be experimentally possible to isolate impulses and to force them 
to act on other substances than the protoplasm” (Uexküll 1920b: 178).
In his theory of a technique of nature as a necessary condition for 
the development and existence of organismic subjects, Uexküll also 
reinterprets evolutionary problems. For Uexküll, neither Darwinian 
adaptations nor gradual neolamarckian transformations can explain the 
inductive and functional aspects of plans that regulate individually 
metabolistic, perceptive and mechanical processes. Rather, the “com­
position” of plans and their harmony in a Weltplan is a necessary, 
though non-scientific precondition for the existence of organisms. 
Ultimately, this ordering order or “organization” can only be under­
stood in analogy with the composition of a “melody” that is composed 
of individual tones or I-tones. Each set of tones needs a comple­
mentary set of tones to express its own “melody” within the 
“symphony” of all.
7. Conclusion
Uexküll’s theory of a technique of nature thus reestablishes the 
problematic settings of older discursive formations.85 The relation 
between partial and general plans that regulate the formation o f the 
“living germ” could be interpreted as a reformulation of Charles 
Bonnet’s theory of germ-fiber-units, and the necessary “leap” from 
one construction plan to the other refers clearly to Georges Cuvier’s 
comparative anatomy and his organizational types.
The philosophical framework of Uexküll’s theory of a technique of 
nature depends on problems that are related to Leibniz’s monadology, 
rather than to Kant’s Critiques.86 Uexküll uses Kant’s notion of 
‘schemes’ that mediate between perception and judgment, but the 
pivotal point of his theory is centered around the “natural” conditions 
of self-differentiating entities and the harmonic “complementarity” of 
their “perspectives”.
Uexküll pointed clearly to the problem that explanations of 
regulative processes have to refer to sign theories of mediating 
material processes and informing “agents”. The rule of the subject 
could thus be interpreted as an active code that produces the 
conditions of its readability and of its coordinating influence during 
developmental and metabolistic processes itself. The code aspect of 
Uexküll’s theory is also related to the notion of complementarity and 
Gegengefüge. The expression of the organismic subject, its 
development and existence, involves an active and reactive exchange 
with other subjects on multiple organizing levels. Intersubjectivity is 
thus necessary for the existence of animal and human subjects. 
However, intersubjective relations are limited through the respective 
set of rules and their range of possible applications that are 
predetermined by the overall organismic plan. Uexküll’s theory of 
organic order thus unfolds, in a biological perspective, the Leibnitian 
problem of monadic worlds. The problem of subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity, however, is part of a larger and long-lasting 
discursive transformation in the first half of the twentieth century. 
Husserl, Cassirer and Heidegger address similar problems to Uexküll, 
but offer different solutions.
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85 Cf. Cheung 2000, 2004a and 2004b.
For a detailed discussion o f the philosophical context and framework o f  
Uexküll’s theory see Langthaler 1992.
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От протоплазмы до умвельта: планы и природная техника 
в теории порядка организмов Якоба фон Юкскюлла
Для Якоба фон Юкскюлла биология является наукой об организации 
живых существ. В контексте механики развития (Entwicklungs­
mechanik) он указывает на опыты X. Дриша и X. Шпеманна над 
эмбриональными зародышевыми клетками как на доказательство 
того, что организмы являются природными объектами, формирую­
щимися в процессе самодифференциации. Юкскюлл сосредоточен 
именно на этой теории самодифференциации или упорядоченности. 
В понятие упорядоченности он включает и “технику природы”, 
которая способна структурировать органический и анорганический 
материал в соответствии с планами и правилами. Эти планы и
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правила являются частью порядка всего универсума. Как пред- 
существующие системы знаков или коды они определяют и регули­
руют развитие и существование отдельных животных субъектов в 
специфических, им присущих Umwelt'ax.
Protoplasmast omailmani: Plaanid ja loodustehnika 
Jakob von Uexkülli organismilise korra teoorias
Jakob von Uexkülli jaoks on bioloogia teadus elusolendite organisee­
ritusest. Arengumehhaanika (Entwicklungsmechanik) kontekstis viitab ta 
H. Drieschi ja H. Spemanni katsetele embrüonaalsete idurakkudega, tões­
tamaks, et organismid on diferentseerumise poolt moodustatavad loodus­
likud objektid. Uexküll keskendubki just sellisele diferentseerumiste või 
organiseerituste teooriale. Organiseerituse mõistesse on tema jaoks kaasa­
tud “looduse tehnika”, mis on suuteline struktureerima orgaanilist ja 
anorgaanilist materjali vastavalt plaanidele ja reeglitele. Need plaanid ja 
reeglid moodustavad osa kogu maailma korrastusest. Eelnevalt olemas­
olevate märgisüsteemide või koodidena määravad ja reguleerivad nad 
üksikute loomsubjektide arengut ja eksistentsi nendele eriomastes oma- 
llmades.
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Abstract. Philosophical anthropology and philosophical biology were both 
very powerful and influential movements in the German academic discussion 
o f the early 20th century. Starting with a similar conceptual background 
(particularly with reference to Hans Driesch’s bio-Aristotelism) they aimed at 
a synthetic philosophy o f nature, which was supposed to include human nature 
into the realm o f  a monist description o f  nature itself. Within this field o f  bio- 
philosophical reasoning, Jakob von Uexkiill’s theory o f  organism and his 
theoretical biology hold a central place. In this paper, Uexküll’s theoretical 
biology is reconsidered as a resumption and reformulation o f  a theory o f  
knowledge from a “Kantian” provenience. Its specific structure as a genera­
lized theory o f  knowledge is reconstructed and the pitfalls o f  a biological 
interpretation o f the condition o f  the possibility o f  knowledge are outlined. 
The theory o f  organism is reconstructed as a centrepiece o f UexkülPs 
approach. The last section o f  this paper presents a proposal o f  engineering 
morphology which allows the full application o f  Uexküll’s insights into the 
relativity o f organismic constitution. The usefulness o f functional modeling 
for evolutionary reconstructions on the basis o f  a theory o f  organism o f  
uexküllian type and its relevance for biological research is evaluated.
Introduction
Jakob von Uexküll is one of the most important representatives of an 
“organism-centred” biology, which was developed in Germany during 
first decades of the 20th century. His approach resembles Kant’s tran­
scendental philosophical “metaphysics of science” in some relevant 
aspects. However, it is just one paradigmatic case of a variety of 
approaches dealing with the very fundamentals of biology, to be found
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in either “life” or in “organisms”, such as H. Driesch’s developmental 
biology, W. Roux’s mechanics of development or H. Plessner’s philo­
sophical anthropology. But the task of Uexküll’s theoretical biology is 
not only to provide a foundation for biology —  at the same time it is 
supposed to be a fundamental extension and widening of Kant’s 
transcendental program:
Die Aufgabe der Biologie besteht darin, die Ergebnisse der Forschungen 
Kants nach zwei Richtungen zu erweitern: 1. D ie Rolle unseres Körpers, 
besonders unserer Sinnesorgane und unseres Zentralnervensystems mit zu 
berücksichtigen und 2. Die Beziehungen anderer Subjekte (der Tiere) zu den 
Gegenständen zu erforschen. (Uexküll 1973: 9)
Ironically, it is exactly this biological interpretation of Kant’s program 
which finally leads to the methodological malformation of Uexküll’s 
approach. My paper then attempts to achieve two goals: (1) to provide 
a critical revaluation of Uexküll’s theory of organism, by identifying 
its methodological shortcomings and insufficiencies, and (2) I wish to 
give at least a rough sketch of a constructivist reinterpretation of this 
theory, which we can then fruitfully apply within the realm of biolo­
gical research.
Uexkülls theory of organism
The biological elaboration of Kant’s theory of knowledge refers to 
organisms, which veritably construct the world they live in. Space, 
time, meaning etc. are considered to be the products and by-products 
of this process of construction. So, for example, the orientation of the 
three canales semicirculares are connected with the three dimensions 
of Euclidean space (for an methodological criticism of this approach 
see Janich 1989). The respective senses of an organism produce a 
specific sense-space, which represents the structure which the orga­
nisms impose on the world by the activity of their sense organs on the 
one hand, and their effector-organs on the other. In accordance with its 
sensitive and effectorial constitution, the organisms produce Merk­
zeichen — signs of recognition, and Wirkzeichen —  signs of effect or 
impact (see Uexküll 1973: 158). The result of this creative activity is 
an interactive relation between the organism and those aspects of the 
external world, of its surroundings, which are designated by the
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organism as its environment. The shift of language (from surroundings 
to environment) indicates the very nature of this relation. The orga­
nism is thought to be implemented into its own creation, i.e. its 
environment:
Schon der bloße Augenschein belehrt uns, ob wir es mit einem Luft-, Wasser­
oder Landtier zu tun haben. Die Flossen, die Flügel und die Füße tragen 
unzweideutig den Stempel ihrer Bestimmung. Je mehr der Funktionskreis auf 
ein eng umschriebenes Medium eingeschränkt ist, um so deutlicher kann man 
an den Effektoren ihre Fügung erkennen. Wir unterscheiden Saugfuße, 
Springfüße, Lauffuße und Kletterfuße, die uns einen ganz sicheren Anhalt 
geben, um das Medium der Landtiere in weitere Unterabteilungen zu zerlegen. 
Bei den Parasiten entdecken wir Klammerftiße, die ganz genau den Geweben 
ihrer Wirte, die ihnen das Medium liefern, eingefügt sind. (Uexküll 1973: 
201)
This relation depends on the constitutions of the organisms itself (its 
Bauplan) and on the specific type of its (sensitive as well as effec- 
torial) action. The types of these actions are summarised in the 
Funktionskreise, the (closed) functional circuits e.g. of medium, food- 
supply, predators and reproductivity. The relationship between orga­
nisms and their respective environment can be (almost physicotheo- 
logically) described in terms of Gefiige and Gegengefüge i.e. structure 
and its corresponding counter-structure.
Die Tiere sind nun derart in die Natur hineingebaut, daß auch die umwelt wie 
ein planmäßiger Teil des Ganzen arbeitet. (Uexküll 1973: 153)
Consequently, evolution —  defined as the transformation o f the 
Bauplan, acting within the structure of its functional circuits — 
becomes a non-gradual, and, at least in its main aspects, non-adaptive 
process, produced and evoked by the structure and activity of the 
organisms themselves; to put it in accordance with Lewontin’s obser­
vation: organisms are not or not only the objects, but the subjects of 
their evolution as well. The worlds, the respective environments 
which the organisms inhabit, are specific systems of signs and 
representations which refer to the organismic activities and not 
primarily to the existing structures of the world p er  se. This concept, 
despite its undeniable merits, raises empirical as well as epistemo- 
logical problems.
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Empirical objections
This becomes clear when we take a short look at the evolutionary 
conception. Uexküll is a prominent anti-Darwinian author, and this 
anti-Darwinism can be shown to be a direct consequence of his 
concept of organism. If organisms are well inserted into their respec­
tive umweit (Uexküll emphasises the completeness of this relation by 
determining organisms as “perfect” entities) they can be considered to 
be in complex homoeostatic harmony with their umwelt:
Ein jeder Organismus kann nur er selbst sein. Aber in sich selbst ist er 
vollkommen, weil er, wie wir wissen, im Gegensatz zu unseren Gegenständen, 
die aus Struktur und Gefüge bestehen, nur aus Gefüge besteht. Daher darf man 
die grundsätzliche Behauptung aufstellen: ein jedes Lebewesen ist prinzipiell 
absolut wllkommen. (Uexküll 1973: 204—205)
Consequently, any shift of the inner functional contexture will lead to 
critical internal-external relations, unless the complete architecture 
itself is changed in a way that guaranties a new, evenly perfect inser­
tion into the umwelt. From this point of view, gradual evolutionary 
shifts become unlikely. Only a saltationist mechanism may provide a 
basis for “phylogenetic” change. Uexküll borrows a mechanism of this 
type from developmental biology, namely the organiser-concept of 
Spemann, combined with Driesch’s regulator-hypothesis. The onto­
genetic development provides an example for abrupt organisational 
shifts. According to this approach, the oocytes and the zygotes of all 
animal phyla start as the same structure, and the differences between 
the single phyla are produced during development because the oocytes 
of the “higher” phyla do not stop their development at a special earlier 
stage. At each single stage of development a new organiser starts its 
activity. Consequently, the higher forms run through the states of 
those forms that stand on the lower levels o f the systematic hierarchy 
of phyla. The development of a chick serves as an example of the 
activity of an organiser that starts to operate when a specific state of 
differentiation in the respective germ is reached:
An einem ganz bestimmten Punkt springen neue Organisatoren ein, die die 
bisherigen Anlagen vernichten und die im Bau begriffenen Zellen als 
indifferentes Ausgangsmaterial benutzen. Ein zweiter solcher Sprung ist nach 
der Anlage der Kiemenbögen deutlich zu erkennen. Die Kiemenbögen
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wachsen nicht zu Kiemen aus, sondern werden von mehreren Organisatoren in 
verschiedener Richtung umgeformt. (Uexküll 1973: 259)
From this point of view, evolution can neither be a series o f gradual 
shifts of organisation, nor a sequence of adaptations. This anti-Dar­
winian approach is a consequence of the underlying theory of orga­
nism. But Uexküll has to pay a high prize for his ontogeny-oriented 
concept, because evolution inevitably collapses into development 
(Gutmann, Neumann-Held 2000).
Epistemological objections
In order to identify possible methodological objections, we should go 
back to the basic anticipations of Uexküll’s “empirical Kantianism”. 
When we describe organisms as the central units of environmental 
formation, we can infer, that within one and the same surroundings 
differing organisms will live in differing environments. The task of a 
biologist, then, is to reconstruct and understand the differing 
environments as the “world-images” of differing Bauplans. In order to 
do so, the biologist undertaking the reconstruction will have to refer to 
invariants of world-making, of environmental formation. To put it 
more epistemologically — if the semantics of the Merk-Wirk-male 
refers to the specific functional constitution of organisms, then we’ll 
need at least a common syntax which allows the identification of 
corresponding world-aspects of differing Bauplans. This raises the 
most serious epistemological problems: the validity of the reconstruc­
tion of the organismic world-making and formation must not depend 
on the validity of this description itself. In order to avoid this type of 
contradiction, we have to state that the validity of our descriptions of 
organismic activities as a sign- and meaning-producing process is 
independent of the description of humans as living entities. In order to 
allow a self-application, Uexküll refers to a machine analogy, from 
which the “machine-like character” of all organisms is inferred — 
including human organisms:
An der Untersuchung der lebenden Organismen sind drei Wissenschaften 
beteiligt, die Physiologie, die Psychologie und die Biologie. Alle drei geben 
eine verscheiden Definition des Organismus. Die Physiologie behandelt ihn 
als Maschine, die Psychologie als beseelte Maschine und die Biologie als
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autonome Maschine. Alle drei stimmen also darin überein, dem Organismus 
die Eigenschaften einer Maschine zuzuschreiben. (Uexküll 1973: 156)
Within the class of machines we can distinguish living from non­
living machines. Organisms, then, are machines which literally pro­
duce meaning by using signs and symbols, constructing represen­
tations of their world etc.
So far so good, but the question remains: how do we know? Let us 
assume that Uexküll’s assumption is correct, and the constitution of 
environmental relationships is tightly connected with their respective 
Bauplan. The knowledge about all aspects of the environment is a 
relative knowledge about the interference between the Wirk-Gefiige of 
the organism and the physical, chemical or biotic aspects of its sur­
roundings. Other organisms then appear in this constructed environ­
ment in the same way, namely as constructed aspects of the en­
vironment, created by the respective organisms itself. But all this takes 
place within the framework of our own description. In order to 
evaluate the validity, i.e. the adequacy of the description, we cannot 
refer to the biological knowledge we used in order to describe the 
type-centred, organism-environment relationships. If we did so, an 
infinite regress or a vicious circle would follow. We would find our­
selves in a dilemma:
(1) If we knew the specific types of meanings of other non-human 
entities just because we reconstructed their behaviour in the 
environment in reference to our self-description as environment- 
forming entities, the validity of our knowledge about other living 
entities would entirely depend on the validity of our self-descrip- 
tion. In this case we would be instantiating exactly an “as if 
relationship” of a Kantian style which is ruled out by premise.
(2) If, on the other hand, we presupposed that our knowledge from 
non-human entities refers to our own animal nature, we would 
either have to state that this assumption is true, because we can 
describe our self “as if we were” a non-human-being, or we 
would have to state the truth of the description referring to the 
type of environment formation, following Uexküll’s approach. In 
the first case it is again an “as if relationship”; in the second we 
would again run into a circle or a regress.
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However, in both cases, the status of our knowledge about organisms 
must be based upon an “as if relationship”, which contradicts our 
premise. As a consequence we have to state, that Uexküll provides a 
classical Kantian framework of “as i f ’ descriptions of living entities in 
terms of organism-environment relations in the form of ontological 
reasoning. We can use this insight most fruitfully by radicalising 
exactly this Kantian point of view. In doing so we could avoid the 
fallacy of category which Uexküll commits by, for example, insti­
tuting his machine analogy in the way we reconstructed above. We 
have to transform the identity between organisms and machines into 
an analogy. This shift has some dramatic consequences, because now 
the production of meaning, the application o f signs, the use of lan­
guage, the creation of environment become a metaphorical description 
in reference to human (and not to animal) activities. Organisms have 
to be considered to be acting as i f  they were producing meaning, using 
language, applying signs or creating their environment. Accordingly, 
the reference to human action as the methodological starting-point 
grants the methodological validity of our descriptions of living entities 
behaving as if they were acting. This reconsideration of the analogy 
has already been used in order to provide a sound basis for the 
constructional-morphological reconstruction of evolutionary pathways 
(for a direct application see Gutmann, Gutmann 1995).
Perspective of a constuctivist morphology
Following the constructivist approach the objects of the sciences 
cannot be found in nature — determined and structured per se inde­
pendent of our description. Considering the sciences (and a fortiori 
natural sciences) to be the product of human action, the objects of the 
sciences are the result of a “construction process”. The construction of 
scientific objects starts within common everyday practices (Lebens­
welt). This starting point is methodological, in contrast to a merely 
historical starting point, because it refers exclusively to practices and 
actions that are not constitutively based upon scientific knowledge or 
know-how. In order to create the very primary scientific objects we 
must observe a “principle of methodological order”, insofar as only 
those concepts or notions can be used which themselves have already 
been introduced. The language we need in order to describe the
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resulting objects refers prescriptively towards the underlying metho­
dological starting point; i.e. a standardized language is constructed in 
reference to the instructions that are creative for the underlying 
practice (for further reading see Janich 1997). The creative conside­
rations that are necessary in order to construct primary scientific ob­
jects are themselves the subject matter of so called “proto'’ disciplines. 
The most important common everyday practice, which has been 
proven to be particularly useful for protobiological purposes, is the 
practice of breeding (especially of animal breeding, plant cultivation 
etc.). In respect to this practice we can talk about singular or collective 
actions, movements or qualities of animals or plants (living beings, 
“Lebewesen”) as well-known objects, which can be described, used, 
manipulated and varied according to the aims of the breeder 
(described using the intended characteristics to be improved during 
breeding) and without referring to a biological theory. Those qualities, 
including animal action or movement, e.g. the non-scientifically 
described behaviour, such as the mode of motion, food-gathering etc., 
can include aspects of the “gestalt” of an animal, as well as the pro­
pagation of characteristics. The descriptions of these collective or 
singular qualities referring to cultural practices build the metho­
dological starting point for the reconstruction of biological theories 
and the objects they are referring to; this reconstruction allows the 
determination of their respective methodological structure and status.
The resulting abstract notions are restricted to an explicable 
context of argument. Two languages will result: a standardized lan­
guage containing all the abstractors, ideators etc. to be introduced into 
the scientific language (S) and a language that refers to everyday 
language (L) (see Janich 1989); S  and L are connected by a third 
language that is represented by technical, physical or other kinds of 
non-biological knowledge. According to the purposes of protobiology, 
we must refer to the common everyday practices as breeding or 
cultivating, the keeping and utilization of living entities. In addition, 
for the individual steps of theory-building, several specified everyday 
practices, such as engineering and technical knowledge, on the one 
hand, and non-biological knowledge, such as physics and chemistry 
on the other hand, are applied as models to construct and structuralize 
biotic entities as objects for biological theories. The term ‘structura­
lize’ is used here to emphasize the operational definition o f structures. 
Consequently, animals or plants don’t “have” structures but they
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become “structuralized” through having models applied to them (for 
further reading see Gutmann 2002).
The constitution of morphological objects
The methodological starting point for the application of models, for 
the construction of biological objects, can be identified within the 
numerous cultural practices, such as using animals to carry, pull or 
move loads. Traditionally, horses or cattle are bred to optimize such 
characteristics which support the tasks required. Accordingly, these 
animals can be described as being used to produce force. In an 
abstract way, they can be described as force-generating units (Kraf- 
taggregate). Consequently, their limbs can be described to provide 
optimal working conditions in order to use these forces most effec­
tively. The fore- and hind-limbs are described as working structures, 
the tendons as force-transmitting structures etc.
The next step is the construction of primary morphological terms. 
The description of animals will invariably begin with a movement or 
motion of the animal (Table 1). We call the descriptions of the 
motions of an animal, such as “swimming”, “running” “digging” etc., 
the bionomal options of that animal. Bionomy (a term in S) covers all 
descriptions of motion and movement (in L) of living beings and must 
not be confused with their respective description, for example, “as” 
locomotion (a term in S). Bionomy has to be constructed as an open 
list of such descriptions to avoid the problems of (mis)understanding 
the quantifiers “all” or “sum total” ontologically.
Bionomic descriptions of animals result, for example, in the 
description of animals as constructions in terms of biomechanics. The 
terms used to describe an animal as a construction are gained by 
applying the machine model. As the parts of a machine will have to 
work together in terms of “force closure” to ensure the mechanical 
continuum during work, the structures of a construction (the parts of 
an animal denoted “as” structures which refer to the description of the 
animal as a bionomal construction) will have to fit in terms of 
coherence. These operations, which describe an animal as a “force- 
generating unit” and its parts as “working structures” indicate a shift 
of language from an ordinary language (animal, working, part etc. in 
L) to a standardized biomechanic language (structure, function, force,
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transmission etc. in S). Consequently, coherence and bionomy do not 
describe the characteristics of an animal in L but of a construction in 
5.
Table 1. Descriptions in everyday language (L) and terms in scientific 
language (S).
list of descriptions of movement
force-closure
animal
utilization
swimming, running etc.
S
bionomy
coherence
construction
function
motion, locomotion
The constructive modelling procedure, which in fact shares the logical 
structure with constitutive metaphors (see Gutmann, Hertler 1999), 
can be adequately understood as the construction of a relationship 
between three different languages. On the one hand, there are the two 
languages (S  and L) that designate the starting point and the result of 
the construction. Additionally, we use knowledge and know-how of, 
for example, technical, physical or chemical origin during the mo­
delling. This third language can be applied without the risk of a 
vicious circle because no biological knowledge (in terms of valid 
biological theory) is needed for the construction of the primary objects 
of the respective sciences and techniques.
From part to structure
Usually, an analogy is assumed to be a two-termed relation of imme­
diate representation between a model and its intended object. In 
contrast to this point of view, within the constructivist approach the 
analogy is transformed into a three-termed “model-relation” applying 
non-biological, physical or technical knowledge to structuralize parts 
of an animal as morphological structures: e.g. the mammalian leg 
serving as a working structure is structuralized according to a tech­
nical lever construction. The tertium comparationis, then, is the func­
tional rule governing the function of an idealized lever construction,
for example in regard to its optimal geometry, the relation between the 
lever arm of a force and the leverage of the load, i.e. their relation to 
the supporting point. In general, it is possible to structuralize the 
“gestalt” of an animal under the given conditions as its respective 
bionomal construction, referring to the practice of preparation (anato­
mical sectioning) by applying the functional principles that are gained 
by modelling in the first step. The result of this model-based 
sectioning is the functional description of parts of the animal as the 
structures of the animal’s construction. Applying functional models to 
structuralize a part of an animal, the resulting structures are the 
product of human operations using, for example, anatomical or histo­
logical methods. Of course, the “function” of a structure is not a 
“natural property” of this structure. We can call the operation, by 
which a part of an animal becomes functionally structuralized, the 
“ascription of function”. When we refer to the different options of 
utilization, different functions of a structure and, consequently, 
differing structures might result, and this is an important point if they 
refer to the same part of the animal.
In addition, it is possible to describe even the mechanical inter­
action of several functionally defined structures, referring to a parti­
cular mode of their action. If muscles are described as “tension-fibres- 
force-generating structures” (Zugfaserelemente = TFGS), referring to 
the performance of the two TFGS on a single “force-transmitting- 
structure” (e.g., bones described “as” FTS, which may be biomecha- 
nically characterized by their flexural stiffness), an agonist and an 
antagonist can be distinguished. In the case of the applied models, 
several types of antagonism can be defined mechanically, which differ 
according to their geometrical arrangement, the mechanical properties 
of the constituting materials, their efficiency etc. By applying the 
hydraulic model other types of antagonism can be constructed (see W. 
F. Gutmann 1972; 1995). The (ant)agonist arrangements, for example, 
of TFGS working within a hydraulic (i.e. a fluid-filled) construction, 
thereby using the fluid itself as a “working substance” to generate 
indirect antagonism, cannot be reduced to classical lever construc­
tions, applied as models above.
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One of the most prominent problems of traditional morphology, na­
mely whether the “form” may be an intelligible scientific object at all, 
can be solved by applying the method of rational morphology I have 
proposed here. After the description of animals in terms of structure, 
function, construction, coherence, bionomy etc., the term “form” can 
be introduced. “Form” then is a character of the construction of two 
animals, structuralized successfully in reference to the same criteria of 
a mechanical description. If two animals are identical in reference to 
their construction, they share the same “form”. The “identity of form” 
is an abstractor, introduced invariantly to the “identity of construc­
tion”. To summarize, all those terms, such as structure, function etc., 
are gained by using, for example, engines or other machines as models 
to structuralize animals. Following this constructivist approach, scien­
tific objects, constituting the “universe of discourse” of rational 
morphology aren’t natural entities but products of human operations. 
Morphology itself will result as one of the numerous disciplines of 
biology, irreducible to any other discipline. We can summarize these 
operations that allow the transition from an ordinary everyday descrip­
tion of living entities to a construction as follows:
KP
L w  = > K Lw
The meaning of the arrow is the instruction to shift from the descrip­
tion of living entities towards the structuralization of constructions; 
Lw  — living entity; К  — construction; K P  — principles of construc­
tions.
Referring to the knowledge which is needed for the modelling 
procedure and which represents a third language in addition to the two 
language levels we already discerned, we can summarize the proce­
dure as follows:
From gestalt to form
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Mod к.
Г11Lw
1
= > C1Lw
ModF2
T21Lw => C*2Lw
ModF
rpn
Lw => •SL
Here T is the specific part of the animal (Lw , living entity) we start 
with; Mod is the knowledge that is applied in terms of the specific 
model (e.g., the know-how of construction and the use of the lever), F  
is the function that is modelled; S is the structures resulting from the 
process of model-guided functional ascription (e.g., the TFGS), and К  
is construction.
As a result of this standardization we finally gain the level of 
standardized scientific languages, which refers to methodologically 
ordered and regulated practices. The notions of constructional (’’ratio- 
nal”) morphology belong to this language level. There are several 
asymmetries governing the systematic relations between these lan­
guage levels and the languages that belong to them respectively. The 
construction of biological (e.g., morphological) objects is only 
possible if we can refer to technical or physical knowledge. But the 
reverse is obviously absurd, as we do not need any biological know­
ledge in order to create physical objects. The same asymmetric rela­
tion can be identified between common everyday descriptions of ani­
mals and morphological descriptions or structuralizations. The result 
of the structuralization process is a “construction” — the rational 
version of the classical “bauplan” we were looking for. The structures 
we are dealing with now are introduced without the danger of 
“evolutionary implication”. With the structuralization of living entities 
as constructions we can provide the bases of rational comparison, 
which we assumed to be a necessary prerequisite of systematic 
considerations (see Webster, Goodwin 1996).
182 Mathias Gutmann
Towards reconstructional morphology
After the introduction of the constructions and their classification as 
different constructional types, the next step of our procedure is the 
reconstruction of possible predecessors. A reconstruction starts with 
the comparison of at least two constructions. We apply an explicated 
“transformation rule“ as the tertium of the comparison. By applying 
such a transformation rule we are able to transform one of our 
constructions into the second construction with which it was to be 
compared. In order to provide a transformation rule of the type that is 
appropriate for our task here, one should bear in mind that the 
constructions are biomechanical structuralizations of living animals. 
Consequently, the transformation that shall be reconstructed must be 
considered as a transformation sequence that is based on biomecha­
nical principles (presenting the transformation line of echinoderms s. 
fig. 1). These principles can again be borrowed from engineering. 
When describing animals as if they were mechanical constructions, 
the transformation of these constructions can be described by either 
optimizing them or by differentiating a given construction for diffe­
rent working conditions. But because animals are only treated as if 
they were mechanical constructions, some fundamental differences to 
the engineering of machines or engines must be appreciated:
In contrast to the optimization or differentiation of engines, we 
start the evolutionary reconstruction with the constructions of actual, 
existing forms and go back to those constructions that can be regarded 
as predecessors.
In contrast to the optimization or differentiation of engines, all the 
individual transformational intermediates that build a transformation 
line must be regarded as being “fit for work”. In terms of engineering 
processes, the force-, form- and material-closure of the intermediates 
of a transformation line must be maintained during the transformation 
process. Additionally, the construction of a field of this type provides 
the abilitiy to reconstruct more than one predecessor for one given 
starting construction.
The antecedent constructions of a given construction must be “re­
interpreted” as the biomechanic “conditions of possibility” o f (for­
merly) living entities. This procedure, i.e. the “imagination” of living 
entities on the basis of the constructional description within a trans­
formation line, can be called “reverse engineering”.
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Figure 1. This drawing represents the transformation line of some funda­
mental echinoid bodyplans, starting with a metameric annelid-like basic- 
construction; 1 ancestral Chordata, 2 ancestral Enteropneusta-Mkz worm, 
3 Pterobranchia, 4 transformation into Echinodermata construction form, 
5 Crinoidea, 6 Ophiuroidea, 7 Asteroidea, 8 Eleutherozoa constructions, 
9 Echinoidea, 10 Holothuria (see Gudo, Grasshoff 2002).
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For the elaboration of a reconstruction, the entire construction has to 
be regarded as a coherent mechanical unit. Consequently, we cannot 
reduce the reconstruction to the transformation of some features or 
characters. In complete contrast, we can identify the features which 
may serve as “characteristics” of evolutionary transformation only 
after the reconstruction was successful.
Concluding remarks
Following Uexkiill’s insight into the necessity of a theory of orga­
nisms, this theory can be applied fruitfully within the framework of a 
constructivist re-description of the machine analogy of living entities. 
Living entities are described and structuralized as if they were 
engines. The term organism then becomes a term of reflection, which 
provides the systematic reference of further biological descriptions — 
e.g. in terms of evolutionary transformation. A structural deficiency of 
classical and neo-Darwinist theories, which was already recognised 
and avoided by Darwin himself, who refers to French anatomy and 
morphology at this point, can be avoided and at the same time the 
methodological locus of the resulting descriptions of living entities as 
organisms is identified.
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Юкскюлл и современная биология: некоторые 
методологические соображения
Философская антропология и философская биология были обе мощ­
ными и значительными движениями в немецких академических 
дискуссиях начала XX века. Имея похожую концептуальную основу 
(в том числе имея в виду биоаристотелизм Ганса Дриша), они ста­
вили своей целью разработку синтетической философии природы, 
которая должна была бы включить человеческую природу в монис­
тическое описание самой природы. В этой биофилософской дискус­
сии теория Якоба фон Юкскюлла занимала центральное место. В 
статье теоретическая биология Юкскюлла рассматривается как про­
должение и переосмысление кантовской теории познания. Ре- 
конструктируется ее структура как общая структура знания и вы­
деляются ловушки биологической интерпретации условий возмож­
ности знания. Теория организма рассматривается как центральная 
часть юкскюлловского подхода. В последней части статьи предла­
гается инженерная морфология, которая позволила бы полнее при­
менить юкскюлловский подход к релятивности органистической 
конституции. Обосновывется полезность функционального модели­
рования на основе теории организма Юкскюлла и изучается ее связь 
с современными исследованиями в биологии.
Uexküll ja kaasaegne bioloogia:
Mõned metodoloogilised kaalutlused
Nii filosoofiline antropoloogia kui filosoofiline bioloogia olid võimsad ja 
mõjukad liikumised saksa akadeemilistes diskussioonides 20. sajandi alul.
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Lähtudes samaselt kontseptuaalselt aluselt (sealhulgas silmas pidades 
Hans Drieschi bio-aristotelismi) seadsid nad oma eesmärgiks sünteetilise 
loodusfilosoofia, mis pidanuks haarama inimloomuse looduse monistlik­
ku kiijeldusse. Selles biofilosoofilises arutelus on Jakob von Uexkülli 
teoorial keskne koht. Käesolevas artiklis vaadeldakse Uexkülli teoreetilist 
bioloogiat kui kantiliku teadmiseteooria jätku ja ümbersõnastust. Re­
konstrueeritakse ta eristruktuur kui teadmise üldine teooria ja tuuakse 
esile teadmise võimalikkuse tingimuste bioloogilise interpretatsiooni lõk­
sud. Organismi teooriat käsitletakse kui Uexkülli lähenemise keset. 
Artikli viimane osa esitab insenermorfoogilise käsitluse, mis võimaldaks 
täielikumalt rakendada Uexkülli lähenemist organismilise konstitutsiooni 
relatiivsusele. Vaadeldakse funktsionaalse modelleerimise kasulikkust 
evolutsioonilistele rekonstruktsioonidele uexkülliliku organismiteooria 
alusel ja selle seotust praegusaegse bioloogilise uurimistööga.
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Schema as both the key to and the puzzle of life: 
Reflections on the Uexküllian crux
Jui-Pi Chien
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No. 1, Sec. 4, Roosevelt Road, Taipei 106, Taiwan 
e-mail: angie2@aptg.net
Abstract. Jakob von Uexküll’s problematic is manifested in his paradoxical 
portraiture o f form within the plan o f  nature: the one a sensual schema and the 
other a transsensual ideal form. At first sight, Uexküll’s belief in the Platonic 
and the Reformational notions o f the immobile becoming o f form seems to be 
a resignation from the heated debates among his contemporary materialists, 
vitalists, dynamists, and evolutionists. However, in terms o f the Kantian 
subjective teleology, Uexkiill’s appropriation o f the ancient philosophy 
reinstates the invisible, static, but repetitive cycle as his regulating principle in 
the observation o f the activity o f animals. This regulating principle dis­
tinguishes itself from the rule o f resemblance established by the appearances 
and fossil remains o f animals, which is linear, incomplete, and digressive. In 
the light o f Michel Foucault, the transition from the visible to the invisible 
recoups the study o f nature from the living beings (les etres vivants) to the life 
itself (la vie), from natural philosophy to biology. My study suggests that we 
recast Uexküll’s sign theory from his observations on the crux that models and 
triggers an animal to action in its Umwelt. Bracketing Uexküll’s transcen­
dental configuration o f form and image, we still find that schema, in its 
sensual and functional context, evolves from a reflection o f the objects to a 
summary o f their features plus an ignorance o f their proper names. Uexküll's 
erasure o f proper names (in different languages) that directs our attention to 
the presentation in its pure form (Gestalt) not only constitutes an important 
step in epistemology, but also in a life science that meticulously delves into 
the genotypes.
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1. The changing shape as a problematic
In his observations of the phenomenon of life, Uexküll bridges two 
seemingly irreconcilable but necessary states —  constancy and 
change. He attributes constancy to the structure of the organism and 
change to its protoplasm. Sometimes he describes the organism as a 
well-built machine, but, more often than not, the organism appears to 
us as an intelligent being, which knows how to lead its life. From the 
Uexküllian perspective, an amoeba under the microscope and the 
clouds floating in the sky are not very different. Uexküll projects the 
functional circle to them both, in which the sensitive and reactive 
organisms take different shapes during their incessant interactions (die 
Wechselwirkung) with the food and the wind. The changing shapes 
(die wechselnd Formen, die Formbilden, die Gestalten) offer an index 
to life; however, each change is not random but already invested with 
a command, a purpose, and a meaning.1 Both a machine and an 
organism are constrained by their innate commands during the course 
of their lives (Zeichenprozesse). One of the essential tasks of Umwelt­
forschung is to explore the centralizing command within an organism 
that attracts only the desired objects, but ignores the undesired ones in 
its outer world.
Regarding the human subjects’ understanding and judgment of 
nature, it is Kant who devises schema as mediation between the innate 
a priori categories and the phenomenon. Without the schemata and the 
sensations, one can see the objects with his given categories, but there 
will be no understanding and no judgment of them. The schemata 
coated with sensibility (Sinnlichkeit), sensations (Empfindung, 
Sinnesempfindung), and the feelings of pleasure (Lust) and displeasure 
(Unlust) realize, but at the same time restrict, the human subject’s 
representation of the world.“ Uexküll closely follows Kantian doctrine 
in order to replace the stereotyped conceptualizations of living beings.
Uexküll reinstates the meaningful shape in Bedeutungslehre: “The meaningful 
shape is constant; it is always the product o f a subject, and never the product of  
random influences on an object. [ . ..]  The meaning o f all plant and animal organs 
as utilizers o f the meaning-factors external to them determines their shape and the 
distribution o f their constituent matter. [ ...]  Until now, we had no reason to infer a 
meaning-command separate from the form-shaping command” (Uexküll 1982: 
37).
2 Kant 1996: 2 7 6 -277 .
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In his rebuke against the mechanists and the dynamists, he excludes 
the possibility of unplanned machines from his planned biology:
One might just as well imagine that a simple mechanism came into existence 
through pure coincidence and remains completely without plan. The same is 
true with dynamisms. A wellspring, which arises somewhere from beneath the 
earth’s surface, is certainly a dynamic system but completely without plan, 
while a fountain in a French park is meticulously planned. Thus the question 
should not be: are living beings dynamisms or mechanisms? One should 
rather ask: are they a planned work or a piece work, which is unconnected to 
any plan (such as the raindrops in a cloud)? (Uexküll 1980: 128; italics 
mine —  J. C.)3
In addition to the construction plans, which are assumed to be uni­
versal in all living organisms, Uexküll distinguishes the unrelated 
object (beziehungsloser Gegenstand)4 from the meaning carrier 
(Bedeutungsträger). An organism without a plan is analogous to a 
human subject without schemata. However, Kant’s anthropocentric 
speculation of schema is rather metaphysical, which is not identical 
with a structure or even something substantial in the human mind. 
Aiming to pick up the tradition developed by Plato and Kant, Uexküll 
has transferred and located this enabling but restricting magic of 
schema in animals. How did he make the breakthrough to prove his 
teleology that all animals, regardless of their levels in the man-made 
classificatory system, are equipped with schemata?5
? Uexküll highlights the idea o f blueprints in all living organisms when he 
refines the borderline between physiology and his biology: “Mechanismus 
irgendwo durch Zufall entstanden ist und völlig planlos bleibt. Das gleiche gilt 
von den Dynamisen. Ein Springell, der irgendwo dem Erdboden entsteigt, ist 
gewiß eine dynamisches System und dabei planlos, während die Springbrunnen 
eines französischen Parks planvoll abgestimmt sind. Die Frage muß daher nicht so 
gestellt werden: Sind die Lebewesen Dynamismen oder Mechanismen?, sodem  
sind sie Planwerk oder Stückwerk, die durch keinen Plan verbunden sind (wie die 
Nebeltropfen in einer Wolke)?”
4 The 1982 translation o f Bedeutungslehre says: “The stone lies in the objective 
observer’s hand as a neutral object, but it is transformed into a meaning-carrier as 
soon as it enters into a relationship with a subject” (Uexküll 1982: 27). Regarding 
the object, Uexküll actually holds a completely negative tone in the German text; 
he says “Der Stein, der als beziehungsloser Gegenstand”. 1 therefore translate the 
key term as “unrelated object”.
5 For the 4th volume o f Symbolic Forms, Cassirer keeps some notes about his 
discontent with Uexküll’s use o f schema in animals. He says: “[Uexküll’s
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Before Uexküll had his book on Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere 
published in 1909, he spent at least seventeen years observing the 
muscular contractions of invertebrates and marine animals, the so- 
called model organisms. Uexküll’s illustration of Schema in this work 
is much more controversial than his use of Umwelt; the former 
promptly caused disagreements among the empirical scientists at the 
time, while the latter still stays within the ordinary notion of the outer 
world or the environment of an animal. In his 1911 reply to a letter 
from Ernst Mach, Uexküll says:
I cannot get over one point, which is about your rejection o f Kant. For me 
personally, 1 do not understand the theory o f  things in itself as much as you 
do. I think it is a purely marginal concept, with which certain things would be 
dismissed and it does not help us understand anything. On the contrary, Kant 
seems to me, as correctly as you do, to observe the sensations as the materials, 
from which the world constructs itself. I particularly have a high regard for the 
chapter on the Schematism o f Pure Understanding, which shows how the 
materials o f sensation [dies Empfindungsmaterial] can be formed as enactive 
objects [Gegenstände] through the schemata. I think many o f  your research 
results can also be developed with this process. (Uexküll 1978: 135; italics 
mine, J. C.)
Mach, as a follower of Fechner and the pioneer of the Vienna Circle, 
presented a series of psycho-physical analysis of human sensations 
between 1900 and 1911 (Thiele 1978: 124; Mach 1998). His project 
adopted “the principle of the complete parallelism of the psychical and 
physical,” in which the reduced amounts of psychological elements 
are equal to the expected amounts in the nerve-processes (Mach 1998: 
30). Except for Mach’s rejection of the metaphysics, Uexküll, in this 
letter, is not strongly against Mach’s physical approach because he 
suggests that schematism and parallelism can enlighten each other. He 
even conveys his admiration to Mach by complementing Mach’s 
original detour from the traditional approach of atomism, which, he
2. The theoretical evolutions of Schema and Umwelt
‘Gegenwelt’] conceives the schema all too narrowly as an image, as a spatial 
schema”; “Animals do not possess such a view as nonperceptual representation.” 
He believes that the human beings become animal-like only under pathological 
conditions, like agnosia [the inability to name objects] and apraxia [the inability to 
move] (Cassirer 1996: 214-215).
criticizes, has led biology to a completely dead end.6 At the early stage 
of Uexküll’s research, the schema in the philosophical domain was 
intended as a higher term to bring metaphysics and the empirical 
sciences together. The schema was also given an anatomical configu­
ration as the “mirror” (der Spiegel) that faithfully and completely 
reflects the objects in an animal’s environment (Uexküll 1985: 234). 
Uexküll believed that an animal reacts to the mirrored image of an 
object that has already been formed in the animal’s eyes. A further 
centralization of the peculiar mirrors from the retina to the brain forms 
the counter world (Gegenwelt), in which he found the number and 
types of objects to be correspondent with the given schemata:
I call this central pathway complex, formed in correspondence with the 
images o f the objects on the retina, a schema and assert that the exact number 
of types o f objects in the surroundings is distinguished by the animal as there 
are schemata present in its counter world. (Uexküll 1985: 240; 1909: 241— 
242)
The counter world constitutes the fundamental organization (Aus­
gestaltung) or the construction plan of an animal. Uexküll takes it as 
the focus, from which derives the sense and signification (Sinn und 
Bedeutung) of every species. In contrast to the Darwinian interest in 
the outer worlds, Uexküll plans to narrow down his scope within the 
inner worlds and the counter worlds that constitute a minimal source 
but generate the broadest implications (Uexküll 1985: 224-225). It is 
the Innenwelt and the Gegenwelt rather than the Umwelt or the 
Umgebung that are charged with high voltage to shift the attentions of 
the scientific communities:
The comparison o f inner worlds [Innenwelten] is just as instructive as the 
comparison o f environments [Umwelten]. Whereas our own environment
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6 In the final paragraph o f the letter, Uexküll says: “Ich habe es immer sehr 
bewundert, dass Sie im Gegensatz zur herrschenden Physik nicht aus dem Atom 
die Weltseele gemacht haben, sodem einen Weg gegan[g]en sind, der eigentlich 
ein biologischer ist und das in einer Zeit, da die Biologie völlig todtgeschlagen 
war” (Uexküll 1978: 135). My gratitude goes to Dr. Torsten Rüting for 
discovering this letter during my two-week stay in Hamburg in July 2003. We 
didn’t find the letter from Mach to Uexküll in the Hamburg archive center. 
Neither did I find any letters between Uexküll and Mach catalogued in the Tartu 
archive centre when I visited it in mid January 2004, with the kind assistance o f 
its chairperson Riin Magnus and Prof. Kalevi Kull.
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[Umwelt], which constitutes the surroundings [Umgebung; geographical 
environment] for all animals, is full o f colorful, resounding, scented objects, 
our counterworld [Gegenwelt] is limited to the succession o f excitations in the 
prestructured nervous tissue schemata [nervösen Fasergebilden (Schema)] of 
our brain. In their form they resemble those objects. (Uexküll 1985: 242; 
1909: 250)
Later manifestations of schema after 1909 still reveal his emphasis on 
the collaboration between the receiving ends and the commanding 
center inside an organism. Uexküll’s renewed definition of the 
nervous schemata can be formally traced in his Theoretische Biologie 
(1920), in which he invalidates the theory of psycho-physical paral­
lelism, but embraces the theory of sufficient determinateness or diffe­
rentiation by Johannes Müller (Uexküll 1926: 146-147; Mach 1998: 
28):
Wheresoever qualitatively different stimuli effect an entry, we find that their 
specific peculiarity is taken from them. Whether an airwave strikes the ear, or 
an etheric wave the retina, the same transformation is set going in both 
cases...The various stimuli are not distinguished through different excitations 
in the nervous system, but by the “person” o f the nerves through which they 
flow ...it was discovered by Johannes Müller, who made o f it, along with all 
its corollaries, the basis o f comparative physiology o f the nervous system. 
(Uexküll 1926: 147)
Assisted by the metaphors of a scale (eine Skala, 1920), some lines 
(die Linienführungen, 1920), and a sieve (ein Sieb, 1940)7, Uexküll 
conceptualizes the schemata as several people, who serve to quantify 
the number of excitations and to control their effects. However, the 
number of schemata definitely does not correspond to the number of 
excitations, nor do the schemata reflect the objects in the outer world. 
The schemata are a “summary” of the features of the objects that are 
most proper and important to the person:
As soon as outlines serve the body as indications, differentiation o f the 
sensory part o f the nervous system speeds off. For now it is useful so to 
combine quite definite sensory nerves o f the eye, that their common or
The 1982 translation o f Bedeutungslehre mistranslates “das Sieb” (the sieve, 
the screen) as a gutter (the underground tunnel), which renders Uexküll’s idea 
bizarre: “At the outer boundary, they [sense organs] serve as a gutter for the 
physico-chemical effects o f the outside world” (48).
successive excitations are linked up into a whole, which makes its way into 
the guiding mechanism as a new unity. I have called these nervous unities 
‘anatomical schemata,’ because they do not give a complete reflection o f the 
outline in the external world, but merely a summary combination o f its most 
important parts, and this with a degree o f exactness suitable for the particular 
animal. (Uexküll 1926: 149)
The Kantian schema is also coined with the reflex arch and the 
functional circle to illustrate the sufficient content qualities inside the 
sense organs. Uexküll’s use of Umwelt still oscillates between the 
subjective world and the physical world. Nevertheless, he gives Um­
welt a greater prominence than his previous work; the Gegenstand is 
refined as the “Umweltding” in his elaboration on “ Welt und Umwelt,” 
supplemented at the end of the 1928 version of Theoretische Biologie:
Now I mark all the surrounding objective realities as the world and all the 
surrounding subjective realities as Umwelt. So it will gradually reveal that the 
two worlds contradict each other...One had best always start from an 
individual object and look for it in the different Umwelten, [that is,] to have a 
sense o f impression, how he [the impression] dresses him self in hundreds o f  
colors and forms and how he [the impression] becomes first one thing and 
then the other in the Umwelt. (Uexküll 1928: 232)8
Umwelt as a theoretical tool gradually outshines the anatomical 
Schema when Uexküll in the 1934 Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von 
Tieren und Menschen distinguishes Umwelt from Umgebung, the 
former is constituted by an organism’s reactions to the geometrical 
shapes while the latter is the objective physical world. On the other 
hand, he presents some case studies about the fallacy of schemata:
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Uexküll came to Hamburg in 1925, and the Institut für Umweltforschung was 
established in 1926. His specification o f Umwelt may be attributed to the rise o f  
the new discipline: “Bezeichne ich nun sämtliche mich umgebenden objektiven 
Wirklichkeiten als Welt und sämtliche mich umgebenden subjektiven Wirk­
lichkeiten als Umwelt, so wird sich Schritt für Schritt zeigen lassen, worin diese 
beiden Welten sich widersprechen” (Uexküll 1928: 228); “Am besten wird man 
immer von einem einzelnen Gegenstand ausgehen und ihn in den verschiedenen 
Umwelten aufsuchen, um einem Eindruck zu gewinnen, wie er sich in 
hunderterlei Farben und Formen kleidet und bald zu diesem bald zu jenem  
Umweltding wird...in der Umwelt eines Singvogels, der in ihren Ästen nistet —  
eines Fuchses, der unter ihren Wurzeln seinen Bau hat —  eines Spechtes, der auf 
Jagd nach die Holzwürmer in ihrer Rinde macht —  in der Umwelt eines solchen 
Holzwurmes selbst.”
25
194 Jui-Pi Chien
they may be broken, dissolved or become incomplete in life situations, 
due to the lack of established pathways or the traumas inside the 
animals. The completeness and the sophistication of the nervous 
systems become an index to differentiate the animals into two types:
It is enough to assume that the receptor cells for local signs in the receptor 
organ are segregated into two groups, those in one, according to the schema, 
broken [aufgelöst], those in the other, according to the schema, compact 
[geschlossen]. There are no further differentiations. (Uexküll 1957a: 40; 1934: 
47)
A dissolved schema is not able to organize the protoplasm or to 
control the muscles, much less to form an enclosed system. An 
organism or an animal without the continuous and systematic network 
is open (eröffnet) to the outer world. Its shape of body is subject to 
constant but blind changes, like the amoeba, the sea urchin, the scallop 
and the earthworm. The schemata dominate the formation of the 
counter world (Gegenwelt) and the perceptual world (Merkwelt). 
However, the function of the schemata will not be completed without 
the operational world (Wirkwelt). The constant oscillations between 
triggering and extinguishing (Das Wirkmal löscht das Merkmal aus, 
1980: 124), selecting and imprinting (Merkmale, die ihnen vom der 
Subjekt aufgeprägt werden, 1940: 57) strengthen an animal subject’s 
“surrounding world” (Umweh; or “rebuilt world” in the sense of 
Umbau), which is a composite of the transformed and abstracted pro­
perties of the objects. Umwelt as an abstract and theoretical tool 
achieves its sufficiency in the 1940 Bedeutungslehre:
Everything that falls under the spell o f a Umwelt (subjective universe) is 
altered [umgestimmt] and reshaped [umgeformt] until it has become a useful 
meaning-carrier; otherwise it is totally neglected. In this way the original 
components are tom apart without any regard to the building-plan that 
governed them until that moment. (Uexküll 1982: 31; 1940: 7-8)
When Uexküll appropriates Umwelt in the sense of ego quality (Ich- 
Ton) rather than the outer world, the Kantian schema becomes merged 
with the nervous system, the functional circle and the intended sense 
of Umwelt itself. Unlike the multiple properties of an object, the Ich- 
Ton of a subject is much restricted to its time, space and sensations. 
The problematic lies in how the subject uses his phenomenal world to 
differentiate his body parts and his perceived world, following a
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purpose, a meaning and a melody. The distinctions or gaps between 
human beings and animals are replaced by a seamless cooperation 
between the meaning user (Bedeutungsverwender) and the meaning 
carrier (Bedeutungsträger).9
3. The Urbild and the Gestalt against evolution: 
the Uexküll-Darwin controversy
Uexküll as a scientist sounds rational and artistic enough, but he 
dramatically negates the schemata when he becomes intoxicated over 
the meaning of life. The metaphysical Uexküll backbites the construc­
tive Uexküll when he adopts the tone of Socratic irony:
But stop! That is not what the spider does at all. It weaves its web before it is 
ever confronted with an actual fly. The web, therefore, cannot represent the 
physical image o f a fly, but rather it is a representation o f the archetype o f a 
fly [eine Ausschnitt des Urbildes der Fliege, a clipping o f the ideal image o f a 
fly],10 which does not exist in the physical world. Hark! I hear the mechanists 
calling: they will say that by this example Umwelt-theory is revealed to be 
metaphysics; because he who seeks effective factors beyond the physical 
world is a metaphysician. (Uexküll 1982: 42; 1940: 20)
Instead of using schema to illustrate the Umwelt of the spider, Uexküll 
shifts to other terms, like the Urbild, Urform, Urfasson, and Urpar- 
titur to indicate the ideal form (eidos) as a higher power over schema. 
This higher power prescribes an animal’s developmental stages from 
its embryo to its death; the beginning has foretold the end. The 
program enacted in the cycle of the ideal form goes beyond human 
acquisition, but embodies Nature as an eternal composer, which is not 
constrained by time, space, and sensations:
There is no human knowledge that can be obtained through experience. The 
tunnel-boring actions o f pea-beetle larvae prove to us that they are condi­
9 See Han-liang Chang’s paper in this volume.
10 The 1982 translation literally translates Ausschnitt as representation, Urbild as 
archetype. The translator may not have paid much attention to the controversy that 
Uexküll evokes in this paragraph. From the position o f an austere metaphysician, 
Uexküll makes a complete distinction from the Darwinian theory o f defining the 
species as modifications (or representations) o f the archetypes. Uexküll reminds 
his readers that the object o f contemplation here is far from the physical types.
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tioned by a transsensual knowledge that is timeless [durch ein übersinnliches 
nicht an die Zeit gebundenes Wissen], Thanks to this knowledge, the com­
poser can shape the future life-requirements o f an unborn beetle [noch nicht 
vorhandenen Käfer] and program the actions o f the beetle larva. (Uexküll 
1982: 59; 1940:40)
Despite the fact that Uexküll has rooted schemata in both human 
beings and animals, from an anatomical point of view, his idea of 
timeless transsensual knowledge in Nature debases human beings and 
the perceptions mediated by schemata. A beetle larva is far more 
superior to a human being in the way that it is always faithful to the 
higher command, but the human being does not have any capacity to 
realize the way it works (Fig. 1; Fig. 2). The gap between human 
beings and nature, which is bridged by Kant, becomes a gulf again 
when Uexküll allies with the animals:
Once this cardinal principle of nature’s technique is understood, we 
can state that no progression occurs from the less to the more perfect. 
Because if a variety of theme of meaning extraneous to the animal 
influence its development [Denn wenn fremde Bedeutungsmotive 
allseitig eingreifend den Aufbau der Tiere gestalten], it is impossible 
to see how successive generations could alter this situation. [...] The 
triumphs of nature’s techniques are readily apparent, but the maimer 
in which its melodies are created cannot be investigated. Nature’s 
techniques share common features with the creation of a work of art. 
We can, of course, see the painter’s hand apply one color after the 
other to the canvas until he has completed the painting, but the 
creative melody [Gestaltungsmelodie] that moves his hand is wholly 
hidden [unerkennbar] from us. (Uexküll 1982: 75; 1940: 58)“
We can also find the metaphor o f a painter at work in the first chapter of 
Michel Foucault’s Les mots et les choses (1966). I hold the hypothesis that 
Foucault was inspired by Uexküll’s idea either through his master, Georges 
Canguilhem, who formally gave three lectures about Uexküll at College Philo- 
sophique during 1946 and 1947, or during his one-year stay in Hamburg in 1959. 
As a daring explorer o f knowledge, Foucault has the habit to prove what he hears 
or studies when he travels to the place that incubates the knowledge.
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Figure 2. The personified Umwelt of ladybirds by an fionian artist, 
exhibited in Tartu University Ibrary during January 004.
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Figure 3. A cartoon drawing made by Johannes Holtfreter in München, 
included in a letter from him to Friedrich Brock, dated Aug. 18, 1934. 
Holtfreter was invited to contribute a paper for Uexküll’s 70th birthday 
Festschrift. He did not send the paper but the letter and the drawing 
instead. The bulky book that he drew is dedicated to both Brock and 
Uexküll but the aura around Uexküll’s head looks ironic. (Permission of 
Jakob von Uexküll Centre, Tartu.)
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Figure 4. Decalcomanie (1966, Rene Magritte, 1898-1967).
Uexkiill’s endorsement of the animals within the invisible Ge­
staltungsmelodie conveys a religious overtone that regards the shapes 
of animals as a sign of the divine Nature. The presentation of the ideal 
form in Gestalten is a well-defined and meaningful theme shared by 
both an animal subject and its species, which is incongruous with the 
human rule of representation [Vorstellung], The Gestaltungsmelodie 
repeats itself in a cycle that guides an animal subject in its former, 
present, and future existences; on the contrary, the rule of 
representation develops over time and creates differences for the 
human subject within his limited present life.12 In his variation on the
12 Some readers may wonder if Uexküll is influenced by Gestalt psychology, the 
trace o f which can also be found in his Theoretische Biologie (1920), where he 
discusses the importance o f apperception and the displacement (rather than the 
disappearance) o f organic functions. However, Uexküll him self denies this link: 
“The results o f studies o f the building o f forms (Gestaltbildung) are interesting 
but o f limited theoretical interest for the knowledge o f  the problems o f life. And 
this will not change even when we go deeper into the process o f form-building 
{Gestaltbildung). But we have in every case, where an animal builds articles for 
its own use, a possibility o f observing the process o f form-building first hand. We 
can follow the weaving o f a spider’s web as accurately as we can follow the 
manufacture o f  an article for use by human [beings], say the shaping and firing o f  
a coffee cup. In both cases the building o f the form is bound to strict rules,
Platonic dialogue about Meno, Uexküll construes the ideal form as “a 
memory of former existence,” which is universal in animals but 
lacking in human beings. Uexküll has Meno and Socrates say:
Meno: Men always observe the models o f their present lives only. They do not 
possess an unforgotten knowledge stemming from a previous existence, 
which could serve them as a rule for the actions o f their present existence.
Socrates: You would find the disadvantage to be even greater if  you made 
clear to yourself that man’s imitations o f the objects he has seen during his 
present life never are the equals o f their originals, whereas the objects 
which animals are capable o f producing by drawing from their inner 
knowledge always are the equals o f their originals, sometimes even 
surpassing them. (Uexküll 2004; 1943: 140; italics mine —  J. C.)
It is exactly with the memory that is persistent in animals but lost in 
human beings that Uexküll fictionalizes the unknown. Uexküll levels 
himself to the same plane as the animals, and the spiritual meaning is 
thus comprehensive only between the animal subject and its objects, 
the privileged observer and his target animals, but excluded from other 
human beings. In establishing his extreme cult, Uexküll cleans away 
sensuality, digressions, and irregularity of shape from the holy 
Umwelts by embracing the Platonic and the Reformation paradox of 
immobile becoming, which is achieved in the unity of time (memory) 
but does not change over time (Fig. 3).13
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[which] we can compare to tunes” (2001a: 121). The founder o f gestalt theory, 
Christian von Ehrenfels, acknowledges the attainment o f a pure and higher gestalt 
quality when one excludes the variations o f time, space, and sensations a 
posteriori. This does not fully match Uexküll’s Gestalt a priori, either. The only 
concept o f gestalt that matches Uexküll’s can be traced back to the Reformation 
text in the 17th century, in which the Gestalten are construed as the holy signs of 
Christ, materialized in the bread and the wine. Ernst Cassirer indicates that Kant 
in the 18th century purposefully dropped the Germanic Gestalt but picked up the 
Greek Skema when he illustrated the Critique o f Pure Reason (Cassirer 1945: 
118-120). Uexküll may have regressed to the religious connotation o f Gestalt that 
was avoided by Kant. This is another example that reveals Uexküll’s resistance to 
his contemporary theories or concepts.
Uexküll in his autobiography describes his mother’s explication about the 
differences between the Catholic and the Protestant churches: “Die Bedeutung der 
evangelische Kirche liegt in ganz anderer Richtung. Sie dient als Versammlung­
sort für die christliche Gemeinde. In ihr ist jades Glied vor Gott gleich. Das 
Wesentliche, was wir hieraus lernen sollen, ist, daß, so verschieden wir im 
weltlichen Leben nicht bloß an Rang, sodem auch an Charakter sein mögen, wir 
im geistlichen Leben alle schuldbeladene Geschöpfe sind. Alles Menschliche ist
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Does Uexküll become incurably insane in his late years when he 
justifies the Platonic ideal form and memory for animals, but debases 
human beings’ lack of them? In the second part of the dialogue, even 
his son, Thure, reminds his father that his belief is simply an illusion. 
However, Uexküll was very much aware of using the given, immobile 
and complete form (or memory) as a demarcation from his contem­
porary mechanist, vitalist and evolutionist views of life. Above the 
dominating factors of energy and matter, Uexküll acknowledges that 
he chose the third factor to imagine the immaterial relationships of the 
material structures:
When the whole complex o f natural phenomenon was traced to only two 
factors, energy and matter [ ...]  the third factor, form, was simply overlooked. 
[...]
Structure is not a material thing: it is the unity o f  immaterial relationships 
among the parts o f an animal body. Just as plane geometry is the science not 
o f the material triangles drawn on a blackboard with chalk but o f the 
immaterial relationships between the three angles and three sides o f  a closed 
figure [ ...]  so biology treats the immaterial relationships o f  material parts 
united in a body so as to reconstitute the structure in imagination. (Uexküll 
1930: 19 and 9; quoted in Cassirer 1950: 200)
Uexküll’s concept of geometry as an innate and immaterial relation­
ship within an organism is given a purpose in the 1930s, both in Die 
Lebenslehre and Streifzüge (1934), before he dramatizes this principle 
again in the dialogue between a Greek master and a slave boy in 
1943.14 Parallel to his identification of schema as the nervous system, 
Uexküll also takes the given but invisible relationship as his guiding 
principle in observing the autonomous actions of animals. In addition 
to the disagreement between the father and the son, the ideal form is 
also the main divergence between Uexküll and Darwin, though they 
both value the “hidden bond” in the species. For Uexküll, the hidden 
bond is persistent; it can be proved and not proved, both anatomized
im geistlichen Leben alle schuldbeladene Geschöpfe sind. Alles Menschliche ist 
verschieden —  alles Göttliche ist gleich” (1957b: 25). This may explain Uexküll’s 
belief that animals are better creations than human beings: men are laden with 
sins, differences, or rather inequalities.
14 When Cassirer stayed in Sweden during 1940, he recognized the importance 
o f geometry in Uexküll’s theory and justified his work as one o f those that follow  
the tradition o f  ideal morphology established by Cuvier and Goethe (1950: 199— 
203).
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in the sense organs and imagined in the transcendental a priori. For 
Darwin, it takes time to find it out, and will be revealed in the 
unpleasant and rudimentary organs in an animal (1964: 450-58). The 
ideal form for Darwin is simply a creation myth, which may 
occasionally survive as the archetype in the species that leave a small 
number of eggs. For most species with a big population over a long 
historical period, in which the new forms constantly supplant the old 
ones, the archetype or the prototype has already been terminated. Even 
if it survives in an irregular shape, it is not functional any longer. 
What kind of truth about nature is revealed in their diverse 
explanations over the structures and actions of animals?
4. Michel Foucault versus Ernst Cassirer, 
two perspectives of history
In evaluating the gaps between Uexküll and Darwin, Cassirer sub­
sumes them both under the Kantian definition of teleology, which 
only makes differences in the maxims that the reflecting subjects 
propagate but are not constituent as a real end in nature (Cassirer 
1950).15 The following Kantian paragraphs echo Cassirer’s inter­
pretation:
Strictly speaking, one must call this legislation heautonomy, since the power 
o f judgment does not give the law to nature nor to freedom, but solely to itself, 
and it is not a faculty for producing concepts o f objects, but only for 
comparing present cases to others that have been given to it and thereby 
indicating the subjective conditions o f the possibility o f this combination a 
priori. [ ...]  The concept o f a real end o f nature therefore lies entirely outside 
the field o f the power o f judgment if  that is considered by itself. [ ...]  Hence 
whatever may be found in experience to belong to teleology contains merely 
the relation o f its objects to the power o f  judgment and indeed to a principle 
o f it by means o f  which it is legislative for itself (not for nature), namely as a 
refecting power o f judgment. (Kant 2000: 28, 34, 35; italics mine —  J. С .)
15 Thanks to Prof. Frederik Stjemfelt in Copenhagen University, I came to read 
the 4th volume o f Cassirer’s Erkenntnisproblem. After listening to my 
presentation in the 3rd Gathering in Biosemiotics in July 2003, he suggested that 1 
find a mediation between Uexküll and Gombrich from Cassirer. Nevertheless, I 
find Foucault more beneficial than Cassirer in rationalizing the paradox in 
Uexküll. Cassirer’s bias o f  ethology and zoology overshadows his willingness to 
explore the mutation in Uexküll’s theory.
By returning to the Kantian notion of an enquiring and regulating 
subject, which cares more about integrating different thoughts than 
arguing over absolute truth in nature, Cassirer allies with the rational 
and contingent proponents of truth to point out the shared dogmatisms 
among the late 19th century scientists. However, if we treat each 
scientist as a consistent and congenial agent in propagating his own 
theory, the history of ideas would be strangely continuous and quiet. 
Foucault reminds us of the fallacy in Cassirer’s historical perspective:
Cassirer exerts himself to find out the intrinsic necessities o f  the thought 
discourses; he lets the thought think all by itself but not to continue the veins 
o f them better and to show the branches, the divisions, the intersections, and 
the contradictions which outline the visible figures in them. He isolates all the 
other histories (o f the individuals, as much as o f  the societies) as autonomous 
rather than theoretical space: [and] under his eyes, he discovers a history, 
which simply stayed quiet at the time. (Foucault 1966: 3; italics mine —  J. 
C.)16
We have gathered that Uexküll actually creates some noises in his 
theory by bringing Plato, Kant, and his religious belief into an arena of 
confrontations; he resurrects the Platonic ideal form at the expense of 
his solid study of Kantian schematism; he acknowledges and denies 
sensations interchangeably; he is both a theoretical biologist and an 
austere metaphysician, preaching absolute harmony in nature and in 
arts. His beloved paintings, music, and architecture even become 
condescending products when he follows Plato’s reasoning. Never­
theless, the noises that we find in his paradoxical portraiture of form 
(Schema, Urform, Gestalt) differentiate the subjective Umwelts into 
two kinds: the one which follows the rule of resemblance but
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16 In his critique on Cassirer’s book, which had been newly translated into 
French, Foucault says: “Cassirer s ’efforce d ’en [discours-pensee] retrouver les 
necessites intrinseques; il laisse la pensee penser toute seule, mais pour mieux en 
suivre les nervures et faire apparaitre les embranchements, les divisions, les 
croisements, les contradictions qui en dessinent les figures visibles. II isole de 
toutes les autres histories (celle des individus, comme celle des societes) l ’espace 
autonome du <theorique>: et sous ses yeux se decouvre une histoire jusque la 
restee muette. Ce decoupage paradoxal, cette abstraction qui rompt les parentes 
les plus familieres n’est pas sans rappeler les gestes iconoclastes, par lesquels se 
sont toujours fondees les grandes disciplines: 1’economie politique, lorsqu’elle a 
isole la production de tout le domaine concrete des richesses, la linguistique, 
lorsqu’elle a isole le systeme de la langue des tous les actes concrets de la parole.”
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pathetically produces variations, degradations, and illusions; the other 
obeys the rule of similitude and cleverly follows the same original 
circuit. Schema as a mediation between the inner world and the outer 
world acquire its pleasant life within the rule of similitude, but will 
definitely become a dead end (todtgeschlagen zu werden), if it is 
designed to distinguish the outer world point by point, sound by 
sound, and color by color (as Uexküll criticizes atomism in his letter 
to Mach).
According to Foucault, the interplay between resemblance and 
similitude helps one recognize the epistemological breaks in history. 
There are two major breaks, the one between the 16th and 17th 
centuries and the other between the 19th and 20th centuries, in which 
the rule of similitude takes the upper hand over that of resemblance.
The rule of similitude transforms the history of science from 
natural philosophy to biology; the former is based on an observer’s 
naked eyes and his classification of the different features among 
animals and plants, whereas the latter highlights the hidden bind 
inside the organisms. The transition from the appearances to the 
invisible relationship recoups the study of nature from the living 
beings (les etres vivants) to life itself (la vie) (Foucault 1994: 160). 
From the Foucauldian perspective, both Darwin and Uexküll 
participate in this break with their enquiries over something inside an 
animal that determines its changes in appearance and action, but 
Uexküll practices the rule of similitude more straightly by drawing our 
attentions to the constant, restrictive, and repetitive cycle inside a cell, 
a neuron and an organ. The Uexküllian confident life only follows the 
rule of similitude, a clipping and a circulation of the ideal Gestalt (Fig.
4).
5. Structural linguistics and theoretical biology
Bracketing Uexküll’s transcendental configuration of form and image, 
we still find that the schema, in its sensual and nervous context, serves 
as a crux of life. It brings a typical relationship to the materials of 
sensation (Empfindungsmaterial) and triggers an animal’s reaction to 
the outer world. As we can tell from Uexküll’s alienation from 
“reflection” to his affiliation with “the centralized pathways” in 
defining the schemata, the typical inner relationships generate their
own speech-acts (enonciations), but do not resemble the proper name 
(ienonce) of an object outside the animal subject. Uexküll distinguishes 
his functional circle from Pavlov’s reflex in his letter to Heinrich 
Junker in 1937:
Pavlov called this a ‘conditioned reflex’. The same effect can be obtained by 
saying the word ‘meat’. Still, from this one cannot conclude that the dog 
understands the word meat. [ ...]  The experiments carried out by Dr. Sarris at 
the Institut für Umweltforschung are a different matter. [ ...]  The word ‘chair’ 
for the dog is not the name o f a thing [einen bestimmten Gegegenstand] but o f  
a performance [eine Leistung]: to sit. To me this seems a fundamental feature 
of language as a means o f communication between human beings as well. The 
spoken word, a certain sequence o f sounds as carrier o f sense and meaning, 
relates primarily to performances and not to things [nicht auf einen 
bestimmten Gegenstand]. (Uexküll 2001b: 446; 1980: 297-298)
Uexküll’s insight about the speech-act reminds us that the arbitrari­
ness of sign cannot be found between the inner world and the physical 
objects; it simply stays within the inner world, or rather in the schema, 
the nervous system and the subjective universe. This arbitrariness is 
located in the causal relationship between “to notice” (merken) and “to 
act” (wirken), the emergence of attention ideally refers to an action. 
The outer world is thus only an imprint of this arbitrary biological 
relationship in the nervous system. It is within the schema that we can 
find the convergence of sign and design in Uexküll. Uexküll’s erasure 
of the proper names and his interest in the synchronic changing shapes 
situate his theory more in the paradigm of structural linguistics than in 
philology.17
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Схема как ключ и загадка жизни: 
размышления над проблемой Юкскюлла
Проблематика Якоба фон Юкскюлла проявляется в его парадоксаль­
ном описании формы как части плана природы — в качестве как 
схемы восприятия так и идеальной формы. На первый взгляд вера 
Юкскюлла в описания неподвижно проявляющейся формы (наподо­
бие Платона и мыслителей времен Реформации) кажется уступкой в 
остром споре среди его современников: материалистов, виталистов, 
динамистов и эволюционистов. Тем не менее, в смысле кантовской 
субъективной телеологии принятие Юкскюллом античной филосо­
фии воссоздает невидимый, статичный, но повторяющийся цикл как 
регуляционный принцип в активности животных. Этот регуляцион­
ный принцип отличается от правила подобия, например, между 
внешностью животных и их окаменевшими останками, которое 
линеарно, неполно, дигрессивно. По Мишелю Фуко переход от 
видимого к невидимому сопутствует переходу от исследования 
живых существ к исследованию самой жизни, от философии при­
роды к биологии. Теория знаков Юкскюлла зарождается из его 
наблюдений над проблемой выяснения того, что моделирует 
действия животного в его умвельте. Оказывается, что схема в ее 
чувственном и функциональном контексте развивается из отражения 
объектов в совокупности их свойств. Удаление Юкскюллом имен 
собственных, которое направляет наше внимание на презентацию в 
ее чистом виде {Gestalt), представляет собой важный шаг не только в 
эпистемологии, но и в “науке жизни”, которая с ненужной тщатель­
ностью углубилась в генотипы.
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Skeem kui elu võti ja mõistatus: 
peegeldusi Uexkülli probleemile
Jakob von Uexkülli probleemistik avaldub ta paradoksaalses vormikirjel- 
duses looduse plaani osana — nii tajuskeemina kui tajuülese ideaalse 
vormina. Esmapilgul tundub Uexkülli usk Platoni (ja reformatsiooni- 
aegsetesse) mõistetesse liikumatuna ilmuvast vormist resignatsioonina ta 
kaasaegsele teravale dispuudile materialistide, vitalistide, dünamistide ja 
evolutsionistide vahel. Siiski, Kanti subjektiivse teleoloogia mõttes, 
antiikfilosoofia vastuvõtt Uexkülli poolt taasloob nähtamatu, staatilise, 
kuid korduva tsükli nagu ka regulatsiooniprintsiibi loomade aktiivsuses. 
See regulatsiooniprintsiip eristub samasusereeglist, näiteks loomade väli­
muse ja fossiilsete jäänuste vahel, mis on lineaarne, mittetäielik, digres- 
siivne. Michel Foucault mõttes, üleminek nähtavalt nähtamatule käib 
kaasas üleminekuga elusolendite (les etres vivants) uurimiselt elu enese 
(la vie) uurimisele, loodusfilosoofialt bioloogiale. Uexkülli märgiteooria 
sünnib ta tähelepanekuist probleemi üle, mis modelleerib ja käivitab 
looma toimimist ta omailmas. Osutub, et skeem, oma meelelises ja 
funktsionaalses kontekstis, kujuneb objektide peegeldustest nende 
omaduste kogumisse, kus pärisnimesid ei tunta. Pärisnimede eemalda­
mine, nagu Uexküll seda teeb, juhib tähelepanu esitusele puhtal kujul 
(Gestalt) ning kujutab endast mitte üksnes tähtsat sammu epistemoloo- 
gias, vaid ka eluteaduses, mis mõttetu peensusega on kaevunud geno- 
tüüpidesse.
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Abstract. Symbol formation is a term used to unify the view on the inter­
dependencies in the research o f the Hamburg University before 1933: the 
Philosophical Institute (William Stem, Ernst Cassirer), the Psychological 
Institute (Stem) with its laboratory (Heinz Werner) in cooperation with the 
later joining Umwelt Institut (Jakob von Uexküll). The term, definitely used 
by Cassirer and Werner, is associated with the personalistic approach: “Keine 
Gestalt ohne Gestalter” (Stem), but also covers related terms like “melody o f  
motion” (Uexküll), and “relational content” (Cassirer), discussing the term 
“empirical scheme” (Kant). All this scientific interest addressed personal 
forces to structure thresholds in equivalent stimuli. This view on intermodal 
formation allowed research in common aspects in the environments of 
animals, o f children and adults to meet there the symbol formation o f artists 
(Weimar Bauhaus) and poets like R. M. Rilke, a friend o f  Uexküll.
Motion and emotion
‘“ Movement in response to an optical impression,’ says Jakob von 
Uexküll, ‘is an integrating factor in the melody of the environment, by 
means of which the forms of objects are brought to inner realisation”’ 
(Werner 1948: 67). With reference to Uexküll, Heinz Werner (1890- 
1964) in his Comparative Psychology o f  Mental Development outlines 
the formative motor processes of realisation:
The high degree o f unity between subject and object mediated by the motor- 
affective reactivity o f the organism results in a dynamic, rather than static, 
apprehension o f  things. Things as constituent elements o f a dynamic event 
must necessarily be dynamic in nature. (Wemer 1948: 67)
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Anticipatory tonal forces1 behind the dynamic interrelation of motion 
and emotion formed both the environmental and internal worlds. 
Changing thresholds of equivalent stimuli shaped the dynamic 
interrelations in the things-of-action and their signal-qualities. The 
interrelation could be varied dynamically by experimental attitude 
change from “Sachlichkeit” to “Leiblichkeit” (Stem 1950: 156; Wohl- 
will 1930: 39). Far from distanced object perception, then a zig-zag of 
lines could become an equivalent stimulus to match the emotional 
content of a metal quality (Wemer 1948: fig. 12), and a specific 
motion could match a tone or colour. This was the language of 
abstract expressionism in the arts. The emotional equivalence in ex­
pression and perception, explored by Heinz Wemer in the Hamburg 
Psychological Laboratory until 1933, was called “physiognomic 
perception” (Wemer 1926: 45), while William Stem (1871-1938), 
head of the Hamburg Psychological Institute (Psychologisches Semi­
nar; Stem 1931) used the term “Synkinesie” to label expressive motor 
activity (Stem 1950: 218). Furthermore Stem focused what he called 
vicarious functioning (Stem 1950: 219; Wemer 1945: 317). What on 
one hand looked like synesthetic (Stem 1950: 215), on the other hand 
allowed the blind to read a word by touch.
Finished in 1934, Stems Allgemeine Psychologie auf persona- 
listischer Grundlage reflected the collaborate scientific aims at the 
former “Hamburgische Universität” 1919-1933. The more this be­
came visible in the second edition (Stem 1950). Ernst Cassirer (1874— 
1945), together with Stem, there had been head of the Hamburg Philo­
sophical Institute (Philosophisches Seminar), while the Psychological 
Institute of Stem had Heinz Wemer as the head of its psychological 
laboratory (Psychologisches Laboratorium). This research focused the 
biology of the person, distinguishing in contact with Jakob von 
Uexküll and his Hamburg Umwelt Institute (Institut für Umwelt­
forschung) biological and transbiological aspects (Stem 1950: 35). 
This also is preserved in Cassirer’s Philosophie der symbolischen 
Formen (1990 [1929]) and the later editions o f Werner’s Comparative 
Psychology o f  Mental Development (1940).
1 Symbol formation (Wemer and Kaplan 1963) also is known as the “Tonus- 
theorie der Wahrnehmung”: perceptual neurogenic muscle tonus modulation 
meets environmental forces. These are neuronal mechanisms in behavioral aspects 
o f sensation.
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The related research focused organic symbol formation to act 
across the environment. Symbol formation was seen an inter-indivi­
dual functional circle and personal binding process, driven by the 
dynamics of motivation, motion and emotion. Cassirer, like Uexküll, 
distinguished action-space and symbol-space (Cassirer 1994: 179), 
while Werner spoke of “things-of-action” and of “signal-things” 
(Werner 1948: 59). The man-animal interrelation in the related cross­
world symbol formation was focused in collaboration with Uexküll’s 
Hamburg Umwelt Institut, the exploration of the environments of 
children, embedded in the environment of the adult, was focused by 
Martha Muchow (1892-1933). She was the assistant of William Stem, 
who himself pronounced the personal characteristics in symbol forma­
tion in his “critical personalistics” (Werner 1938). Accordingly 
Cassirer focused the relational binding in communicative and 
explorative symbol formation in his “theory of symbol formation”, 
while Werner looked at the dynamics of symbol formation in culture 
(Werner 1948; Werner, Kaplan 1963), which brought him together 
with art and art education. This guided Werner to understand motor 
tonality in the formative forces of modem art and its motivating 
interrelation with the environment: “De meme, l’osieau au fond de 
l’azur represente d ’abord l’immortelle envie de planer au dessus des 
choses humaines, mais dejä vous etes l’oiseau lui-meme” (Charles 
Baudelaire, Les paradis artificiels, 1860; Wemer 1958: 56; but not 
1948: 82). The interest in the formation of the artist’s worlds Uexküll 
joined with the poet Rainer Maria Rilke. Though, there was an 
empirical basis of these interests.
Threshold in equivalent stimuli
In 1948, when the second revised edition of his “tonal theory of 
perception” was published, Heinz Wemer had become professor of 
psychology at Clark University, Worcester, MA, still recalling several 
former experiments at the Hamburg Psychological Laboratory, which 
had been closed in 1933. Until then the Hamburg Psychological 
Institute shared many experiments with the Umwelt Institut (Wemer 
1948: 65, 115). Many terms and concepts Wemer had to transform to 
communicate the ideas of the Hamburg organic approach to his new 
audience. The catching realisation (be-merken) now was described as 
a signal-property (Merkzeichen) to drive (be-wirken) of things-of- 
action (Wirkzeichen), performing equivalent stimuli for the tonality of
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the related receptors and effectors. This were the terms Heinz Wemer 
used to describe the functional circle forming an environment by 
perception and action. The new audience learned more about the 
related collaboration of the Hamburg institutes: “one of the most 
promising experiments inquiring into a world built up of things-of- 
action and signal-qualities has been carried out by E. G. Sarris in 
Uexküll’s 'Umwelt Institut' in cooperation with our Hamburg Psycho­
logical Laboratory” (Wemer 1948: 61). These equivalent stimuli then 
were used to explore the dog’s environment, to understand the action 
related communication of dog and man across their different biolo­
gical environments. William Stem as the head of the Hamburg 
Psychological Institute intended to communicate the Hamburg biolo­
gical approach to his colleagues and invited Uexküll to talk in April 
1931 to the Hamburg Congress of Psychology about “Das Duftfeld 
des Hundes”. This speech and the following discussion was a critical 
point for the political acceptance of the biological view of the Ham­
burg Institutes (G. v. Uexküll 1964: 168). Nevertheless, the metho­
dical background of the biological approach Uexküll brought to the 
audience. In short he described the motivation to focus the threshold 
in equivalent stimuli, directly addressing the joined research of his 
Umwelt Institut with the psychological laboratory of the Hamburg 
University:
Die Umweltlehre sucht die Schwierigkeit, die die Unerkennbarkeit der 
Empfindung tierischer Subjekte der Forschung bietet, dadurch auszugleichen, 
daß sie nach Merkmalen sucht, auf die die Subjekte reagieren. [...] Die 
Umweltforschung vermeidet die unkontrollierbaren Analogieschlüsse aus der 
menschlichen Psyche auf die Tierseele, indem sie nicht die Empfindungen 
und Gefühle der Tiere untersucht, sondern ihre Objektivationen in der 
Umwelt. Sie faßt alle Objekte als Merkmalträger des Tiersubjektes auf. Ist in 
der ‘Umgebung’ des Tieres ein roter, eckiger Gegenstand gegeben, der dem 
Tiersubjekt als Reizspender dient, so fragt sie, ob die Form oder die Farbe, 
oder beide in der ‘Umwelt’ des Tieres zu Merkmalen werden, und kümmert 
sich nicht darum, welcher Art die Empfindungen sind, die dabei im Tiere 
wachgerufen werden. Statt der Empfindungen erforscht sie die Eigenarten der 
speziellen Tierdinge in der Welt des gegebenen Subjektes. [...] Sie berück­
sichtigt dabei seinen momentanen Schwellenwert, denn der gleiche Gegen­
stand kann bald eine Hauptrolle auf der Umweltbühne des Subjektes spielen, 
bald völlig in der Versenkung verschwinden. (Uexküll 1932: 432)
Wemer presented his recent research in sensation (Wemer 1932: 190), 
and the discussion touched the related research by Wolfgang Metzger 
and Erich Moritz von Hornbostel. In 1931 Karlfried von Dürckheim
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(Leipzig) had presented his related studies in personal space to the 
Hamburg Congress (Diirckheim 1932: 318), in 1933 he pronounced 
his ideas about personal time (Diirckheim 1934: 129), while Stem 
presented his paper “Raum und Zeit als personale Dimensionen” 
(Stern 1933) to this last free conference. Both these conferences of 
1931 and 1933 had unveiled not just an interrelation, but a common 
basis in the organic approach.
The common basis of the organic approach
In 1931 a common methodical basis in the interest in the organic 
relation of the Umwelt and the Innenwelt of the subjects became 
visible, leading to the question of their common basis. Something 
common was in the signal-quality of a chair, inviting the tired to sit 
on, its “sitting-tone” for dog and man (Wemer 1932: 61), and in the 
motor qualities of the acoustic tone, which not just exists as a 
perception coming then and there from the environment, but also as a 
signal arising and affecting the human bodies internal tonality in 
general. There were reasons, to use trumpets instead of harps, to signal 
the appropriate melody of movement.
Motor dynamics to cause object constancies over time, later Alfred 
Prinz Auersperg discussed with reference to Uexküll in 1937 
(Auersperg 1937: 129), at a time, Stem already had left Europe.
The symbol formation, composing a communicative motor melody 
across time, Uexküll in his Theoretical Biology had illustrated by a 
movie sequence of a jumping ball. The piled slides of this sequence 
represent the signal qualities, the human organism needs to access, to 
perceive the given object constancy in space-time. This organic 
formation of a movement across time, Stem had discussed in 1894 in 
his article “Die Wahrnehmung von Bewegungen vermittelst des 
Auges” (Stem 1894), getting the key for his personalistic theory, to 
which Heinz Wemer later introduced the readers of Character and 
Personality in 1938 (Wemer 1938). In short, this was an introduction 
to the idea of the organic “personal world”, generated and dependend 
on the characteristics of the individual: each individual has but one 
character emerging from the interaction of internally conditioned 
striving with the ‘actionalizing’ factors of the personal world. 
Expressed otherwise, character is both (and equally) ‘intelligible’ and 
‘empirical’” (Wemer 1938: 122). The words used by Wemer referred
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to terms used earlier by Kant, to describe an aspect also Uexküll had 
brought to debate in 1907.
Function and substance
When Uexküll had published his “Umrisse einer kommenden Weltan­
schauung” in 1907, Constantin Gutberlet, the editor of the Philo­
sophisches Jahrbuch in his article “Die Substanz als Bewegungs­
melodie” (Gutberlet 1907) had picked out the critical point, where 
Uexküll had linked his term “Bewegungsmelodie” with the 
“empirische Schema der Gegenstände”, an expression used by Kant in 
his “Kritik der reinen Vernunft” (2nd ed, 1787, book 2: “Von dem 
Schematismus der reinen Verstandesbegriffe”; Cassirer, Das Er­
kenntnisproblem, 2, 1922 [1907]: 716). Gutberlet rejected the Kantian 
position in general, just the moment Ernst Cassirer, later together with 
Stem head o f the Hamburg Philosophical Institute, prepared his 
“Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff: Untersuchungen über die 
Grundfragen der Erkenntniskritik” (Cassirer 1910). There Cassirer 
proposed a psychology of relations (Cassirer 1910: 433) to catch the 
“Relationsgehalt”, binding the subject and the object to each other as 
complementary motor events: “wie zwei aufeinander bezogene und 
abgestimmte Bewegungsformen, die wir jedoch niemals rein und selb­
ständig zu isolieren, sondern nur in ihrer wechselseitigen Bestimmung 
durch einander zu bestimmen vermögen” (Cassirer 1910: 435).
In the misinterpretation of this stream of consciousness, William 
James had detected “the psychologist’s fallacy” (Cassirer 1910: 441). 
The relational content, the formation of structures in the dynamial 
interrelational processes became the focus of the future Hamburg 
philosopy and psychology (Wemer 1922: 241) in cooperation with 
Uexküll. “Keine Gestalt ohne Gestalter”, William Stem pronounced to 
express the specific Hamburg personalistic position, to address the 
communicational aspect of the “Relationsgehalt”, which in 1910 took 
Cassirer from the mathematical subject of motion (Cassirer 1910: 158) 
and the numerical substance (Cassirer 1910: 206) to a theory of signs 
(Cassirer 1910: 402): “We do not realize objects, but we cognize 
objectively”: “... wir erkennen gegenständlich, indem wir innerhalb 
des gleichförmigen Ablaufs der Erfahrungsinhalte bestimmte Abgren­
zungen schaffen und bestimmte dauernde Elemente und Ver­
knüpfungszusammenhänge fixieren”. This functional binding (Cas-
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sirer 1910: 122) allows to catch and to communicate the relational 
scheme across space and time.
The renewed idea of the scheme allowed to understand constancies 
in personal dynamical processes, which generated the substance of the 
object and made the sign:
In der Tat liegen unseren reinen sinnlichen Begriffen nicht Bilder der 
Gegenstände, sondern Schemata zugrunde... Der Begriff vom Hunde bedeutet 
eine Regel, nach welcher meine Einbildungskraft die Gestalt eines vierfüßigen 
Tieres allgemein verzeichnen kann, ohne auf irgendeine einzige besondere 
Gestalt, die mir die Erfahrung darbietet, oder auch ein jedes mögliche Bild, 
was ich in concreto darstellen kann, eingeschränkt zu sein. (I. Kant, Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft, 2nd ed., 1787, book 2)
Uexküll’s Theoretical Biology has chapter on the scheme (Uexküll 
1920: 36) has examples of the formation of motor melodies, to 
distinguish further thing and object, object and substance, and object 
and “Gegenstand”, like a ladder, remaining meaningless unless the 
knowledge of its melody allows to serve motion. The personal 
performance producing and communicating these relational rules later 
made the motto of the Hamburg institutes: “Keine Gestalt ohne 
Gestalter!” The related personalistic chapters on interpersonal per­
ception of space and time (Stem 1950: 206; 211) focus the same 
object constancies, as touched by Uexküll. In this personalism, in 
Werners “symbol formation” and in Cassirers philosophy of symbolic 
forms remain the outlines of the “psychology of relations”, proposed 
by Cassirer in Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff (Cassirer 1910: 
433). To illustrate this, Cassirer there pointed to the relational binding 
of a melody across a variety of transpositions, leading from the author 
via the orchestra to the audience in the theatre. This “Tongestalt” 
across time, consequently lead Cassirer to the “Raumgestalt” across 
space (Cassirer 1910: 442). These relational compounds were the 
same, his Hamburg colleagues addressed as “compositions” or 
“melodies”.
In this organic view, the object constancies formed by artists, all 
are manifestations of personal worlds. Equivalent stimuli Uexküll had 
in mind, when he shared his interest in the empirical scheme of 
objects with the poet Rainer Maria Rilke, when in 1905 they both 
discussed the idea of the scheme, as proposed by Kant in his “Kritik 
der reinen Vernunft”. An edition of this book Uexküll once dedicated 
to Rilke, remaining still in the Rilke-Archive.
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When Uexküll communicated his ideas to the public, the new Cassirer 
edition became the standard (Immanuel Kant, Werke, vol. 1-11, 
Berlin 1911-1921, ed. E. Cassirer). The term “melody of motion” for 
the empirical scheme of the objects became a perfect expression to 
serve Uexküll and Rilke. Gudrun v. Uexküll in her biography of Jakob 
v. Uexküll 1964 prints the facsimile of Rilke’s poem “ТЪе Panther”, 
handwritten by Rilke himself for Uexküll in April 1905. The rhythm 
of the words there represents by its rhythm the specific melody of 
motion (Bewegungsmelodie) of the panther in his cage. There are 
different translations of this poem, more or less keeping the rhythm of 
movement as a melody of recognition, which allows to realize the 
panther:
Sein Blick ist vom Vorübergehn der Stäbe 
so müd geworden, daß er nicht mehr fühlt; 
ihm ist, als ob es tausend Stäbe gäbe 
und hinter tausend Stäben keine Welt.
Though Gutberiet in 1907 had rejected the idea to bind recognition by 
melodies of motion, motor rhythm in 1900 definitely was in the focus 
of the sciences and the arts. Ernst Meumann in Hamburg surveyed in 
his Einführung in die Ästhetik der Gegenwart (3rd ed. 1919) the 
related research in the productive processes to generate and perceive 
works of arts. There he mentions research by H. Münsterberg and A. 
Pierce, by Ethel D. Puffer (Psychology o f  Beauty, 1905) and George 
Malcom Stratton (Psychology and Culture, 1903) to understand vision 
related spatial “rhythmical equivalents”, research to be continued by 
William Stem and Heinz Werner as followers of Meumann. Without 
knowledge of these psychological experiments, in his 1907 article on 
the future biological world view, Uexküll also had addressed the 
melodies of the environment by the fact, that landscape painting is the 
representation of a specific melody to guide the recognition of the 
landscape itself. Quoting from Uexküll, to these melodies and the 
proposed psychology of relations also Heinz Werners Comparative 
Psychology o f  mental development refers. It is not that surprising, 
because the mental development itself for him is a structured spatio- 
temporal differentiation, a “geistiger Bauplan”, a dynamical process to 
generate the “Gefuge der Gegenstände”. Wemer there is referencing 
Uexküll’s Theoretische Biologie (1928), Umwelt und Innenwelt der 
Tiere (1921) and Streifzüge (1934). Nevertheless, even the adult still 
has access to earlier processes of formation.
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To keep the dynamics of the binding processes in mind, Uexküll 
had used symphonic terms, while Wemer explored the organic 
formation of micromelodies in his related series of studies (Das 
Problem der motorischen Gestaltung, 1924; Über Mikromelodik und 
Mikroharmonik, 1925; Über die Ausprägung von Tongestalten, 1926). 
And like Uexküll, Wemer addressed the bipolar functional dynamics 
of the signal and ten related action by biological examples. While 
Wemer also quotes Buytendijk (Wemer 1948: 59. 63), Uexküll has 
the equivalent observations from Fabre to illustrate his “psychoidal 
laws” (Uexküll, Kriszat 1934: 85, fig. 39; Uexküll 1930: 94, fig. 2), to 
point at the fact, that an acting organism will not realise the signal at 
its receptors border here in the ear or the eye, related to the internal 
world, but at a localisation of the moving and sounding source there 
outside in the environment. The same personal spatio-temporal dimen­
sions were subject of the psychological research (Stem 1936; Muchow 
1935).
The preservation of pre-Nazi scientific tradition
In 1919 the term Umwelt first was used by Wemer (Wemer 1919: 217). 
The first edition of his Einführung in die Entwicklungspsychologie in 
1926 in book 2 follows the bipolar concept of the Aussenwelt and the 
Innenwelt with its specific physiognomic perception (Wemer 1926: 45). 
His second edition in 1933 has the fmal distinction of the things-of- 
action and the signal-things. To continue, it is interesting to realise, 
where Wemer refers to Uexküll in his Comparative Psychology o f  
Mental Development when he addresses his American audience. 
Though there are differences in the 2nd (1948) American edition and 
the 4th (1958) German edition (which incorporates the 1948 addenda), 
this German edition had a specific purpose: to preserve the pre-Nazi 
scientific tradition. But the three books of the American edition reveal 
much better the organic approach. Book 2 (“Primitive mental 
activities”2) is combining human psychology and animal psychology in 
its bifocal interest in the inner world of internal signal processing, while 
the outer world of action and personality is discussed in book 3 (“The
: Book 2 includes five parts: I Sensori-motor, perceptual and affective organi­
zation; II Primitive imagery; III Primitive notions o f space and time; IV Primitive 
action; V Primitive thought processes.
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world and personality”). This bifocal layout mirrors the functional circle 
in environmental access.
Clearly Wemer even in the structure of his book presents the two­
fold organic model of the internal Merkwelt and the external Wirkwelt. 
Accordingly, Wemer twice refers to Uexküll (Wemer 1948: 61 [Book 
2], and 379, 382 [Book 3]) to address the animal’s environment, and to 
Martha Muchow to address the human personalistic environment by her 
mainly unpublished research (Wemer 1948: 19, 72, 122, 227, 385), the 
research Wemer himself tried to continue (Wemer 1948: 122).
The children’s worlds
In an article published in Character and Personality Wemer has an 
elaborated view the personalistic approach, which also throws some 
light on the focus the Hamburg Psychological Institute once had:
The notion o f a personal world provided the basis for the Hamburg Institute’s 
program o f investigation o f the different types o f such personal worlds. [...] 
But in the actual procedure o f analysis not only the developmental stage, but 
the whole cultural setting as well must be taken in account. Hence, Martha 
Muchow’s program for such an analysis seeks to establish a typology of the 
child-world and the adolescent-world, one that is definitely cognizant of 
specific cultural patterns in space and time. Miss Muchow, in strict confor­
mity with this program, has made a study o f the life-space o f the city world. In 
this study she demonstrated for the first time the typical characteristics o f the 
world o f the child as thus conditioned. In her posthumous, most admirably 
written book, she has shown how life-space emerges from the interaction of 
external, nonpersonal factors and the child-like dispositions, how the child 
selects and interprets the outer stimuli, and molds them into a world of his 
own that is typically at different developmental stages.
These novel and productive approaches to the problems o f child- 
psychology were tragically interrupted by M. Muchow’s premature death 
[1933]. She was undoubtedly Stern’s most brilliant pupil. Her studies realize 
the synthesis o f personalistic theory and empiric investigation in perhaps its 
most fruitful form. (Werner 1938: 124)
While this exploration of the children’s life-space as their action- 
world, illustrated by the Muchow experiments in mental activity 
(Wemer 1948: 72-75) had much to do with the studies in the 
territories of the dog at this time, the words “things-of-action” and 
“signal-quality” (Wemer 1948: 61), the later action related chapters on 
“primitive worlds” (Wemer 1948: 379) refer again to a paper written 
by Sarris on common aspects in the environment of the blind man and
Symbol formation 219
his guiding dog (Sarris 1931), there to introduce Martha Muchow’s 
study of the environment of children in opposition to the world of the 
adult and the building bureaucracy (Werner 1948: 384—385). To 
illustrate the differences in the child’s world of action compared to the 
view of the adult, Werner there also published some drawings. This 
brought ideas to the American public, which years later were renewed 
by Kevin Lynch in his The Image o f  the City (Lynch 1960), who then 
mentioned the metal worlds of Marcel Proust and Mark Twain, but 
apparently had no knowledge of the personalistic approach to the 
organic worlds, represented by the two mentioned chapters on 
personal worlds at both ends of the book Comparative Psychology.
The Artist’s worlds
The children’s worlds Werner linked with the artist’s worlds. Already 
in 1913 Werner had published an article on melody driven symbol 
formation in poetry (Werner 1913: 432):
Klanglos schläft der Sommergarten.
Durch die Nacht, erschöpfte Tiere 
Schleppen sich die großen Wolken 
In die neuen Rastquartiere.
Quoting a poem of Detlef von Liliencron (1844-1909), he discussed 
emotional symbol formation, reflecting the operational world, in 
contrast to emotional driven symbol formation, reflecting the inner 
world. Later in this Hamburg personalistic respect, as mentioned, he 
quoted Baudelaire (Werner 1958: 56). Perhaps also this personalistic 
view has to be taken in account, reading Uexküll’s Niegeschaute 
Welten (1936). There in chapter xiv, Uexküll describes his friendship 
with the poet Rilke:
‘Was ist wirklich schön?’ Es war eine Autorität, an die sie die Frage richtete, 
denn der Befragte war niemand Geringeres als der Dichter Rainer Maria 
Rilke. ‘Die Schönheit gleicht einem Schmetterling, der gewisse Dinge bevor­
zugt, auf die setzt er sich, und sie werden schön’, war die Antwort des 
Dichters. [...] ‘... Stil ist ein Maß, das wir an die Dinge herantragen und, wenn 
wir Dichter sind, in sie hineintragen, um sie zu formen, und das tun Sie, lieber 
Meister, in erster Linie.’ ‘Dann wäre ich selbst der Schmetterling’, lächelte 
Rilke. (Uexküll 1936: 257, 258)
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Accordingly, the last entry of Oskar Schlemmer, the painter and 
master at the Bauhaus, in his diary in 1.4.1943 quotes from a 
published letter of Rilke to Uexküll: “Die Kunst nicht für eine 
Auswahl aus der Welt halten, sondern für die restlose Verwandlung 
ins Herrliche hinein”. In Heinz Werners Comparative Psychology o f  
Mental Development children and artists become these butterflies, 
generating their specific worlds, to which still the distant (sachlich) 
man has access to.
The art-related research of Hamburg Philosophical and Psycho­
logical Institutes Wemer tried to preserve, because only some of the 
pre-Nazi experiments could be published (Wemer 1948, 70; Krauss 
1930). Emphasising remarks of the painter Wassily Kandinsky 
(Wemer 1926: 47; 1948: 71), Wemer manifests his touch with the 
formation of modem art, which, as declared in the German edition, 
based on discoveries by the music-teacher and vocalist Gertrud 
Gmnow (1870-1944) (Wemer 1926: 68; 1958: 28, 66, 68, 72), who, 
like Kandinsky, earlier had been a master at the Bauhaus (entry in the 
1921 Weimar directory). Later both lived in Berlin, but so far just a 
postcard by Gertrud Gmnow, mentioning a Berlin meeting with 
Kandinsky in 1932, proves subsequent contact in the field of primary 
symbol formation. There are some further traces of research in 
primary colour form abstraction in the collaborate Hamburg animal 
psychology (Uexküll 1932: 432), and in research continued by Martin 
Scheerer, who also had left Germany to Columbia University (Gold­
stein, Scheerer 1941). Some further hints again are found in Werner’s 
Comparative Psychology (Wemer 1948: 235).
Wemer throughout there refers to facts which otherwise are 
associated with the productive pedagogical training at the Weimar 
Bauhaus (Wemer 1958: 46, 81, 92, 162, 175). This relies to the 
personally bound functional circle o f the productive artist to generate 
his objects and worlds. This training had to guide intuition. This 
organic approach is the common aspect in the original Weimar 
writings published in 1923. But this common aspect is not an obscure 
common sense in European cultural dynamics, but a specific concept 
(Uexküll 1973: 49), which then was targeted by those, who still 
believed in the existence of an absolute objective world. Gertrud 
Gmnow is known to have handed copies o f the articles published by 
Uexküll in the Deutsche Rundschau to her Weimar students.
An article by Wemer on rhythm (Wemer 1919) clearly unveils, 
that his later research together with Gertrud Gmnow touched her field 
as a profound teacher of rhythmical education by exactly the facts
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Uexküll had described as motor melodies. While a kind of auto­
biographic article: “W'as ist Jaques-Dalcroze dem Sänger?”, printed in 
the Rheinische- Musik und Theaterzeitung in 1911, presents herself as 
a follower of rhythmical education, in 1919 Wemer in his “Rhythmik, 
eine mehrwertige Gestaltenverkettung” distinguishes rhythmical poly- 
figurations and a-rhythmical monofigurations. In this view objects as 
well as melodies (Tongestalten) are understood as arhythmic mono­
figurations: “Die Dinge der Umwelt sind einwertige, eindeutige 
Figurationen” (Wemer 1919: 217). These monofigurations, like 
columns or steps, are the elements to compose motor related rhythmic 
environments; the related research in the environmental effects on 
motor activity was continued later by Paul von Schiller (Schiller 
1934). The there mentioned artificial environment is known as 
architecture. Architecture in this view is a polyfiguration, like the 
compositon of a dance, a picture, a concert. This in mind, it is 
interesting to trace the figurative aspects even in the writings of the 
architect Walter Gropius. So far and without knowledge of Werner’s 
publications, it was only the Italian art historian Carlo Guilio Argan, 
to understand her central position in the Weimar circle to train 
individually constructive motor activity (Argan 1962: 22).
While Stem had the term “Synkinesie” (Stem 1950: 218) to 
address her methods to train environmental access, the audience today 
unfortunately is confronted with the limitations of the English edition 
of Hans M. Winglers The Bauhaus (1969), which does not contain a 
full translation of the main writing of Gropius, “Idee und Aufbau des 
Staatlichen Bauhauses”, but just parts of an early 1922 version of the 
Gropius text in translation, without reference to the printed full 
version of 1923. And just one the related illustrations of the volume 
Staatliches Bauhaus 1919-1923  was reproduced by Wingler, perhaps 
by copyright reasons: The full translation with all illustrations already 
had been published by the Museum of Modem Art (Bayer et al. 1938: 
21), but published there without the related texts by Gmnow and 
Kandinsky. Furthermore, Wingler did not print the layout of the 1923 
exhibition, when a sequence of rooms presented the educational work 
of Gmnow, Kandinsky and Klee together to the public. Consequently, 
all the references linking the Gropius text with the article written by 
Gertrud Gmnow (“The creation of Living Form through Color, Form, 
and Sound”) are lost.
Gertrud Gmnow and Walter Gropius were both in contact with 
scientific research. Together with Gropius she had visited the first 
Berlin conference of the Association in Aesthetic and Art Research in
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1913, and since early 1920 to 1924 she and her Weimar assistant 
Hildegard Heitmeyer (with a Hellerau diploma in rhythmical 
education) were the only professionals in art education at Weimar. 
Their training there was called “Harmonisierungslehre”, to show their 
aim to enforce the environment directed productive interrelation of 
signal-things and things-of-action.
There was a common sense in the Weimar education referring to 
the productive dynamics in physical signal and physical action 
qualities: “Das bildnerische Werk entstand aus der Bewegung, ist 
selber festgelegte Bewegung und wird aufgenommen in der Be­
wegung (Augenmuskeln)”, accordingly explained Klee in his 
“Schöpferische Konfession” (printed in 1920). These related writings 
by Kandinsky and Klee still are available and in print, while there are 
just rare traces on Grunows homogeneous methods, as Wemer classi­
fied them. There remain some articles printed in the Journal Kunst und 
Jugend 1935 to 1938 about her preliminary education in sensation and 
expression. For this she used a spatial circle on the ground. This circle 
of about 2 m in diameter had twelve clock-face like locations, to place 
a tone or a colour on these places. The training of the interdependency 
of tone and colour then used the external location to feed back 
sensation in the internal world. Beyond this Froebel- or Montessori- 
like education in sensation and expression, her main interest was 
symbol and artefact formation by motor activity. At Clark University, 
Worchester, the Wemer papers give no further hint on this Innenwelt- 
driven Aussenwelt formation in perception and creation. And the 
manuscript of her final summarizing work definitely is destroyed. Few 
is known of the content of her the volumes, which apparently intended 
to fit the three volumes of the Philosophy o f  Symbolic Forms of 
Cassirer, which he had presented her when he left Hamburg in 1933, 
while she moved in contact with Gertrud Bing and the Warburg 
Institute to London. But Bing later destroyed all her letters even in the 
London Institute, and no traces remained there about the “Pathos­
formel” related motor formation, which was another aspect of higher 
order symbol formation.
Uexküll in his “Theoretical biology” has a chapter “Das Schauen” 
(Uexküll 1973: 46) where he exactly addresses the biological view of 
tone and colour, Grunow already discussed in her 1923 article “Der 
Aufbau der lebendigen Form durch Farbe, Form, Ton” —  with 
reference to the biological view. The same view is found also in the 
contribution of Walter Gropius: “Idee und Aufbau des Staatlichen 
Bauhauses”. Even this title pronounced the bipolar environment
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paradigm: “Nichts besteht mehr an sich, jedes Gebilde wird zum 
Gleichnis eines Gedankens, der aus uns zur Gestaltung drängt ... ” In 
fact, this personal bipolarity is the basis of the concept to handle the 
personal unification in environment directed motor activity. The secret 
of the world is not behind the object, but behind the subject, as 
Uexküll proposed in his theoretical biology, to ask “denn warum 
sollten zwei räumliche Eindrücke im gleichen Subjekt sich nicht 
beeinflussen?” (Uexküll 1973: 50). Consequently there was a training 
to perceive and handle the primary classes of matter and shape, to 
shape the “Werkwelt”, at term associated with the term “Wirkwelt”, 
while the formative dynamics of the personal world occur as 
“bewegter lebendiger künstlerischer Raum” (Gropius 1923: 9).
Though the contact of Gropius to the publications of Uexküll 
nowhere seem to be realized, he had provable knowledge since 1919, 
when in a letter dated Weimar, December 29, he wrote to Adolf 
Behne, that for the Bauhaus students he, Gropius, had bought 30 prints 
of his “Wiederkehr der Kunst” (Leipzig 1919). There p. 109 Behne 
summarised the view of Uexküll (.Bausteine einer biologischen 
Weltanschauung, 1913) and referred to his own article “Biologie und 
Kubismus” (1917/1918: 694-705).
Conclusion
“Unsere Empfindungen und Vorstellungen sind Zeichen, nicht 
Abbilder der Gegenstände” Cassirer concluded in his “Substanzbegriff 
und Funktionsbegriff’ in 1910. The Hamburg scientists Cassirer, 
Stern, Uexküll and Wemer in the pre-Nazi time renewed the idea of 
the “empirical scheme of the objects”, which at their time synchro­
nized European philosophy with American Philosophy, emphasising 
their relation with ideas pronounced by William James (Teuber 1982). 
The “stream of consciousness” in the organic view of personalistics 
receives a new biological platform (Cassirer 1994: 210; Stem 1950: 
715). While there is a formative interrelation of Henry and William 
James, the formative interrelation of the Hamburg scientist’s organic 
view is leading to the Weimar Bauhaus. This contact to the artists of 
their time was mirrored by their life and work. In touch with this 
productive world of signs, cooperating with Gertrud Gmnow and 
Wassily Kandinsky, Wemer is said to have lived with his wife, the 
dancer Jo Gervai, in Hamburg in a Bauhaus environment (Marianne
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Teuber). And Fritz Heider, who had left Stem’s Hamburg Institute 
before 1933, focused aspects of this Hamburg view in his description 
of the psychological environment in the world of Proust (Heider 
1941). While the Hamburg institutes had focused formative dynamic 
motor aspects in the bipolarity of the internal and external worlds until 
1933, looking at equivalent signals and intermodal aspects in animal, 
child and adult psychology, a more psycho-physical approach to 
measure the facts in environmental access followed G. A. Brecher 
(Brecher 1932) and E. v. Skramlik (Skramlik 1937), when Viktor v. 
Weizsäcker developed a new personal concept (Gestaltkreis) of 
psychophysical dynamics in environmental interrelation (Weizsäcker 
1939), while J. H. Schultz, with his “autogenic training”, allowed the 
mental access of internal thresholds, mentioning Uexküll’s early 
articles on sea urchins (Schultz 1950: 33).
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Формирование символа
Понятие формирование символа объединяет повлиявшие друг на 
друга исследовательские работы в Гамбургском университете до 
1933 года: в Институте философии (Вильям Штерн, Эрнст Касси­
рер), в Институте психологии (Штерн) и в его лаборатории (Хайнц 
Вернер) и в Институте Umwelt'a (Якоб фон Юкскюлл). Это понятие, 
в том смысле, как его использовали Кассирер и Вернер, связано с 
персоналистским подходом (Штерн), но охватывает и близкие тер­
мины как ‘мелодия движения’ (Юкскюлл) и ‘реляционное содер­
жание’ (Кассирер), развивая понятие ‘эмпирической схемы’ (Кант). 
Одновременно все они связаны с проблемой структурирования по­
рога при равных стимулах. Этот взгляд интермодального формиро­
вания позволяет исследовать общие стороны в Umwelt'ax животных, 
детей и взрослых и производство символа у художников (Weimar 
Bauhaus) и поэтов (Р. М. Рильке).
Sümboliloome
Sümboliloome on mõiste, mille kaudu ühenduvad vastastikku teineteist 
mõjustanud uurimistööd Hamburgi ülikoolis enne 1933. aastat: Filosoofia 
Instituudis (William Stem, Emst Cassirer), Psühholoogia Instituudis 
(Stem) ja selle Laboratooriumis (Heinz Wemer), ning Keskkonna Insti­
tuudis (Jakob von Uexküll). See mõiste, nagu teda kasutasid Cassirer ja 
Wemer, seondub personalistliku lähenemisega (Stem), kuid haarab ka 
seotud termineid nagu ‘liikumise meloodia’ (Uexküll) ja ‘relatsiooniline 
sisu’ (Cassirer), arendades ‘empiirilise skeemi’ (Kant) mõistet. Ühtaegu 
on kõik need seotud läve struktureerimise probleemiga võrdsete stiimulite 
puhul. Intermodaalne arusaam võimaldas uurida ühiseid tahke loomade, 
laste ja täiskasvanute omailmas ning sümboliloomet kunstnikel (Weimar 
Bauhaus) ja luuletajail (R. M. Riike).
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The musical circle: 
The umwelt theory, as applied to zoomusicology
Dario Martinelli
Abstract. The purpose o f the present article is to illustrate the crucial role 
played by the Umwelt theory in zoomusicological (and, more generally, zoo- 
semiotic) studies. Too much, in fact too little, has been written on the relation­
ship between non-human animals and music. Most o f these writings do not 
explicitly aim at contributing to the actual problem (a good example being the 
reflections on birdsong contained in John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding). Some are, so to speak, a little folkloristic, quite a few broach 
the problem in strictly scientific terms, and very few take a clearly zoo­
musicological approach. In an attempt to understand all the possible ways in 
which the problem can be analysed, it turns out that all these contributions —  
in spite o f their reciprocal diversity —  have points in common, leading to 
three main categories o f approach: discontinuity, gradualism, and pluralism 
(or Umwelt theory). The discontinuist attitude is by definition opposed to the 
intent o f a zoomusicological research, which in fact defends the thesis that 
music is not specific only to humans. On the other hand, one might share the 
gradualist assumption that musicality departs from a basis common to many 
animal species (at least, all those provided with vocal apparatuses). However, 
such a basis cannot be interpreted as monolithic (i.e., as having developed in a 
unique and indivisible way), carrying, as a result, qualitative differences in 
music between species. For the above-mentioned reasons, and for others to be 
illustrated in the present paper, it becomes clear that the approach to zoo­
musicology must necessarily be pluralistic. The most suitable framework 
seems to be that postulated by Jakob von Uexküll, and known as the theory of 
Umwelt.
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A brief definition of zoomusicology
The idea of zoomusicology, in the modem sense of the term, 
originated with F rancis  Bernard Mache, in his Music, Myth, Nature. 
He announces that zoomusicology is “not yet bom”, thus establishing 
in actual fact its birth. Briefly put, the aim of Mache’s essay is to 
“begin to speak of animal musics other than with the quotation marks” 
(Mache 1992: 114). His book first came out in 19831, thus one can 
understand how little has been said until now about the subject, and 
how much remains to be said.
First of all, there is the problem of defining the discipline. If I was 
asked to define zoomusicology in a few words, in order to include this 
term in a dictionary, I would probably say that this discipline studies 
the “aesthetic use of sound communication among animals”. This 
definition would have the following consequences:
1. I would avoid the use of that really dangerous word, “music”. 
This is because such a concept must be handled with extreme care, 
even when related to human music only. If one approaches a not-yet- 
defined sound phenomenon and claims that such a phenomenon is 
musical, then one really must prove it.
2. I would include another dangerous word, “aesthetic”. That is 
because a) although non-experts would hardly extend this concept to 
non-human animals, in actual fact, ethology, especially recently, tends 
to acknowledge the existence of an aesthetic sense in animals; b) most 
of all, at this very generic stage, the use of this word, as preferred to 
“music”, is motivated by the fact that this expression represents a 
methodological presupposition, whereas the expression “music” 
constitutes the real theoretical goal. Indeed, concepts like musicality 
and musical culture still have too strong an anthropological conno­
tation to be applied to the rest of the animal kingdom as well; c) the 
concept of “aesthetics”, within my theoretical framework, is a funda­
mental presupposition for defining music.
3. By simply saying “animals”, and not “non-human” ones, I leave 
open the possibility of including Homo sapiens in zoomusicological 
research. That is because a) as I already stated in the introduction, we 
should not forget that humans are animals, thus it is important to make
1 The excerpts quoted in this book are taken from the English edition of 
Mache’s work, published in 1992; the original version was issued in 1983.
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clear that zoomusicology is not “opposed” to anthropomusicology, but 
actually includes it; and b) if the analysis of human behaviour can also 
fall into the ethological domain, then human music can fall into the 
domain of zoomusicology. I am not envisioning a zoomusicological 
version of Desmond Morris’s controversial The Naked Ape, but still I 
feel that a change of perspective can be scientifically healthy.
4. By saying “sound communication”, I am explicitly declaring a 
semiotic approach to music. In this essay, I consider music as both a 
semantic and syntactic system. I will clarify this approach shortly.
Secondly, one might wonder about the raison d ’etre of zoomusico­
logy; i.e., what consequences are implied in zoomusicological study? 
What is zoomusicology really putting up for discussion? Mache 
provides an answer when he says that “if it turns out that music is a 
widespread phenomenon in several living species apart from man, this 
will very much call into question the definition of music, and more 
widely that of man and his culture, as well as the idea we have of the 
animal itself’ (Mache 1992: 95). In my opinion, such a statement 
implies a few interesting reflections. Zoomusicology approaches non­
human animals from the direction of human sciences, and music from 
the direction of biological sciences. As I have already pointed out, 
certain changes of perspective can be quite helpful for a more 
complete overview of the phenomena analysed.
Moreover, the basic innovation provided by zoomusicology is the 
assertion that music is not an exclusively human phenomenon, but 
rather an emotion and instinct-based one.
If we had at our disposal sufficient studies o f the neuro-physiological links 
between biological rhythms and musical rhythms, I would probably have been 
able to draw up arguments which reinforce the conception I am defending, 
that o f music as a cultural construct based on instinctive foundations [...] . But 
if the animal world reveals to us precisely this emergence o f music from the 
innate, this should enable us to compare it with what happens in man. (Mache 
1992: 95).
Hence, to adopt the zoomusicological paradigm means to put seriously 
into discussion the present definitions of music, starting from its 
strongly anthropocentric connotation.
At the same time, the whole conception of the nature-culture 
dichotomy is to be revised. Mostly, one should wonder — as Peirce
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already did in speaking of synechism — if we really have to consider 
it as a dichotomy.
Finally, on a more ethical level, zoomusicology, together with zoo- 
semiotics, cognitive ethology and other studies, testifies to the en­
couraging progress of human knowledge in studying other animals. 
Hopefully, the disturbing ghosts of hardcore mechanism, behaviou­
rism and evolutionism, will soon disappear, allowing humans to per­
ceive and interpret other living beings in a more appropriate and 
realistic way.
Gradualism, discontinuity and pluralism
In an attempt to understand and classify all the possible ways in which 
the zoomusicological problem has been and can be analysed, it turns 
out that all the contributions — despite their reciprocal diversity in 
typology and reliability — have points in common, and lead to three 
main categories of approach: gradualism, discontinuity and pluralism 
(or Umwelt theory).
By gradualism  is meant a generically Darwinian approach2. The 
idea is that of an evolutionary continuum in which the human being 
occupies the highest position, and in which, position after position, the 
characteristics of the diverse species are less and less complex and 
refined, although adequate for ensuring the survival of the species in 
question. In this sense, music, like language, intelligence and so on, is 
a unique and gradual structure, which finds its maximum development 
in human beings. This means that sounds uttered by other animals 
may easily be considered musical, but their apparently lower comple­
xity, the lack of elements present in human music (musical instru­
ments, written musical notation, etc.) and other such differences, are 
considered to be manifestations of a comparatively inferior develop­
ment. Typical gradualistic attitudes are recognisable in those who con­
sider birdsong as proto-musical, and who more generally maintain that 
the origins and mdiments of art can be traced to several animal 
species. For instance, Hamilton and Marler take a gradualistic 
approach when they declare: “we must also bear in mind the
2 Many o f the references to Darwin in this essay are deliberately approximate, 
for they intend to recall a common idea on Darwininan theories, more than the 
real theoretical principles postulated by the British naturalist.
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possibility that some aspects of song variation [in birds] are a manifes­
tation of some kind of primordial exercise in aesthetics” (Hamilton, 
Marler 1966: 446).
Discontinuity refers to an attitude that is generally sceptical, if not 
hostile, of the hypothesis that other animals possess an idea of music. 
The typical approach here is to emphasise a “discontinuity” in the 
evolution of human beings, in comparison with all other living beings. 
In other words, a sort of autonomous and peculiar development started 
at some point in the human evolutionary course, in a way that every 
behavioural element articulated from then on constituted an exclusi­
vely human characteristic. An example of discontinuity is the opinion 
that music is a typically human phenomenon, which has nothing to do 
with sound manifestations made by other animals. Such manifesta­
tions may sound like, but definitely cannot be music.
The discontinuist attitude is by definition opposed to the intent of 
the zoomusicological research, which in fact defends the thesis that 
music is not specific to humans only. In addition, I will explore the 
hypothesis of the Transpecific character of many musical elements, 
and the species-specificness of many others. In other words, I will 
share the gradualist assumption that musicality departs from a basis 
common to many animal species (at least, all those provided with 
vocal apparatuses). At the same time, however, such a basis is not 
interpreted as monolithic nor as having developed in a unique and 
indivisible way, carrying, as a result, qualitative differences in music 
between species.
For these reasons, and for others to be considered later, it becomes 
clear that the approach to zoomusicology must necessarily be plura­
listic. The most suitable framework seems to be that postulated by the 
theoretical biologist Jakob von Uexküll, and known as the theory of 
Umwelt.
The theory of umwelt
Ask a human being to name a piece of furniture consisting of a 
smooth flat wooden slab fixed on legs. Most probably, the human 
subject will call such an entity a table. Now imagine posing the same 
question to a wood-worm. Possibly, the latter will describe this object 
as a big, wide, immense food area. The human subject and the wood­
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worm are facing the same entity, apparently sharing the same environ­
ment, are in the same area of the planet Earth, breathe the same air, 
and are surrounded by the same quantity and quality of matter and 
molecules.
Nevertheless, the human being and the wood-worm do not share 
the same Umwelt, i.e., the same subjective phenomenological environ­
ment. The wood-worm, because of its physical constitution, its modes 
of perception, its experience, and in relation to what is ‘necessary’, 
‘interesting’ to its existence, interprets and (metaphorically) describes 
the surrounding environment in a totally different way than a human 
does. The human, in turn, has a given physical constitution, given 
perceptual possibilities, etc. In other words, although living in the 
same environment, human beings and wood-worms establish a diffe­
rent relation with it (a relation that is evidently semiotic). Humans and 
wood-worms see the same things as different objects. John Deely has 
explained very clearly the difference between an object and a thing:
[ .. .]  there is a great difference between an object and a thing. For while the 
notion o f thing is the notion o f what is what it is regardless o f  whether it be 
known or not, the notion o f object is hardly that. An object, to be an object, 
requires a relation to a knower, in and through which relation the object as 
apprehended exists as terminus. A sign warning o f  ‘bridge out’ may be a lie, 
but the thing in question, even in such a case, is no less objective than in the 
case where the sign warns o f a ‘true situation’ (Deely 2001: 129)
Cimatti (2001, personal communication) indicates the three basic 
implications of the Umwelt theory as follows:
1. What we might consider a stupid behaviour in another species, 
depends in reality on the fact that the animal in question values the 
same situation according to very different perceptual criteria. Lite­
rally, it sees different things than we do.
2. In order to understand non-human animal communication, we first 
need to investigate how they organise their own experience, i.e., what 
is pertinent to them and what is not.
3. Something interesting or pertinent for a non-human animal may 
not be perceived by humans at all.
Rather erroneously, the term “Umwelt” has often been confused 
with that of “environmental niche”, or in other cases with “habitat”, 
and in the most inattentive cases, with “environment”. It is evident,
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though, that Umwelt does not designate a touchable and tangible 
category, but rather an array of phenomenological elements. As John 
Deely emphasises,
We see then how different and richer is the concept o f  Umwelt than the sub- 
alternate concept o f  ‘environmental niche’. The concept o f  environmental 
niche simply identifies that part o f  the environment as physical upon which 
a given biological form mainly depends in deriving the physical aspects o f  
its sustenance. The concept o f Umwelt, by contrast, shows us how a given 
‘environmental niche’ is merely the physical part o f  a larger, objective, not 
purely physical whole which is, as it were, fully comprehensible only from 
the perspective o f the particular lifeform whose world it is, whose ‘environ­
ment’ is meaningful in the specific way that it is thanks only to an irre­
ducible combination o f relations many o f  which have no being apart from 
the lifeworld and all o f  which contribute to the contrast between the 
physical environment as neutral or common respecting all organisms, on the 
one hand, and parts o f  that same physical environment interpreted and 
incorporated within a meaningful sphere o f  existence shared by all the 
members o f a species, on the other hand. Only things which are objects 
make up part o f  these species-specific worlds, but within these worlds are 
many objects which also are not things apart from the worlds. (D eely 2001: 
129-130).
More specifically, Uexküll considers Umwelt as the result of two 
main elements: the Merkwelt, i.e., the specific perceptive field of a 
given organism, and the Wirkwelt, i.e., the field of actual interaction, 
the operational dimension of the same organism. Perceptual and 
operational factors contribute to form a specific Umwelt, which is 
exclusive for each species, and — proceeding by levels, and es­
tablishing adequate proportions3 —  for each community, individual, 
class, family and so forth. To make the concept clearer, consider Fig.
1. On one side, an organism (e.g., a frog) takes part in a semiosis 
process, in which it plays the role of “receiver of meaning”. On the 
other side, the environment that surrounds the frog functions as a 
counter structure, and the frog is related to it both from a perceptual 
and from an operational point of view. In the first case, receptors 
(senses) are important; in the second case, organs ‘affecting’ the
3 U exküll conceives the idea o f  Um welt in a b iological framework, thus 
his reflections have much to do with specific differences. In practice, how ­
ever, one may re-interpret, as many have already done —  the w hole concept 
under different lights: cultural, psychological, socio log ica l, and so forth.
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environment — such as legs — become preeminent. The environment 
thus works as a “carrier of meaning”, for it addresses receptive and 
operative messages to the frog.
Transpeciflc and species-specific traits
How does the adoption of the Umwelt paradigm affect zoomusico­
logy? Many aspects are to be considered here. First of all, to conceive 
the animal kingdom in the light of the Umwelt theory means at the 
same time to acknowledge transpecific and species-specific traits in 
the various species. The word “transpecific” refers to the musical ele­
ments that can be found in more than one species, even when among 
just a few. This level is important in order to show the common 
biological bases of musicality, and is definitely less problematic than 
the second level, since in most cases the analysis reveals great 
similarity between the species observed and human musical culture. 
The most banal example is of course singing, but other, more
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particularised aspects could be cited — such as non-human animals 
arranging sounds into a graduated scale (Mache 1992; Schafer 1985; 
Martinelli 1999; 2001; 2002).
Elements are called “species-specific” when they present characte­
ristics that are typical of the species observed. This level shows how 
musicality, despite the above-mentioned biological basis, has taken 
quite varied courses, according to the evolution of each species, 
and — most of all — to the articulation of the respective Umwelts. Of 
course, the less a species exhibits human musical traits, the more 
difficult musicological analysis becomes. This is because zoo­
musicology is just taking its first steps: it is natural that human 
musicality, for the moment, represents the only complete point of 
reference. When musical cultures of other animals will have been 
studied more closely, we will probably be able, through abduction, to 
create new musical parameters to apply to the most peculiar cases. A 
typical example of a species-specific trait is the number and quality of 
pertinent sounds and intervals that occur during a performance. The 
perception and use of these pertinences vary from species to species, 
so that — quite trivially — a sound that is catchy and pleasant to a 
dolphin's ear might sound totally out of tune to a seagull.
Such a distinction should also be considered useful in the area of 
rules and principles and not only in defining specific traits. For 
instance, the fact that wolves utter an arch-shaped melody (i.e., a 
prolonged sound that starts low in intensity — and quite often in 
frequency, too, then increases to a certain peak, and finally decreases 
again) is surely not a species-specific trait of that species (humans, to 
mention one species, occasionally perform in that fashion). Rather, the 
fact that that type of melodic pattern occurs so often as to make it a 
distinctive mark of howling can be considered species-specific.
Of course, one shall not deny how problematic the picture is in this 
case. To deal with the species-specific traits issue means to take a 
whole responsibility to tell what, in animal sound manifestations, 
distinguishes one species from all other existing on Earth. This is 
predictably a hopeless task. Even if it was not, the presence of 
millions of animal species on this planet would make this the thickest 
book ever. Thus, any attempt in this direction is doomed to failure 
anyway. What is more realistic, is to propose some methodological 
indication and — very cautiously — some hypothetical example.
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As already mentioned, by species-specific we mean an element 
(behavioural, physical or else) that must be considered exclusive of 
the species examined. The concept itself of exclusivity is however to 
be put into discussion, for matters of principle:
1. How to deal with the same element emerging in two different 
species, which presents the characteristics of a simple analogy rather 
than homology (in a few words, such an element fulfils a given 
function for one species and a totally different one for the other)?;
4 I have already pointed out that the aim o f zoomusicology is to demonstrate 
that a concept o f music (or aesthetics, more generally) exists in non-human ani­
mals as well as in human ones. In other words, my claim is that sound manifesta­
tions in non-human animals are homologous to musical manifestations in humans. 
They are not simply analogous. As Sebeok points out, “These parallels 
immediately raise several problems, the most obvious being whether the animal’s 
behaviour is ‘merely’ analogous to man’s, whether, that is, shifting to a more 
familiar parlance, [for instance] the label ‘dance’ is ‘just’ a colourful and 
suggestive metaphor —  as it must surely be in Frisch’s designation o f the kinetic 
component o f the communication system o f the honeybee as a ‘dance’ —  or 
whether something deeper is implied, perhaps indeed a remote phyletic 
homology4” (Sebeok 1981: 218).
Let us consider three men holding up their hands. The first stands on a 
basketball court and has just scored a point. The second stands before the TV 
watching that basketball match and supporting the team which the first guy plays 
for. The third guy is somewhere else and has a gun pointed at his back, and to be 
sure, is not interested in basketball at all. The behavioural pattern (hands up) of 
the first guy is homologous to that o f  the second, and analogous to that of the 
third, since the first two cases are clearly a display o f  agonistic euphoria, while the 
third is just obedience to a robber’s command.
The homologies-analogies issue, very typical in animal-related studies, applies 
also to ethnomusicological contexts. “[ .. .]  the facts inventoried in the sound 
material and considered identical by the musicologist do not necessarily have the 
same meaning for each o f  the autochthonous people who have played them [...]. 
It is very interesting to find analogies between a work by Messiaen and a Tibetan 
piece from the point o f  view o f  sound material perceived, but one must note that 
such a comparison —  which might end up, why not, by finding universals —  
retains a necessarily etic character” (Nattiez 1977: 99).
The problem o f homologies is widely studied also in ethology, especially as 
concerns acoustic communication. According to Tembrock (1963: 777), there are 
three criteria by which to define homologies:
1. The criterion o f position, understood as “the situation that exists at the time 
when the sound is made. This concept o f  'position' would have to include all 
available external and internal factors” (Tembrock 1963: 777);
2. The criterion o f the special quality o f  the structures;
2. Is it acceptable to take into consideration elements that are actually 
exclusive of a given species, but emerging in totally isolated and 
sporadic situations, without any significant statistic continuity?; and 
finally
3. Is species-specificity the sole parameter to consider as opposed to 
universals, or order-specificity, class-specificity, individual-specificity 
etc. should be also considered?
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3. The criterion o f interconnection by intermediate forms.
These criteria refer directly to sound forms, and, in Tembrock’s view, could 
be used in principle, if  comprehensive data on acoustic communication in non­
human animals were available.
Tembrock indicates further, auxiliary criteria that can be used for simple 
structures: “a) simple structures can be regarded as homologous if  they occur in a 
large number o f nearly-similar pieces; b) the probability o f  a homology in simple 
structures increases with the existence o f further similarities o f equal distribution 
in nearly-similar pieces; and c) the probability o f homology o f  a characteristic 
decreases with the frequency o f  occurrence o f  this characteristic in species which 
are definitely not related” (ibid.).
Unfortunately, the fact that certain types o f non-human animal behaviour may 
be considered either analogous or homologous to human behaviour does not only 
depend on the factors listed above. In some cases, the exclusive human-ness or 
non-human-ness o f certain behavioural traits is simply taken for granted - e.g., 
music is claimed to be exclusively human - so that attempts to detect homologous 
characteristics in such patterns is a priori accused o f anthropomorphism or 
zoomorphism.
Significantly, scholars supporting the aesthetic hypothesis in non-human 
animals must systematically stress that their researches are not affected by 
anthropomorphism. “[...]  a natural recognition o f the remarkable similarities 
which actually exist between the dances o f birds and men and the identity o f the 
emotional sources from which both take their origin. The resemblances between 
avian and human dancing are the outcome o f  emotional drives which underlie the 
behaviour o f all the higher animals; and the natural corollary is that we can use the 
terpsichorean activities o f men to interpret those o f birds, and vice versa. Let us 
not be scared by the bogey o f anthropomorphism into the arms o f the spectre o f  
Cartesian mechanism. It is not anthropomorphism to believe that man and the 
higher animals have much in common so far as instinct and emotion are 
concerned, but an acknowledgement o f truth scientifically demonstrated” 
(Armstrong: 1963: 195). Provided that the analogies-homologies phenomenon can 
be demonstrated in the zoomusicological field (which is one aim o f the present 
essay), I look forward to the time when one will not have to “justify” his/her own 
anthropomorphic tendencies, especially when they are not at all anthropomorphic 
in the common sense.
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On the first point, Sebeok seems to have quite clear ideas, even 
without explicitly dealing with the problem:
Although ‘flehmen’, or lip-curl, which involves the closure o f nasal openings 
when the head is jerked back, is a widely distributed behavioural trait in 
mammals, this facial expression has evolved into a particular sign in horses 
which elicits particular responses on the part o f other horses. A fearful rhesus 
monkey carries its tail stuck stiffly out behind, while a baboon will convey the 
same emotion to its fellows by holding its tail vertically. In brief, each kind of 
animal has at its command a repertoire o f signs that forms a system unique to 
it or is, in biological parlance, species-specific. (Sebeok 1986b: 76-77)
In other words, if given patterns are displayed by more than one 
species with different functions, than they should be considered 
species-specific. In zoomusicological terms, this implies the trans­
position of musical traits from their structure to their function, which 
is quite an interesting point.
As for the second point, I will propose my personal reflections. 
When a musical characteristic is detected with more frequency than 
another, it does not necessarily mean that the former is more relevant 
than the latter. It is surely important to detect the recurrence of a trait, 
in order to understand how essential and distinctive this trait is to a 
species (or a community, or an individual). The very large number of 
solo piano pieces written by Chopin is a clear clue of how relevant 
that instrument was for the compositional process of the Polish 
composer.
On the other hand, the sporadic emergence of a given trait should 
not lead to the conclusion that such a trait is less or not significant at 
all. There is only one Queen song in which the classic drum kit is 
replaced by plenty of hand-clapping and foot-stomping, i.e., “We Will 
Rock You”, but it takes a bit of courage to affirm that this song — a 
Queen standard — is not typical of or significant to the repertoire of 
the English rock-band. At the same time, an arched-shaped melodic 
howling is undoubtedly a frequent and characteristic trait in canidae, 
but from that we should not necessarily deduce that other, quasi-arch 
shaped forms of howling are melodic mistakes5. There are several
In fact they can be, if  there is a way to demonstrate that precise arches are an 
aesthetic goal in canidae s howling, and thus “almost-arches” are a sort o f pre­
song, as occurs in birds. My claim here is that neither one nor the other conclusion 
can be made on a simply statistical basis.
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analytical levels to take into account: one is the transpecific, and 
another is the species-specific, but within the latter there are numerous 
cultural (i.e., related to the habits of a given community instead of one 
another) and individual nuances. The amazing variety of humpback 
whale songs is paradigmatic in this sense.
In addition, just the existence of a wide range of individual 
variations and styles makes zoomusicology an inexact science.
Obviously, the study o f an animal species cannot be exhaustive. Just as the 
best singers are at the same time those in whom one finds the greatest 
individual variations, one must have access to numerous hours o f recordings 
o f a great number o f different individuals, throughout their entire habitat, in 
different seasons and over many years. It is not surprising that the number o f  
species for which this kind o f work has been done remains minuscule. 
Generalisations still depend largely on the familiarity o f the describer with the 
species described. (Mache 1992: 98)
More to the point, the emerging of a trait, even when sporadic, shows 
that the species in question is in fact able to produce it (even through a 
single specimen). When a sportsman establishes a world record in a 
given discipline, he not only demonstrated that he is able to break that 
boundary in space or in time, but he also demonstrated that human 
beings are. Then, if that record happens to be undefeated for a very 
long time, it would be quite paradoxical to consider it as little 
significant just because it is isolated and episodic. As a consequence, 
my answer to the second question is yes: it is acceptable to take into 
consideration rarely-emerging elements.
Finally, although quite crucial, the third question must be tempo­
rarily left apart. It is very probable —  sure, in fact — that other types 
of specificity (by order, by individuals etc.) must be taken into con­
sideration, and that the simple species-specific/transpecific dichotomy 
is in fact inadequate. However, at present, zoomusicology is too 
young and this essay too limited to transcend human music as a point 
of reference. And Homo sapiens is notoriously a species, rather than 
an order, a class or else. At present, zoomusicological research is 
pushing the musical boundaries from the anthropological (i.e., 
species-specific) level to the generally zoological (i.e., transpecific) 
one. At the moment, these are the levels in questions.
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Although much more similar to gradualism than to discontinuity, the 
Umwelt theory is undoubtedly a third way for zoomusicology. Music 
cannot be conceived as a unique continuum, simply divided by grades. 
To locate music on one level instead of another, implies the under­
standing of where exactly a sound utterance should be considered 
musical (human beings? great apes? primates? mammals? animals? 
living beings?) and also where (i.e., at which point) certain traits can 
be analysed in their specific autonomy.
If one interprets the musical process at the same level of any other 
process of semiosis between organism and environment, a funda­
mental principle of musical activity becomes quite clear: music is the 
result of an interaction between a subject and an object, between a 
structure and a counter-structure, between a receptor and a carrier of 
meaning. These two parts are in constant and reciprocal informational 
exchange. In fact, the exchange itself is the real generator of the 
musical phenomenon, since the latter would simply not exist if the 
subject was not affected by it and did not affect it. Any zoomusico­
logical (and generally musicological) research should take into 
account such a conception, otherwise it risks perverting the essence of 
the musical phenomenon.
An excellent exemplification of this close structure-counter- 
structure bound in music is the theory of bio-acoustic relations. 
According to Dane Harwood, “human beings construct meaningful 
patterns from information in their environment, and [...] these patterns 
form the basis of complex bodies of knowledge represented in 
memory. Categories — names for classes of patterns which are useful 
in coding, and operating in, the real world — have meaning to the 
extent that they specify one concept rather than others which are 
viable alternatives” (Harwood 1976: 529). Philip Tagg refers to such 
categories as bio-acoustic relations. They occur between a subject and 
a musical object. These relations are detectable between the following:
1. (a) musical tempo (pulse) and (b) heartbeat (pulse) or the speed of 
breathing, walking, running and other bodily movements. This 
means that no one can musically sleep in a hurry, stand still while 
running, etc.;
Analytical levels
The musical circle 243
2. (a) musical loudness and timbre (attack, envelope, decay, tran­
sients) and (b) certain types of physical activity This means, for 
example, that no one can make gentle or “caressing” kinds of 
musical statements by striking hard objects sharply, by singing 
jerky lullabies at breakneck speed, or using legato phrasing and 
soft, rounded timbres for hunting or war situations;
3. (a) speed and loudness of articulating tones and (b) the acoustic 
setting. This means that quick, quiet tone beats are indiscernible if 
there is a lot of reverberation and that slow, long, loud ones are 
difficult to produce and sustain acoustically if there is little or no 
reverberation. This is why a dance or pub rock band is well 
advised to carry its own “sound-space” with it, in the form of echo 
effects, to overcome all the carpets and clothes that would other­
wise dampen the sounds the band produces;
4. (a) musical phrase lengths and (b) the capacity of the human lungs. 
This means that few people can sing or blow and breathe in at the 
same time. It also implies that musical phrases tend to last between 
two and ten seconds.
If we accept such a theoretical framework — and Tagg’s application 
of it to human musical experience is very convincing — it could be 
interesting to interpret animals’ musical cultures as consequences of 
each species’ musical-biological Umwelt. The articulation and the 
modalities of the sounds produced by humpback whales is a perfect 
illustration:
1. Velocity. If modem human life is characterised by numerous social 
rhythms, the movements of whales’ life are much more regular. “The 
tempo is largo and maestoso, and it seems to proceed at the same pace 
of the waves. Maybe this is the rhythm the whales are most familiar 
with, since they live with it” (Payne 1996: 153, my translation).
2. Echo\ It is apparent that whales are aware of deep underwater 
feedback. Several recordings catch them amusing themselves by 
uttering a peremptory sound and letting the echo do the rest. In human 
music, such effects are artificial, as in popular music one hears 
flangers, phasers, and wah-wahs. Among other things, it would be 
interesting to know if the boom in the use of these effects in the 1970s 
is somehow related with McVay and Payne's discovery of whale songs
6 From http:// www.tagg.org/texts.html.
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(1971). According to Murray Schafer, a relation of this kind actually 
exists (see Murray Schafer 1985: 60).
3. Cyclic nature o f  singing. One session may be composed by many, 
manipulated repetitions of the same song. A similar characteristic is 
hardly found among humans, who seem to be more interested in 
thematic repetition. Payne maintains that whales' songs are cyclic 
because almost everything in their life is cyclic: “The life of most 
cetaceans is cyclic. A whale calf, as soon as it is bom, perceives the 
circular movement of waves. The bigger the wave, the bigger (and 
slower) is the circular trajectory passively followed by the whale. [...] 
Migration routes, in many species [...], are circular instead of straight 
back-and-forth [...]. Whales, as all animals, experience the daily 
rhythm of light and darkness, and the seasonal rhythm of cold and 
warm. They experience the changing of tides, as affected by the cycles 
of the moon’s phases [...]” (Payne 1996: 19, my translation). I would 
add that the above-mentioned underwater acoustic effects shape the 
sound wave in a roundish fashion. A rock guitarist who uses a flanger 
on his electric guitar is usually seeking a rounder, more water-like 
sound.
4. Length o f song sessions, or, more generally, the time devoted to 
singing. To my knowledge, there is no human society that sings non­
stop for 22 hours;
5. Sounds and intervals. The number of sounds employed in a whale 
song is much greater than those used in the songs o f humans, since the 
former sounds make use of intervals smaller than a semitone. As 
illustrated earlier, all of these microtonal sounds are likely to be 
significant for a humpback.
6. Manipulation o f  sound material. The tendency to transform and 
“play” with sound material is widespread among non-human animals. 
Such a tendency can be found in humans, but definitely not on a 
regular basis.
Umwelt theory and biocentric approach
Given such remarks, the question we now wonder about is whether a 
discipline like zoomusicology (or zoosemiotics in general), which 
practically deals with animal sound communication through (and thus 
accepting the idea of) the functioning of their cognitive process,
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should make do with anthropocentric methodological models7. One 
should say no, of course, but at the same time, is there any efficient
According to usual definitions, anthropocentrism interprets Nature as (a) an 
entity existing apart from  and for the benefit o f  humans, so that (b) nothing in 
Nature can be considered in itself, autonomously from humans; and (c) it is 
ethically acceptable for humans and non-humans to be treated in different ways. 
In other words, Nature is not o f interest (e.g., to conservationists and pre­
servationists) because o f its hypothetically intrinsic value, but just because o f its 
instrumental value, i.e., the values it has for and to humans.
Most criticism against animal-related studies tends to emphasise that a totally 
impartial interpretation o f animal behaviour is not possible, for observations are 
external to the subject o f  study and cannot avoid frames o f reference that are 
typical o f human interpretation o f reality. In this sense, the approach is anthropo­
centric, i.e., concentrated on and mediated by the fact o f being human. Such a 
statement deserves, however, specific reflections.
First, such forms o f criticism are a little simplistic, and merely constitute a 
comfortable and socially shared (thus, stereotypical) way out o f facing a problem 
that is in fact quite complex. It may be easy to speak o f  anthropocentrism as an 
apparently unavoidable form o f  interpretation o f  reality that affects scientific 
research; however, to mix all its nuances in the same big pot reveals a lack o f  
knowledge on the topic. It is more proper to dissect the question into all its 
components in order to re-interpret anthropocentrism more accurately.
Secondly, I have the feeling that those who doubt the scientific validity o f 
animal-related studies, because of the difficulty o f avoiding anthropocentrism, 
often seem to be sceptical only about part o f the story, while in a few other cases, 
animal-related studies seem to enjoy everyone’s confidence. Very well known is 
the scepticism that surrounded and partially still surrounds Darwin’s theories, but 
where are the sceptics when it comes to evaluate the very probable anthropo­
centrism o f pharmacological research? Should they not be at least suspicious 
about transferring given data from non-human species to the human one so easily?
Lastly, these types o f criticism are a little too defeatist. It is true that there is 
no way to avoid some elements o f anthropocentricity, but is this an absolutely 
unbridgeable gap between scientific research and a correct interpretation o f  
reality? Things are never all black or white: the impossibility o f being totally 
objective and impartial towards a topic is not really a good reason to give up 
scientific research in general. Different degrees o f impartiality, according to 
specific cases, can be achieved. The challenge is to tend towards absolute 
impartiality. Otherwise, not only animal-related studies but also 99% o f scientific 
fields would not be scientifically believable.
The above considerations appear rather simple, if  not banal. Yet when animal 
studies are involved, scholars tend to forget them quite often.
Hence, the very first question, Is there just one type o f anthropocentrism, or 
are there more? In other words, How many ways exist to observe reality according 
to the criteria o f interpretation and classification proper to the human being? My
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alternative, an Umwelt-based model, which I call biocentrism  for 
reasons I am about to illustrate, which works on both theoretical and 
concrete levels? I believe there is, and in fact I believe that — 
unconsciously or not — part or most of such a model is already used 
in scientific research (possibly, under different labels), the main 
problem thus being just that of systematising the different parts into a 
coherent and realistically applicable theoretical model.
An issue such as biocentrism deserves more than the general 
scrutiny I give it in this article. First, because concepts that are 
complex and crucial, in order to understand and regulate the human 
role in the ecosystem, could be made to seem a bit generic and banal.
research suggests me that such criteria should be distributed on at least two layers: 
default anthropocentrism and binary anthropocentrism. The latter, in its turn, can 
be divided into quantitative and qualitative types.
The first elementary level, default anthropocentrism, consists in the banal 
consideration that the subject who observes a given animal species is evidently a 
human being, with all its resources, limits and modes o f  categorisation. What we 
understand about a dog, for instance, is what we are able to understand, given the 
means that allow us to do. Technology does not (yet?) allow us to understand a 
dog the way, say, a pigeon would understand it. Such a consideration is not very 
different from statements like “Alvar Aalto is a great architect”. Quite evidently, 
in pronouncing such statements, we are reporting one o f our forms o f inter­
pretation o f reality, founded on personal experience, education, culture, perceptive 
sources and so on. Now, this looks to me obvious, inevitable, and not dangerous. 
The other way round, however, could be dangerous, for it could mean the 
expressing o f opinion without any point o f reference or any code, resulting in a 
sort o f perceptive anarchy. As long as an anthropocentric attitude is reduced to 
this very basic expression, no kind o f scientific research runs the risk o f being 
taken little seriously.
The second type is binary anthropocentrism. Here, the fact o f being a 
different entity from the object observed (human, rather than another animal) 
produces a dualistic interpretation o f  reality, based on criteria o f difference 
(iqualitative anthropomorphism) and/or a strongly hierarchical identity (quantita­
tive anthropomorphism), which puts the observer, and the group s/he belongs to, 
in a superior position in relation to the group observed. In the case o f  qualitative 
anthropocentrism, the observer-human being tends to distinguish him/herself from 
the non-human animal by means o f either/or qualities, which is almost a causal 
relation (i.e., “humans do, ergo animals don’t”). In the case o f quantitative 
anthropocentrism (which is a post-Darwinian anthropocentrism in a way), the 
difference between human beings and other animals is expressed by means of 
quantities (more/less). Within this framework, a statement like “Unlike Gropius, 
Alvar Aalto is a great architect” is o f qualitative type, while the statement “Walter 
Gropius is a good architect, but Aalto is definitely better” is quantitative.
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Second, because I also run the risk of using the wrong terminology. In 
particular, if zoosemiotics pertains to animals, why should I use a 
word like biocentrism, which actually refers to all living beings, 
including plants, and not the more appropriate term zoocentrism! And 
why not even ecocentrism, referring thus to the whole ecosystem? 
There are three possible explanations for my choice:
1. Very simply: there is not room enough to develop every single 
issue and to provide adequate terminological and conceptual 
explanations. Among the above-mentioned options, biocentrism  is 
the most familiar and, theoretically speaking, the best defined. For 
my purposes, that should be enough.
2. One of my main theoretical sources for this section is the Finnish 
philosopher Leena Vilkka, who has exhaustively illustrated the 
three concepts (Vilkka, 1997: 37-83). According to her definitions, 
zoocentrism “covers the discussions in which the notions of higher 
animals and their value are central. Zoocentrism is the animal- 
centered, especially vertebrate-centered philosophy” (ibid.: 37). In 
zoosemiotics, invertebrates have a definite and important role (see 
the importance of zoosemiotic studies on bees’ communication). If 
one accepts Vilkka’s definition (which she argues quite con­
vincingly), the concept of zoocentrism is too limited in this 
context.
3. Any scientific theory should always take into consideration its own 
possible developments. If a phytosemiotics exists (and it does), 
nobody can exclude, a priori, the application of certain zoosemiotic 
principle to plants, as well. I am not saying that we should, but 
simply stating that, in looking forward to further developments, it 
is wise not to take too solid a position.
Having accepted that, other considerations can be proposed. As a first 
step, the concept of anthropocentrism must be reconsidered. Indeed, 
the real core of the biocentrism-anthropocentrism problem is not, as 
one might expect, the dichotomy between instrumental and intrinsic 
value. Anthropocentrism is certainly an interpretation of Nature on the 
basis of its instrumental value, but this conception is not necessarily 
opposed to the idea of intrinsic value.
The concept o f intrinsic value can be interpreted at least in three ways: a) as a 
quality or property that human conscience attributes to something, and that 
characterises this object as possessing a value in itself, not related solely to 
human interests, or solely to the value o f the conscience that gives birth to it;
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b) as a property that emerges from the relation between an event and a 
conscience, in a relational-phenomenological fashion; c) in Platonic terms, as 
a totally objective value, inscribed in the objects themselves and independent 
o f human evaluation (e.g., Nature’s value existed before human conscience 
and will keep on existing when the latter disappears”). (Bartolommei 1995: 
42; my translation, D.M.)
In environmental philosophy, these three interpretations may be 
separated or combined. If kept separate, mostly excluding the third, 
ontological interpretation, there is little contradiction with a default 
anthropocentric attitude. It is not problematic for an anthropocentrist 
to accept that Nature, in whatever form or manifestation, may have 
value in itself, if a distinction is made between humans as source and 
as centre of values (Bartolommei 1995: 43). In a way, default anthro­
pocentrism is nothing other than anthropogenesis: what is said or 
thought by humans starts from the human interpretation of reality, 
but — and this is the point — does not necessarily have to be confined 
to humans. What is said and thought by — say — a supporter of 
Juventus Football Club is not a priori “Juventus-centric”.
In other words, the condition o f the subject who speaks must not be confused 
with the contents o f his/her statements: anthropocenmsts should easily 
acknowledge that if it is true that there is no value without someone valuing, it 
is also true that the value o f the object is not reduced to the sole value it has 
for the one who values, nor to the value o f  this latter him/herself. In short, it is 
one thing if anthropocentrism is meant as negation o f values independent and 
separated from human acts o f  evaluation; anthropocentric prejudice is another 
thing (i.e., the idea that everything on Earth is only a function o f human 
values). (Bartolommei 1995: 43-44; my translation, D.M.).
It is evident that the value I am discussing here is the musical one. The 
thesis I defend is that just because human beings create and theore­
tically develop the concept of music does not constitute a sufficient 
reason to think that music is an exclusively human peculiarity. I 
illustrate this concept further on. What matters now is to point out the 
four basic implications of a biocentric musicology:
1. Hermeneutically speaking, Nature is to be divided into levels, 
organised as follows. Beyond a general common basis, here called 
ecological, whose constraints — such as being subject to gravity — 
are shared by everything on Earth, there is a second, biological level, 
in which every living being is included. Eating and reproducing, for
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instance, typify humans and birds, insects and flowers, and so on. 
Things become more interesting on the third level, called the 
zoological or the transpecific, which concerns aspects held in common 
among the whole animal kingdom. At this point, more than one 
human conception is to be revised. This book, for instance, proposes 
that music is not an exclusively human domain. In a way, it is only a 
matter of complexity. In turn, complexity is a relative concept, since it 
should be proportioned to the respective needs of each species, or to 
their respective Umwelts. Fourthly, there is the level of characteristics 
that concern a single species (species-specific). An activity such as 
making a presentation with the use of transparencies must be con­
sidered an exclusively human skill, just as giving the exact position of 
a flower by a figure-eight dance is a skill-specific to bees. From the 
next level on, the course is quite clear for humans, but is yet to be well 
defined for other species. This is because the categories are now 
species-specific, and each species has developed a unique process. For 
most animals, including humans, this level is mainly social, but many 
species are not organised into societies at all. Thus, one should stop 
here.
2. In this research, the transpecific level must be considered the first 
meaningful category. Zoomusicology is concerned with all those 
musical features that are not exclusive to humans, but are shared 
among at least some other species, specifically, among those provided 
with vocal apparatuses. It can now be said that as a zoological 
phenomenon, music can no longer be analysed from an anthropo- 
centric point of view, just as decades ago ethnomusicologists said that, 
as an anthropological phenomenon, music should not be analysed 
from a strictly Eurocentric point of view.
3. The species-specific level is so capacious that nobody should take 
this kind of research as being too zoomorphic. Homo sapiens retains 
its incredibly large number of exclusive aspects. The problem here is 
to arrange categories in the right position and proportions, and to 
create a more appropriate “cosmology”. As Cimatti comments, 
“centripetal” tendencies must be balanced with “centrifugal” ones: 
“On the one hand, this centripetal tendency is positive, for it finally 
reminds us that we are animals, that our behaviour does originate from 
an immaterial entity, and — as a consequence — that we have clear 
responsibilities towards Nature. O f course, this tendency is good as 
long as we do not neglect differences, falling once again into an
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excess of anthropomorphism (a typical attitude of TV programmes). 
Non-human animals are very different from us, and I would also say 
that it is ethically wrong to say that we should preserve them since 
they are good, they take care of the children, and things like that. 
Animals are not good  from our point of view, but definitely this is not 
the point. We should preserve the animals' world as itself, precisely 
because it is so different from us. I would rather say that biology 
reminds us that we all are similar — we all descend from other living 
forms — and different at the same time, just because every animal 
species is different from all the other, otherwise it would not be a 
species. So, this centripetal movement is not wrong, but it must be 
accompanied by an analogous centrifugal movement that reminds us 
of the biological differences of each species” (Cimatti 2001: personal 
communication, my translation).
4. As biomusicologists like Nils Wallin (1991) maintain, the study 
of music in its biological dimension can be very useful for under­
standing its real essence and development.
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Музыкальный круг: теория умвельта применительно 
к зоомузыкологии
Цель настоящей статьи — иллюстрировать существенное значение 
теории умвельта для зоомузыкологических (и шире — зоосемио- 
тических) исследований. Много писалось о связи музыки и различ­
ных животных, но при этом мало внимания обращали на саму суть 
проблемы. Некоторые исследования относятся скорее к фолькло­
ристике, только немногие исследуют проблему научными методами 
и лишь одиночки используют зоомузыкологию. Несмотря на много­
образие разных подходов, при ближайшем рассмотрении вы­
ясняется, что у них имеются общие точки соприкосновения, что 
позволяет выделить три главных подхода: градуализм, дискретность 
и плюрализм (или теория умвельта). Исходящий из идеи дискрет­
ности взгляд уже по своему определению противоречит принципам 
зоомузыкологии, так как последняя придерживается мнения, что 
музыка присуща не только людям. Градуалисткая точка зрения 
предполагает, что музыкальность базируется на основе, являющейся 
общей для многих видов животных (по крайней мере для всех тех, 
которые имеют голосовой аппарат). Все же такую основу нельзя 
считать монолитной (т.е. развитой единственным и неделимым 
способом), такой, которая бы могла быть основанием качественных 
различий в музыке разных видов. Самой подходящей кажется 
созданная Якобом фон Юкскюллом теория умвельта.
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M uusikaline ring:
Omailma teooria, rakendatuna zoomusikoloogias
Käesoleva artikli eesmärgiks on illustreerida omailma teooria olulist täht­
sust zoomusikoloogilistes (ja laiemalt — zoosemiootilistes) uuringutes. 
Muusika ja erinevate loomade seostest on küll palju kiijutatud, kuid väga 
vähe on puudutatud selle sisulist probleemi (nagu ka John Locke’i 
käsitlus linnulaulust ta teoses Essay Concerning Human Understanding). 
Mõned käsitlused on pigem folkloristlikud, üksikud uurivad probleemi 
teaduslikus plaanis, ja vaid väga üksikud kasutavad otseselt zoomusiko- 
loogilist lähenemist. Erinevaid vaateid ja lähenemisviise mõista püüdes 
selgub, et neil on — mitmekesisusele vaatamata — ühiseid punkte, mis 
viib kolme peamise vaateviisi eristamisele: gradualism, mittepidevus, ja 
pluralism (ehk omailmateooria). Mittepidevusest lähtuv vaade on määrat­
luse kohaselt vastuolus zoomusikoloogiaga, kuna viimase püüdeks on 
kaitsta seisukohta, et muusika ei ole üksnes inimomane. Gradualistliku 
vaate järgi eeldatakse, et musikaalsus lähtub alusest, mis on ühine palju­
dele loomaliikidele (vähemalt kõigile neile kel on hääleaparaat). Ometi ei 
saa sellist alust pidada monoliitseks (s.t. ainsal ja jaotumatul viisil 
arenenuks), mis annaks aluse kvalitatiivsetele erinevustele erinevate 
liikide muusikas. Sobivaim raam tundub olevat Jakob von Uexkülli poolt 
sõnastatu, mis on tuntud kui omailma teooria.
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Race and breathing therapy: 
The career of Lothar Gottlieb Tirala 
(1886-1974)
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Abstract. The historiography o f life, work and visions o f Jakob von Uexküll 
(1864—1944) has grew up during the last years. But up to now lifes o f  his 
important followers in science are still unknown. This article ist devoted to 
life and work o f Lothar Gottlieb Tirala (1886-1974), who studied psychology 
and medicine in Vienna and started cooperation with Uexküll in 1914. They 
stayed in contact during the following decades, although Tirala began a career 
in race hygiene and neo-darwinistic scientific thought. He organised the 
contact between Uexküll and Houston Stewart Chamberlain and got support 
from the Wagner-family in 1933 to become professor for race biology in 
Munich. After his booting out in 1936 because o f massive faults in teaching 
Tirala changed his scientific interests and began to stretch Uexkülls 
“Reflexlehre” into healing o f blood pressure diseases in men. He became a 
favourite researcher in German natural cure community after 1945. Even 
today his studies are integrated in efforts to fight hypertonia.
In a death notice in the Wiesbadener Kurier newspaper on Feb. 23, 
1974, relatives mourned Dr.med. Dr.phil. Lothar Gottlieb Tirala, o.ö. 
Universitätsprofessor a.D., “He was a person of unusual intellectual 
gifts and tireless creative work”.1 This formulation is a masterly 
circumlocution for one of the strangest medical careers that ever 
played out on German territory. The protagonist thereby managed in 
extraordinary manner to blur almost all the tracks of his various 
activities, so that the historian’s work must resemble that of a
1 Death notice Lothar G. Tirala. Wiesbadener Kurier Feb. 23, 1974.
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detective.2 In the standard work “Rasse, Blut und Gene” (“Race, 
Blood, and Genes”), Tirala appears almost in a series with Karl Sailer 
as a “victim of occupational reprisals,” in the Third Reich (Weingart 
et al. 1988: 536). Like Sailer, the authors assert, Tirala was fired in the 
1930s; and the reason he was dismissed from his teaching tasks were 
his weak efforts to conform to the National Socialists (Weingart et al. 
1988: 541). The authors illuminate neither Tirala’s career before 1933 
nor his work after his dismissal in 1936. Paul Weindling has 
researched the first, along with the network of influential persons who 
furthered Tirala (Weindling 1989: 510). But Weindling’s information 
on the time between 1936 and 1945 is unclear, and after 1945 Tirala 
seems not to have existed at all. Weindling, as well as Weingart, 
Bayertz, and Kroll, overlooked Tirala’s unique research approach to 
homosexuality. Manfred Herzer was the first to describe this, but in 
complete isolation from Tirala’s other oeuvre and person (Herzer 
1992:116).
The following essay examines Tirala’s career, his approaches to 
research, and the long path of his career from 1908 to 1974, thus 
closing a gap in research.
Lothar Gottlieb Tirala came from a respected Austrian family of 
civil servants. His grandfather Johann Gottlieb Tirala was a member 
of the Imperial Academy of Sciences and a Professor of Chemistry in 
Graz. Johann Gottlieb’s son Theodor had made his career in law, and 
had been transferred as an Imperial Councilor to Brünn. Here, Lothar 
Gottlieb Tirala was bom on Oct. 17, 1886. Like his forefathers, he 
went to Vienna to study and completed his Dr. phil. in Psychology in 
1908 and his Dr. med. in 1913.3 His scientific teachers in this period 
were Otto Weininger’s companion4 (Tirala 1969: 119), the private 
lecturer Hermann Swoboda (Tirala 1930: 165), and the pharma­
cologist Ernst Meier. For a while he had to do with the Psycho­
analytical Society. He also felt drawn to the ideas of the biologist
For example the University Archive in Vienna has no files on Tirala in his 
capacity as university employee. The Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv (Bavarian 
Main State Archive) and the Archive o f  the University o f Munich do not have the 
files on Tirala’s appointment. Nor are any files found in the Hessian ministries on 
any measures relating to Tirala.
3 Vienna a: File Tirala.
Tirala seems not to have had any contact with Weininger. But he later proudly 
underscored that he had lived next to the room in which Weininger died.
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Jakob von Uexküll (1864—1944), whose concept of a neo-vitalist-like 
doctrine of existence (“Umweltlehre”, or “theory of environment”) 
would lastingly shape Tirala’s thinking. Among these ideas were the 
radical rejection of leading protagonists of the idea of racial hygiene 
and the glorification of “Mendelism” at the expense of Darwinism, 
which was condemned as unnatural and scientifically untenable 
(Uexküll 1912/1913: 1089). In accordance with the tenets of his 
mentor, Tirala, too, believed in a supra-individual guiding principle in 
nature that influenced people (Tirala 1969: 57). But in contrast to 
Uexküll, he was open to the idea of the neo-Darwinists. This did not 
alter the long-lasting friendship between Tirala and Uexküll, but it 
often led to long scientific debates between them, as Tirala under­
scored with great plasticity in a “fictional discussion” about Uexküll 
between himself and a colleague that Tirala wrote on the occasion of 
Uexküll’s 70th birthday (Tirala 1934d). Thus, Tirala argued to his 
antagonist that Uexküll’s actions were based on Kant, that Uexküll 
rejected Lamarckism as well as Darwinism, and that he made biology 
scientific again, in opposition to Ernst Haeckel, who, in connection 
with Darwinism, had raised it to the level of a religion (Tirala 1934d: 
274). At the same time, he argued, Uexküll’s ideas were extremely 
modem, due to their orientation toward Mendel’s laws, which had 
only recently been rediscovered. Beyond that, claimed Tirala, Uexküll 
was also able to judge and analyze the situation of living beings in 
their living worlds (Tirala 1934d: 279). In this way, he was not only 
able to support the neo-vitalistic teaching of adjustment, but also to 
surpass the Darwinists in explaining the world (Tirala 1934d: 282). In 
Tirala’s explication, the completely overwhelmed adherent of Darwi­
nism has no choice but to follow Uexküll’s argumentation. At the end 
of the discussion, Tirala points to the valuable remarks of Houston 
Stewart Chamberlain, who probably also arranged the cooperation 
between Uexküll and Tirala.5 In Bayreuth in the summer of 1914, 
Tirala encountered Siegfried Wagner, the heir and epigone of Richard 
Wagner (Tirala 1935a: i). This contact to Bayreuth would later have 
favorable consequences for Tirala’s further career. Tirala’s publica­
tions permit the deduction that, after completing his medical training, 
he worked for Uexküll as an Assistant and was permitted to ac­
5 Bayreuth Archive: Uexkiill-Chamberlain April 10, 1911; G. v. Uexküll 1964: 
97; ASZN A 1931 T Tirala-Dohm.
company him to France in 1914 on field studies (Tirala, Uexküll 1914; 
G. v. Uexküll 1964: 97). Earlier, in the academic year 1913-14, Tirala 
had worked as an Assistant at the Pharmacological Institute of the 
University of Vienna under Prof. Meier.6 In the following years, as 
well, he continued his career as a biologist, transferring to the Physio­
logical Institute of the University of Vienna as a regular member of 
the staff with the position of Assistant (Tirala 1917).
In World War I, Tirala, whose initial rank was that of a Lieutenant 
of the Reserve, was assigned to a front hospital and rose to the 
position of Senior Physician of the Reserve.7 In 1915, he married 
Auguste Victoria Wenzlitzke, who bore him two sons and three 
daughters in the course of a long marriage. Also in 1915, Tirala 
assumed the direction of the Surgical Ward at Levico Army Hospital, 
which he headed until Spring 1918.8 Then he was appointed Head 
Physician at the Army Gas School in Vienna and was permitted to 
devote himself to the ideological schooling of officers (Tirala 1934c:
355). He compiled his lectures in a small book that contained all the 
ideas of racial hygiene that would be discussed in the German­
speaking world in the 1920s (Tirala 1918). Tirala was in favor of both 
positive and negative eugenics, warned against letting “inferior 
people” breed out of control now that the nation’s most capable had 
died on the battlefields, and underscored the dangers of syphilis and 
tuberculosis (Tirala 1918: 6-18).
After the lost war, Tirala initially continued to work in or near 
Vienna, but already left university employment before the beginning 
of the 1919-20 academic year. In the period that followed, he gained 
recognition for lectures on racial hygiene at schools (Tirala 1934c:
356) and for the continuation of his zoological studies (Tirala 1923). 
He gave lectures at the University of Vienna on “Problems of the 
General Theory of Inheritance” and spoke on the topic of the “Decline 
of the West or the Ascent of the German People?”9 In mid-1920, he 
set up a practice as a general practitioner and railroad doctor in 
Wilhelmsburg, Lower Austria (Weinrich 1990: 345). There he
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1913. Übersicht der akademischen Behörden Professoren, Privatdocenten, 
Lehrer, Beamten, etc. an der k.k. Universität zu Vienna für das Studienjahr 1913- 
14, Wien: Universitätsverlag, p. 49.
7 Weinrich 1990: 345; Vienna b.
8 Berlin, Bundesarchiv W1 A 537.
9 BDC PK 12678.
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assembled a circle of adherents and advocated the sterilization of 
“inferior” people — and National Socialism, as a companion later 
recalled.10 From 1922 to 1924 he studied again to become a gyneco­
logist at the Viennese Women’s Clinic (Degener 1935: 1613). At the 
same time, he interned for a short time at the medical department of 
the German University in Prague (Hlavackova, Svobodny 1998: 212). 
He maintained contact with Houston Stewart Chamberlain and Jakob 
v. Uexküll, whom he informed about the course of Chamberlain’s 
illness.11
In 1925, he moved to his home city of Brünn, which now lay in the 
Czechoslovakian republic, and took over a local gynecology prac­
tice.12 In 1926, he completed his Habilitation in Physiology at the Ger­
man University in Prague, but was not hired to instruct.1 A year later, 
he applied for a Lectureship in Racial Hygiene at the Prague Univer­
sity, but was not accepted (Weindling 1989: 510). By returning to the 
city of his birth, Tirala also opted for Czechoslovakian citizenship. 
Uexküll occasionally visited Tirala in the latter’s new home.
In the years up to his failed application in Prague, Tirala did not 
publish anything else. But he held a lecture at the Technical College in 
Brünn on experiments with the housefly, on labor physiology, and on 
the seemingly ineluctable “decline of the civilized nations”. In 1927, 
he held a funeral eulogy for Houston Stewart Chamberlain. A year 
later, Tirala had his first appearance abroad when he gave a short 
lecture to the Medical Section of the Society of German Natural 
Scientists and Physicians at their meeting in Hamburg; another year 
later, he expanded this lecture into an essay (Tirala 1929a). He 
regarded himself as a student of Uexküll and thought about applying 
to humans Uexküll’s teachings on the nerve and tonus centers of 
animals (Tirala 1929a: 139). Tirala hypothesized that using a special 
breathing technique that eases the nerves would make it possible to 
heal all blood pressure diseases. He referred in particular to the publi­
cations that Uexküll had written in 1903 and 1907 and had
10 REM A A 106/1.
" Bayreuth Archive: Uexküll-Chamberlain Oct. 29, 1920, Uexküll-Eva Wagner 
Aug. 3, 1924.
12 Vienna a.
13 Munich b: MF 68256.
14 BDCPK 12678.
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reformulated with his companion Albrecht Bethe in 1929 (Uexküll 
1903; 1904 a-c; 1907; 1929 a-b).
Tirala was also increasingly politically active for the German 
Nationalists (until 1928) and National Socialists. His radicalism found 
expression in a series of essays in the magazine Volk und Rasse (“Folk 
and Race”). Along with special instructors for racial hygiene at 
schools for continuing education (Tirala 1931). He called for the 
establishment of state-run eugenic marriage counseling offices (Tirala 
1932) and for child rearing to be oriented toward “breeding, selection, 
reproduction, and enhancement” (Tirala 1930: 169). He also ad­
vocated a kind of tax on bachelorhood to prevent the extinction of the 
German people (Tirala 1929b: 87), whereby a few years later he him­
self denied the sense of such a punitive tax (Tirala 1932: 111). 
Nothing more is known about further contacts with National Socialist 
party leaders or persons standing close to them. But Tirala’s relations 
with important members of the Nazi party must have been substantial. 
Otherwise it is difficult to explain why the until then almost unknown 
gynecologist from Brünn should be appointed to the chair for racial 
hygiene at the University of Munich in Summer 1933. Fritz Lenz, he 
previous holder of this chair, unique in Germany until 1933, had been 
called to the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Anthropology in the field of 
human genetics and eugenics.
Tirala had neither made his mark in renowned specialized journals 
nor held lectures at a college or university. But with the support of the 
new National Socialist government, he managed to have his teaching 
position turned into a tenured professorship. 5 The appointment pro­
cedure was a farce. While the medical faculty and the founder of the 
German racial hygiene field, Alfred Ploetz, spoke against Tirala and 
Ernst Rüdin also maintained neutrality, Tirala received decisive 
support from the external “evaluators” Eva Wagner (the wife of the 
deceased Houston Stewart Chamberlain), Julius Lehmann (a pub­
lisher), and Philipp Lenard (the founder of “German physics”).16
15 Munich b: MF 68256.
Philipp Lenard (1862-1947) is regarded as the founder o f “German physics”, 
as opposed to Albert Einstein and his theory o f relativity. For his research on the 
possibility o f the ionization o f the air, Lenard received the Nobel Prize in Physics 
in 1905 and was a Professor at Heidelberg University until he was pensioned in
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Tirala’s co-applicant Ernst Rodenwaldt found no acceptance from the 
responsible Bavarian State Ministry of Education and the Arts, 
although — or perhaps precisely because — the established faculty in 
Munich had backed him (Weindling 1989: 510). At the end of 1933, 
Tirala had been appointed to the chair in Munich. His training or 
academic upbringing by Swoboda and Uexküll had made him critical 
of Rüdin’s stance on racial hygiene. Additionally, he had not even 
made a name for himself with scientific publications. Fritz Lenz com­
mented upon this development with the words: “To sum up, the 
following can be said about Mister Tirala: His publications show that 
he has not been instructed in the elementary foundations of racial 
hygiene. The information he provides is unreliable, his presentations 
unconcentrated and unclear”.1
Tirala began his career in Munich with two mistakes. First, he 
claimed that the law to prevent the birth of children with hereditary 
diseases, which was designed for the long term, would have positive 
results immediately — an affront to the protagonists of the draft law, 
Ernst Rüdin and Hans Luxenburger, who headed the “German 
Research Institute for Psychiatry” (Deutsche Forschungsanstalt fur  
Psychiatrie) in Munich (Tirala 1933). A little later, Tirala also 
denigrated the grand master of German heredity research, Eugen 
Fischer, and his main work as useless in terms of racial hygiene 
(Tirala 1934a). He slapped down Fischer’s protest (Fischer 1934) by 
pointing out his own achievements in the field of racial hygiene 
(Tirala 1934b).
This performance led to a subtly planned counter-measure on the 
part of the medical faculty, which included several professors who felt 
snubbed by the performance of the newcomer from Bohemia. For 
example, Ignaz Каир, one of the forerunners of the racial hygienic 
seminars at the University of Munich, had to relinquish his own 
courses after the Ordinariat (tenured professorship) for racial hygiene 
was set up (Böhm 1995: 249).
Increasingly, Tirala’s lectures were disturbed (Böhm 1995: 349) — 
and the Assistants of the head of the university psychiatric clinic,
Later, in the Foreword to his book Rasse, Geist und Seele, Tirala called 
Lenard his “fatherly friend”. Tirala worked on the Festschrift for the dedication of  
the “Philipp-Lenard-Instituts” at Heidelberg University. See Tirala 1936b.
17 Munich b: MF 68256.
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Oswald Bumke, whom Tirala had also snubbed, immediately reported 
this to the rector’s office.
The moment that Tirala entered the auditorium, he was received with 
listeners’ seemingly endless foot stamping, so that Tirala could not make 
him self understood for a long time. The unrest continued throughout the entire 
lecture. The lecture was very frequently interrupted by trampling, laughing, 
and catcalls. Tirala’s attempts to re-establish order were answered with 
laughter and noise [...] . Professor Tirala often speaks quietly, sometimes 
almost as if  talking to himself. Sentences are often not finished. Several times 
long-lasting lulls developed... It was often difficult for me to follow the sense 
o f what was said, even when I understood it acoustically; in part it seemed to 
me that the unusual succession o f ideas was to blame. (Bavarian Main State 
Archive: MF 68256)
Seemingly well-meaning members of the medical faculty immediately 
recommended examining Tirala for nervousness.18 Tirala suspected a 
broad intrigue against him, but his request for a disciplinary hearing 
petered out and he had to accept the presence of his antagonists’ 
Assistants as “customary”. To rid himself of them, Tirala suddenly 
had the scheduled lectures for jurists and pre-internship heredo- 
biologists dropped from the 1935 summer semester.
Even thought Tirala had to expend much energy defending him-
• • 1 9self, he came to the fore with numerous lectures in Munich. As 
Director of the Institute for Racial Hygiene, by 1935 he had autho­
rized about 70 dissertation topics that show his interest in expanding 
Kretschmer’s theory of body types beyond the differential diagnosis 
between schizophrenia and manic depression (e.g. Hermann 1934; 
Kreutzer 1934; Mayr 1935; Pichler 1935; Raff 1935; Riese 1935). 
Together with Ernst Rüdin, he also represented the Gennan Empire at 
the conference of the “International Federation of Eugenic Organi­
zations” (IFEO) in 1934 in Zurich, where he embarrassed himself with 
unqualified remarks on the topic of homosexuality (Schlaginhaufen 
1995: 182). But he asked Rüdin to provide him material about test 
persons for a study of his own on homosexuality.20 A short time later, 
Tirala invited his former academic mentor Hermann Swoboda to the 
Munich branch of the German Society for Racial Hygiene {Deutsche
18 Bavarian Main State Archive: MF 68256.
19 Munich c: MPIP-HA GDA 134.
20 Munich c: MPIP-HA GDA 134.
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Gesellschaft für Rassenhygiene), where Swoboda was permitted to 
present his theory of cycles, which Rüdin regarded as unscientific 
(“calculating in the algebraic kitchen of alchemy”, Swoboda 1917; 
Weber 1993: 208.). Tirala expressed his ideas on homosexuality in a 
lecture before the Gesellschaft deutscher Naturforscher und Ärzte 
(Society of German Naturalists and Physicians, Tirala 1935b). 
Referring to the alleged degeneration of the Hellenes, Tirala declared 
that homosexuality was caused by racial miscegenation. This “true 
homosexuality” comprised the genotype, and its carriers were active 
as seducers (Tirala 1935b). This hypothesis was included in Tirala’s 
main racial-hygiene work, “Rasse, Geist und Seele”, in which he also 
construed a connection between Asiatic races (Jewry) and homo­
sexuality (Tirala 1935a: 66/67, 80). The connection between inter­
sexuality of secondary sex traits and homosexuality, as well as the 
alleged tie between racial degeneration and homosexuality, reveals 
that Tirala took inspiration from Otto Weininger (Weininger 1904: 52, 
81). But Tirala did not go quite as far as other physicians in the Third 
Reich, who declared sexual research, homosexuality, and Jewry to be 
a single conglomerate (Rodenfels 1939; Thiele 1939; Trumit 1939, 
see also Braun 2001). Outside of medicine, the only similar opposi­
tional stance toward homosexuality and homosexuals was in the 
oeuvre of the jurist Rudolf Klare (Klare 1937: 27, 35, 45).
In 1935, Tirala’s position in Munich seemed to have stabilized. 
Along with his racial hygiene writings, he wrote the book Heilung der 
Blutdruckkrankheit durch Atemübungen (“Healing Blood Pressure 
Disease with Breathing Exercises”), in which he concretized the 
studies on breathing therapy he had been conducting since 1929 
(Tirala 1935c). In this book, he maintained that breathing therapy 
relaxed all tensed nerves in the body, thus enabling an alternative cure 
not only for high blood pressure, but also for all cardiac and circu­
latory diseases (Tirala 1935c: 66-69). This view is based primarily on 
the theory of reflexes developed by Jakob v. Uexküll, with whom 
Tirala continued to maintain contact. 1
Tirala was also a convinced opponent of the use of alcohol and 
nicotine (Tirala 1935c: 71-73).
But at this time another intrigue against him was spreading, one he 
had himself provoked. Soon after his appointment in Munich, he had
21 Tartu, Uexküll Centre: Correspondences 1934.
already complained to the Bavarian State Ministry of Education and 
the Arts about hostility that his family, which initially remained in 
Brünn, was exposed to. The Foreign Ministry thereupon assigned its 
local consul to look into the matter.22 But by the beginning of 1936, it 
turned out that, in contrast to what he had said earlier, Tirala had a 
very bad reputation as a doctor and that, on the other hand, he had not, 
after all, always been a strong supporter of the National Socialist 
cause 23 In addition, accusations, to this day unproven, were accumu­
lating that Tirala had performed abortions. Tirala himself denied all 
the charges and accused the responsible Foreign Office agents of 
intellectual corruption. To secure himself against every form of attack 
from state authorities, at the beginning of November 1935 Tirala 
applied for “Selbstreinigung” (“Self-purification”), a party trial before 
the party court of the NSDAP (National Socialist German Workers 
Party) in the Gau (“province”, in Nazi parlance) of Munich.24 Before 
this court could begin its work, events accelerated. Because of 
quarrels about alleged behavior unfitted to his profession, Tirala was 
expelled from the Nazi physicians association in early December 
1935.25 Critics had judged his new book Sport und Rasse (“Sport and 
Race”, Tirala 1936a) to be ridiculous or insignificant (Jaensch 1936; 
Schultz 1936). It also turned out that Tirala had accepted lecture fees 
without holding the corresponding lectures and that, in seminars, he 
had falsified the number of attendees.26 This was especially proble­
matic because at this time Lothar Gottlieb Tirala was not yet tenured; 
as a result, he was discharged without notice in Spring 1936. The State 
of Bavaria and the University of Munich also sued him for reimburse­
ment of about 5,000 Reichsmarks in lecture fees and advances.2'
Tirala’s dismissal was an important turning point in the Third 
Reich’s policy of filling university chairs. The offended established 
medical faculties had been victorious in the middle term over the 
outsiders supported by Party offices. Even the head of the NSDAP 
Racial Policy Office, Walther Gross, had to concede at this time that
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Foreign Ministry.
23 Munich b: MF 68256.
24 Berlin, BDCOPG 1696.
25 Munich b: MF 68256.
26 Munich b: MF 68256.
27 Ibid.
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the politicization of higher education since 1933 had failed because of 
unknowledgeable party members (Uhle 1999: 280). The further 
direction of the Institute for Racial Hygiene was entrusted to Ernst
Rüdin and Hans Luxenburger, while the rooms were acquired by the
28Institute of Hygiene.
Tirala responded to his termination immediately, filing an objec­
tion. In the time that followed, he repeatedly tried to get an appoint­
ment to a chair for racial hygiene, at the same time expanding his 
expertise to the field of alternative medicine. Thus, he declared that 
breathing therapy could cure liver damage and cardiac dilation (Tirala 
1936 c-d), as well as occupationally induced heart damage (Tirala 
1937), once again underscoring that these studies were based on 
preliminary work by Uexküll.
Until 1943, however, Tirala focused his attention on the possibility 
of being reinstated as a Professor of Racial Hygiene. In the dispute 
over the State of Bavaria’s demand for money, he claimed that the 
ministry’s staff had grossly deceived him about his tenure status and 
answered them with a counter suit).29 But the leaders of the Munich 
branch of the Nazi party also felt offended and launched against Tirala 
a campaign of vituperation that culminated in his dishonorable dis­
missal from the party.30 Winifred Wagner — one of the Bayreuth 
friends of Bavarian State Interior Minister Adolf Wagner and of the 
head of the Personnel Office of the Reich Labor Leader, Freiherr v. 
Loeffelholz — supported the former Professor of Racial Hygiene by 
filing complaints with Reich Minister Rust.31 Winifred Wagner also 
invited Tirala to Bayreuth in the summer of 1936 and personally 
introduced him — and his work — to Adolf Hitler.32 This indicates 
that the contact between Tirala and this representative of the Villa 
Wahnfried must have been close, yet no correspondence is extant in 
the Archive of the Richard Wagner Memorial Site of the City of 
Bayreuth. Nor did Brigitte Hamann write a single syllable about Tirala 
in her monumental study “Hitlers Bayreuth” (Hamann 2002). At about 
the time when Winifred Wagner brought to Hitler’s attention the fate 
of her friend, the former university professor Lothar Gottlieb Tirala,
28 Berlin, BDC W1 508.
29 Munich b, MF 68256.
30 Berlin, REM A A 106/1.
31 Ibid.
32 Berlin, REMA 106/11.
we note a suspension of Tirala’s opponents’ efforts. In March 1937, 
Tirala even went on the offensive. He won a court victory against 
Hans Luxenburger, who had to make a formal apology retracting all 
assertions that Tirala was pedagogically incompetent.33 In late 
March/early April of the same year, the Führer’s Chancellery under 
Philipp Bouhler ordered a complete audit of the proceedings against 
Tirala. But the first concrete results were not forthcoming for almost a 
year. Then the highest party court of the NSDAP resolved to rescind 
Tirala’s expulsion and declared all the accusations against him null 
and void.3 The primary reason the court gave was the points of 
accusation against “Prof. Tirala’s” activities as a physician in Brünn 
could not be investigated. So this was a dismissal of charges, rather 
than a finding of innocence. On May 4, 1938, the Gauleiter of Fran­
conia, Julius Streicher, turned to Education Minister Rust, appealing 
to his “National Socialist conscience”, and demanded Tirala’s rein-
35statement. Not long afterward, Tirala self-confidently approached 
the minister to make it clear that, after the end of the “baseless 
campaign of slander” against his person, there was no longer any 
reason not to confer the venia legendi on him again.36 At the same 
time, with the support of Julius Streicher, Tirala tried to get an 
appointment to an as yet unfounded School of Racial Hygiene in 
Nuremberg (Weindling 1989: 511). The Führer’s Chancellery appa­
rently saw in this the chance for a compromise and issued a directive 
that Tirala be paid 1,000 Reichsmarks from the support funds of the 
Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG —  German Research 
Association) until the appointment to the Munich chair was settled.37 
This subsidy was preceded by a debate within the DFG, because 
Ferdinand Sauerbruch initially spoke against such support; but he was 
outvoted after Walter Groß, Julius Streicher, and Gerhard Wagner 
intervened with Reich Education Minister Rust (Klee 2001: 179). 
Tirala had long-term plans to create an “Institute for Racial Physio­
logy” that would address the “physiology of sexuality” and pregnancy 
testing, among other things.38 In this, Tirala showed himself to be an
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34 Ibid.
35 Ibid. Streicher-Rust May 4, 1938.
36 Ibid. Tirala-Rust June 17, 1938.
37 Berlin, REMA A 106/11 Bouhler-Streicher March 28, 1939.
?s Berlin, REMA A106/II Tirala-DFG June 24. 1938.
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adherent of the writings of Arthur Dinter (“Die Sünde wider das 
Blut” — “The Sin Against the Blood”). This research intention was 
backed especially by Julius Streicher, who in March 1939 reported the 
provision of rooms to this end in Nuremberg.39 But the outbreak of 
war seems to have prevented the development of such an institute in 
the “Stadt der Reichsparteitage” (“City of the Reich Party Con­
ventions”), so that in June 1940 Tirala resumed his efforts for an 
appointment to the chair in Munich.40 These efforts at reinstatement, 
along with the possibilities given since 1938 through the occupation of 
the Sudetenland and the construction of the protectorate of “Bohemia 
and Moravia”, led in 1940 to a comprehensive police reinvestigation 
of the charges pressed against him in 1936. Several witnesses thereby 
gave testimony under oath that Tirala had accepted tremendous fees to 
carry out illegal abortions41 and that he had maintained business 
contacts with local Jews. The result of these charges was that, in 
Spring 1943, the Bavarian State Ministry of Education and the Arts 
and the Security Service of the SS declared Tirala to be unworthy of 
appointment to a chair. The Ministry also insisted on reimbursement 
of a total of 6,635.79 Reichsmarks and once and for all forbid Tirala 
to bear the title of University Professor (Ibid.). Weindling’s arguments 
thus seem unpersuasive that Tirala’s chances to be reappointed in 
Munich had improved in 1944 because Rüdin’s position was 
weakened (Weindling 1989: 511). It is indeed true that at this time 
Rüdin had long ceased to play the role he had still had in the 1930s 
(Weber 1993: 253/254, 259-261), but Tirala had already been taken 
completely out of the running for the chair in Munich. It is true that 
the plenipotentiary for the Sanitation/Health Department, Paul 
Rostock, as well as the Squadron Physician Armin of Tschermak- 
Seysenegg made some efforts on behalf of the “causa Tirala” in Fall 
1944.42 But in January 1945, the Reich Education Minister briefly 
informed the petitioners that “Reich Leader Bormann has rejected 
further support for Tirala”.43
39 Ibid. Streicher-Rust March 29, 1939.
40 Ibid. Tirala-Rust June 28, 1940.
41 Munich b: MF 68256.
4: Berlin, REM A A 106/11 Rostock-Rust Oct. 18, 1944; Tschermak-Rust Nov. 3,
1944.
43 Ibid. Rust-Rostock Jan. 8, 1945.
34
Tirala had eluded further criminal prosecution by following his 
family to Kitzbühel in secure Tyrolia at the end of 1944. Here he ran a 
small practice —  without official permission — until 1946. He 
earned additional money by publishing an extremely successful small 
book with Reclam publishing house (Tirala 1943)45.
By fleeing to the Tyrolian mountains, Tirala not only shed his 
investigators from the police and the educational bureaucracy, he also 
escaped denazification in Munich. In Austria, where denazification 
consisted merely of a short questionnaire, Tirala claimed he had been 
dismissed from state service “for political reasons” in 1936 and also 
expelled from the NSDAP, which he had been forced to join.46 When 
the Munich physicians’ association wrote to the Tyrolian Chamber of 
Physicians that Tirala had been a convinced National Socialist, he 
rebutted this with various witness testimonies to the opposite effect 
from clergymen and earlier acquaintances.47 Thus, Othmar Spann also 
confirmed Tirala’s role as an antifascist who had even hidden Spann’s 
son Adalbert from the Gestapo in 1936. Tirala and Spann may have 
known each other for a long time, since the latter had been a Professor 
at the Technical College in Tirala’s home city, Brünn, in 1909.
Tirala immediately received registration as a physician and moved 
to Graz, where he lived from 1948 to 1950. There he briefly headed 
the sanatorium Himmelhof before opening a private practice.48 
Undisturbed by the Bavarian ministerial bureaucracy, he called 
himself “Univ-Prof. fur Erbpathologie a.D. [University Prof. for 
Heredopathology, ret.], Dr.med. et Dr.phil. Tirala, Facharzt fur 
Gynäkologie [Specialist for Gynecology], Internist”. But in 1949, the 
physicians’ association in Graz denied him the right to use the last 
title. After Tirala had once again entangled himself in disputes about 
demands for payment, he moved to Vienna in Summer 1950. But the 
Chamber of Physicians there demanded a comprehensive resume from 
Tirala prior to any registration. In his list of publications, he left out 
all his essays in Volk und Rasse (“Folk and Race”) and renamed his 
main work as “Bios, Geist und Seele” (“Bios, Mind, and Soul”).49 He
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45 By the end o f the war, Tirala had sold about 30,000 copies o f this 70-page book.
46 Vienna a.
47 Ibid.
48 Vienna a, report o f the Styrian physicians’s chamber.
49 See Vienna a, Tirala’s resume.
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also listed a number of studies that had never been published50. Tirala 
was permitted to open a practice as a general practitioner, but was 
denied the right to carry the title of a specialist or the term “Univ- 
Prof’. But this did not stop Tirala from continuing to promote himself 
with these academic titles. The Chamber of Physicians responded to 
this in 1952 with criminal proceedings, and Tirala also stood once 
again under suspicion of behavior unworthy of the profession, due to 
advertising measures.51 In the same year, the press termed him a racial 
hygienist who administered lethal injections. " The matter in question 
was an apparently fateful treatment of a diabetes patient53.
At this time, the Bavarian bureaucracy had already taken up 
Tirala’s trail again, since he had complained about the confiscation of 
his property in an indignant 1950 letter to the University of Munich.54 
The new — and apparently completely clueless —  university manage­
ment displayed willingness to give him his skull collection, his X- 
rays, his microscope, a manuscript (“Der Erbgang des Genius” — 
“The Heredity of Genius”), and autographs from Richard and Wini­
fred Wagner, but first sent an inquiry to the Bavarian State Ministry of 
Education and the Arts. The Ministry immediately remembered its 
claims for monies owed and demanded that Tirala transfer 663.58 DM 
(in place of 6,635.79 RM)55. In various letters to Austrian addresses 
(the Vienna Chamber of Physicians, Vienna University), the Ministry 
and the University underscored that Tirala was not entitled to bear the 
title of Professor. 6
Overtaken by his own past, in February 1952 Lothar Gottlieb 
Tirala left Vienna for Wiesbaden in a hurry. Here he was entrusted to 
head a sanatorium operated by the married couple Wilke at Bierstädter 
Straße 1. This workplace seems to have left him enough time to en­
gage in research again. At the 59th Congress of the “Deutsche Gesell-
50 Die Erbgrundlage und Entstehung der Homosexualität, Munich 1935. Konsti­
tutionspathologie und Zwillingsforschung, 1947 “in press”. Zur Theorie der 
Heilatmung, 1947 “in press”. Grundlagen und Erfolge einer neuen Diabetesbe­
handlung, 1949, (manuscript).
51 Vienna a.
52 Ibid.
53 This may be the reason why the book Tirala planned in 1949, “Grundlagen 
und Erfolge einer neuen Diabetesbehandlung”, never appeared.
54 Munich a.
55 The currency reform pegged the exchange rate at 1:10.
56 Munich a.
schaft für innere Medizin” (German Society of Internal Medicine), in 
the presence of other prominent researchers (including Thure von 
Uexküll), he explained the significance of breathing therapy (Tirala 
1953). He emphasized the importance of “dextrose therapy” (Tirala 
1954: 105) and “oxygen treatment”, which were highly thought of in 
the 1950s (Tirala 1956/1957). As supportive measures for the 
breathing therapy he continued to propound, he discovered the use of 
leeches, hormones, and novocaine shots (Tirala 1954: 89, 130, 131). 
He also engaged in cancer research (Tirala 1954/1955).
But Tirala continued to use the title of Professor, which repeatedly 
led mistrustful contemporaries to make inquiries to the University of 
Munich.57 His adverse experiences with state agencies — in particular 
in relation to his activity under National Socialism — did not stop 
Tirala from demanding in 1957 that the Hessian State Interior Mi­
nistry ]эау him compensation for damages suffered during the Nazi 
period. 8 Thereupon, the Vienna Chamber of Physicians, the Bavarian 
State Ministry of Education and the Arts, and the University of 
Munich sent file material on Tirala’s activity to Hesse, with the result 
that the original files went missing in the mills of the Hessian 
bureaucracy, but Tirala still did not receive any compensation. In 
1958, he also lost his position as senior physician when Franziska 
Wilke closed the sanatorium after her husband’s death.59 Tirala there­
upon opened his own practice in internal medicine. In 1960, he briefly 
cooperated with the pharmaceutical company Cesra (Tirala 1960).
He continued to work as a propagandist for breathing therapy. In 
the early 1960s, he had already sold more than 100,000 copies of his 
book Heilatmung bei Blutdruck-, Herz- und Kreislaufkrankheiten 
(“Breathing Therapy in Blood Pressure, Cardiac, and Circulatory 
Diseases”). As an author, he called himself “Dr.med.et.phil. Lothar 
Gottlieb Tirala, o.ö. Univ-Professor a.D”. Also in the early 1960s, he 
“discovered” the pemiciousness of rock music as a trigger of hyper­
tonia (Tirala 1961). But he claimed he noticed a positive side effect of 
breathing therapy in the curing of eye diseases (Tirala 1966). In 1967, 
Tirala founded a private “breathing school” in his medical practice in 
Wiesbaden.60 In the same year, he found a forum for his research in
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60 Wiesbaden, business file card Tirala.
the Weltunion fiir  prophylaktische Medizin und Sozialhygiene (“World 
Union for Prophylactic Medicine and Social Hygiene”), located in 
Vienna since the early 1950s. Here, in the second half of the 1960s, he 
presented not only new ideas to expand breathing therapy, but also his 
revisionist hypotheses on the Nazi period. He summarized the latter in 
1969 in his last book (Tirala 1969), Massenpsychosen in der Wissen­
schaft (“Mass Psychoses in Science”), which was published by the 
Grabert-Verlag and declared an auxiliary issue of the rightwing- 
conservative Deutschen Hochschullehrer-Zeitung (“German College 
Instructor Newspaper”). Along with Einstein’s theory of relativity and 
Freud’s psychoanalysis (“psychological placebo”), Tirala also rejected 
Darwin’s teaching and the Nazi doctrine of racial hygiene (Tirala 
1969: 12-13, 93). Instead, he asserted, biology as pursued by Jakob 
von Uexküll was suited to explore the origins and effects of the human 
race (Tirala 1969: 8). The succession of this neo-vitalistically 
anchored theory, he said, included the studies by Hermann Swoboda, 
whose theory of cycles had scientifically demonstrated the inheritance 
of character traits (Tirala 1969: 112-113). Finally, he once again 
wrote on the inheritance of homosexuality (Tirala 1969: 114) which 
he sought to explain with Richard Goldschmidt’s chromosome theory, 
which had been refuted by 1956 at the latest (Goldschmidt 1916; 
Bleuler, Wiedemann 1956). Tirala may have seen his last book as 
revenge, fixed in writing, against his opponents, who had long since 
been branded as forerunners of National Socialism. Unlike many 
contemporaneous colleagues, he did not thereafter write any memoirs, 
but continued to run his medical practice and the attached “breathing 
school” in Wiesbaden. But his 1933-1936 interlude in Munich was 
mentioned in the recollections of former antagonists:
The dilettantism was terrible —  we had a racial hygienist who had not even 
mastered the fundamentals o f genetics, but who “healed” diseases, from brain 
tumors through dental granuloma to flat feet, by means o f breathing exercises 
[...]. (Bumke 1952: 144)
After his death on Feb. 20, 1974, his oldest son Siegfried (bom in 
1917) did not continue the “breathing school”. But this did not lead to 
Tirala’s disappearance from the parascientific discussion. His 
supposed victim’s role in the Third Reich benefited him again. First, 
his bestseller Heilatmung bei Blutdruck-, Herz- und Kreisl­
auferkrankungen was republished in 1997 under the title Heilatmung:
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Gesundheit ohne Medikamente (“Breathing Therapy: Health without 
Medications”, see Tirala 1997) and second, his breathing therapy 
teachings experienced further development in the digital age. 
Although Tirala himself had rejected confronting a weakened orga­
nism with modem musical sounds as dangerous (Tirala 1961), at the 
beginning of the new millennium, the Israeli dance teacher and thera­
pist Benjamin Gavisch propounded the combination of meditation 
music and breathing therapy.61 Melodies, said Gavisch, stimulated the 
body directly and improved breathing technique. Gavisch thereby 
referred directly to Tirala’s earlier works. Tirala’s work had unfortu­
nately been forgotten, lamented Gavisch, who, with his CD player and 
breathing therapy, is pushing onto the pharmaceutical industry’s ca. 
26-billion-dollar hypertonia treatment market. After preliminary 
clinical tests in Europe, in 2001 the U.S. Federal Drug Administration 
granted permission for this product resulting from racial physiological 
ideas to be sold on the U.S. market (ibid.). Since the product is already 
found on German-language homepages,62 it cannot be ruled out that, 
via the detour through the U.S.A., Tirala will manage a brilliant 
comeback in the German-speaking world. That would pave the way 
for his rise to the Olympus of (para-)science and his final laundering 
of all suspicion of National Socialist contacts.
But at the same time, his importance in the history of biological 
schools of thought in Germany between 1900 and 1945 would remain 
unconsidered. For the close, decades-long contact between the neo- 
vitalist-like Jakob von Uexküll and the mostly neo-Darwinistically 
oriented Lothar Gottlieb Tirala raises doubts whether the strict 
separation or even enmity between mechanists/Darwinists and neo- 
vitalists, as presumed until now in the history of science, ever existed 
in reality. Might there also have been other personal and ideological 
intersections? And what effects did the exchange of ideas have on the 
development of both research directions? These are questions that 
could shatter our image of the history of the natural sciences in 20th- 
century Central Europe. Tirala is not thereby the key to the gates of 
wisdom, but he may be a previously unperceived glimmer pointing in 
the right direction.
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61 Musik hören gegen zu hohen Blutdruck. Handelsblatt 22. 08. 2002.
62 See for example www.musikmagieundmedizin.com/aktuell (as o f Summer 
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Раса и дыхательная терапия: 
жизнь Лотара Готтлиба Тиралы (1866-1974)
В историографии жизни, трудов и взглядов Якоба фон Юксюолла за 
последние годы многое прибавилось, но в то же время биографии 
его последователей почти неисследованы. Лотар Готтлиб Тирала, 
чья жизнь и деятельность рассматривается в статье, учился психоло­
гии и медицине в Вене и начал научную деятельность в сотрудни­
честве с Юкскюллом в 1914 году. Их связь продолжалась и в после­
дующие десятилетия, хотя научная карьера Тиралы пошла вверх в 
области расовой гигиены и неодарвинистской науки. Он установил 
контакт между Юкскюллом и X. С. Чемберленом. После увольнения
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с места профессора по расовой биологии из университета Мюнхена в
1936 году он поменял свою научную ориентацию и начал применять 
“учение о рефлексах” Юкскюлла в лечении гипертонии.
T õugja hingamisteraapia: 
Lothar Gottlieb Tirala (1886-1974) elukäik
Jakob von Uexkülli elu, töö ja vaadete historiograafiale on viimastel 
aastatel palju lisandunud, kuid samal ajal on ta teaduslike järgijate elud 
peaaegu uurimata. Lothar Gottlieb Tirala (1886-1974), kelle elu ja tööd 
artikkel vaatleb, õppis psühholoogiat ja arstiteadust Viinis ning alustas 
koostööd Uexkülliga 1914. a. Nende side jätkus ka järgnevail kümnen­
deil, kuigi Tirala kaijäär oli seotud rassihügieeni ning neodarwinliku 
teadusega. Tema korraldatud oli kontakt H. S. Chamberlaini ja Uexkülli 
vahel. Pärast vallandamist rassibioloogia professori kohalt Müncheni 
Ülikoolist 1936. aastal vahetas Tirala oma huviala ning asus rakendama 
Uexkülli “refleksiõpetust” vererõhuhaiguste ravis.
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Abstract. The first part of this essay outlines Cassirer’s philosophy of biology 
in the context of philosophy of science in the 20th century, giving an overview 
of Cassirer’s different writings on the philosophy of biology. The second part 
outlines his treatment of what he took to be the chief philosophical problem in 
the philosophy of biology: the conflict between mechanism and vitalism. 
Cassirer interpreted this conflict as a methodological debate, not a meta­
physical problem. In Cassirer’s eyes, each point o f view is justified within 
specifics limits. The third part explicates Cassirer’s critique of Darwinism. 
Although Cassirer was critical of particular conceptions of Darwinian 
evolution, he did not reject evolution and, in fact, asserted that the concept of 
emergence was also of far-reaching importance in other fields besides 
biology. Part four offers concluding remarks about the importance of the 
philosophy of biology for Cassirer’s general philosophical orientation and for 
his conception of the tasks of philosophical theory.
1. Background
Ernst Cassirer’s Philosophy o f Symbolic Forms is one of the largest 
twentieth-century works of philosophy —  three volumes and over a 
thousand pages — but despite its size it was unfinished. Cassirer inten­
ded to publish a further, concluding volume. He actually completed part 
of the book: a first chapter dealing with the problem of life and a 
second, more sizeable, one entitled “The Problem of the Symbol as the 
Basic Problem of Philosophical Anthropology”. In these texts, which he 
dated “April 1928”, Cassirer gives great prominence to Jakob von 
Uexküll’s theoretical biology. Two years before — in 1926 — Uexküll
278 John Michael Krois
became the director of the Institute for Umweltforschung in Hamburg, 
and Cassirer became a frequent visitor to the institute and Uexküll’s 
friend. Cassirer’s 1928 text was published in 1995, in the first volume of 
the German Nachlass edition (ECN 1: 1-109), and soon thereafter in an 
English translation (Cassirer 1996: 3-111). Previously, Cassirer’s debt 
to Uexküll was primarily known through his 1944 book An Essay on 
Man. The other source was Cassirer’s treatment of biology in the fourth 
volume of his The Problem of Knowledge. That work was written in 
Sweden in 1940 but first appeared in an English translation in 1957. The 
text from 1928 was Cassirer’s earliest treatment of Uexküll, but it is by 
no means the only example of a previously unpublished application of 
Uexküll’s thought. The second volume of the Nachlass edition, a book 
Cassirer finished in 1937 called Ziele und Wege der Wirklichkeitser­
kenntnis (ECN 2), includes frequent references to Uexküll. More is still 
to appear. The following unpublished texts deal importantly with 
Uexküll: a lecture course {Probleme der Kulturphilosophie) from the 
Winter semester of 1939 in Göteborg, a manuscript entitled Zur 
‘Objektivität der Ausdrucksfunktion’, a year long lecture course in 
Göteborg 1939—40 on philosophische Anthropologie, and 1941 book 
manuscript in English entitled “Philosophical Anthropology” (not to be 
confused with the more popular An Essay on Man). Uexküll plays an 
important role in all these texts, which will be published in volumes 5 
and 6 of the Cassirer Nachlass edition.
A briefer text that will also appear in the Nachlass edition (ECN 
17) is historically significant. In March 1929 Cassirer gave a lecture at 
Davos entitled “The Basic Problems of Philosophical Anthropology”.1 
In this lecture Cassirer linked concepts from Uexküll’s thought and 
similar notions in Heidegger’s Being and Time. Heidegger attended 
this lecture of Cassirer’s in Davos. That October, Heidegger explicitly 
took up Uexküll’s conceptions in his lecture course at Freiburg 
(Heidegger 1983), focussing upon the distinction between the 
‘worldlessness’ of things, the ‘world poverty’ of animals, and the fact
1 After the title, Cassirer wrote in round brackets “(from the standpoint of 
Martin Heidegger’s existential analysis)”. This manuscript, “Grundprobleme der 
philosophischen Anthropologie (unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Existenzanalyse 
Martin Heideggers) ”, will be included in Emst Cassirer, Nachgelassene 
Manuskripte und Texte (henceforth cited as: ECN), vol. 17.
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that humans are able to fashion worlds.2 As far as I have been able to 
determine, it was Cassirer who introduced Heidegger to Uexküll.
By the time all of these texts relating to Uexküll are available it 
will be clear that Cassirer’s late work was deeply indebted to Jakob 
von Uexküll and it will be obvious that Cassirer was himself a pioneer 
in biosemiotics.3 In his text on the “Objectivity of the expresssive 
function” of symbolism and his philosophical anthropology Cassirer 
treats semiotic processes in biological and not just in cultural terms.
Here, I am not going to enter into these new, and as yet 
unpublished writings, rather my focus will be more general: Cassirer’s 
placement of biology in philosophy.
Cassirer is best-known as an interpreter of modem physics, but he 
also developed a theoretical interpretation of biology. Biology was of 
great significance for his philosophy of symbolic forms4 and espe­
cially for its explication as a philosophical anthropology. Cassirer’s 
teachers at Marburg — Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp — 
interpreted Kantianism as a philosophy of natural science and espe­
cially of mathematical physics.5 Cohen and Natorp were not alone in 
attributing to physics favored status as a science, indeed, this was 
typical among philosophers throughout most of the twentieth century. 
In the 1920s and 30s, the philosophers in the “Vienna Circle of 
Logical Positivism” (centered around Moritz Schlick, Otto Neurath, 
and Rudolf Carnap) and the “Berlin Group” (led by Hans Reichen­
bach), all treated physics as the prototype of genuine scientific know­
ledge. This elevation of physics went together with their conception of 
the “unity of science” expressed in the doctrine of “physicalism”. 
Physicalism is the doctrine that all descriptions are “subjective” unless 
they are expressed in physicalistic language. Hence, in order to be 
scientific, psychological, sociological, and biological terminology all 
needed ultimately to be rephased in the language of physics. The
See Heidegger, 1983: 263: “ 1. der Stein (das Materielle) ist weltlos; 2. das 
Tier ist weltarm; 3. der Mensch ist weltbildend”.
Biosemiotics has been defined as “the study of signs, of communication, and 
of information in living organisms” (Oxford Dictionary of Biochemistry and 
Molecular Biology 1997: 72; cf. Hoffmeyer 1998.
References to the philosophy — and not just the book of that name —  are 
pven in lower case spelling.
Cohen (Cohen 1918: 94) contended that Kant’s transcendental method arose 
from his reflection on Newton’s Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica.
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“unity of science” in the philosophy of science meant: unity based 
upon the supremacy of physics.
Cassirer knew the Vienna circle philosophers and Reichenbach 
personally, and he followed their work, often with approval — except 
for their physicalism. For Cassirer, the unity of science could neither 
be interpreted to mean the supremacy of one science above all the 
others nor the natural sciences over the cultural sciences (by which he 
meant both the social sciences and the humanities) or vice versa. The 
unity of the sciences is functional, not substantial as phyicalism 
proposed.6 As Cassirer explained in the preface and introduction to the 
first volume of his Philosophy o f Symbolic Forms (Cassirer 1953), 
different ways of having a world can be understood as distinct 
symbolic forms, which have a functional, rather than a substantial 
unity. Cassirer’s criticisms of physicalistic philosophy of science 
enabled him to give biology far greater importance than it was granted 
in the Vienna or Berlin schools. Cassirer’s well-known books on the 
theory of relativity (Cassirer 1953a) and on the problem of causality in 
quantum physics (Cassirer 1956) are his most extended writings on 
the philosophy of science. This is not surprising considering the 
philosophical problems raised in these fields in the early part of the 
twentieth century for traditional conceptions of space, time, and 
causality, or for such particular notions as that of a material point. 
Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to assume that Cassirer’s lesser- 
known writings on the philosophy of biology only were of marginal 
importance for him.
Cassirer began his academic career in 1892 as a student of German 
literature, but he switched to philosophy after four years of study due 
to disappointment with the anti-theoretical and biographical ap­
proaches prevalent then in German studies. Cassirer’s earliest theore­
tical orientation stemmed from this first stage of his academic career. 
As a student of German literature, long before he read Kant or took up 
philosophy, Cassirer was already an avid admirer of Goethe. His 
admiration, which bordered on fascination, continued his life long; 
indeed, he once remarked that he had read in Goethe’s works almost
Many of Cassirer’s writings on these subjects were never published. Some 
with be appearing soon in ECN, vol. 8. For a discussion of his unpublished 
writings about the Vienna Circle and the prevalent forms of philosophy of science, 
see Krois 2000.
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daily for 50 years — from age 16 on.7 Goethe, of course, was not only 
a dramatist and poet, but a scientific thinker whose chief concern was 
the study of life.
When Cassirer switched his field of study from German to 
philosophy in the Winter semester of 1896/97 his outlook was already 
deeply influenced by his reception of Goethe’s work. Cassirer’s 
interpretation of biology needs to understood against the background 
of his work on Goethe, and this is also true of the growing importance 
he attributed to biological theory in his later years when he developed 
his philosophical anthropology.
While philosophers have always raised questions about the nature 
of humanity, “philosophical anthropology” was a distinct development 
in German philosophy in the 1920s, arising from dissatisfaction with 
purely empirical, quantitative approaches to the human sciences. 
Philosophical Anthropology sought to avoid treating human beings in 
physicalistic terms, yet some writers, such as Helmut Plessner, 
preserved an almost positivistic, purely descriptive approach, while 
Max Scheler, assumed a kind of religious perspective. Cassirer’s best- 
known work on the subject, An Essay on Man (Cassirer 1944), 
focused upon human creativity, which he traced to the use of 
symbolism, hence his definition of human beings as “animal symbo- 
licum”. Kant had introduced the study of anthropology into philo­
sophy, but for Kant the concept of reason ( Vernunft) defined mankind, 
and reason was universal. Symbolism was not reason. Mythologies 
and many other forms of communal symbolism have only local 
validity. Yet, Cassirer contended, it was symbolism which also made 
reason possible. That much of Kant remained in Cassirer’s philo­
sophical anthropology.
Kant, of course, also wrote about the problem of teleological 
judgement in biology in his Critique o f Judgement, but this side of 
Kant’s work was not what interested Cassirer’s philosophical mentors. 
Paul Natorp’s well-known book on Plato (Natorp 1903) showed that 
modem mathematical physics could be interpreted as a new form of
The depth of Goethe’s influence on Cassirer has been greatly underestimated. 
His fascination with Goethe is most evident in his Swedish lectures on Goethe, 
which are now in press as vol. 11 of ECN. A check of the membership roster of 
the Goethe Gesellschaft (published annually in the “Jahresberichten der Goethe- 
Gesellschaft” in the Goethe-Jahrbuch) lists Cassirer from 1895 (vol. 16: 22) until 
he left Germany in 1933.
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Platonism. Cassirer too saw mathematics as the bond between Galileo 
and Plato, but he did not relegate the theory of life to a minor position 
in his interpretation of science. Unlike Cohen — who is said to have 
referred to Aristotle as “the apothecary” —  Cassirer seems to have 
shown increasing interest in Aristotelianism as time went by, because 
of the latter's work on biology. An indication of Cassirer’s perspective 
can be found in a series of lectures on Greek philosophy which he 
gave at Yale in 1941 and 1942. There for the first time he gave a 
systematic interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy (120 pages).8 
Rather than focusing upon Aristotles’ metaphysics or logic, Cassirer 
saw the “centre of gravity” in Aristotle’s philosophy in his theory of 
organic growth. Cassirer wrote at the beginning of the lectures: 
“Within the limits of these lectures I cannot give you a description of 
the Aristotelian system and of all its ramifications. I only wish to fmd, 
as it were, the centre of gravity of this system. To my mind this centre 
of gravity is to be sought in the biology of Aristotle, in his theory of 
organic life”. In the next paragraph Cassirer stated: “Mathematics is 
the clue that serves us as guide in our study of Platonic philosophy; 
organic life and the laws of organic development are the clue that we 
have to follow in our study of Aristotle”.9
Cassirer’s most extensive publication on biology was the 100-page 
section on the history of biological theory in volume 4 of his The 
Problem of Knowledge.10 Goethe is clearly the central figure in this 
history. Cassirer’s primary concern was to trace the conflict between 
supporters of Mechanism and Vitalism and to show the importance of 
this debate in transforming the conception of scientific knowledge. He 
covered much the same ground in a large unpublished study written 
about the same time (between 1936 and 1940) on the Objectivität der 
Ausdrucksfunktion (objectivity of the expressive function) and in the 
recently published (ECN 1: 3-109; Cassirer 1996: 3-111) first state­
ment of his philosophical anthropology (from 1928). Cassirer also
8 This text will appear in ECN 13.
Cassirer, “Aristotle”, second paragraph (Yale Beinecke Mss 98, box 36, folder
690).
Cassirer wrote the manuscript of this book between July 9 and November 26, 
1940. See Charles W. Hendel: Preface (Cassirer 1950: ix). The original German 
text was not published until 1957. The new edition (Cassirer 2000) of this volume 
in Cassirer’s works (ECW) includes a complete bibliography of the large literature 
on biology cited in the book.
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discussed biology in various published essays as well.11 To understand 
Cassirer’s position it is best to begin with the theoretical problems to 
which he reacted.
2. The vitalist controversy
Cassirer conceived the conflict between mechanists and vitalists as a 
methodological debate, not a metaphysical problem. In Cassirer’s 
eyes, each point of view is justified within specifics limits. Cassirer 
was ready to side with a strict mechanist like Jacques Loeb when he 
explained the growth of plants towards the light by means of a system 
of “tropisms” or involuntary changes due to physical processes, just as 
he was critical of Fechner’s view that this turning of plants towards 
the light was a sign of a “höhere Sehnsucht” (“higher longing”, ECN 
2, 144). In the same way, Cassirer also rejected Driesch's return to the 
Aristotelian notion of “entelechy” and, indeed, all speculative notions 
of life, which, as Cassirer said, went “beyond anything that science 
could establish or prove” (Cassirer 1950: 196). Yet Cassirer agreed 
with the vitalists’ contention that life is a phenomenon sui generis that 
could not be subsumed under mechanism. Cassirer developed his own 
version of organicism, i.e., he believed that biology deals with wholes.
A particularly telling comment of Cassirer’s about biology can be 
found in an essay where one would hardly expect it: his posthumously 
published lecture “Structuralism in Modem Linguistics”. Cassirer 
argued there that biology and modem linguistics both employ 
comparable methodological conceptions, for neither can be modeled 
upon mechanistic conceptions. Rather, the principles of knowledge in 
biology are akin to those of linguistics in that both are “structural”. 
That is, each deals with systems in which the relationships between 
the elements produce a complex whole, and both study structural 
changes morphologically, rather than causally. Cassirer found his 
view best illustrated in L. v. Bertalanffy’s Theoretische Biologie, 
about which he said: “It puts in place of the idea of purpose the 
concept of organization and characterizes life by ascribing to it the
11 Cassirer also dealt with these issues in unpublished manuscripts such as the 
text of his Yale Seminar on Symbolism and the Philosophy of Language from 
1941-1942, the fourth chapter was which is devoted to “The biological aspect”. 
This material is closely related to Cassirer 1944.
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property of a system” (Cassirer 1950: 216). In addition to Bertalanffy, 
Cassirer cites Haldane’s conception of holism and Uexküll’s theore­
tical biology as illustrations of this conception of biology, which he 
traces back to Goethe.
While Goethe is the chief figure in Cassirer’s historical treatment 
and conception of biology, he does not regard his work without con­
siderable reservations. Cassirer did not agree with Goethe’s rejection 
of mathematics nor his denigration of interventional experiments, or 
his preference of imaginative vision over historical, phylogenetic 
study. Goethe relied upon observation alone, yet his observations led 
him to discoveries of fundamental importance, in particular they 
convinced him of the untenability of the supposed immutability of 
botanical classifications. To Goethe, Linne’s strict divisions according 
to the number of stamen and pistils in a plant and the assumption of 
fixity in the botanical world misrepresented nature. Cassirer notes that 
in the 19th century, Goethe was given the highest praise possible: he 
was called a “Darwinian before Darwin” (Cassirer 1950: 137). 
However, Cassirer is anxious to point out that Goethe was a morpho­
logist, not an evolutionist.
Goethe’s notion of ‘morphology’ — a word he invented — derived 
from his empirical observation of the fact that the same plants grew 
differently in different environments. Goethe no longer regarded 
botanical form as fixed; he discovered the variability and changing 
nature of species. But he did not, like Darwin, concern himself with 
their genealogy. As Cassirer put it, “Goethe’s concept of ‘genesis’ is 
dynamic, not historical” (Cassirer 1950: 149). Instead of facing the 
empirical question of the descent of species, Goethe gave an ideal 
outline of the process of transformation. To Cassirer’s mind this was a 
virtue, not a fault, because Goethe did not confound the concept of 
structure with that of mechanical causation. Goethe’s Morphology 
offered a way to conceive of changing biological forms without 
reference to mechanistic views or returning to teleological conceptions 
of nature.
Cassirer cites approvingly Bertallanfy’s criticism that Darwin 
made improper use of the notions of “survival” and “adaptation” by 
treating them as purposive conceptions. Goethe’s conception of the 
organism regarded species as changing, temporal identities without 
resorting to any kind of teleology. As Cassirer put it, Goethe no longer 
thought in terms of “spatial forms” (Raumgestalten) but rather in
“temporal forms” (Zeitgestalten) (Cassirer 1950: 147). On Cassirer’s 
view, the notion of a biological species was a whole with temporal 
limits. The unity of a species was the history of its development. 
Cassirer argued that while the idea of purpose had no place in modem 
science, this could not be said of the notion of a “whole”. (He argued 
that the concept of an organized whole is needed in other sciences as 
well, including field physics and Gestalt psychology (see Cassirer 
1945; cf. Cassirer 1950: 212). Cassirer wrote in the Problem o f  
Knowledge: “In contrast to the idea of purpose, the concept of 
organization characterizes life by ascribing to it the property of a 
system” (Cassirer 1950: 216). This view undercuts the battle between 
mechanists and vitalists, for it offers no barrier to physicochemical 
explanations yet maintains that not all biological phenomena can be so 
explained, namely, the structures of living things as wholes. Anatomy, 
or rather comparative anatomy, therefore assumed fundamental 
importance for zoology on Cassirer’s view, just as it was the empirical 
basis for Darwinianism as well.
According to Cassirer, biology became an autonomous field of 
study with the publication in 1543 of Vesalius’ De Humani Corporis 
Fabrica (On the Fabric of the Human Body) (see Cassirer 1943). In 
that work Vesalius created empirical descriptive anatomy, breaking 
with the ancient authority of Galen and explanatory theories taken 
from ancient physics (such as the four elements) or astrological 
“correspondences”. This emphasis on the importance of anatonomy 
for biology also explains why Cassirer took such an intense interest in 
the theoretical biology of Jakob von Uexküll, for, as Cassirer once 
wrote: “Uexküll was above all an anatomist” (Cassirer 1950: 199; cf. 
ECN 1 40^43 and Cassirer 1996: 43-45).
Jakob von Uexküll (1864-1944) was Cassirer’s colleague and 
friend in Hamburg in the 1920s. Cassirer was drawn to Uexküll 
because the latter's view of anatomy resurrected Goethe’s program of 
morphology (Cassirer 1950: 200). Goethe’s approach to biology, 
Cassirer thought, was the source of Uexküll’s definition of the study 
of life. Cassirer was so taken with Uexküll’s definition of biololgy he 
quoted it twice in full in his study of the history of biology in The 
Problem of Knowledge (Cassirer 1950: 129, 199). Uexküll said: “The 
science of living beings is a purely natural science and has but one 
goal: investigation of the structure of organisms, their origin, and their 
functioning” (Cassirer 1950: 199; cf. Uexküll 1930: 9). In an un­
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published text Cassirer stated explicitly that Uexküll was the biologist 
who avoided both extremes in the controversy between Mechanists 
and Vitalists: “The real middle way in biology is taken here by 
Uexküll, who is a methodical Vitalist, without being a metaphysical 
Vitalist”.12
Uexküll’s own contribution to biology derived, however, from his 
expansion of the viewpoint of descriptive anatomy to include a 
conception of an organism’s environment (Umwelt). These aspects 
come together in his concept of the structure of an organism, which he 
called its “Bauplan” or structural form.13
Cassirer emphasized repeatedly the importance of Uexküll’s view 
of the “Bauplan”.14 The following passage is from his 1928 text on 
“Das Symbolproblem als Grundproblem der philosophischen Anthro­
pologie”, but a similar assessment is found sixteen years later in An 
Essay on Man (Cassirer 1944: 23ff).
Cassirer wrote in 1928:15
This organization [Bauplan] creates the environment of living organisms so 
that this is in no case a constant but rather different for every creature since it 
varies with their organizations [Bauplan]. Just as environmental factors are
12 “Die richtige Mitte in der Biologie hält hier Uexküll, der methodischer Vitalist 
ist, ohne metaphysischer] Vitalist zu sein” (Cassirer, Objektivität der 
Ausdrucksfunktion, section VII., in Beinecke Mss. 98, Box 52, Folder 1043). This 
text will appear in ECN 5.
13 See Uexküll 1930: 73-75: “Die Baupläne”. Cf. Uexküll 1921: 5: “Über der 
Innenwelt und der Umwelt steht der Bauplan, alles beherrschend. Die Erforschung 
des Bauplanes kann ... allein die gesunde und gesicherte Grundlage der Biologie 
abgeben”. (Over and above the inner world and the surrounding world stands the 
bauplan, governing everything. An examination of the bauplan provides the only 
healthy and secure basis for biology.)
14 See e.g. Cassirer 2000a: 23-27, where “Bauplan” is translated as “blueprint”. 
“Der Bauplan schafft selbsttätig die Umwelt eines Lebewesens, sodaß diese
keineswegs als konstant, sondern als für jedes Wesen verschieden, als mit dem 
Bauplan variabel anzusetzen ist. Und ebenso objektiv[,] wie es die Faktoren der 
Umwelt sind, müssen die von ihnen hervorgerufenen Wirkungen im Nerven­
system autgefasst werden. Auch sie sind nirgends anders als von der körperlichen 
Struktur her bestimmbar, und sie sind von vornherein durch diese gesichtet und 
geregelt. Die Gesamtheit dieser Wirkungen nun ist dasjenige, was wir als die 
Innenwelt” eines Lebewesens bezeichnen, sodaß —  wie Uexküll betont — auch 
die Feststellung dieser Innenwelt “die unverfälschte Frucht objektiver Forschung” 
bildet, die “nicht durch psychologische Spekulationen getrübt werden” soll” (ECN 
1:41).
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objective, so too we must take as objective the effects called forth by it [the 
Bauplan] in the nervous system. These effects too can only be determined by 
reference to the body’s structure, and from the outset they must be seen as 
regulated through it. Now the totality o f these effects is what we designate as 
the ‘inner world’ of a living creature, so that —  as Uexküll emphasizes — 
even establishing the existence of this inner world is ‘the unspoiled fruit of 
objective research’, which ‘should not be clouded by psychological 
speculation’. (Cassirer 1996: 42f)
The Bauplan embraces not only the brain and nervous system, as well 
as the skeleton but the total anatomy of the organism. The primacy of 
the Bauplan brought with it Uexkiill’s characteristic approach to the 
distinct “worlds” of animals. According to the anatomical structure 
(Bauplan) of the animal, with its particular receptor and effecter 
systems (Merknetze and Wirknetze), the animal lives and moves in 
specific functional circles (Funktionskreise): circles of nutrition, 
defense, and reproduction. As Uexküll colorfully puts it: “In the world 
of a fly, we find only fly things, in the world of a sea urchin only sea 
urchin things” (Cassirer 1944: 23). Cassirer concludes: “The expe­
riences — and therefore the realities — of two different organisms are 
incommensurable with one another” (Cassirer 1944: 23).
This kind of pluralism was for Cassirer a modem version of 
Goethe’s conception of the uniqueness of each biological form 
(Cassirer 1950: 204). Each has its own center within itself, which 
cannot be measured by any kind of external purposiveness.
3. Cassirer’s critique of Darwinism
Cassirer did not reject evolution, but he criticized Darwin’s inter­
pretation of it. In his text on “Darwinism as a Dogma and as a 
Principle of Knowledge” (Cassirer 1950: 160-175) he offered a 
balanced critique of both dogmatic adherence and dogmatic oppo­
sition to Darwin’s ideas. Cassirer’s own criticism was quite specific. 
Darwinism has been variously extrapolated to social theory. Darwin 
cannot be blamed for the interpretations which have been placed upon 
his notion of “the fittest,” but much of Cassirer’s general disincli­
nation towards the theory of evolution relates to the socio-political 
interpretation of Darwinism, although it does not derive from this 
alone. When Cassirer wrote his study of biology in Swedish exile in
288 John Michael Krois
1940, the notion of a master race was having its political heyday, and 
it is noteworthy that Cassirer took pains to show a further point of 
agreement between Uexküll’s biology and another basic aspect of 
Goethean morphology: namely, the elimination from biology of the 
ranking of species.
For Goethe, the biosphere is not ordered such that the various 
kinds of animals exist for each other, or form a series which finds its 
end — in either the sense of a terminus or a purpose — in any species, 
including mankind (Cassirer 1950: 203). Cassirer emphasized that for 
Goethe “it would be impossible to select any single race, human or 
otherwise, from the totality of life and set it up as the goal, the 
measure, the canon” (Cassirer 1950: 204). Cassirer cites the following 
passage from Goethe’s comparative anatomy to illustrate this: “An 
individual cannot serve as a standard for the whole, and so we must 
not seek the model for all in any one. Classes, orders, species, and 
individuals are related as cases are to a law; they are included under it, 
but do not constitute it” (Cassirer 1950: 144). The “law” in question is 
the principle of morphology.
Goethean morphology abandons both “the invariability of the 
species” and the view that any species of life is superior to any 
another. This conception is fundamentally pluralistic, and on this point 
in particular, Cassirer says: “Uexküll’s biology conformed in every 
particular with this view of Goethe” (Cassirer 1950: 205). The social 
and political undercurrent in this line of argument is unmistakable, but 
it would be wrong to conclude that Cassirer was attracted to such a 
theoretical position for political reasons. Rather, Cassirer’s entire 
approach to science and culture was conceived from the outset in 
reference to his criticisms of traditional logic, with its hierarchy of 
classes based upon the concept of substantial forms or essences. 
Beginning with his first systematic work, Substance and Function in 
1910, Cassirer denied any scientific value to traditional logic. The 
subsumption of things under higher classes is typical of language, but 
the resulting classifications are just that: linguistic classifications. This 
capacity to make binary divisions led early biology into the realm of 
mere names which Cassirer says even became “a veritable mania for 
classification” in Linnaeus (Cassirer 1950: 127). In Substance and 
Function he showed how in numerous sciences the logic of relations 
and functional thinking had replaced traditional logic. Later, in The 
Philosophy o f Symbolic Forms, he argued for contextualisation against
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panlogism and developed a pluralistic conception in which different 
symbolic forms were regarded as autonomous ways o f having a world. 
It is no wonder that he found Uexkiill’s notion of irreducibly different 
surrounding worlds (Umwelten) congenial.
Cassirer approved of Goethe’s abandonment of the invariability of 
species, but he still had to address the problem of how to explain their 
origin. Cassirer’s most explicit statements on this question are found 
in his study “The Problem of Form and the Problem of Causality” in 
his late (1942) book Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften (The Logic o f  
the Cultural Sciences). This study explicates a fundamental concep­
tion in Cassirer’s general philosophy of science: the indispensability 
of discontinuity for development. Cassirer distinguishes the concepts 
of form and causality radically, and suggests that the emergence of 
new structures demands abandoning the ancient notion of natura non 
facit saltus, for, he contends, Nature does make jumps. He quotes 
approvingly from Hugo de Vries’ characterization of mutations 
(Cassirer 2000a: 102), where he claims that the origin of a species 
“constitutes a break which sharply and completely distinguishes the 
new form as a species from which it came. The new species comes 
into being immediately; it arises from the earlier one without 
detectable preparation and without transition”. Cassirer says that such 
a “metabasis eis alio genos” is found again and again in both natural 
and cultural developments. This notion of going over into a new genus 
or category is recurrent throughout all of Cassirer’s writings, not only 
in his philosophy of biology.
Cassirer claims that empirical research and philosophy are here on 
the same footing: they can exhibit the emergence of new forms but 
they cannot give any causal explanation of them.16 Here he sees him­
self as following Goethe, whose notion of the Urphänomen, Cassirer 
explains, entails admitting that such developments are “irreducible 
facts” (Cassirer 2000a: 99). Yet these are processes, and processes 
emerge from other processes. Cassirer affirmed a concept of
6 Cassirer claims that the shift from language as a vent for expressing feelings 
to language as a tool for attaining practical ends and to language as a means for 
asserting propositions is always a jump, never a gradual change. Cf. Box 52, 
folder 1041: “Aber weder der Empfindungslaut, noch der Wirk- und Werklaut 
(Noire) kann die dritte Stufe der Sprache, die rein symbolische Darstellung 
erfassen und erklären. Hier bedarf es immer eines “Sprunges”, einer “Mutation”, 
nicht Evolution.”
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emergence which demanded more theoretical explication than he ever 
provided.17
4. Concluding remarks
Cassirer’s interpretation of biology was not an isolated part of his 
philosophy, rather it can be found incorporated into and further 
developed within his philosophical anthropology. An illustration of 
this can be seen in his reception of the work of the neurologist Kurt 
Goldstein. Goldstein was most noted for his work on aphasia, which 
concentrated upon the effects of brain damage on the use of language. 
Goldstein did not think that neurology should focus upon the activity 
of the brain or neural paths independently of the rest of the organism. 
For example, he did not think that language abilities were localized in 
a fixed place in the brain but could be transferred. Rather than viewing 
the symptoms of aphasia as negative signs of a loss, Goldstein 
regarded them positively as the attempts of the organism to find a new 
way to preserve a function. In Goldstein’s book, The Organism, 
(Goldstein 1995, first published in German in 1934) he regarded the 
organism and its environment in terms comparable with Uexküll. 
Cassirer visited Goldstein’s clinic in Frankfurt to observe the behavior 
and speech of patients suffering from aphasia.18 These observations 
provided the background for the chapter on the pathology of the 
symbolic function in the third volume of The Philosophy o f Symbolic 
Forms, one of the most important texts for Cassirer’s philosophical 
anthropology. Cassirer conceived of this chapter as a kind of negative 
proof of his theory of symbolism: “the process of the world’s 
’symbolization’ discloses its value and meaning where it no longer 
operates free and unhindered, but must struggle and make its way 
against obstacles” (Cassirer 1957: 277). These words, echoing 
Goldstein’s model of the organism, show that Cassirer’s philosophical 
anthropology is closely linked to his theoretical interest in biology. 
Cassirer’s An Essay on Man did not appear until 1944 but the ideas in
290 John Michael Krois
For a recent study of Goethe dealing with the close affiliation of his 
conception of science and process philosophy, see Stephenson 1995.
On Cassirer’s contacts with Goldstein in Frankfurt, see Cassirer 1957: 210, n7 
and 217, nl9. Cf. esp. Cassirer 1999.
Ernst Cassirer ’s philosophy o f  biology 291
that book derived ultimately from his contacts with Goldstein and 
Uexküll in the 1920’s.
Cassirer upheld what we might best be called a medical model of 
biology, for he regarded life in terms of concrete, particular, even 
individual forms. The organism in its environment could only be 
understood in terms of this particular unique whole taken as an 
individual case. While chemistry may supply the answers to questions 
linking botanical and zoological processes with the physical world, 
this in no way eliminates the validity of a medical “case” model for 
the study of life processes. Anatomy, on Cassirer’s view, becomes the 
focal point for zoology because the interaction of the organism with 
its environment is an ultimate phenomenon for biology.
The individual has a similar central place in Cassirer’s philo­
sophical anthropology. Cassirer defined humanity by reference to the 
use of symbols, reinterpreting the traditional notion of animal 
rationale as animal symbolicum. He conceived his view as a supple­
ment to Uexküll’s theory of the animal’s Bauplan. Human beings 
have a symbolic world that cannot be compared with animals’ 
reactions to signs (Uexküll’s Merknetz). Humans develop “symbolic 
worlds” which acquire an objective status of their own. While 
language can be used to give oral signals, there is a difference of kind 
between such behavior and the use of written, propositional language, 
just as there is between the use of stick as a tool and the creation of a 
technology, i.e., a system of instruments. With the development of 
such systems, individual actions and documents can have long-lasting 
and wide-ranging effects over generations. Cassirer contended that 
there can be no transition between an animal’s Merknetz of signals and 
such “symbolic systems”,19 but only a metabasis eis alio genus — a 
jump to a new species.
But even Cassirer’s philosophical follower, Susanne Langer, did 
not want to leave the jump from the animal to the human unbridged. 
In her late work (Langer 1967; 1972; 1982) she sought to understand 
this shift by investigating the nature of feelings. Empirical researchers 
have not been satisfied with this purely descriptive outlook either. The 
“symbolic species” (Deacon 1997) has a history, which can be 
reconstructed, and research on the co-evolution of symbolism and the
19 Cassirer 1944: 24. Cassirer also refers there to symbolism as a medium 
(Cassirer 1944: 25) and to different symbolic forms as media.
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brain may show that Cassirer’s biosemiotic perspective is better as a 
program for research than as a “final interpretation” of the question of 
the “nature of man” than Cassirer seemed to think.
On the other hand, Cassirer’s attempt to show the limits of causal 
explanation is clearly valid in the area of symbolic systems. Popper 
rejected the possibility that so-called “laws of history” could predict 
historical developments, for they would also have to predict the course 
of future scientific knowledge. Cassirer proposed a comparable view 
in his essay on the “Naturalistic and Humanistic Philosophies of 
Culture” (Cassirer 1961), which he first gave as a lecture in Vienna in
1937 at the Kulturbund. History, Cassirer argued, is dependent upon 
symbolic meanings, but we cannot predict the way the different 
symbolic forms of culture will develop. Unlike Popper, however, 
Cassirer did not adopt evolution, even in a reinterpreted form, as a 
model for the theory of knowledge, even though Cassirer recognized 
that symbolisms were the means to problem solving. Cassirer’s view 
of evolution, if he would have accepted that name for it, would have 
been more like Peirce’s, who distinguished between evolution due to 
some causal principle and cases requiring the assumption of absolute 
chance (tychism), i.e., of developments “without detectable prepara­
tion and without transition”.
Cassirer granted teleological conceptions a place in social and 
psychological theory, but not in biology. For all his interest in anthro­
pology, Cassirer was critical of anthropomorphism. On this point he 
liked to quote Goethe, who said, “Nature and Art are too great to be 
directed to ends”.
Cassirer erected a high wall between causal explanation and the 
concept of structure in his theoretical interpretation of biology so as to 
avoid teleological assumptions about natural processes. This wall was 
permeable in the last analysis because the notion of morphology
20 See ECN 11, Goethes geistige Leistung, Erste Vorlesung. The passage reads: 
“Natur und Kunst sind zu groß, um auf Zwecke auszugehen”. Cassirer’s source is 
Goethe (1830: 223): “es ist ein gränzenloses Verdienst unsres alten Kant um die 
Welt, und ich darf auch sagen um mich, daß er, in seiner Kritik der Urtheilskraft, 
Kunst und Natur kräftig nebeneinander stellt und beiden das Recht zugesteht: aus 
großen Principien zwecklos zu handeln. So hatte mich Spinoza früher schon in 
dem Haß gegen die absurden Endursachen gegläubiget. Natur und Kunst sind zu 
groß, um auf Zwecke auszugehen, und haben's auch nicht nöthig, denn Bezüge 
gibt es überall und Bezüge sind das Leben.”
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permitted Cassirer to conceive the rise of new forms by non-mecha­
nical explanations, relying ultimately upon the notion of chance. The 
recent dissemination of self-organization theories seems to indicate 
that Cassirer was perhaps on the right track. In any case, his theore­
tical interpretation of biology was not just of incidental importance to 
him, but an integral part of his own philosophy.
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Философия биологии Эрнста Кассирера
Первая часть статьи описывает философию биологии Эрнста Касси­
рера на фоне философии науки XX века, давая заодно обзор важней­
ших работ Кассирера о философии биологии. Вторая часть посвя­
щена проблеме, которая, по мнению Кассирера, является главным 
философским вопросом биологии, — конфликту механицизма и 
витализма. Кассирер показал, что в этом конфликте мы имеем дело с 
методологическим спором, а не с метафизической проблемой. Обе 
точки зрения — как механицизм так и витализм — по мнению 
Кассирера в определенной мере оправданы. В третьей части статьи 
рассматривается критика дарвинизма Кассирером. Хотя в целом 
Кассирер относился критически к дарвинисткой эволюционной кон­
цепции, он не отрицал эволюцию и считал, что понятие эмергенции 
имеет значение и за пределами биологии. В заключении показы­
вается значение философии биологии в философской ориентации 
Кассирера в целом и в его взгляде на задачи теории философии.
Bioloogia filosoofia Ernst Cassireril
Artikli esimene osa kirjeldab Emst Cassireri bioloogiafilosoofiat 20. 
sajandi teadusfilosoofia taustal, andes ühtlasi ülevaate Cassireri erine­
vatest kirjutistest bioloogia filosoofia kohta. Artikli teises osas vaadel­
dakse probleemi, mis on Cassireri vaate kohaselt bioloogia peamine filo­
soofiline küsimus — mehhanitsismi ja vitalismi konflikti. Cassirer näitas, 
et selle konflikti puhul on tegu metodoloogilise vaidluse, mitte metafüü­
silise probleemiga. Mõlemad seisukohad — nii mehhanitsistlik kui 
vitalistlik — on Cassireri meelest oma teatavais piirides õigustatud. 
Kolmandas osas käsitletakse Cassireri darwinismikriitikat. Olles kriitiline 
Darwini evolutsioonikontseptsiooni suhtes, ei eita Cassirer evolutsiooni, 
ning nägi emergentsuse mõistel bioloogiast kaugemale ulatuvat tähtsust. 
Neljandas osas tehakse kokkuvõte bioloogia filosoofia tähtsusest Cassireri 
filosoofililisele orientatsioonile tervikuna ja tema vaatele filosoofiateooria 
ülesannetest.
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Mimesis and Metaphor: 
The biosemiotic generation of meaning 
in Cassirer and Uexküll
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Abstract. In this paper I pursue the influences of Jakob von Uexkiill’s 
biosemiotics on the anthropology of Emst Cassirer. I propose that Cassirer in 
his Philosophy o f  the Symbolic Forms has written a cultural semiotics which 
in certain core ideas is grounded on biosemiotic presuppositions, some 
explicit (as the “emotive basic ground” of experience), some more implicit. I 
try to trace the connecting lines to a biosemiotic approach with the goal of 
formulating a comprehensive semiotic anthropology which understands man 
as embodied being and culture as a phenomenon of general semioses.
1. Introduction
Together with Jakob von Uexküll there was another important semio- 
tician teaching in Hamburg in the twenties and thirties of the past 
century: Emst Cassirer. Like Uexküll’s, Emst Cassirer’s role as a 
major contributor to semiotics has only recently been understood in all 
its breadth. Cassirer’s work has been influential in the theory of art 
and aesthetics (Langer 1953; 1979; 1967-1983; Goodman 1997), in 
ethnology (Geertz 1997), in cultural philosophy and epistemology 
(Schwemmer 1997) and other areas.
Uexküll had argued that organisms perceive their worlds as signs; 
their realities are constructed from meanings. Cassirer, however, had 
proposed that humans perceive their worlds through symbols — there 
is no experience possible outside the various symbolic forms, as there 
are myth, religion, art, science. I want to analyze some of the philo- 
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sophical relationships between Uexküll and Cassirer. Both thinkers 
knew each other and also repeatedly met in academic circles. Some 
statements of great mutual respect have been recorded (Heusden 
2002). But there is first of all a marked influence which Uexküll’s 
thinking left on Cassirer’s late works, particularly in the Essay on Man 
(1944).
I will concentrate on one topic in the relationship between the two 
thinkers which can be considered important for both of them: the 
connection between a cultural semiotics, which is Cassirer’s Philo­
sophy o f Symbolic Forms, and a biosemiotic theory. The major 
problem for such a synthesis, which lies at the core of the two- 
cultures-problem, is to show how culture emerges from or anchors in 
the body. Cassirer’s reception of Uexküll can be said to be an attempt 
to solve this, to overcome the arbitrariness of an approach to man 
which is limited only to cultural phenomena. Cassirer takes even a 
kind of protobiosemiotic position when he explains how symbols are 
generated from human experience. Cassirer is not very explicit about 
this process, apart from in certain core passages of his Philosophy of 
Symbolic Forms. It is particularly these arguments which need bio­
semiotic analysis. To provide this is the aim of the present paper.
Cassirer’s main interest was not biological meaning generation. He 
adopts biological findings because he needs what he thinks of as a 
“vitalist” scheme of the living to justify his cultural semiotics 
(Heusden 2002; Cassirer 1944). Cassirer had to legitimize the fact that 
he took culture to be the defining character of man. “Vitalism” hence 
is the prerequisite to Cassirer’s culturalism, because the former is an 
emergentist paradigm: if the living system can be described as 
emerging from matter arranged in a particular way, it could mean that 
the symbolic universe emerges from a specifically fitted animal, 
Homo sapiens.
But even here Cassirer’s understanding of Uexküll, though deci­
sive for a new framing of his cultural philosophy, does not fathom out 
the real depth of semiotic possibilities which a biological explanation 
of meaning can provide. Paradoxically, Cassirer has become relatively 
famous because the references to body and organism are so scarce in 
his work. He seemed to have written an anticipation of contemporary 
semiotics, the symbolic forms being somewhat similar to the much 
more recent argument that everything is “discourse”.
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But, as certain crucial passages in his works show, the body —  
or the basic emotive ground of experience, as Cassirer expresses him­
self — plays a major, though hidden, role in the making of the 
symbol. Cassirer tries to anchor his philosophy in the world of the 
living, even if he is not very explicit about it. It is for this reason that 
his philosophy is important today, at a time when the poststructuralist 
semiotic approach showing major methodological difficulties (Falck 
1994; Latour 1995).
To strengthen this hypothesis we have to look for a deep relation 
between the concept of symbolic forms and a biosemiotic viewpoint. 
Here I will concentrate on Cassirer’s idea of the process of how 
symbols are produced. This has always been the most critical and 
enigmatic part of the Philosophy o f Symbolic Forms. But at the same 
time it is the key to it — and here Uexküll’s work does enter.
2. Kant’s bold heirs
The most striking similarity in Cassirer and Uexküll is their determi­
nation to continue the “critical business” of Immanuel Kant. It is 
interesting that this has also been the aim of the semiotician Charles 
Sanders Peirce — to complete what Kant had left open. To go over 
Kant’s constructionism apparently leads to semiotics.
Cassirer and Uexküll start their projects on different levels of 
Kant’s heritage. Uexküll tries to further analyze the biological func­
tions as the source of the Kantian “conditions of possibility” of any 
perception. What is transcendental for Kant, for Uexküll is provided 
by the biological building plan of an organism. Uexküll thus creates a 
biological constructivism avant la lettre. Consequently, there is no 
longer a rational subject which maps its categories on an outside 
world. Any perceptional categories are related to the anatomy of the 
respective organism. They are the embodied process of cognition. 
Uexküll’s new rationality is one of the building plan —  hence a 
rationality which can not leave the body.
Cassirer, however, argues that Kant’s faculties of human reason 
have to be completed by the symbolic forms of culture. Thus, similar 
to Uexküll, he introduces a stance of uncertainty, of contingency into 
the Kantian clarity. Culture is not purely rational, but, as we know, it 
is always entangled with situations; it is manifold, dense, even “dirty”.
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In thus writing forth Kant, Cassirer already uses Uexküll’s develop­
ment of Kant’s philosophy. In his anthropological summa, the Essay 
on Man, Cassirer introduces a “symbolic network”, enlarging Uex- 
küll’s effector and receptor cycle, whereas Uexküll had also placed 
culture inside the biological functional circle. Cassirer opens the circle 
to encompass the symbolic faculty of man as a part of his biological 
layout — indeed, as a feature of his building plan.
Obviously, both semiotic approaches overcome problems that in 
the Kantian framework had remained difficult. Both stress the 
relativity of knowledge —  one referring to cognition, the other to 
culture. But both approaches also contain their own gaps: for Uexküll, 
as for all constructivists, it is difficult to avoid a solipsistic stance. 
Why is any communication possible in the first place, if each 
individual is locked in its own “bubble” of perception, its own 
“Umwelt” (Uexküll 1980)? As we know, Uexküll had to introduce the 
rather cryptic “Naturplan” to explain the harmony of the living world.
Cassirer, on the other hand, has no problem with intersubjectivity. 
He can simply elucidate it as a central feature of symbolic forms. The 
semiosphere is the symbolic cosmos shared by all men. His diffi­
culties are nevertheless also related to the problem of the external 
world. What mediates the entry of certain experiences into the 
symbolic realm? Wrhy do specific symbols play a pertinent role in 
nearly all cultures — as do strong metaphors of nature, which are 
known from the most ancient cultures, but are still today commonly 
used in poetry? What Cassirer is missing in his theory of man as an 
“animal symbolicum” precisely is the animal. For this reason he is 
interested in Uexküll. And it is here where a further biosemiotic 
deepening can make Cassirer’s already acclaimed philosophy still 
more important. We only have to follow the way he himself indicated: 
as Cassirer stresses, any critique of culture ultimately must be 
grounded on a critique of perception.
To meet the problems left open by Kant, we have to go beyond 
Uexküll and Cassirer. How does fully reflexive semioticity emerge 
from the organic realm? However, the leap Cassirer takes right into 
the symbolic universe does not have to be necessary any longer. As 
we know today, life is no mystery inside matter, but rather a lawful 
outcome of some of its special arrangements, permitted by them, 
though not caused. Symbolic behavior may then be a lawful stage of 
the same emergent process in just another magnitude (Weber, Varela
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2002). To explain the way in which symbolicity arises from biological 
meaning, Cassirer himself has contributed a good part of the map. To 
understand it, let us have a look at his conception of the making of 
symbolical value.
3. Metaphor: Biosemiotic generation 
of the symbol in Cassirer
A core term in Cassirer’s philosophy is what he calls symbolische 
Prägnanz, “symbolic pregnance” (Innis 2001). It defines the process 
by which an outside factor or stimulus enters the symbolic universe of 
culture (Cassirer 1977-1982, vol. 3: 235). Symbolic pregnance is 
present in all strata of culture, but it is accessible most broadly in the 
“expressive function”, which is the basic form of symbolisation. It can 
be found in myth, religion, and art: their expressive functions are the 
fires where living symbols are forged, where sense is extracted from 
experience.
Symbolic pregnance is possible because any sensual experience 
already provides its transformation into a symbol which perfectly fits 
to express the experience. Symbolism is a corporal matter. Things are 
experienced through sensory perception. Their symbolical value is 
their value for the experiencing body. So far, Uexküll and Cassirer’s 
thinking is parallel. To understand Cassirer’s switch to culture how­
ever, we have to look at what might be called “primordial” metaphors 
or symbols: gestures that arouse the same feeling as is felt in the 
original experience which they symbolize. Hence, in a primary 
process of symbol generation, experiences are what they mean. For 
Cassirer the symbolic understanding of the world is grounded on this 
basic emotional background, “gefühlsmäßiger Urgrund” as he puts it 
(Cassirer 1977-1982, vol. 2: 118). All experiences are valued as they 
carry gloomy or serene traits that immediately characterize their 
symbolic import. Cassirer calls this process an “Urphänomen”, in 
reference to Goethe’s holist theory of symbols.
We can see here a strong similarity between Cassirer’s ideas and 
some core theses of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception: 
“‘Semiosis’ is here ‘pushed down,’ with an explicit reference to 
Cassirer, to the emergence of meaning in the perceptual field itself’ 
(Innis 2001). The world has a physiognomic appearance before any
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interpretation takes place. It is coloured by a primary accent of value 
(Cassirer 1977-1982, vol. 2: 118f).
In the way Cassirer describes the working of this primary value he 
comes very close to the biosemiotic account of how meaning arises 
from a grid of signification which the cognising organism lays out 
onto the world. As Cassirer states:
Only those sensory experiences are extracted from the fluid stream of 
perception which somehow are shown to be related to the centres of will and 
of doing, which prove to be helping or hindering the whole of the living, 
which thus prove to be important and necessary. (Cassirer 1983: 106; my 
translation, A. W.)
This quotation shows Uexküll’s influence in a much deeper way than 
Cassirer might have admitted. Cassirer speaks of sensory experiences 
and of the way they become valued as symbols. Already in his 
terminology he adopts a biosemiotic way of expression.
Most interestingly, Cassirer touches the question of value which a 
system exhibits in trying to keep alive (Weber, Varela 2002). The 
character of an experience is determined by what has been its 
embodied signification for an organism. The quality of this signifi­
cation is dependent on whether the embodied interaction is good or 
bad. For a simple organism, we could even say, any experience is an 
Urphänomen. Any experience melts down to this universal existential 
coin of lived value, and is then paid back in due amount for the 
construction of the sign — or rather for that flash of insight, coupling 
existential value, or of vital import to the gestalt of the original 
situation. Here we can clearly see, that in the first stage of the sym­
bolic process signs mean exactly what they really are for the 
organism.
To understand the process of meaning generation proposed by 
Cassirer we have to go back to the creation of meaning by the orga­
nism as such. Because of the living’s incessant need of input to keep 
up the fragile equilibrium of Autopoiesis (Maturana, Varela 1980), 
stimuli gain an existential cognitive significance. This significance is 
represented to the organism as a perspective of existential concern. 
External influences hence act as signs that have a meaning for the 
organism’s survival (for discussion see Weber 2001; 2002; 2003).
This sounds somewhat trivial, but it may mark also for man, as he 
is an embodied being, the crucial point where experiences become
metaphors, and where the metaphor still has the gestalt of the 
experience that forged it. Think for example of the symbolic power of 
darkness, which really is a frightening situation for a daylight species 
like man. Darkness marks a family of metaphors which stand for the 
uncanny, for the gloomy aspects of the soul. The “Gestaltung”, the 
form which the symbol will take, is the efficient form of experience 
which the human organism is undergoing.
In a manuscript, that has never been published, Cassirer discusses 
the symbolic worlds of certain animal species. Contrary to his state­
ments in the Essay on Man, at least some seem to be fitted with a 
symbolic system which has a physiognomic character, as the mythic 
world order of early peoples had (Cassirer 1992). This idea contradicts 
the more elaborate (and “official”) position in his Essay on man where 
he accepts a symbolic faculty solely for humans. But this finding 
stresses even more how important the relationship between 
“physiognomy”, i.e. embodied experience, and the symbol was for 
Cassirer.
Following Cassirer, we might postulate a genealogy of meaning 
generation, starting with early human cultures. Their obsession with 
the facts of nature seems to indicate a state of “physiognomic 
character”, where embodied experiences still are what they mean. As 
recent works (e.g., Morphy 1995) have shown, however, the semiotic 
universe of ancient peoples is rather complicated and at any rate not 
simpler than ours. Still (as another work would have to show), we 
might learn from this intricacy a lot more about the necessary 
interrelation between the experience of nature and its use to under­
stand human social existence (Descola 1997; Ingold 2000): ancient 
cultures do not rest in an innocent “physiognomic” condition towards 
nature, but they show with very little “cultural noise” the interrelation 
of embodiment and symbolicity. Archaic cosmological systems are not 
paradigms for the lowest stage of symbolic forms. They nonetheless 
prove Cassirers link between embodiment and symbol in showing in a 
very clear way how the body (or nature) and symbol are intertwined.
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4. Mimesis: how new meaning arises from old bodies
To understand symbolic pregnance, the body must be comprehended 
as the condition of the possibility of any expression. As such it lies at
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the base of any culture. This can be grasped more clearly if we regard 
how poetic metaphor recalls or even re-enacts primary symbols: it 
tries to arouse the same feeling by generating vital import (Langer 
1953). Metaphorical truth, therefore, is far from being literal, but it has 
to obey the laws of organic flow and rest, the laws of need, of organic 
desire. A “warm smile” sends out energy by way of meaning, not as a 
fire does.
There is one fact central to this re-enactment of vital import: what 
is expressed in the symbol has real properties that cause its uncoupling 
from the foregoing situation. The metaphor, as a living one, is partly 
unchained from its pregnance and starts its own semiotic fecundity. 
This core phenomenon may account for the independency of culture in 
reference to its embodied origin. Metaphor entrains all its cultural 
background framework, but then in its primary core as vital import 
rolls back onto the subject with existential force. Obviously, an “as i f ’ 
gesture can have the same import as the “real thing”, or even more — 
living in a family where nobody smiles can chill as much as the lack 
of heating can. The reason for this analogous effectiveness may be 
that all impressions enter the cognitive network melted down to a 
universal existential value, a kind of synaesthetic protostate (Weber
2003), where “real” and “virtual” is not differentiated, and “inside” 
and “outside” are not really clearly marked.
Here we have to introduce the concept of mimesis. This term can 
be defined as the interpretative reaction to a stimulus from the 
surrounding world, which leads to its mirroring with slight variation 
(cf. Gebauer, Wulf 2003). It is important to note that any gesture has a 
mimetic relationship to its meaning. Any gesture by living being is an 
interpretation of a sign and at the same time a new one. Meaning is 
thus an event which construes a new reality by the fact of expressing 
or enacting its signifying value. It happens on a middle ground, being 
at the same time new and known, incorporating old, but also calling 
forth new meanings. Because a symbol is always a gesture in its own 
right, it always remains at some final point an enigma too.
By this definition, most organic cognition is mimetic, because it is 
the interpretation of a sign. This inevitably leads to a cascade of 
related form in the interpretation. The signified is contained in the sign 
as an analogous form, not as an abstract code. The track is new, but at 
the same time it is the hollow form which contains the step. To come 
back to Goethe and his notion of the Urphänomen in general poiesis,
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that of art and that of the living: when Goethe is proposing that the eye 
is sun-like, “sonnenhaft”, he does not mean that the eye is designed 
for sunlight — but that in receiving light it somehow mirrors its action 
by mimetic shape. It interprets the fact that there is light by its own 
action of shining.
If we look at poetry again, we might retain a glimpse of what is the 
enigmatic differentia specifica of the animal symbolicum seen under an 
embodied-subject view. The deciding moment in the symbolic (or poetic) 
achievement, the so called “keen metaphor” (Haverkamp 1995), is that it 
does not only arouse a vital import through the synaesthetic enactement of 
feeling: it produces something entirely new, something never heard of, 
which becomes an opaque part of the world itself. Maybe this is the alter 
in the middle of the idem. What I propose as human specific difference, 
then, is not the sole fact that humans use symbols, but their increase in 
poietic power: reinforced creation.
The symbol jumps over the blind spot of cognition with a flash of 
unexpected light. It knows more than what it was borrowed for. Its 
wisdom stems from a double source, always merging body and culture: 
the symbol is filled with the embodied wisdom of primary metaphor, and 
at the same time it brings with itself the material of a whole culture, the 
unfathomed depth of the semiotic system. Following Paul Valery, the 
symbol is the thou which knows of me what I cannot see, but what, for 
exactly this reason, brings me to life in the first place.
We have to accept the independency of culture for the very reason 
that it is biologically based. A biological symbol always entrains the 
newness of the event, the continuing enactment, the absoluteness of 
interbeing which already presupposes the other in the building of self. 
From this standpoint we can come back to Cassirer and to his attempt 
to formulate the genesis of cultural symbols from an emotive base. For 
Cassirer, the relationship between body and soul —  or culture —  is 
symbolic: it is even the paradigmatic example for symbolicity. From 
here stems the permeability of body for cultural metaphor.
Biosemiotic mimesis in human terms means to be bom in a world 
of both material meanings and of a priori nonmaterial significations. 
But with every breath both become part of enactive mimesis, of the 
interpretative re-enactment of the world. The resulting topography is 
the organism’s own path: twirling lines where the silhouette of 
mountains and trees and the shaking and shivering of the moving spot 
become indistinguishable.
39
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Мимезис и метафора: 
биосемиотическое производство значения 
у Кассирера и Юкскюлла
В статье рассматривается влияние юксюолловской биосемиотики на 
антропологию Эрнста Кассирера. Утверждается, что “Философия 
символических форм” Кассирера написана как семиотика культуры, 
которая в некоторых своих основных идеях основывается на био- 
семиотических пресуппозициях, в одних случаях эксплицитно (как 
“эмоциональная основа” опыта), а в других — имплицитно. Вы­
являются черты, общие с биосемиотическим подходом, с целью 
сформулировать всеобъемлющую семиотическую антропологию, 
которая рассматривала бы человека как телесное существо и куль­
туру как феномен всеобщего семиозиса.
M imees ja metafoor: 
Biosemiootiline tähendusloome Cassireril ja Uexküllil
Vaatluse all on Jakob von Uexkülli biosemiootika mõjud Emst Cassireri 
antropoloogiale. Väidan, et Cassireri “Sümboliliste vormide filosoofia” 
on kujutatud kui kultuurisemiootika, mis oma teatud põhiliste ideede osas 
tugineb biosemiootilistele eeldustele, osalt otsesemalt (kui kogemuse 
“emotiivne alus”), osalt kaudsemalt. Püüan välja tuua ühendusjooni bio- 
semiootilise lähenemisega, eesmärgiga formuleerida semiootilist antro­
poloogiat, mis mõistaks inimest kui kehandunud olendit ja kultuuri kui 
üldsemioosilist fenomeni.
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Abstract. The emergence of novelty in the realm of the living remains, despite 
the long tradition of evolutionary biology, unwelcome, calling for explanation 
by old, established knowledge. The prevailing neodarwinian evolutionary para­
digm approaches living beings as passive outcomes of external (and extraneous, 
hence “blind”) formative forces. Many teachings opposing Darwinism also take 
the existence of eternal, immutable and external laws as a necessary prerequisite. 
Ironically enough, authors who oppose Darwinian theory, and admit that living 
beings possess a “self’, often accentuate internal, ideal and eternal harmony, 
which is incompatible with historical changes; moreover such harmony is again 
imposed by external, atemporal “laws”. I describe here a third approach em­
bodied by the names of two unrelated scholars, Stuart Kauffman (biology, 
physics) and Juri Lotman (semiotics, culturology). Their approach suggests that 
the evolution of organisms, minds, cultures — is a continuous negotiation (se­
miosis) of ‘laws’, driving to ever broader spaces of freedom and constantly 
larger autonomy of existence.
Es klingt wie eine banale Selbstverständlichkeit, 
wenn man den Satz aufstellt: Die Kaffeetasse ist 
kaffeehaft. Doch besagt der Satz mehr, als es den 
Anschein hat. Er besagt, daß die Leistung der 
Tasse darin besteht, den Kaffee zu beherbergen, 
aber darüber hinaus, daß diese Leistung zugleich 
das Motiv fü r  ihre Herstellung war.
Jakob von Uexküll (1958: 146)1
1 “It looks like a banal self-evident truth when we say that a coffee cup is of 
coffee-nature. Yet the sentence explains more than is apparent. It suggests that the 
performance of the cup is in harboring coffee; before all, however, it suggests that 
this very performance served as a motive for the making of the cup.”
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Nous verrons que certaines reveries poetiques sont 
des hypotheses de vies qui elargissent notre vie en 
nous mettant en confiance dans I ’universe. [...]
Un monde se form e dans notre reverie, un monde 
qui est notre monde. Et ce monde rive nous 
enseigne des possibilites d 'agrandissement de 
notre etre dans cet univers qui est le nötre.
Gaston Bachelard. (1960:7)2
Science is conservative: an innovation is rarely welcome. Reality does 
not change: this is the basis of its objectivity — and of scientific 
knowledge as well. Any novelty, or unexpected (unpredicted) pheno­
mena, must be explainable (or explained away) within the frames of 
extant knowledge. Thus, the idea that novelty might appear in the 
world studied by natural sciences has always been met with the 
greatest suspicion. The quest of modem (Newtonian) science has 
focused on the axiom of timeless, etemal “natural laws”. In such a 
world, there is no room for any genuine change: for contingence 
singularities, inventions, progress, creative acts, free choice etc. 
Actual history is not allowed, and the task of evolutionism is to 
merely reduce apparent changes of living forms to combinations and 
recombinations of chemical elements.
If chaotic, haphazard phenomena are observed in a world allegedly 
governed by mathematical rules, for science it simply means that the 
system is too complex (in the number of components or in the terms 
of computation) or our methods are not sensitive enough to decipher 
the order reigning in the background. The question whence the rules 
themselves came into the picture is forbidden — they are simply 
there — whether they originated as prescripts by god, or are implied 
by geometrical, mathematical and logical principles, or were a result 
of primeval events (symmetry breaking) following the Big Bang, 
which then froze forever. Hence the difficulties which great biologists 
like Hans Driesch, Theodor Eimer, Jakob von Uexküll or, in our 
times, Anderas Suchantke have had in accepting evolution. These and
2 “We shall see that some poetical daydreams represent hypotheses of our 
worldviews that enrich our lives by establishing our intimacy with the universe. 
From such daydreams will arise a world which is ours. And this dreamt-of world 
renders a possibility of uplifting our being to this universe which is ours.”
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other great German scientists tried to maintain the purity of science 
against haphazard and spontaneous events.3 Their leading axiom was 
the existence of harmony in nature, nature as a glockenspiel, they saw 
the task of a biologist as being to write down the score (already 
existing, but hidden) of the natural symphony (as perfectly as 
possible).
We should not be misled by the contemporary neodarwinian 
paradigm concerned with the quest for tricks which allow chance to be 
introduced into biological science, while remaining in the good old 
realm of eternal computable rules. Yet uneasiness and perplexity is 
being felt, leaking through statements from people trying to make a 
serious attempt to reconcile mechanistic science with blind chance (for 
a superb illustration of such a vain enterprise see Monod 1970, or 
Jacob 1970).
On the other hand, in some realms of the humanities, the existence 
of novelty and creativity is being admitted. Hermeneutics, semiotics, 
history, poetry etc. teach us how meaning can and does arise. The 
problem is that these fields indeed are “humanities”, i.e. they con­
centrate on human affairs. Attempts to broaden their realm into bio­
logy are received with suspicion or even contempt — paradoxically 
from both sides of the trench dividing the realm of human knowledge. 
Thus, a phenomenologist speaking of the lived world (Lebenswelt)
1 Here are some examples of such a bureaucratic science, which describe a 
lawful, strictly disciplined world: (1) “Alles in der Natur muß selbstverständlich 
Gesetzen folgen — kein Vernünftiger wird das bestreiten. Aber das von Darwin 
angenommene Abändern nach den verschiedensten Richtungen ist ein regellos, 
zufälliges im Vergleich zu dem gesetzmäßig nach bestimmten Richtungen vor 
sich gehenden, wie ist es thatsächlich nachweise” (Eimer 1897: xi); (2) “The ‘law 
of nature’ is the ideal I am speaking about, an ideal which is nothing less than one 
of the postulates of the possibility of science at all” (Driesch 1929: 4); (3) “Die 
verschiedenen Tiere und die Pflanzen eines bestimmten Lebensraumes gleichen 
Organen oder Zellen eines Einzelorganismus darin, daß sie innerhalb des ihnen 
übergeordneten lebendigen Ganzen bestimmte festumrissene Funktionen erfüllen 
und in diesen Aktivitäten mit anderen Mitgliedern dieses Gefüges in Verbindung 
und Austausch stehen; in seiner Gesamtheit ergibt das ein lebendiges Funktions­
und Tätigkeitsgeflecht von unerhörter Komplexität. Das alles hat sich nicht 
irgendwie zusammengefunden, sondern unterliegt formenden, dirigierenden 
Kräften übergeordneten Charakters, wie es sich etwa im Zusammenspiel von 
Feuchte und Trockenheit, Helligkeit und Dunkel, Wärme und Kühle zeigt” 
(Suchantke 1994: 68).
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feels quite indignant when a biologist suggests applying his insights 
on non-human living beings: he simply finds the idea improper.
By the same token, concepts borrowed from humanities soon 
suffer semantic degradation. Thus, in informatics, information became 
but another calculable magnitude upon such a transfer. A similar fate 
meets the very concept of meaning if somebody dares to use it. “Bio­
logical meaning” either has something to do with survival, or it points 
to the effect of a signal. Other meanings of “meaning” are forbid­
den—  at least in contemporary, orthodox biology. Attempts to 
introduce it come to, as a rule, the simplistic conclusion that meaning 
is something that has always been there or at least was produced, and 
could have been produced at any time, according to (decipherable) 
rules of “contrapunct” (Neubauer 1991; Markoš et al. 2003). This is 
the case when it comes to otherwise incomparable authors like, e.g., J. 
von Uexküll (1958) and M. Barbieri (2003). Meaning stripped off its 
hermeneutical dimensions, produced according to rules, will become 
the simple decoding of signals. This reduction to a stimulus/response 
scheme is but a pale ghost of how meaning is generally understood by 
common sense —  not to speak of hermeneutics or poetry!
What all such activities have in common with “objective” science 
is their understanding of living beings as passive pieces on the 
chessboard of nature, pushed and pulled according to rules imposed 
from outside.
Since we humans are used to conducting our affairs with effort from one goal 
to another, we believe that animals live in the same manner. That is a basic 
error, which so far has misled all research. [...] Therefore our first concern 
must be to quench the will-o’-the wisp of a goal when observing Umwelten. 
[...] [Animals] are controlled directly by a plan of Nature, which determines 
their characteristics (Merkmale). (Uexküll 1958 [1934]: 60)
Does this mean making science out of what principally cannot be 
subordinated to any strict rules?
Contemporary attempts to find a common language for both parties 
on opposite embankments of the trench are therefore nihil novi sub 
sole. What is new is that such calls for synthesis are usually led by a 
conviction that objectivist and reductionist natural science (in its 
current form) is the sole owner of correct knowledge. Such proposals 
argue in favor of the transformation o f all knowledge into a branch of 
natural sciences, within the lines of the worn out 17th century
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Enlightenment ideals (Wilson 1998). Fortunately, they are not usually 
followed by any practical action.
Meanwhile, in the backyard, a real process of a genuine “con­
silience” — mutual interpenetration with the aim of synthesis — has 
taken place. Instead of being an artificial construction of solid beams 
which should bridge the ditch in a unique and definitive way, it is 
made of a fabric of multiform tangled brambles. Soon, hopefully, it 
will cover up the ditch completely; soon it will be strong enough to 
form a natural bridge... Formally, particular fibers do not lose their 
identity in the web, but our discrimination ability is limited, and not 
all fibers, shoots and sprouts can be distinguished at the same time. 
The basic theme, emerging from the background web is competence’. 
we have gained the understanding that the living world (or maybe 
even the whole world) is taking care o f its own affairs. The rules and 
laws are not imposed from outside: they are being negotiated and 
enacted by a spontaneous, internal effort (as, after all, are any laws) 
through an internal, integrating dialogue. Competence and self- 
imposed laws (habits, rules), then, raise evolution from its marginal 
status of a Cinderella malevolently disturbing the ideal circles of our 
objective science to the basic principle ruling the universe!
Let me illustrate this rather inconspicuous process by following 
two such “fibers” selected from the fabric (in more detail see Markoš 
2002): one is the work of the Russian linguist and culturologist Juri 
Lotman, the second is the theoretical biology of the American 
biologist and mathematician Stuart Kauffman. Many parallels can be 
traced in their language and thus also in their models of the world, 
called semiosphere by the first author and biosphere by the second.
Semiosphere
In the first part of his Universe o f mind, Juri Lotman (1996 and 2001) 
criticizes the attempts to reduce natural languages (and texts) to a code 
in a way reminiscent of the models of genetic information processing 
provided by molecular biologists. Such attempts suggest parallels with 
the reduction of natural phenomena to natural laws in natural sciences: 
here as there, whatever is beyond the code is ignored. If such an 
approach is adopted in semiotics, it is assumed that the user of lan­
guage is interested only in receiving the relevant messages, by specific
40
selection from the plethora of background noise. All other aspects of
the tex t__ its multiple and variable relation to the context — is
ignored. The recipient is “hardwired” or, to express it within the 
context of this meeting, "Umwelt-bound”. A text plays the role of a 
mere carrier of transmitted messages, and the single goal of a semiotic 
process is an adequate transmission of the message. It is taken for 
granted that the meaning of the text remains invariant with regard to 
the transformations of the text itself. Upon this assumption rests most 
of the reasoning concerning the relations between text and meaning. 
The Umwelt remains constant and the codes are frozen.
According to Lotman, by accepting such a scheme, we are con­
fronted with a lot of patent paradoxes. First of all, all natural lan­
guages are very poorly equipped to fulfill such a role. Problem-free 
transmission requires that the sender and the receiver of a message 
have an identical table of codes. This can be achieved, however, only 
if the sender and the receiver are identical, and new information will 
change neither the receiver nor the context. A shared natural language 
is not a prerequisite of code identity — on the contrary, this fact 
especially hinders the achievement of sender-receiver identity! It 
follows that an identity of codes can be achieved only in special cases, 
to serve very special, narrow purposes, at the price that the language is 
no longer natural.
For a total guarantee of adequacy between the transmitted and received 
message there has to be an artificial (simplified) language and artificially 
simplified communicators: these will have a strictly limited memory capacity 
and all cultural baggage will be removed from the semiotic personality. The 
mechanisms created in this way will be able to serve only a limited amount of 
semiotic functions; the universalism inherent to natural language is in 
principle alien to it. (Lotman 2001: 13)
Thus, artificial languages model not language as such, but only one of 
its functions: the ability to transmit a message (e.g., Eco 1995; 
Hofstadter 1979). Language would be deprived of its additional — 
actually essential — functions, and after some time such functions 
would even be forgotten: language would turn into a sort of algebra 
and its function would scarcely differ from a mechanical cause-effect 
relationship. The creative function of language is the most important 
factor that would be swept aside: the text works not only as a 
transmitter of messages, but also as a generator of new ones. In this
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sense, not only understanding, but also misunderstanding is an 
important and useful means of communication (remember jokes, 
metaphors...)- It follows that neither unambiguous transmissions nor 
mathematical solutions can be characterized as new messages.
Artificial languages are but a special cause from one extreme of an 
imaginary continuum, states Lotman (in agreement with many others, 
of course). On the other pole we find languages in which the creative 
constituents are emphasized — like poetical language. In such a case, 
receiving and translating the message are creative acts. In special 
cases the codes cannot even be translated at all: Lotman provides an 
example of a canvas showing a scene from the Gospels. The image 
cannot be translated into the particular text of the Gospel, and, of 
course, it does not follow that reading the text will bring to mind this 
very scene.
From the semiotical point of view, it is important that new 
meaning can originate in the process of extracting meaning from the 
text. The language precedes the messages transmitted, and is an 
integral part of them. Great deeds in, for example, the arts, are often 
followed by boisterous applause or, on the contrary, embarrassment, 
simply due to fact that the audience does not understand the language 
of the message — in spite of the common cultural tradition. As time 
goes by, such a novelty may end up in a kind of machine meta­
language (cf. Peircean habit). Only then will information be 
communicated as codes given beforehand — but this does not mean 
that natural language has been transformed into a machine language. 
Although transmitted digital messages can be quantified objectively in 
the machine language, nothing like this is possible in a natural 
language. Well, of course, a written message can be easily digitized, 
says Lotman — but this simply means that it is always on the decision 
of the receiver o f the message whether he accepts the text received as 
a code or as a message. This double function of the text enables even 
petrified truths of religious, cultural, or scientific communities to 
escape canonical (i.e. coded) interpretation and allow the emergence 
of novelty. Such truths may breach the narrow hold of previous 
cliches and start again to circulate in broader contexts. This happens 
again and again in cultural evolution — but is biological evolution 
different in this aspect?
Since a live language never excludes a new interpretation of even 
very canonical codes (habits), it may resist the evaporation of infor-
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mation from texts with time. On the contrary — if the text is active in 
a culture, it will ceaselessly pick up new meanings. Lotman gives a 
Hamletian parable:
Nowadays Hamlet is not just a play by Shakespeare, but it is also the memory 
of all its interpretations, and what is more, it is also the memory of all those 
historical events which occurred outside the text but with which 
Shakespeare’s text can evoke associations. We may have forgotten what 
Shakespeare and his spectators knew, but we cannot forget what we have 
learned since their time. And this is what gives the text new meanings. 
(Lotman 2001: 18-19)
The part devoted to autocommunication is also of great interest. Lot­
man here upbraids semiotics for preferring communication between 
subjects (I -  thou) and neglecting the question of how novelty can 
emerge in the mind of a single subject (communication I -  I). Again 
and again he returns to examples of how a thinking subject introduces 
new levels into already established codes — generated endogenously 
or evoked by the environment. We can even make a generalization 
about a whole culture:
The laws of construction of the artistic text are very largely the laws of the 
construction of culture as a whole. Hence culture itself can be treated both as a 
sum of messages circulated by various addressers [...] From this point of view 
human culture is a vast example of autocommunication. (Lotman 2001: 33)
Culture is therefore a function of paired communication systems (I- 
thou, I—I); what will emerge is a collective personality with a 
collective memory, mind, and history. Lotman named this entangled 
web a semiosphere, a system integrated across all levels of its orga­
nization! (Compare with the Kauffmanian biosphere below.)
The importance of this statement is apparent when we compare it 
with two other outlines which allow us to grasp organization: the 
atomic and dissipative-structure models. The atomic (or reductionist) 
system aims to explain organization from a single basic level. Other 
levels (it is strange that their slavish position is labeled as “higher”) 
only reflect the behavior of elements from the basic level, according to 
pre-established and immutable “laws”. The “communication” between 
levels (if it can be called communication at all) is one-way only: the 
lower level determines phenomena on the higher one(s). But the very 
expression — “communication” denotes that which is in common —
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commune\ I. Prigogine — who developed the theory of dissipative 
structures — had upset this hierarchy when he showed that each of the 
particular domains of description has its autonomy. Communication 
between domains is bi-directional, but at the price of non-canonicity: 
the change of language between domains always brings about losses 
as well as gains (Havel 1996). Dissipative structures, however, lack 
memory and anticipation —  features that are natural for both the 
semiosphere and, as we shall see, the biosphere. These systems (and 
the real biosphere as well) behave as if they contained no domains. 
Yes, we can distinguish elements — atoms, molecules, words, and 
sentences — but these are interconnected, not only within a particular 
domain, but also across domains; moreover, the flow of information 
between the domains is reciprocal. What really takes place at the 
interface is communication, a semiotic process, not simple decoding.
It is, however, very difficult to manage —  or even imagine — such 
entangled hierarchies in the context of our culture. This is why I 
consider Lotmanian or Kauffrnanian spheres to be important. Lotman 
shows that even if we succeed in distinguishing a “basic element” in a 
cultural continuum symbol, we cannot avoid paradoxes. It can be 
demonstrated through the concept of symbol.
a. The symbol indeed belongs among the most durable elements of the 
continuum, however not in the atemporal sense typical of the “atoms” 
from basic levels of description in science. This is because:
b. The symbol is never synchronous — its memory goes deeper than 
the memory of its (non-symbolic) context. The symbol exists before 
the texts; the user literally digs it from the deepest layers of his 
culture.
c. The sensory and communicative potential of symbols is always 
broader than what comes up in a particular actualization.
d. Thanks to symbols it is possible that text and topics can be 
transferred across different layers of the culture, thus preventing 
fragmentation into different cultural layers.
Lotman compares the function of symbols in a culture to the genetic 
memory in a body. Such a comparison invites a reciprocal view from 
the side of biology. Genes — originally the presumptive “atoms” of 
heredity, have experienced during the last century a strange trans­
formation into strings of signs — codes and even texts. This prompts 
us to draw a parallel to Lotman’s points above:
aa. Genes belong to the most durable elements of the continuum 
comprised of cells, individuals, species and biosphere, 
bb. Genes are not synchronous: the user, i.e. the living being, receives 
them from the thesaurus, memory of its “culture”; by culture we shall 
mean species or genealogical lines. Individuals dwelling at the current 
endpoints of such historical chains thus govern the whole experience 
of the line, i.e. both the genes and the directions for their usage and 
interpretation.
cc. The impact of genes cannot be localized to a single concrete 
realization — most of the genes become engaged in a plethora of 
topics and their effect cannot be sharply demarcated (Dawkins 1982). 
dd. Thanks to genes, topics can percolate across different layers 
(domains). To elucidate this last point, let me give three examples:
(1) In ontogeny, whole complexes of genes become repeatedly 
activated in totally different contexts. For example, the pro­
ducts of a gene set may assist in the establishment of body 
axes in early embryogenesis, later they work in organizing the 
primordia of appendages or inner organs, and then in pat­
terning marginal features, like the structure of a feather or 
wing ornaments in butterflies.
(2) The same complexes of universal genes (i.e. symbols in our 
parable) work within a broad spectrum of species (i.e. cultu­
res). Their impact, however, is determined by the modulation 
via the “cultural” medium they find themselves in. The 
forelimb of a human, a horse, or a bird, was induced — 
evoked into life — by the same group of genes — symbols; 
yet their final appearance is species- (culture-) specific.
(3) Gene complexes can be transmitted horizontally: such a 
“transcultural” transfer is especially common in prokaryotes, 
enabling them to engage in genetic communication through­
out the whole biosphere. Dissemination of, for example., 
resistance towards antibiotics, is a good example of this 
phenomenon.
How, then, do genes-texts-symbols work? What laws determine their 
different engagement in different contexts — temporal or cultural? Or 
better, what game do they play?
Let us take seriously Lotman’s assertion that language, culture and 
texts live. All participants of communication enter the game with a 
certain background of experience and memory. Living beings are
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participating parts, active creators/builders of their own Umwelt, not 
merely thoroughly tuned into a given one! As we shall see below, 
Kauffmanian autonomous agents are in a similar situation. Neither 
biosphere nor semiosphere can originate de novo like simple dissipa­
tive structures, such as a flame or a vortex. Lotman compares 
semiosphere to a museum hall, full of visitors: inside it you can find a 
semantic overlap of dinosaur bones, teachers, clay tables with 
cuneiform script, school children, old china collection etc. A text, says 
Lotman, has an internal drive towards becoming a unique long word, 
thus opening a multidimensional space, influencing, in a feedback, the 
meanings and morphology of the language. Such transformations from 
the discrete (digital) into the multi-dimensional (analog) do not take 
place at a single interface: the same game is played again and again at 
different levels of organization — domains. Articulation of a topic by 
means of a language typical for different domains helps to disclose its 
nature. Semiosphere is indeed a generator of new knowledge (see, 
again, Kauffman below).
Let us return to the game and to its antipode —  the law. Lotman 
states that if a goal is given in advance, there is no room for liberty:
As the reserve if indeterminacy becomes exhausted, the degree of information 
drops, falling to zero at the moment when it becomes entirely redundant, i.e. 
totally predictable. [...] When we can predict the next link in the chain of 
events then it follows that there was no act of choice between equal 
alternatives. But consciousness is always a choice. So it follows that if we 
exclude choice (unpredictability which the outside observer sees as chance) 
then we exclude consciousness from the historical process. And historical 
laws are different from all others in that they cannot be understood without 
taking account of people’s conscious activity, including semiotic activity. 
(Lotman 2001: 227, 234)
In other words: if the trajectory of a thrown stone can be predicted to 
the tiniest detail, i.e. if nothing unpredictable can happen during its 
flight, there is no need to throw it. If this holds, then history would be 
superfluous; God would not play dice. He would be merely watching 
ready-made videotape — and not even that, since He would be able to 
see it all at once! But in a culture, the less expected a phenomenon is, 
the greater impact it has, and the same probably holds true in other 
areas of human activity, even in science. This is why linguistic topics 
like interpretation, translation, evolution etc. nowadays enter all 
sciences; this indicates the end of the belief in timeless laws.
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Moreover, opposites like culture —  species or evolution — history 
become blended. We cannot avoid the strange feeling that Lotman 
himself does not fully allow for such a blending: phrases like 
“historical laws are different from all others” or “people’s conscious 
activity” suggest that, in spite of all his ambitions, he still remains in 
the realm of human affairs. A more consistent attempt at such a 
blending comes from the sciences.
Order for free and the expansion into adjacent possible
Stuart Kauffman, mathematician and biologist, has experience with 
mathematical models, as well as their “incarnation”, whereby an ideal 
mathematical map becomes a mutable and living landscape, when 
eternal timeless laws give room to physis. In the preamble to his book 
Origins o f Order (1993) we read:
Simple and complex systems can exhibit powerful self-organization. [...] Yet 
no body of thought incorporates self-organization into the weave of evolu­
tionary theory. No research program has sought to determine the implications 
of adaptive processes that mold systems with their own inherent order. 
(Kauffman 1993: vii)
The last sentence could serve as the epigraph for Kauffman’s lifelong 
scientific activity. Where does order come from in nature and in living 
beings? He does not take the neodarwinian explanation rooted in 
frozen accidents sieved by natural selection and shared in genealogical 
lines. Organisms come out from such an image as passive, ad hoc 
contraptions: they represent the outcome of historical contingency, 
their ontogeny being determined by “blind” genetic programs. Evolu­
tion is opportunistic and no room is given to the spontaneous 
emergence of order. Kauffman, on the other hand, aims to prove that 
order is for free: it is here not because of natural selection, but in spite 
of it. The greater the complexity of the system, the less power 
selection has to change its properties; order emerges not through a 
random walk, but as a result of a system’s internal dynamics.
Even more advanced in this respect is another treatise by Kauff­
man (2000), Investigations, inspired, as he says, by Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations. The crucial idea is that the properties of 
a system cannot be stated in advance, by providing a list of a kind. It
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follows that deterministic laws of physics enabling the calculation of 
the behavior of a system (its configuration space) are not general, but 
special cases. They only work if we can state initial and boundary 
conditions for the system. Newtonian or Einsteinian physics thus 
cannot be applied to systems with evolution, where this condition 
cannot be fulfilled. It was demonstrated that general laws for such 
systems couldn’t be stated at all; Kauffman, however, asks whether 
they couldn’t be found at least for a special class of system —  the 
autonomous agents.
The definition of an autonomous agent at first looks quite bizarre. 
It is a system acting on its own behalf:
All free-living cells and organisms are autonomous agents. But a bacterium is 
“just” a physical system. In its Kantian form, my core question became, What 
must a physical system be such that it can act on its own behalf? The stunning 
fact is that autonomous agents do, every day, reach out and manipulate the 
universe on their own behalf. Yet that truth is nowhere in contemporary 
physics, chemistry or even biology. So, what must a physical system be to be 
an autonomous agent? (Kauffman 2000: x)
It must embody two features, says Kauffman: autoreproduction and 
the ability to perform working cycle(s). The last condition is crucial 
and distinguishes an autonomous agent from the dissipative systems 
described by Prigogine, such as a flame or a tornado. To perform work 
in a cycle means to have a contraption — a machine, which is able to 
return periodically to its initial state. Thus, cyclical processes lie in the 
heart of the acyclical, historical process o f evolution.
To perform work, the autonomous agent must be able to build a 
machine to lower the degrees of freedom available for the dissipation 
of energy. Making a machine, however, requires an investment of 
work. The agents are thus characterized by a cycle (or spiral) o f work, 
and the work extracted may be utilized to reproduce the system or to 
increase its organization (e.g. by building new machines allowing new 
kinds of work cycles). It can also be used for mapping the surrounding 
universe in an active search for resources which can be used to 
perform work. The author thus leads us towards a kind of herme­
neutical circle in nature.
This aspect will become even more accentuated when it comes to 
communities of autonomous agents — biospheres. By expanding from 
the actual state into the adjacent possible (defined as a state one time-
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interval from the actual, time interval being defined deliberately) the 
biosphere explores the field of possibilities and accomplishes, or 
chooses, one of them. The two states may differ in the number and/or 
quality of particles (creating new ones never seen before in the 
universe) and in creating new, unpredictable structures. Due to this 
uncertainty, it is not possible to predict the evolution of a biosphere, 
even in a single time interval separating the present from the adjacent 
possible.4
Biospheres are thus characterized by a ceaseless flow from the 
actual into the adjacent possible, en passant increasing their organi­
zation. The problem is, says Kauffman, that expanding organization 
does not fit into the established set of physical concepts like entropy, 
matter, information, energy etc., nor can it be derived from them. In 
spite of this, the biosphere is a physical system. We know the mole­
cular structure of living beings, the metabolic pathways, membrane 
function etc., but we have no idea what causes this assembly to be 
alive — we lack concepts for self-propagating dynamic systems. Even 
worse, our ability to generalize is somewhat limited when unique 
exemplar cases of autonomous agents and biospheres are provided by 
earthly living beings. Would it be possible to generalize about any 
possible agents and biospheres? Is it possible to formulate laws valid 
for such systems? Kauffman takes the challenge and formulates 
several variants of what he calls “The fourth thermodynamic law”. 
The most general definition is as follows:
Biospheres, as a secular trend, that is, over the long term, become as diverse
as possible, literally expanding the diversity of what can happen next. In other
words, biospheres expand their own dimensionality as rapidly, on average, as
they can. (Kauffman 2000: xi)
How, then, do the biospheres construct themselves? Autonomous 
agents are ceaselessly measuring the parameters of the surrounding 
universe (which is a co-construct of the whole biosphere), they detect 
the resources utilizable to perform work and canalize it via machines 
built for this purpose.
Compare with deterministic systems of statistical physics, which allow such 
moves both into the future and into the past. The solution is not in shortening the 
time interval between the actual state and the adjacent possible — we’d only end 
up in the realm of uncertainty principle.
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Curiously, at this very point, semiotics enters the scene. When a 
system is in a thermodynamic equilibrium, no work can be extracted 
out of it. Even the trick with Maxwell’s demon will not help, because 
the amount of work necessary to measure and store information about 
the microstates of the system equals the amount of work subsequently 
gained. Kauffman, however, notes that if the system is far from 
equilibrium, it pays off to perform such measurements. Under such a 
condition, the demon uses up only a small fraction of the energy 
available. Thus, under ordinary circumstances the problem is not that 
of the energetic balance but that of knowledge. And knowledge means 
useful, relevant knowledge — not just information of any kind! To 
look for the right kind of knowledge, sorting the useful (or at least 
promising and hopeful) type of data from the “garbage” requires the 
interpretation of the signs of the surrounding world. In other words, 
how is the demon (i.e. the autonomous agent), first of all, to know 
which particular properties of the surrounding universe to measure, to 
decide what measurements are likely to provide him with energy 
resources?
We are already amidst semiotic problems: how does Kauffman’s 
“agent” come to know how to build an appropriate machine, able to 
canalize that very type of the energy gradient? The universe offers an 
endless number of qualities that can be distinguished from the back­
ground and measured. Only some of them, however, are 
relevant — leading to the recognition of a utilizable energy source that 
can be coupled to the extraction of work by a machine. The agent is a 
demon of a world not in equilibrium. It performs natural games based 
on incessant scanning of the environment, the selection of data and 
comparison of it with the thesaurus of its (his? her?) experience and 
memory. It actively breaks symmetries, looks for and discovers new 
ways of energy canalization (and, of course, puts at stake its own 
integrity or even existence), extracts meaning, constructs the adjacent 
possible.
The heart of mystery concerns a proper understanding of “organization” and 
“propagating, diversifying organization.” [It] concerns the historical coming 
into existence since the Big Bang of connected structures of matter, energy 
and processes by which an increasing diversity of kinds of matter, sources of 
energy, and types of processes come into existence in a biosphere, or the 
universe itself. (Kauffman 2000: 93)
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Xhus — by definition— autonomous agents are endowed with 
endogenous activity, they are by no means passive substrates molded 
by external forces. The co-evolution of autonomous agents then drives 
them into the adjacent possible along a trajectory, which is non-deter- 
ministic, (but determining) i.e. selective. By doing so, they open/ 
create a larger space of possibilities. The definition of the autonomous 
agent is at the same time the very definition of life, says Kauffman. 
We — autonomous agents — are co-constructors of our universe.
But how do we perceive our “autonomous activity”? Kauffman 
provides an answer:
Story is the natural way how we autonomous agents talk about our raw getting 
on with it, mucking through, making a living. If story is not the stuff of 
science yet is about how we get on with making our ever-changing living, 
then science, not story, must change. Our making our ever-changing livings is 
part of the unfolding of the physical universe. (Kauffman 2000: 119)
Story is the most adequate, maybe the only way, of storing experience. 
Problems, situations, tasks never repeat themselves in exactly the 
same way. But problems successfully solved in the past may be of 
enormous help when one is confronted with a similar situation again. 
Not because of what is constant, invariant, equivalent, but because of 
similarities, analogy, correspondence in dealing with novelties — in 
how to mutually respond (co-respond!) to new challenges. One must 
first be “versed” in being able to con-verse, with changing rules of 
game. Such experience in versatility cannot be provided (or re­
presented) by static data. It is the ‘tune’ — the course of the change 
that makes one tuned to the changing world according to its past 
trajectory modifications — both gradual and sudden. Thinking in 
terms of stories seems to be a type of “information processing”, which 
became most effective in evolution.
The bounty of life around us represents players of winning stra­
tegies in natural games. But this is but a story, a narrative. Does it 
belong to science at all? Can this be formalized as science? Kauffman 
says yes, and gives the outlines of a general biology leading, to the 
biologization of physics, as an alternative to several centuries’ unsuc­
cessful effort to achieve the physicalization of biology.
This would undoubtedly be a great triumph if a semiotic physics 
could arise one day — it would be a great satisfaction for people like 
Peirce. Compare such a concept with the prevailing contemporary
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worldview which takes reality (the true, ultimate reality — the objec­
tive one!) to be hidden: people or living beings do not take care of 
themselves, they are pulled and pushed by invisible forces governed 
by the hidden laws of physics, genetics, economy, market, selection... 
But what if they do, as Kauffman states, take care of themselves? 
Then science rooted in Newton is doomed...
When read out of context, Kauffman, Lotman, and со. may well 
evoke an impression of bringing about something completely new. 
Within a broader cultural and historical horizon this is definitely not 
the case. Their great merit lies rather in their timely and priceless 
contribution to cultural memory: their courage and ability to bring 
back to the contemporary consciousness the half-forgotten truths and 
narratives as old as humankind. They show our generation that the 
realm of life, history, symbols and stories is as living and unbound by 
“objective laws” as ever— still binding themselves with responsi­
bility — binding together science with conscience.5
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Поиск новшества: биосфера Кауффмана и семиосфера Лотмана
Появление новшеств в сфере живого осталось, несмотря на долгую 
традицию эволюционной биологии, нежелательным явлением. Пре­
обладающая неодарвинистская парадигма рассматривает живые су­
щества как пассивный результат внешних (и чужих, следовательно, 
“слепых”) формирующихся сил. Многие учения, противопоставляю­
щие себя дарвинизму, считают также необходимой предпосылкой 
существование вечных, неизменных и внешних законов. Часто те, 
которые противопоставляют себя дарвинизму и признают, что жи­
вые существа обладают “самостью” (self), подчеркивают внутрен­
нюю, идеальную и вечную гармонию, которая несовместима с 
историческими изменениями. Поэтому подобная гармония опять-та- 
ки обусловлена внешними, вневременными “законами”. В данной 
статье описывается третья возможность, которая связывается с 
двумя отдельно стоявшими исследователями: Стюартом Кауффма­
ном как биологом и физиком и Юрием Лотманом как семиотиком и 
культурологом. Их сближение выявляет, что эволюция организмов, 
сознаний, культур — непрерывный диалог (семиозис) между “зако­
нами”, что приводит к росту свободы и автономии.
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Uudsuseotsing: Kauffmani biosfäär ja Lotmani semiosfäär
Uudsuste ilmumine elusa sfääris on jäänud, vaatamata evolutsioonilise 
bioloogia pikale traditsioonile, soovimatuks nähtuseks. Valdav neo- 
darwinlik paradigma vaatleb elusolendeid kui väliste (ja võõraste, 
järelikult “pimedate”) kujundavate jõudude passiivseid tulemeid. Paljud 
darwinismile vastanduvad õpetused peavad samuti igaveste, muutumatute 
ja väliste seaduste olemasolu vajalikuks eelduseks. Tihti need, kes 
vastandavad end Darwini teooriale ja tunnistavad, et elusolendeil on 
“ise”, rõhutavad sisemist, ideaalset ja igavest harmooniat, mis aga on 
kokkusobimatu ajalooliste muutustega; seega selline harmoonia on jällegi 
tingitud välistest, ajatutest “seadustest”. Kirjeldan käesolevas artiklis aga 
kolmandat võimalust, mis seostub kahe eraldiseisjaga — Stuart Kauff­
mani kui bioloogi ja füüsiku ning Juri Lotmani kui semiootiku ja kulturo­
loogiga. Nende lähenemine toob esile, et organismide, teadvuste, kultuu­
ride evolutsioon on pidev läbirääkimine (semioos) “seaduste” vahel, viies 
seeläbi vabaduse ja autonoomia kasvule.
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The Eternal Question: 
Biological variations on a Platonic dialogue1
Jakob von Uexküll, Thure von Uexküll1
Abstract. The reinterpretation of Nature by biology, which will prevail in 
spite of all obstacles, has brought our thinking closer to antiquity, giving us 
the chance to reinvigorate our perused terminology with the help of the 
resources to be found in the thoughts of the greatest minds of mankind. The 
way to Plato thus being cleared, I perceived the idea to seek enlightenment on 
pressing biological questions from the great Sage. As means to this end, I 
chose to make Socrates continue one of his dialogues, with the adjustment of 
giving him the knowledge of our contemporary biological problems. Thus 
some kind of interaction between the Ancients and ourselves is created, to our 
considerable benefit.3
I f  death were a release from  everything, it 
would be a boon fo r  the wicked, because 
by dying they would be released not only 
from the body but also from their own 
wickedness together with the soul.
Plato, Phaedo (107c)
1 The original: Uexküll, Jakob von; Uexküll, Thure von 1943. Die ewige Frage: 
Biologische Variationen über einen platonischen Dialog. Europäische Revue 
19(März): 126-147. It was also published as a booklet: Uexküll, Jakob von; 
Uexküll, Thure von 1944. Die ewige Frage: Biologische Variationen über einen 
platonischen Dialog. Hamburg: Marion von Schröder Verlag. Translated by Edgar 
Vögel.
: Part One of this text is the work of J. von Uexküll. It is followed by a 
continuation (Part Two) authored by his son, Thure von Uexküll, based on a letter 
responding to the father. Insofar, the whole piece represents a dialogue between 
father and son on Plato’s Meno dialogue.
3 This abstract (in German) has appeared as a footnote on the p. 126 of the 
original.
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First Part
On the front of an imposing blue painted half-timbered farmhouse in 
Upper Hesse one finds an inscription, intended as a serious admo­
nition to passersby. The inscription reads: Where do you want to 
spend eternity?
This motto could as well have been inscribed on a farmhouse in 
ancient Athens. For people of all centuries were aroused by the 
question of man’s personal immortality, giving now a positive now a 
negative answer.
Thus it may not be without interest to take up the evidence, as far 
as it is of biological interest, that has been brought up for the existence 
of personal immortality, and to link the different pieces of evidence; 
this is best done by taking up the one of Plato’s dialogues that has 
until now given the most convincing argument, and by linking it with 
our biological discoveries, thus reexamining its reliability.
In order to create a vivid picture of the Platonic dialogue, we take 
ourselves on an imaginary journey back to ancient Athens, the scene 
of our drama.
The columned court of a large villa opens towards a garden 
surrounded by a marble balustrade. In the garden grows an abundance 
of laurel bushes offering shadow, with cypresses standing out here and 
there. Above the green of the garden shine the distant yellow columns 
of the Parthenon and above them in steel-like blue the blinding rays of 
the Greek sky.
In the shadow of the columns, comfortably seated on a chair, sits 
the Master, who is enthusiastically admired by the Athenian youth. 
His sophisticated complexion, with its friendly bright eyes, leaves no 
one unimpressed. His small hands with their agile fingers readily 
accompany his words.
Next to him, leaning against a column, stands the noble stature of 
his host, easily recognizable as someone refined in the art of living. 
His delicately shaped lips seem to be up to some witty remark. Not far 
from them, on the balustrade, sits a young man with beautiful noble 
features. In his hand he holds a wax tablet on which he occasionally 
carves his notes, each time the course of the conversation reaches a 
climax. Through him it is that posterity received the tidings of this 
conversation.
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Being called by his master, a servant of the household, almost still 
a boy, with frank and intelligent features, joins these men. Whereas 
the three free citizens are dressed in long white robes covering the 
whole body, the slave’s bare chest shines in a luxuriant reddish- 
brown. —
This roughly is what we shall imagine the stage set to be like, 
which is about to gain brilliance and meaning through the dialogue 
recorded by Plato.
It is easy to describe the background of this scene for one’s body’s 
eye. A wholly different task arises for us in painting the background to 
be presented to one’s mind’s eye. But it is absolutely necessary to give 
account for the intellectual background. We have to know these 
preconditions which are taken as granted by the characters of the 
dialogue in such a manner that they will not make mention of them; 
otherwise we will not be able to fully comprehend their words.
Recently Otto’s great works have introduced us to the Greeks’ 
concept of their gods and of Nature. But this concept is miles apart 
from our contemporary concept of Nature, so that we have to feel our 
way back to the Greeks’ world view step by step. —
As starting point I take a conversation which, although it has come 
down to us only in way of an anecdote, is full of insight. During the 
first years of the last century, shortly after ascending the imperial 
throne, Napoleon paid a visit to the famous astronomer Laplace and 
his newly erected observatory. The first useful telescopes made it 
possible to gain a clear image even of distant stars.
Napoleon had himself introduced by Laplace to the wonders of the 
cosmos. He felt like he was entering an enormous dome, the dimen­
sions of which his searching eyes could not measure. The cosmic 
dome rose higher and higher. This dome, created from many lights, 
did not rest, but everything in it was majestically moving. It seemed to 
the emperor as if he could hear the music of the spheres.
Laplace kept talking on and on, about rotating motions and about 
numbers, numbers and again numbers. After he had finished the 
emperor leaned back where he sat, looked at him with his piercing 
eyes and asked: “And you don’t say anything about the Spirit who 
created this wonderful world?”
“Sire, nous n ’avons pas besoin de cette Hypothese” (Sire, we don’t 
have any need for this hypothesis.”) was Laplace’s answer. The 
emperor looked at him for a long time and finally said mockingly:
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“Vous finirez par corriger la Nature.” (“You will end up improving 
Nature.)
This conversation presents to us an instance of two fundamentally 
different ways of viewing Nature. Laplace took the position of an 
uninvolved observer, standing on the outside of the starry vault — 
whereas Napoleon took his position right in the middle of Nature, 
standing on this Earth, taking part in the dancing of the constellations.
The emperor’s prophetic words should come true soon. Without 
God’s hands holding it together, the universe turned into a mere 
astronomical machinery. Instead of illuminating the dome of endless 
space erected to glorify God, the stars were assigned the new role of 
senselessly rotating around each other as part of a giant cosmic 
machine.
The cosmic machine, having come into being by accident, indeed 
turned out to be defective. There literally was a shower of cosmic 
rubble in space.
After it came to light that the existence of living organisms was at 
best possible only on a few lonely planets in an endless space, Nature 
began to lose more and more respect with the general public. As far as 
the physicists were concerned, the living things were also integrated 
into the great cosmic machine as tiny mechanisms. Their expressions 
of life, as thoughts and emotions, were reduced to chemical processes 
in the brain.
It was Loeb who went the furthest in mechanizing the cosmos by 
reducing the whole life of animals to a mere reactive turning of the 
animal bodies away from or towards all external stimuli.
But the decisive attack on Nature was led by Darwin. He declared 
her to be a blind idiotic being. Having come into existence by chance 
she could as good perish by chance; because all living creatures are 
permanently caught up in their mutual annihilation, what Darwin 
called the struggle for existence, which supposedly gives rise to 
evolution by survival of the fittest. The world was like a battlefield of 
automatic tanks, and Nature only a scene o f devastation inhabited by 
soulless freaks. —
In comparison to this, Jennings’ doctrine looks more moderate. 
After observing the behavior of individual animals, which reached a 
goal through many attempts, he traced the evolution o f species back to 
trial and error. He overlooked that he was putting Nature in the role of 
a petty-minded small shopkeeper, who after many setbacks in
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conducting his business learns to be clever through experience. But 
whereas learning by experience seems to be appropriate for individual 
creatures, it would be unworthy behavior for Nature as Creator.
Being thus, it takes no wonder why the general public was filled 
with an ever-more deepening contempt for Nature.
The campaign against the religious view of Nature celebrated one 
triumph after another. In the lower house of the French parliament, the 
Deputy Viviani proclaimed under the frenetic applause of the 
chamber: “Avec un geste magnifique, nous avons eteint tous les astres 
du cielT  (“By a magnificent gesture we have extinguished all the stars 
in the sky.”) Thus the cosmic dome, which Napoleon not long before 
had entered reverently, finally collapsed. —
But science itself is the place where the tide turns. The physical 
scientists are turning away from observing space and time from the 
outside and are entering space itself. The concept of time as flowing 
through the universe, passing at the same speed everywhere, has been 
left behind. The physicist judges the events in time from a point in 
space, and if the point in space changes, so do the relations in time. 
From a point of view A, two events, let’s say two gunshots, may occur 
simultaneously, given the observer stands halfway between the two 
gunmen. From a point of view B, closer to one of the gunmen, that 
gunman’s shot will move faster in time. This kind of consideration led 
to the introduction of time ordinates for every system of spatial 
coordinates and finally to the concept of a four-dimensional space­
time continuum.
The cosmic machine was replaced by the world formula, i.e. matter 
was replaced by an idea. The idea of Nature was lost in the process. 
From here the way back to Greece cannot be found. —
But now the understanding that we have to observe not from the 
outside, but from the inside, dawns even on biologists.
I take the example of a fly having a walk on a desk. Nowadays we 
know that the feet of flies are equipped with organs for tasting, so if 
the fly steps on some kind of food suitable for flies it immediately 
sticks it proboscis out for it. Everything that is found on the desk, 
whatever variety of things it may be, like matches, postage stamps, 
pencils or sealing wax — to the fly all these things have the same 
meaning as to us the floor we walk on. The fly is simply surrounded 
by fly things and does not know human things. The owner of the desk
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does not exist within the fly’s environment, he exists outside the range 
of its comprehension.
It is impossible for us to enter a fly’s soul in order to find out what 
it feels, but we are able to establish those things or matters that are 
important to flies, that are appropriate to them. Instead of trying to feel 
ourselves into the fly’s soul we are able to follow the fly’s life as 
observers. Thus we are able to establish those things that are regarded 
by the fly as appropriate to itself, may it be as its food, or as its 
enemy, or as an obstacle, or as a mating partner.
The biological study of insect colonies brought forth an abundance 
of discoveries. Entering an imaginary beehive, anthill or termites’ 
nest, we are not to look for human things, but for bee, ant or termite 
things, by this means opening to ourselves new wondrous worlds. 
Laying before our eyes we find great empires, the peoples of which 
are connected with each other by industrious intercourse; we are 
enabled to study their work, their building, their care for their brood 
and the laws of their government.
This actually means to view Nature from inside. Only then Nature 
reveals her true greatness. Only then we understand Nature’s con­
fidence in distributing her gifts to every of her creatures, both physical 
and spiritual gifts. It assigns, so to speak, to every living subject, be it 
an animal or a human being, its faculty of sensing (Merkfähigkeit) and 
its faculty of action ( Wirkfähigkeit). And if anyone feels compelled to 
complain because he regards the dose of intellect and reason assigned 
to him as too modest, he is free to do so; but he shall not maintain that 
Nature, who bestows all those gifts, lacks them herself. The habit of 
uselessly criticizing Nature must come to an end, it will only make 
contemporary science look stupid for all time.
Considering the above, we are getting a good step closer to the 
Greeks. Even in his wildest dreams a Greek would never have 
ventured to criticize Nature.
Nature is like a solemn symphony, all of the thousands of different 
voices interwoven into one score of music. Speaking with Bilz,4 
Nature performs for us a cosmic drama consisting of thousands of 
interwoven dramas. The dramas present a sequence of “living scenes”, 
the scripts of which are predetermined. The actors change, but the play 
is repeated again and again, generation after generation.
4 Bilz, Rudolf 1940. Pars pro toto. Leipzig: Georg Thieme.
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Later on we are going to see in what way this concept of Nature 
approaches the Greek one. First we have to state more precisely what 
separates Greek religion from the Christian church.
“I believe in one God, the Father, the Almighty, Creator of heaven 
and earth” —  this is the beginning of the Christian creed. Without 
doubt, God is seen here as standing outside of Nature. Our senses are 
able to comprehend Nature, but not God. But he is not only the 
Creator and ruler of Nature, but also of man’s destiny. Often Nature is 
nothing more to him than a means to influence man’s destiny. But 
often it is Nature herself who leads man astray from the path of God. 
Thus arises a permanent antagony between God and Nature.
This kind of thoughts was far from the Greeks’ minds. To them, 
visible Nature was the divine, without any connection to man’s 
destiny. The visible gods, as heaven, sea and earth, only provided the 
scenario on which the human dramas took place, written by destiny.
The gods are without destiny, they live in an eternal present, 
youthful and happy. But man, bound by destiny, leaves the past, 
passes through the present and enters an uncertain future. The gods, to 
whom were attributed human souls, would from time to time, 
assuming human figure, descend on earth to stand by their favorites. 
But they were always close to man. He just had to open his eyes to see 
heaven, earth, see, sun and moon, the immutable witnesses of all 
human events. —  Only one god is different from the other immortals; 
it is Dionysus, the god of human destiny, the ups and downs of which 
found their shocking expression in the mysteries of Eleusis.
The Greeks knew all that is human. The small group around 
Socrates in Meno’s columned court was in the first place, besides 
other things, concerned with the question of the past, including the 
question of death.
The conversation had started with Meno’s question: if virtue could 
be taught or not. Socrates’ questions led the conversation to take a 
surprising turn. Meno himself was not sure anymore what was meant 
by virtue. He was, in his own words, confused like he had been hit by 
a stingray. On Socrates’ request to ascertain the unknown nature of 
virtue together with him, he replied: But how will you look for 
something when you don’t in the least know what it is? How on earth 
are you going to set up something you don’t know as the object o f 
your search? To put it another way, even if  you come right up against
it, how will you know that what you have found is the thing you didn ’t 
know?5
Meno’s attack is not just aimed at Socrates, but inasmuch against 
all scientific study. To Meno, study is the same as a mere searching. 
But one always searches only for an already known object. 
Unsystematic searching and well-trained research, indissolubly linked 
to all scientific discovery and insight, get indeed mixed up quite often. 
Serious research can of course be aimed at an unknown goal, as long 
as it does not disregard the fundamental context.
Socrates regards Meno’s words as a sophistic trap which he 
uncovers at once.
S o c r a t e s :  I know what you mean. Do you realize that what 
you are bringing up is the trick argument that a man cannot try to 
discover either what he knows or what he does not know? He would 
not seek what he knows, for since he knows it there is no need o f the 
inquiry, nor what he does not know, for in that case he does not even 
know what he is to look for.
Meno, regarding Socrates’ studies as unsystematic experimenting, 
thinks the sophistic argument to be appropriate and asks: Well, do you 
think it a good argument?
No, replies Socrates, and now he develops his doctrine, which he 
adopted from those regarded as having inspiration, i.e. the human soul 
being immortal and having acquired during numerous subsequent 
forms of existence some amount of knowledge which just rests 
forgotten inside man. The purpose of all learning is to resurrect this 
knowledge, learning being nothing else than remembering knowledge 
from a former existence.
M e n o :  Can you explain how it fails?
S o c r a t e s :  I  can. I  have heard from men and women who 
understand the truths o f religion ...
M e n o :  What did they say?
S o c r a t e s :  Something true, I thought, and fine.
M e n o :  What was it, and who were they?
S o c r a t e s :  Those who tell it are priests and priestesses o f the 
sort who make it their business to account for the functions which they 
perform. Pindar speaks o f it too, and many another o f  the poets who 
are divinely inspired. What they say is this — see whether you think 
they are speaking the truth. They say that the soul o f man is immortal
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At one time it comes to an end — that which is called death — and at 
another is bom again, but is never finally exterminated. On these 
grounds a man must live his days as righteously as possible. As a poet 
has said: For those from whom Persephone receives requital for  
ancient doom, in the ninth year she restores again their souls to the 
sun above. From whom rise noble kings and the swift in strength and 
greatest in wisdom, and for the rest o f time they are called heroes and 
sanctified by men.
Sokrates continues: Thus the soul, since it is immortal and has 
been bom many times, and has seen all things both here and in the 
other world, has learned everything that is. So we need not be 
surprised if  it can recall the knowledge o f virtue or anything else 
which, as we see, it once possessed. All Nature is akin, and the soul 
has learned everything, so that when a man has recalled a single 
piece o f knowledge — learned it, in ordinary language — there is no 
reason why he should not find out all the rest, if  he keeps a stout heart 
and does not grow weary o f the search, for seeking and learning are 
in fact nothing but recollection. We ought not then to be lead astray by 
the contentious argument you quoted. It would make us lazy, and is 
music in the ears o f weaklings. The other doctrine produces energetic 
seekers after knowledge, and being convinced if  its truth, I am ready, 
with your help, to inquire into the nature o f virtue.
Meno has been closely following Socrates’ explanations. At once 
he grasped the essence. If it can be shown that our knowledge is a 
memory from a former existence, the existence of personal immorta­
lity is proven with it. That is why he replies to Socrates: I  see, 
Socrates. Can you teach me that it is so?
S o c r a t e s :  I just said that you ’re a rascal, and now you ask me 
if  I can teach you, when I say there is no such thing as teaching, only 
recollection. Evidently you want to catch me contradicting myself 
straightaway.
M e n o :  No, honestly, Socrates, I wasn ’t thinking o f that. It was 
just habit. If you can in any way make clear to me that what you say is 
true, please do.
S o c r a t e s :  It isn’t an easy thing, but I still should like to do 
what I can since you ask me. I see you have a large number of 
retainers here. Call one o f them, anyone you like, and I will use him to 
demonstrate it to you.
M e n o :  Certainly. [To a slave boy.] Come here.
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S o c r a t e s :  He is a Greek and speaks our language?
M e n o :  Indeed yes — bom and bred in the house.
S o c r a t e s :  Listen carefully then, and see whether it seems to 
you that he is learning from me or simply being reminded.
M e n o :  I  will.
S o c r a t e s :  (Socrates begins to draw figures in the sand at his 
feet. He points to the square.) Now boy, you know that a square is a 
figure like this?
B o y :  Yes.
S o c r a t e s :  It has all these four sides equal?
B o y :  Yes.
S o c r a t e s :  And these lines which go through the middle o f it 
(Fig. 1, AD-ВС) are also equal?
В
Figure 1.
B o y :  Yes.
S o c r a t e s :  Such a figure could be either larger or smaller, 
could it not?
B o y :  Yes.
S o c r a t e s :  Now if this side (AB) is two feet long, and this side 
(BD) the same, how many feet will the whole be? Put it this way. If  it 
were two feet in this direction and only one on that, must not the area 
be two feet taken once?
B o y :  Yes.
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S o c r a t e s :  But since it is two feet this way also, does it not 
become twice two feet?
B o y :  Yes.
S o c r a t e s :  And how many feet is twice two? Work it out and 
tell me.
B o y :  Four.
S o c r a t e s :  Now could one draw another figure double the size 
o f this, but similar, that is, with all sides equal like this one?
B o y :  Yes.
S o c r a t e s :  How many feet will its area be?
B o y :  Eight.
S o c r a t e s :  Now then, try to tell how long each o f its sides will 
be. The present figure has a side o f two feet. What will be the side o f 
the double-sized one?
B o y :  It will be double, Socrates, obviously.
S o c r a t e s :  You see, Meno, that I am not teaching him 
anything, only asking. Now he thinks he knows the length o f the side of 
the eight-foot square.
M e n o :  Yes.
S o c r a t e s :  But does he?
M e n o :  Certainly not.
S o c r a t e s :  He thinks it is twice the length o f the other.
M e n o :  Yes.
S o c r a t e s :  Now watch how he recollects things in order — the 
proper way to recollect. [To the boy.] You say that the side o f double 
length produces the double-sized figure? Like this I mean, not long 
this way and short that. It must be equal on all sides like the first 
figure, only twice its size, that is, eight feet. Think a moment whether 
you still expect to get it from doubling the side.
B o y :  Yes, I do.
S o c r a t e s :  Well now, shall we have a line double the length o f  
this (CD) if  we add another the same length at this end (DE)?
B o y :  Yes.
S o c r a t e s :  It is on this line then, according to you, that we 
shall make the eight-foot square, by taking four o f the same length?
B o y :  Yes.
S o c r a t e s :  Let us draw in four equal lines, using the first as a 
base. Does this not give us what you call the eight-foot figure (Fig. 2, 
GFEC)?
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B o y :  Certainly.
S o c r a t e s :  But does it contain these four squares, each equal 
to the original four fo o t one?
B o y :  Yes.
S o c r a t e s :  How big is it then? Won’t it be four times as big?
B o y  ' . Of  course.
S o c r a t e s :  And is four times the same as twice?
B o y :  O f course not.
S o c r a t e s :  So doubling the side has given us not a double but 
a fourfold figure?
B o y :  True.
S o c r a t e s :  And four times four are sixteen, are they not?
B o y :  Yes.
S o c r a t e s :  Then how big is the side o f the eight-foot figure? 
This one has given us four times the original area, hasn ’t it?
B o y :  Yes.
S o c r a t e s :  And a side (fig. 2, CD) half the length (as CE) gave 
us a square offour feet?
B o y :  Yes.
S o c r a t e s :  Good. And isn't a square o f eight feet double this 
one (ABDC) and half that (GFEC)?
B o y :  Yes.
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S o c r a t e s :  Will it not have a side greater than this one (CD) 
but less than that (СЕ)?
B o y : /  think it will.
S o c r a t e s :  Right. Always answer what you think. Now tell me. 
Was not this side two feet long, and this one four?
B o y :  It must.
S o c r a t e s :  Try to say how long you think it is.
B o y :  Three feet.
S o c r a t e s :  I f  so, shall we add half o f this bit (DK to CD) and 
make it three feet (СК)? Here are two (CD), and this is one (DK), and 
on this side similarly we have two (CA) plus one (AL), and here is the 
figure you want.
B o y :  Yes.
S o c r a t e s :  If  it is three feet this way (CK) and three that (CL), 
will the whole area (LMKC) be three times three feet?
B o y :  It looks like it.
S o c r a t e s :  And that is how many?
B o y :  Nine.
S o c r a t e s :  Whereas the square double our first square had to 
be how many?
B o y :  Eight.
S o c r a t e s :  But we haven’t yet got the square o f eight feet even 
from a three fo o t side?
B o y :  No.
S o c r a t e s :  Then what length will give it? Try to tell us exactly. 
If you don’t want to count it up, just show us on the diagram.
B o y :  I t’s no use, Socrates, I just don’t know.
S o c r a t e s :  Observe, Meno, the stage he has reached on the 
path o f recollection. At the beginning he did not know the side o f the 
square o f eight feet. Nor indeed does he know it now, but then he 
thought he knew it and answered boldly, as was appropriate — he felt 
no perplexity. Now however he does feel perplexed. Not only does he 
not know the answer; he doesn 't even think he knows.
M e n o :  Quite true.
S o c r a t e s :  Isn ’t he in a better position now in relation to what 
he didn ’t know?
M e n o :  I admit that too.
S o c r a t e s :  So in perplexing him and numbing him like the 
stingray, have we done him any harm?
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M e n o :  I think not.
S o c r a t e s :  In fact we have helped him to some extent toward 
finding out the right answer, for now not only is he ignorant o f it but 
he will be quite glad to look for it. Up to now, he thought he could 
speak well and fluently, on many occasions and before large 
audiences, on the subject o f a square double the size o f a given 
square, maintaining that it must have a side o f double the length.
M e n o :  No doubt.
S o c r a t e s :  Do you suppose then that he would have attempted 
to look for, or learn, what he thought he knew, though he did not, 
before he was thrown into perplexity, became aware o f his ignorance, 
and felt a desire to know?
M e n o :  No.
S o c r a t e s :  Then the numbing process was good for him?
M e n o :  I agree.
S o c r a t e s :  Now notice what, starting from this state of 
perplexity, he will discover by seeking the truth in company with me, 
though I simply ask him questions without teaching him. Be ready to 
catch me if  I  give him any instruction or explanation instead o f simply 
interrogating him on his own opinions. [To the boy:] Tell me, boy, is 
not this our square offour feet (fig. 3, ABDC)? You understand?
G
Figure 3.
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B o y :  Yes.
S o c r a t e s :  Now we can add another equal to it like this 
(BEFD)?
B o y :  Yes.
S o c r a t e s :  And a third here (DCGH), equal to each o f the 
others?
B o y :  Yes.
S o c r a t e s :  And then we can fill in this one (DFIH) in the 
corner?
B o y :  Yes.
S o c r a t e s :  Then here we have four equal squares?
B o y :  Yes.
S o c r a t e s :  And how many times the size o f the first square is 
the whole?
B o y :  Four times.
S o c r a t e s :  And we want one double the size. You remember? 
B o y :  Yes.
S o c r a t e s :  Now do these lines going from corner to corner 
(CB, BF etc.) cut each o f these squares in half?
B o y :  Yes.
S o c r a t e s :  And these are four equal lines enclosing this area 
(BCHF)?
B o y :  They are.
S o c r a t e s :  Now think. How big is this area?
B o y : /  don’t understand.
S o c r a t e s :  Here are four squares. Has not each line cut off the 
inner half o f each o f them?
Boy: Yes.
Socrates: And how many such halves are there in this figure? 
B o y :  Four.
S o c r a t e s :  And how many in this one (ABDC)?
B o y :  Two.
S o c r a t e s :  And what is the relation offour to two?
B o y :  Double.
S o c r a t e s :  And how big is this figure then?
B o y :  Eight feet.
S o c r a t e s :  On what base.
B o y :  This one (CB).
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S o c r a t e s :  The line which goes from corner to comer o f the 
square offour feet?
B o y :  Yes.
S o c r a t e s :  The technical name for it is ‘diagonal so if  we use 
that name, it is your personal opinion that the square on the diagonal 
o f the original square is double its area.
B o y :  That is so, Socrates.
S o c r a t e s :  What do you think, Meno? Has he answered with 
any opinions that were not his own?
M e n o :  No, they were all his.
S o c r a t e s :  Yet he did not know, as we agreed a few  minutes 
ago.
M e n o :  True.
S o c r a t e s :  But these opinions were somewhere in him, were 
they not?
M e n o :  Yes.
S o c r a t e s :  So a man who does not know has in himself true 
opinions on a subject without having knowledge.
M e n o :  It would appear so.
S o c r a t e s :  At present these opinions, being newly aroused, 
have a dreamlike quality. But if  the same questions are put to him on 
many occasions and in different ways, you can see that in the end he 
will have a knowledge on the subject as accurate as anybody s.
M e n o :  Probably.
S o c r a t e s :  This knowledge will not come from teaching but 
from questioning. He will recover it for himself.
M e n o :  Yes.
S o c r a t e s :  And the spontaneous recovery o f knowledge that is 
in him is recollection, isn ’t it?
M e n o :  Yes.
S o c r a t e s :  Either then he has at some time acquired the 
knowledge which he now has, or he has always possessed it. I f  he 
always possessed it, he must always have known; if  on the other hand 
he acquired it at some previous time, it cannot have been in this life, 
unless somebody has taught him geometry. He will behave in the same 
way with all geometric knowledge, and every other subject. Has 
anyone taught him all these? You ought to know, especially as he has 
been brought up in your household.
M e n o :  Yes, I know that no one ever taught him.
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S o c r a t e s :  And has he these opinions, or hasn’t he?
M e n o :  It seems we can’t deny it.
S o c r a t e s :  Then if he did not acquire them in this life, isn 7 it 
immediately clear that he possessed and had learned them during 
some other period?
M e n o :  It seems so.
S o c r a t e s :  When he was not in human shape?
M e n o :  Yes.
S o c r a t e s :  If  then there are going to exist in him, both while he 
is and while he is not a man, true opinions which can be aroused by 
questioning and turned into knowledge, may we say that his soul has 
been forever in a state o f knowledge? Clearly he always either is or is 
not a man.
M e n o :  Clearly.
S o c r a t e s :  And if  the truth about reality is always in our soul, 
the soul must be immortal, and one must take courage and try to 
discover — that is, to recollect — what one doesn 7 happen to know, 
or, more correctly, remember, at the moment.6
At this point we interrupt the scene, and we are going to continue after 
making no more changes to it than to give Socrates the possession of 
our contemporary biological knowledge.
M e n o :  In considering such a serious and important question, as 
the existence or non-existence of personal immortality is one, I would 
be grateful to you, Socrates, if you could offer me one more proof for 
the existence of knowledge from a former life.
S o c r a t e s :  My dear Meno, does it not seem to you that our 
existence is similar to the tragedies of Sophocles and Euripides, 
insofar as it consists of nothing but a sequence of individual scenes?
M e n o :  Certainly, Socrates, the great poets attempted to make us 
aware of life itself, and therefore rendered for the stage the scenic 
sequence of life’s events.
S o c r a t e s :  And did not the poets attempt to clarify through the 
sequence of scenes destiny’s influence on man’s soul?
M e n o :  Certainly. They assign to every actor his detailed part 
consisting of words and gestures.
6 Plato, Meno (86b). 
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S o c r a t e s :  Now, are the assigned words and gestures 
announced directly to the actors by the poet or one of his 
representatives during the performance?
M e n o :  Not at all, Socrates. The actors already have to know 
their parts by heart when they enter the stage.
S o c r a t e s :  Did they not, before finally performing, rehearse 
the whole play, in order to recite it without mistake to the people of 
Athens?
M e n o :  Certainly. Otherwise they would create an awful chaos 
on stage instead of depicting life.
S o c r a t e s :  Therefore we can say, that the drama simply 
consists of the actors’ memories of the rehearsal they lived through 
earlier.
M e n o :  We can say so.
S o c r a t e s :  And now, if, Meno, the drama would not be left at 
being performed once, but if it would be performed over and over 
again —  would it not be possible for us to maintain that the part of life 
shown to us by the poet in his drama repeats itself over and over?
M e n o :  Certainly, Socrates.
S o c r a t e s :  Then, Meno, think about it being thus, that in 
Nature the same play is performed to us over and over again.
M e n o :  Can you give me an example for that?
S o c r a t e s :  Look into your garden. There you see a tiny 
songbird collecting stalks to build his nest. Without any reasoning he 
chooses the right one each time and adds it to the elaborate fabric of 
his nest, his children’s future home. No one taught it how to build a 
nest. No one told it that it is going to have children.
M e n o :  That is indeed astonishing! Could it be that the bird has 
foresight?
S o c r a t e s :  Does it not seem to you to be more probable that it 
has some knowledge stemming from a former existence, like the actor 
has it who lived through his rehearsals?
M e n o :  Yes, this seems to me to be the truth.
S o c r a t e s :  Is it not this knowledge stemming from a former 
existence, which is called by the trivial name of ‘instinct’?
M e n o :  Yes, it is as you say, Socrates.
S o c r a t e s :  Only as far as the bird has this knowledge it is able 
to foresee things. Xenocrates had a tamed owl to which he had 
entrusted two duck eggs for breeding. When the ducklings crept out of
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their eggs, mother owl tried to feed them with a dead sparrow which 
she had tom apart as food for her young.
M e n o :  Indeed, this shows that the owl had no foresight, but 
some knowledge about something rehearsed earlier.
S o c r a t e s :  But since it never had had offspring before, this 
knowledge must have stemmed from a former life.
M e n o :  Even the nightingales in my garden, when they begin 
singing their beautiful songs, should they be applying their knowledge 
of a melody learned in a former life? Is this what you mean, Socrates?
S o c r a t e s :  Certainly this is what I mean, and does it not appear 
to you as if the melody of a nightingale’s song is a rule of tones, as the 
act of building a nest is a mle of movements?
M e n o :  This certainly is the matter.
S o c r a t e s :  And is not the knowledge of these mles already 
sufficient to sing the song correctly and to build the nest correctly?
M e n o :  It seems so.
S o c r a t e s :  Thus it is the knowledge about these mles which 
the living things carry in their memories. Thus being, it also were the 
rules comprising geometry that I brought out of your slave’s memory 
again through my questioning.
M e n o :  Certainly he carries some knowledge hidden to himself.
S o c r a t e s :  And this hidden knowledge is comprised by mles.
M e n o :  Could it be that there are men who know about certain 
mles unknown to other men?
S o c r a t e s :  This indeed seems to be the case. For there are 
people like Xenophon who are unable to sing the simplest song 
properly, because they do not know the mles of the tones — whereas 
others, like Alcibiades, are outstanding singers.
M e n o :  Therefore we distinguish between those men who have a 
gift for music and those who lack musicality.
S o c r a t e s :  And we rightly do so. For some master the mles of 
the tones from the time of their birth onward, whereas some do not.
M e n o :  Thus you believe that some owe their knowledge to a 
previous existence, whereas some have not inherited this knowledge, 
although they no doubt know about the existence of those mles and 
occasionally search for them, too. Thus some croak like ravens and 
some sing like nightingales, just like these two species of birds have 
brought their knowledge about different melodies from their previous 
lives. But to me such an assumption appears to be unnecessary.
S o c r a t e s :  What do you mean by your words, Meno?
M e n o :  This is what I mean: Even within a drop of water the rule 
of turning into an ice crystal is invisibly present, coldness being the 
only condition for enforcing the rule of crystallization.
S o c r a t e s :  What more?
M e n o :  Well, the knowledge about this rule is certainly not 
present within the drop of water, but the water drop is simply playing 
his role, like an actor.
S o c r a t e s :  And now you believe that the nightingale as much 
as the drop of water is governed by its role like by a rule, sometimes 
forcing it to sing, sometimes to build its nest?
M e n o :  That is exactly what I mean, Socrates. And therefore 
your assumption of a hidden knowledge stemming from another life 
would be invalid.
S o c r a t e s :  My dear Meno, certainly you would be right, if 
there were no difference between a drop of water and a nightingale, 
but both were inanimate. In order to be able to acquire knowledge one 
needs, before anything else, to have an organ not only possessing the 
ability of perceiving the events of the outside world, like the ears 
perceive sound and the eyes color, but also possessing the ability to 
transform perception into knowledge; that is to say, to recognize its 
meaning. And now observe the little bird, how it confidently picks 
only those stalks which are meaningful to its nest-building, but leaves 
other stalks unpicked. You do not discover any of these qualities in a 
drop of water. It no doubt loses its shape to reappear in new shape, as 
ice crystal. Yes, one could say the rain dies as water in winter to be 
resurrected as ice in the shape of a snow flake, but the water drop does 
not notice it. It blindly obeys the commandments o f Zeus, who hides 
his countenance one time with rainfall, another time with hailstorm, 
again another time with snowfall.
M e n o :  Thus you, Socrates, believe that Zeus has ordained two 
roles to the water drop, the one of liquid water and the one of solid 
ice, replacing each other according to the rhythm of heat and cold, one 
time turning water into ice, another time turning ice into water.
S o c r a t e s :  Certainly this is what I have in mind. Water and ice 
follow, without any restrictions, the roles Zeus implanted them, but 
they do not know anything about each other and about the world 
outside of them, for they do not possess any organ for remembering 
things and therefore no knowledge. But in bearing the roles appointed
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to them by Zeus they still are immortal and manifest themselves as 
soon as they are given the opportunity to do so.
M e n o :  And how about plants, Socrates?
S o c r a t e s :  Demeter has bestowed on them, like on all other 
living things, the succession of generations. The children always 
succeed their parents, becoming parents themselves. The same souls, 
having received their roles from Demeter, reappear again and again on 
life’s stage, having to play the same roles over and over, but each time 
the Fates send them a different fate. At one time an acorn grows to 
become a great oak, at another time it dies in its youth.
M e n o :  In the process, the appointed role and the bodily shape 
fitting this role are of the same kind.
S o c r a t e s :  Do you not think, Meno, in this case one has to 
speak about immortality?
M e n o :  I admit to that —  but what distinguishes a plant from an 
ice crystal, except that the role of the plant includes more complex 
rules than the role of the crystal?
S o c r a t e s :  First of all, the role of the crystal is carried through 
without being influenced by any outside events —  except for the cold, 
whereas the roles of the plants are continuously influenced by their 
surroundings. All plants always grow upwards and their blooms turn 
towards the sun, while their leaves serve as gutters in order to supply 
their roots with water. Yes, after all, the role of the plants consists of 
adopting themselves to the outside world without having sensory 
organs, interacting with it in a way truly impossible for a drop of 
water.
M e n o :  But you do not want to attribute knowledge to plants?
S o c r a t e s :  No, as far as plants and small animals are 
concerned it is sufficient to assume that they merely repeat their roles, 
which Demeter once and for all assigned to her loved ones.
M e n o :  At all times defending the same role against the 
intervention of the Fates after all comprises the nature of the plants’ 
soul.
S o c r a t e s :  Your words exactly hit the point, Meno!
M e n o :  Now we are getting to the large animals, which not only 
master their roles, but also know about their role and clearly see the 
meaning of their actions. Of course they need their memory of 
previously having performed the same role to assist them. If the bird 
would not possess a knowledge about nest-building from a previous
life, it would be completely incapable of distinguishing the stalks 
meaningful to building his nest from those having no meaning to it — 
as you have already explained, Socrates!
S o c r a t e s :  I am glad that you now say the same things as I do.
M e n o :  We admire those animals which are not only capable of 
performing simple tasks, but also are in the position of producing 
objects for which they lacked, as we thought until now, any model — 
be it the bird’s nest, be it the spider’s web, be it the ball which the 
holy beetles of Egypt are capable of producing from dung. Now you 
have demonstrated that animals have to take their own actions from a 
previous existence as models, even if these actions appear to be 
completely inappropriate within their present lives, as was the case 
with the owl which tried to treat the ducklings as if they were young 
owls. That kind of actions is close to unknown within the lives of 
men. Men always observe the models of their present lives only. They 
do not possess an unforgotten knowledge stemming from a previous 
existence which could serve them as a rule for the actions of their 
present existence. Yes —  it even was very difficult to prove that my 
slave possessed such a knowledge at all, forgotten and resting in him, 
only pulled back into light by your artful questioning.
S o c r a t e s :  This certainly is remarkable.
M e n o :  Can you tell for what reason the gods put us at such a 
disadvantage in comparison to the animals, for they have put man 
above animal in every other regard?
S o c r a t e s :  You would find the disadvantage to be even greater 
if you made clear to yourself that man’s imitations of the objects 
he has seen during his present life never are the equals of their origi­
nals — whereas the objects which animals are capable of producing 
by drawing from their inner knowledge always are the equals of their 
originals, sometimes even surpassing them.
M e n o :  In this you are right, Socrates. The more justified is my 
question about the cause of this discrimination against man, for man 
indeed would never succeed in imitating even the simple nest of a 
songbird.
S o c r a t e s :  Just think about it now, what may be the cause of 
this apparent disadvantage. The bird building his nest, even in case he 
repeats his task the following year, always has one choice only, i.e. to 
build exactly the same nest without any variation, because it always has 
to be made only according to the one original existing in its memory.
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And now imagine yourself to be in the position of a human architect 
who has been commissioned to build a number of new houses, which 
are to meet the needs of various clients, the architect possessing only 
one model of a truly beautiful but all the same stereotypical house from 
a previous life. And go on to imagine our great Praxiteles had only a 
single model for every of his likenesses of the gods in his memory — 
would he then still be in the position to delight our eyes and hearts by 
ever new, ever more marvelous likenesses?
M e n o :  In this you are right. For the price of all our mediocre 
craftsmen and architects being able to produce many different copies 
of existing things, the memory of the divine originals received from 
Nature has been taken from everyone. Only the truly inspired, on 
whom Apollo himself bestows the knowledge of a new image, have 
the gift to create a true original.
S o c r a t e s :  But the god who robbed from man the knowledge 
from his previous existence nevertheless treated him hard, for he 
robbed from him the confidence pertaining to all actions of the other 
living beings. Yes, the god took from him the knowledge governing 
all the rest of the world.
M e n o :  You do believe that confidence within Nature is based 
on an all-governing knowledge?
S o c r a t e s :  I certainly believe so.
M e n o :  Explain it to me by giving an example.
S o c r a t e s :  You know the market in Piraeus, where the 
fishermen put their goods on offer?
M e n o :  I certainly do.
S o c r a t e s :  Do you remember those strange crabs living in a 
snail-shell, the back part of which is regarded as a delicacy by the 
common people?
M e n o :  Certainly, these crabs are called hermits, because 
everyone of them lives in his own house.
S o c r a t e s :  Now, if we put the origin of the hermit crab’s home 
under scrutiny, we see that it was with great certainty built by a snail 
to serve for its protection and as a dwelling as long as it lives. After 
the snail’s death, the shell would uselessly lie on the bottom of the 
sea, unless a crab would have come to know about it through the 
knowledge common to Nature, and then confidently directed its own 
body’s growth according to the design of the snail’s shell. But this 
would not be sufficient. The crab itself must have been given its own
knowledge of the snail’s shell to accompany it on its life’s journey, for 
as soon as its house becomes too small for it, it starts searching a new, 
larger one. If the crab finds a snail shell, many hundreds of which are 
on offer on the sea bottom to choose from, it examines the shell’s size 
and durability. Then the crab quickly exchanges the shell for its old 
house by carefully hiding its soft rear part in the protective cover. This 
clearly demonstrates that the confidence of the body’s design and the 
knowledge about someone else’s house stem from the same root, 
which cannot be anything else than a divine natural knowledge 
revealing itself on one occasion in the structure of tissue, on another 
occasion in the actions of animals.
M e n o :  Your explanations are quite convincing, Socrates. Thus 
plants as well as animals and men take part in divine Nature’s 
knowledge through the structure of their tissue — but only animals in 
their actions draw their personal knowledge from this same source, 
whereas man in his actions has to rely on his own experience and 
therefore lacks confidence.
S о с r a t es : It seems to me that the difference between human 
knowledge and Nature’s knowledge is to be found in that respect, 
namely that man has to rely on his deceitful experience, whereas 
Nature’s knowledge constitutes the structure of Nature herself and 
precedes all experience. That gives animals in their actions an 
advantage over our actions.
M e n o :  What shall we do to compensate for this disadvantage?
S o c r a t e s :  Does it not seem to you that Nature, who uses her 
knowledge to design the animals’ bodies, has also applied it to bestow 
on them their role in life?
M e n o :  Certainly.
S o c r a t e s :  Now, animals know their role directly, but man 
does not and from this results his lack of confidence. Should it 
therefore not be our most important task to track down this knowledge 
about our own role?
M e n o :  It indeed seems to be so.
S o c r a t e s :  Only if man realizes the divine knowledge that 
constructed his body and bestowed his role on him, and if he keeps the 
purity of his soul, he will at the end of his days, when he gives up his 
body and with it his role, confidently return home into Nature’s divine 
knowledge.
M e n o :  I will never forget these words, Socrates!
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Second Part
S o c r a t e s :  Thus a spirit reveals itself through all the creatures of 
Nature and their actions, an immortal spirit which is heard through all 
ages in the same manifold voice, a motherly basis underlying all 
created things. All living things realize this spirit through their growth 
as much as through their actions. Obeying an unconscious urge the 
shapes of the living things rise out of the spirit without becoming 
conscious of what they are realizing and what is driving them. And the 
things that were created by the spirit are absorbed back into it without 
having gained any consciousness of the process other than the 
unconscious natural knowledge which they take part in. They were 
never completely separated from the spirit, but they only agitated its 
surface, like waves agitating an ocean moving by its own harmonies. 
But human consciousness is knowledge of a different nature, it is so 
much different from that unconscious participation in the knowledge 
of the motherly basis that it within the sphere of man’s consciousness 
eternally separates him from the confidence given by unconscious 
knowledge.
M e n o :  That all the living things in their becoming and their 
actions, ‘instinct’, as we call it trivially, take part in a knowledge 
impossibly being acquired by them in their present lives, this idea, 
Socrates, appears to me to be beautiful and true. But I have to 
contradict you when you say they acquired it in a previous life which 
they spent on Earth in a similar shape.
S o c r a t e s :  What kind of argument are you bringing up again 
now, Meno? You claim they have acquired it neither in a previous nor 
in their present life?
M e n o :  That is just what I claim, namely that a memory of 
previous experience does not explain the knowledge about the laws of 
Nature.
S o c r a t e s :  There you put yourself in a difficult position if you 
maintain that the living things do have knowledge but did not acquire 
it, neither now nor previously.
M e n o :  You are right, Socrates, I feel like the stingray hit me 
again; that is why I again make the request to you to assist me.
S o c r a t e s :  I will try, but first tell me exactly what you mean.
M e n o :  I imagine the bird, which we saw building its nest in my 
garden, were the first of his species, just having risen to the light from
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the creating elemental forces of the cosmos; whereupon I begin to feel 
pity for the unfortunate creature, which lacks the possibility of calling 
on the experience of previous lives. Not only it will not be able to 
build its nest, it probably will hardly survive for more than a few days, 
not even knowing where and how to find its food. And I imagine all 
living things to be in the same pitiful position, even my slave and 
myself, even including you, Socrates. Before having been able to 
make the slightest experience on geometry, we will starve to death, or 
drown, or fall down a slope. And even if a merciful god would save us 
from this fate, giving us food and drink, we would be unable to cope 
with our wildly confused sensory impressions in such a manner as to 
make the simplest experience.
S o c r a t e s :  Thus you are saying that every living thing’s 
existence, be it the simplest or the most complex one, already requires 
knowledge, thus one cannot imagine it is acquired through experience.
M e n o :  Just as it is unimaginable that a man without possessing 
a non-acquired knowledge of the basic laws of space will make the 
slightest geometric experience; as it is unimaginable that a fish, 
thrown upon land by a storm, will then learn to find its way on dry 
land, for which he lacks every precondition.
S o c r a t e s :  Therefore you think scientists should try to 
understand how hereditary qualities are acquired before studying how 
acquired qualities are inherited?
M e n o :  That is just what I mean, Socrates.
S o c r a t e s :  And what do you believe we have to imagine the 
acquisition of qualities to be like?
M e n o :  You said earlier that one has to distinguish between 
man’s conscious knowledge and the unconscious participation in 
common natural knowledge. And therefore I believe that one cannot 
imagine the acquisition of this knowledge to be of the same kind as 
the acquisition of human knowledge, but that it is an original 
knowledge without beginning, possessed by the first of all living 
things as much as by the last of them.
S o c r a t e s :  By that you claim there can be no progress and no 
evolution of life, neither of the same living thing in different lives nor 
of successive generations.
M e n o :  I think this idea improperly transfers human concepts 
onto natural processes, for such progress and evolution can be 
found only within man’s conscious knowledge and its tradition; but
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transferred onto Nature this idea reduces itself to absurdity. For the 
whole problem of human experience and its tradition has absolutely 
nothing to do with our question, which deals with that kind of 
knowledge which must precede all experience. But a man who would 
grow up without gaining any knowledge about his ancestor’s 
experience, would not be more wise but more stupid than a wild animal.
S o c r a t e s :  And in spite of this you believe that one can extract 
from him by appropriate questioning the hidden knowledge which, so 
to speak, constitutes the semen of or precondition for all human 
development.
M e n o :  You proved this to me earlier on my slave, Socrates. But 
I still want to believe that there is a difference between my slave’s 
hidden knowledge and that knowledge revealing itself through the 
actions of animals.
S o c r a t e s :  What do you mean by that, Meno?
M e n o :  By this I want to say that both types of knowledge in fact 
must be without beginning and original in the same way, for they 
cannot result from experience, but that they differ in the way they 
reveal themselves.
S o c r a t e s :  If I understand you the right way, Meno, then you 
believe in the existence of an original knowledge revealing itself as 
nightingale knowledge in nightingales, as owl knowledge in owls and 
also as a knowledge of man as a living being in man, insofar as it 
concerns that part of his actions and fate that he shares with animals. 
This knowledge reveals itself directly through the actions o f living 
things, without them becoming conscious of it. But the knowledge that 
we discovered in your slave also must be an original knowledge, the 
experience of space being unimaginable without it, but revealing itself 
only if being raised up into man’s consciousness.
M e n o :  You expressed very well what I have in mind. For we 
agreed for good reasons to describe as a common natural knowledge 
the unconscious knowledge of the various animal species as well as of 
man, insofar as he as a living thing belongs to Nature, because the 
various species reveal a knowledge about the physical structure and 
habits of other species, like the spider in building its web reveals a 
knowledge about the physical structure and habits of flies; therefore 
we have to describe the other kind of original knowledge as the 
common original knowledge of man, because we find it only in him, 
but there in every individual. But experience can be made in both
spheres of knowledge, though to a completely different degree in the 
human sphere. But experience dies with the individual which made it. 
And the experience of an individual man’s life also perishes with him 
and has to be taught anew to each child through tradition, in speech 
and writing. Human experience lives only by tradition and therefore 
language and writing are to be regarded as truly divine gifts, only they 
make it possible for man to be himself.
S o c r a t e s :  But the original knowledge about measure, number 
and spatial relations is reborn with every man, whereas the world built 
by man through the course of thousands of years, applying his 
experience based on this knowledge, lives and dies together with 
tradition. But as far as animals are concerned, their individual 
experience always dies with the individual, for they have no tradition 
in the human sense.
M e n o :  And, as you, Socrates, have shown earlier, the animals 
of our world do not need something like human tradition at all, for 
Nature shows herself in all their actions in her original way, and they 
carry out Nature’s knowledge without having to give account for it to 
themselves.
S o c r a t e s :  Indeed, Meno, I admit to having found in you an 
apt student of midwifery, with whom it is worthwhile to examine the 
hidden interrelations of life. Therefore you believe the world of human 
experience to be a world of giving self-account, not found anywhere 
with animals and belonging of living things to man alone. Now let us 
examine why man attained this special position and what we can 
conclude from it.
M e n o :  Yes, Socrates, this seems to me to be one of the great 
questions, but I admit I cannot see any way of getting us closer to an 
answer.
S o c r a t e s :  Did you ever hear the story being told of 
Prometheus, who, at mankind’s dawn, robbed fire from the gods and 
brought its bright flame to man?
M e n o :  Surely I heard the myth being told, and also how the 
gods, angered by the crime, seized Prometheus and forged him onto a 
rock for eternal torture.
S o c r a t e s :  Thus hear now what I heard being told by priests 
and wise men: After Prometheus had brought the light of the eternal 
flame to man, the gods punished not only Prometheus, but they also 
turned man’s eyes around so that he cannot see fire itself, but only its
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twitching reflections and the shadows cast by illuminated objects. But 
since that day man is unable to see the things themselves just as he 
cannot see fire itself, for his eyes have been turned around. Thus since 
that day man does not anymore live in the realm of his motherly 
world, i.e. knowledge unconsciously realizing itself, but also not in the 
realm of light, but in an intermediate realm of twilight; for man also is 
only capable of observing of the things and living beings in front of 
his eyes the flitting shadows emitting from them. But the things and 
living beings, the shadows of which he perceives, are like man himself 
expressions of the original motherly natural knowledge, from which 
stems all that has come to be. But the shadows cast by them are 
reflections of the divine fire lit by Prometheus behind the things, the 
blurred shapes of which inhabit man’s world since that day. And of 
themselves, men also realize only the shadowy shapes. The realm of 
original motherly natural knowledge, giving birth to all living things, 
men, animals and plants, unconsciously realizes itself and lacks 
consciousness, in which solely exist shape, form and law. Thus it is 
the ideas of man, as rays of the divine light, which bestow contours 
and shape on the motherly natural knowledge. But man, hit by the rays 
of the divine fire, is excluded from the original confidence bestowed 
by the motherly knowledge on its creatures. He is forced to construct 
his own human world, in which both embrace and merge with each 
other. Thus therefore seems to me to be the position and the purpose 
of man, as determined by Prometheus’ deed: He must spend his life as 
the being of an intermediate realm between the shadowy forces of 
eternal Nature and the realm of immortal divine light, belonging to 
both spheres, but not at home in any of them. But it is this transitory 
human world where the divine and the demonic spheres meet and 
merge.
M e n o :  And just as it is not given to us to see our own eyes, 
except by looking in a mirror, you believe it is not given to us to see 
the light of the spirit and its ideas, except in the mirror of the world 
where the ideas, reflections of the divine flame in which they have 
their origin, realize themselves. When I understand you correctly, 
Socrates, this is what you want to say by your parable about the gods 
turning around our eyes, so that we may not see fire itself, only its 
reflections and its silhouette.
S o c r a t e s :  I interpret the legend, which I heard being told by 
priests and wise men, just as you do, Meno. They can speak on the
origin and development of human existence, but only by metaphors 
and parables; for it does not become mortals to inquire into this 
matter. Although it definitely seems to me to be our duty to inquire 
and understand if their parables correctly describe the state of our 
world; for we can in this matter call on our experience, both on the 
experience which we gain through our own consciousness and our 
resulting actions and on the experience of other living things and the 
their actions resulting from it, because we participate in their 
experience inasmuch as we are living things.
M e n o :  In that I agree with you, Socrates. And certainly also in 
allowing us to trust the priests’ stories about a question as far-reaching 
as man’s personal immortality only insofar as they give a true 
impression of our existence. But we have to remain suspicious in 
every other respect, for we do not know if they tell the truth or just 
maintain something in order to please themselves and us. Therefore I 
now venture to return again to the original question, about which I am 
so concerned that earlier I already could not be satisfied by your 
explanations, but had to press you to continue on the path together 
with me.
S o c r a t e s :  Then tell me, what insights on this question can, in 
your opinion, be gained from our inquiries?
M e n o :  I actually had ambiguous feelings earlier, when you, 
Socrates, said that a man, having found the common natural 
knowledge which brought forth his body and assigned his role to him, 
could at the end of his days, after discarding his role together with his 
body, confidently return into the divine knowledge of Nature. At first, 
it seemed to me that realizing a common natural knowledge, to which 
we owe our roles as living things and our bodies, does in no way 
indicate a previous existence as living beings, for we could never have 
acquired our part of this knowledge, but carry it with us as knowledge 
without origin. It rather seemed to me that Nature speaks to us at all 
times through our bodies’ growth and through the roles she makes us 
play; of course she does not use any of the human languages.
S o c r a t e s :  Yes, Meno, as it seems to me, you provided 
convincing evidence for what you claim.
M e n o :  Thus everything seems to point in that direction that we, 
at the end of our days, do not only discard our bodies and our roles, 
but also our individual existence which is but the primary condition 
for what we call personality; for a previous existence cannot be proven
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and for our memory of hidden knowledge obviously being nothing 
else than the realization of the words Nature speaks to us at all times. 
The words from which our bodies and our roles as living beings arose, 
Nature takes back into herself, while we dissolve into the motherly 
source which brought us forth, like a drop of water falling into the 
ocean.
S o c r a t e s :  Looking on things from this angle, your conclusion 
seems to be unavoidable.
M e n o :  Well, this kind of immortality or, as it should rather be 
called, dissolution seems to be no better than the so called immortality 
which the materialists comfort themselves with by saying: Not a 
single atom of all the parts of our body perishes, but is simply returned 
to the universal cycle of matter. And they comfort themselves with the 
idea of their body parts continuing to exist in future as dust, rain or 
whatever else.
S o c r a t e s :  You make me laugh, Meno, when I see the heavy 
weaponry you put up against me. But there just seems to me to be a 
certain difference between the idea of continuing one’s existence as 
dust, ashes or rain and the idea promising one’s unification with the 
omniscient spirit of Nature.
M e n o :  I would be the last one to deny that, but no one of the 
two promises personal immortality. And inasmuch as, according to the 
materialist faith, the wicked man is with his death released of both his 
body and the wickedness of his soul, the aspirations of the good man 
and the crime of the wicked man have also been in vain to the same 
degree; for man’s relation towards Nature as a living thing is all that 
remains, but this relation is absolutely the same for both of them.
S o c r a t e s :  Meno, because you are pressing me so hard I must 
admit that realizing one’s participation in the common natural 
knowledge is not sufficient for understanding man’s special position 
and his striving for truth and rightousness. If there were nothing 
except for this knowledge, man’s striving would indeed be in vain, 
nothing else than deceiving himself.
M e n o :  But you do not want to maintain that view, do you, 
Socrates?
S o c r a t e s :  You are like one of those ferocious hunting dogs 
not letting go of their game even when their already made the kill. In 
this dispute, I surrender to you and beg you to show mercy on me.
Please show me how I erred. You are not going to deny that we 
conducted a zealous and honest inquiry?
M e n o :  I do not deny it in any way, Socrates. Just like you, I am 
convinced that the results of our inquiry are correct.
S o c r a t e s :  Therefore personal immortality does not exist and 
virtue, our initial subject, is a meaningless illusion entertained by 
man?
M e n o :  It would appear to be like that if we forgot that the 
human world is not limited to realizing the original natural impulse, 
but a world of giving self-account in every regard. We saw earlier that 
man only to some degree originates from the unconsciously creating 
sphere of Nature, and that in his spirit lives a reflection of the divine 
flame, of which it is said it originated in Prometheus’ crime. This 
ambiguous nature of human knowledge also seems to be of great 
importance to our question. For we saw everywhere how man 
impresses the flame of his consciousness on his world, even when he 
as a little child starts finding his position in the world, man’s 
consciousness definitely being different from Nature’s unconscious 
creating knowledge. And your parable appears to me to be beautiful 
and convincing: That we live in a world of twilight, observing of the 
divine light only what is reflected by Nature’s creatures, like illusions 
of a dream, but being denied by the gods to see the flame itself, since 
they have turned our eye’s around
S o c r a t e s :  And what effect, in your opinion, has man’s double 
nature on answering our question?
M e n o :  For man stems from two different spheres, it seems to 
me, my dear Socrates, that it will turn out at the end of his days, if he 
will, following the general gravitation of his physical nature, dissolve 
into the shadowy source of all natural existence; or if he will, being 
forged well enough by the divine flame, become light and pure 
enough to attain a higher spiritual existence.
S o c r a t e s :  But how do you imagine this higher existence to be 
like, Meno? Do you believe man’s soul to be tom apart into two 
pieces, an earthly and a spiritual one, which afterwards part from each 
other, returning to their respective spheres?
M e n o :  No, I do not believe it to be like that. It rather seems to 
me that Nature herself, insofar as she has been under the spell of the 
spirit’s light, enters a higher existence. I am drawn to the conclusion 
that man is given one goal in everything he does: To raise Nature up
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into spiritual consciousness. And I believe that we clearly are ‘human’ 
in the true sense of the word only insofar as Nature attains spirit 
through us; for we may see the light of the divine flame only in the 
world s mirror, on which it is cast through us. But to a certain degree 
it seems to be put in our hands, Socrates, in which way the light shines 
onto the world, clear or blurred, pure or refracted and darkened by 
instinct. Thus every look a man takes into Nature bears witness on his 
quality as a human medium, depending on him, if he seeks truth, 
goodness and beauty or if he looks out for satisfying the desires of his 
instinct. Thus all our words, looks and actions influence how things 
around us evolve. The things around us reflect ourselves, they are a 
mirror which is either lit up by the divine flame or stays what it has 
always been, a part of Nature’s original, shadowy existence. In the 
second case, man passes his life in vain and the world just remains 
what it has been without him. But in the first case, man will retain that 
kind of spiritual shape and personality that corresponds to spiritua­
lized Nature. And thus it seems to me, Socrates: Whoever sees the 
workings of unconscious Nature in a spiritual light clear enough to 
make her shine and speak in a way man will understand, he will 
during his lifetime imprint the clarity of his personal existence on 
Nature, and he will never loose that clarity.
Вечный вопрос: биологические вариации одного 
платоновского диалога
Биологическая реинтерпретация природы, которая преобладает не­
смотря на все препятствия, приблизила наше мышление к антич­
ности и дает возможность оживить нашу разработанную терминоло­
гию с помощью рессурсов мысли величайших умов человечества. 
Очищая таким образом путь к Платону, я задумал искать просветле­
ния, задавая биологические вопросы этому мыслителю. В этих целях 
я продолжил диалоги Сократа, давая ему информацию о современ­
ных биологических проблемах. Так, принося нам ощутимую пользу, 
создан мост между нами и античнои мыслю. Текст опирается на диа­
лог Платона “Менон”. Первая часть написана Якобом фон Юкскюл­
лом, вторая его сыном Туре фон Юкскюллом. Впервые он был 
опубликован в 1943 году и здесь мы имеем, видимо первый 
опубликованный перевод на английский язык.
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Igavene küsimus:
Bioloogilised variatsioonid ühele Platoni dialoogile
Looduse tõlgendamine bioloogia poolt, mis valitseb kõigile tõketele vaa­
tamata, on toonud meie mõtlemise lähemale antiigile ja annab võimaluse 
ergastada meie läbitöötatud terminoloogiat inimkonna suurvaimude 
mõtteressursside kaasabil. Puhastades niiviisi teed Platoni juurde, tulin 
mõttele otsida valgustust bioloogiliste küsimuste küsimise kaudu mõtte­
targalt. Selleks panin Sokratese jätkama oma dialooge, andes talle tead­
misi tänapäevastest bioloogilistest probleemidest. Nii on loodud teatav 
kokkupuude antiiksete mõtlejate ja meie vahel, meie märgatavaks kasuks. 
Tekst tugineb Platoni dialoogile Menon; esimese osa on kiijutanud Jakob 
von Uexküll, teise tema poeg Thure von Uexküll. Esmakordselt avaldati 
see 1943. aastal, käesolev on arvatavasti esimene avaldatav tõlge inglise 
keelde.
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Jakob von Uexküll and Right Livelihood__ 
the current actuality of his Weltanschauung1
Jakob von Uexiill, jr .1
I am humbled by your invitation for I can offer neither personal 
reminiscences —  as I never met m y grandfather —  nor scientific expertise 
about his work. My school education in the natural sciences was very patchy. 
The teacher was a failed mining engineer w hose chemistry lessons I 
remember only because he managed to set the classroom  on fire. His 
knowledge o f  biology was even less im pressive. So, w hile my grandfather 
stood out —  from the descriptions o f  his w idow  and children —  as a 
remarkably warm and fascinating human being, my attempts to understand 
him took much longer. When I first read his Theoretical Biology  I felt I was 
entering a new and very com plex world.
When the Right Livelihood Awards became w ell-know n, I found m yself  
in the embarrassing situation o f  people com ing up to m e and asking me to 
sign copies o f  Theoretical Biology, assuming me to be the author. I also  
started getting letters from authors who had written books which they told me 
had been inspired by my grandfather’s work. Two o f  these were entitled  
Understanding Understanding and The View from  the Oak. They covered  
very different fields and made me aware o f  the width and depth o f  my  
grandfather's worldview and influence. So I went back to his writings, hoping 
that his perspective on life would also help me understand why, despite our 
material progress, w e feel so lost and are doing so badly in m eeting the 
challenges facing us.
I am a generalist interested in practical results. I sold my business and set 
up the Right Livelihood Awards to identify exemplary individuals and 
initiatives, “projects o f  hope” showing us that solutions exist to practically all 
the current crises and that w e have the resources to implement them. But 
som ething in the ruling worldview holds us back. And what can be more 
paralysing than to be told that our lives are m eaningless, that w e are just
1 Speech given at the symposium “Signs and the Design o f Life —  Uexküll’s 
Significance Today”, in Hamburg University, on Jan. 9, 2004.
2 Author’s address: Jakob von Uexküll, Jr. Right Livelihood Awards, 7 Park 
Crescent, W IN 3HE London, U.K..
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chance creations o f  “trial-and-error” mutations, alone and disconnected in a 
hostile, silent universe and dependant on constant struggle to survive?
This terrifying story is the one w e are born into. Perhaps no one captured 
the stark drama o f  this materialist w orldview  better than Bertrand R ussell, one 
o f  the most respected and influential philosophers o f  our time. I quote a 
passage from his essay “A free m an’s worship”:
That man is the product o f causes which had no prevision o f the end they were 
achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and 
beliefs, are but the outcome o f accidental collocations o f  atoms; that no fire, 
no heroism, no intensity o f thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life 
beyond the grave; that all the labours o f the ages, all the devotion, all the 
inspiration, all the noonday brightness o f human genius, are destined to 
extinction in the vast death o f the solar system, and the whole temple o f man’s 
achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris o f  a universe in 
ruins —  all these things, if  not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, 
that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. (Russell 1957 
[1910]: 107)
If matter is the deepest (or only!) reality, then the only meaningful statement 
w e can make in life is to accumulate as many material possessions as possible 
and shopping becom es our key cultural activity.
Our ancestors regarded selfishness and greed only as acceptable and 
natural in extreme situations —  otherwise they were condemned, while 
service to the community, respect for life and the comm on good were 
prioritised. If our ancestors had lived as selfishly as w e do, w e would not be 
here as the earth would be uninhabitable by now.
But, w e are told, m odem  science has proved that selfish greed is 
“natural”. You may struggle against it but ultimately nature wins. This is the 
legacy o f  Darwinism as it is com m only understood and taught. Its power is 
unprecedented —  it rules not just in biology, but determines our economic, 
educational, social, psychological and other paradigms and policies. Some 
argue that this is not what Darwin really meant. His writings are contradictory 
and partly obscure, perhaps because his own thinking was unclear, or because 
he did not want to offend his follow ers. B ooks with titles such as Darwin ’s 
Lost Theory o f  Love (David Loye) argue that Darwin saw human evolution 
not as a struggle for survival but as a struggle for moral growth.
But this is not the Darwinism ruling us and the majority o f  Darwin’s 
teachings underpin a very different w orldview  —  one which both my 
grandfather and my uncle Prof. Thure von Uexküll found not only dangerous 
but deeply scientifically flawed.
In his recent biography o f  Thure, Rainer Otte writes: “In the teachings o f  
Darwin, Jakob and Thure von Uexküll recognised the forerunners o f  the 
catastrophe which showed clearly what happens to the world when the 
struggle for survival and the survival o f  the fittest is raised to the status o f
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universal law. M y grandfather foresaw that Darwinism helped legitim ise the 
modern institutionalised irresponsibility in science and politics, for the rule o f  
chance destroys all values. He developed his b iology and worldview in 
dispute with Darwinism, to which he provided a deep and broad alternative. 
He rejected determinism —  both scientific and religious —  arguing that 
science has the duty to make sense. Decades o f  studying the sensitive 
universes o f  animals and humans convinced him o f  the survival o f  the 
normal: that life functions according to a natural plan, not chance. He 
ridiculed the D arwinists’ search for elusive “m issing links” to prove that all 
animals are related as “playing gam es, not science”. He was scathing about 
the narrow perspective o f  mechanists like the astronomer Eddington who 
claimed that humanity is “an error in the cosm ic machine”, describing this 
view  as the “horrific and ridiculous result o f  an astronomic fly  environm ent”. 
His challenge went even further. Thus, in a letter to his friend Dr. Theiss, he 
asserted that “the time w ill com e when everyone w ill be regarded as 
uneducated who does not believe in immortality”.
Was he (m ainly) right, ie. has science since his time (m ainly) provided  
evidence for his worldview or for that o f  his Darwinist opponents?
The “officia l” position is unambiguous: In 1959, the institute carrying on 
his work in Hamburg was closed by the university because his type o f  
research was regarded as obsolete. The human cost o f  this dogmatic 
shortsightedness has above all been moral. The Darwinists’ justification o f  
ruthless selfishness has been described by one critic as “an incitement to 
crime” (Stove 1995: 74). In Darwin’s tim e it justified chaining children to 
machines. Hitler found it helpful: “B y means o f  struggle, the elites are 
continually renewed. The law o f  selection justifies this incessant struggle by 
allowing the survival o f  the fittest” (M idgley 1985: 1193).
A few  contrarians have tried to link my grandfather’s ‘holistic’ b iology  
(the w hole being more than the sum o f  the individual parts) to the justification  
o f euthanasia etc. But an understanding o f  the underlying unity o f  life leads, 
on the contrary, to a desire to preserve it everywhere. M y grandfather was 
deeply conservative and made his abhorrence o f  N azi ideology clear on 
several occasions. And it was o f  course Darwin who com plained that 
“excepting in the case o f  man him self, hardly anyone is so ignorant as to 
allow his worst animals to breed” (Darwin 1874: 205).
But even if  Darwinism is morally inferior, it is claimed to be underpinned 
by such strong evidence as to be scientifically irrefutable. Thus, Darwinists 
usually reject the scientific credentials o f  their critics.
This fundamentalism is doing great damage to the creditability o f  science. 
For the scientific case against Darwinism is very strong. (I refer o f  course to 
his “General Theory”, not to obvious adaptations within the same or closely
3 Quoted from H. Trevor-Roper (1953), Hitler’s Table Talk: 1941-1944. 
London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson.
related species.) The “m issing links” are w ell and truly m issing. The more 
technology enables us to study life on the m icro-level, the stronger the 
evidence for it's irreducible com plexity and intelligence becom es.
The way in which most Darwinists ignore, suppress, dism iss and ridicule 
such evidence —  trying to lump it with religious determinism —  is one o f  the 
greatest scientific scandals o f  our time. The ramifications are even more 
important today than in my grandfather’s time. For the scientific hubris with 
which narrow specialists now meddle with the blueprints o f  life to overcom e 
the genetic barriers between unrelated species w ould not be acceptable if  we 
understood life as an intelligent plan —  about which w e still know very little.
Randomness is irreconcilable with the interactive and dynamic structures 
and functions o f  living organisms. Genes are not “selfish m olecules” acting 
independently but have many different functions activated in different ways. 
Genetic engineering not only speeds up genetic changes by about a billion  
fold —  far too fast to ensure safety before release —  but also changes their 
goal from evolutionary success to econom ic profit. Genetic manipulation, far 
from being the pinnacle o f  industrial modernity, is actually industrial 
primitivism, applying a reductionist and m echanistic mindset to living  
system s that do not work that way.
Craig Venter, who set up the private com pany which sequenced the 
human genom e, has since concluded that w e sim ply do not have enough 
genes for biological determinism to be right. “The wonderful diversity o f  the 
human species is not hard-wired in our genetic code. Our environments are 
critical”. The company he created has so far lost almost three quarters o f  a 
billion dollars. The fact that one gene can give rise to multiple proteins, 
depending on the dynamic o f  the entire organism, has destroyed its theoretical 
foundation. But the scientific com m unity stubbornly ignores experimental 
results which contradict the central dogmas o f  molecular biology, causing the 
editor o f  Science in Society, Dr. Mae-Wan Ho, to lament “the intellectual 
decline sympomatic o f  the degenerate research programme that’s neo- 
Darwinian biology”.
Strong words —  but justified when celebrated Darwinists like Richard 
Dawkins “explain” the supposed random evolution o f  life by the random 
behaviour o f  computer programmes. Unable to fit the desire for adopted 
children into his “selfish gene” theory, Dawkins believes that “mothers 
deliberately try to deceive naive young wom en into adopting their children” 
(Dawkins 1979: 110). With spokespersons like this, no wonder Darwinists 
shy away from debating their opponents.
For, as Prof. Michael Behe points out in Darwin ’s Black Box, no scientific 
publication has described how the molecular evolution o f  a real com plex  
biochem ical system occurred or could occur. Irreducibly com plex system s
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(e.g. bloodclotting) cannot be put together piecem eal. Every step requires 
several separate developm ents. Attempts at gradual evolution are a recipe for 
extinction. The selective public presentation o f  the fossil evidence to promote 
evolutionism  is a serious abuse o f  public trust. The fortuitous accumulation o f  
beneficial mutations via natural selection is as plausible as a tornado blowing 
through a scrap yard assem bling an aeroplane. In the fruit fly experiments o f  
Thomas Hunt Morgan, the mutated flies, when left alone, reverted to normal 
after a few  generations...
The evidence o f  Darwinist evolutionism dissolves once we evaluate it fairly 
and avoid the deceptive language o f  its proponents. For evolutionists have 
filled the gaping hole in their theory by turning “purposeless evolution” and 
even “chance” into active agents with godlike powers. Their theory also pre­
supposes that evolution has enough numbers to work on, i.e. it requires a very 
high percentage o f  child mortality. Darwin believed that
every single organic being around us may be said to be striving to the utmost 
to increase in numbers; [...]; that heavy destruction inevitably falls on the 
young or old, during each generation or at recurring intervals. Lighten any 
check, mitigate the destruction ever so little, and the number o f  the species 
will almost instantaneously increase to any amount. (Darwin 1966 [1859]: 6 6 -  
67)
He also believed that “many more individuals o f  each species are bom  than 
can possibly survive” (Darwin 1966 [1859]: 5). But these amazing claim s 
have no basis in reality. (For a detailed discussion, see David S tove’s 
“Darwinian Fairytales”, Essay V .)
I very much w elcom e the opening o f  the Jakob von Uexküll Archive 
because I hope it w ill help biology and other sciences, currently trapped by 
Darwinism, to liberate them selves —  as more researchers gain access to my 
grandfather’s writings. I hope that this symposium w ill be follow ed by others, 
debating the many aspects o f  his work. There w ould be no lack o f  dis­
tinguished scientific speakers, e.g. —  apart from those already mentioned —  
Dr. Rupert Sheldrake (w ho acknowledges the influence o f  Jakob von Uexküll 
in his work), Dr. Mary M idgley, Prof. Lynn Margulis, etc. The actualite o f  
such a debate is evident. For, to quote my grandfather, “In a world where men 
are reduced to machines, all sense o f  allegiance to higher principles is lost. 
Only the crude m echanism o f  the market continues to demand obedience”.
Jakob von U exküll speculated that the key discoveries o f  the com ing  
decades would be made “diesseits” rather than “jenseits” ourselves, ie. in our 
inner universes. Much has been discovered, but blinded by mechanistic 
dogmas, w e have diminished rather than enhanced ourselves. There is no 
scientific reason, which forces us to explain our highest achievem ents in 
terms o f  their neurotic perversions. Yet we choose to do so. Similarly there is 
no science requiring us to turn our genes into our gods, w hose adaptation is 
described as “designed”, “organised”, “precisely calculated”, etc. —  i.e.
endowed with intent and purpose. Yet we choose to do so due to our current
cultural conditioning.
Science claims to be exempt from such conditioning, yet in m y practical 
experience the opposite is the case. In almost 25 years o f  highlighting 
“alternative” thinkers and doers through the Right Livelihood Awards, I have 
found the scientific establishment to be surprisingly dogmatic and intolerant. 
In democratic countries today, you are less likely to risk your reputation and 
your livelihood (or even be physically threatened!) i f  you disagree with the 
political mainstream than if  you are a scientific dissident.
If you deny that life is “but the outcom e o f  accidental collocations o f  
atoms” (Bertrand Russell), and especially i f  you do not just deny it but insist 
that it is unscientific nonsense, as my grandfather did, then your work is 
likely to end up in the university cellar where his archive has languished for 
45 years. It might still be there, if  Estonia had not regained its freedom, 
enabling Prof. Kalevi Kull and his colleagues to create the Tartu Centre ...
One o f  my grandfather’s short stories describes a rich American who 
found that his focus on making money had destroyed his ability to appreciate 
beauty. When he achieved his life-long dream o f  com ing to N aples, he could  
only see stones and water. He became depressed and drank h im self to death ... 
Darwin him self complained bitterly in old age that his churning out natural 
laws had destroyed (what he called) his higher faculties, including his ability 
to enjoy poetry...
The consequences for us today are even more serious. W ise men, like 
former President Vaclav Havel call for a new “ethos, emanating from a 
rediscovered sense o f  global responsibility” but how can such an ethos be 
built on a human story which portrays us, with all the authority o f  science, as 
chance products o f purposeless mutations?
As the historian Jacob Needleman pointed out, there is a great difference 
between a Universe which exceeds us in size alone and one which exceeds us 
in depth o f  purpose and intelligence. The first excludes and crushes us. The 
second places us.
It is inconceivable that a society based on the Uexküllian —  rather than 
Darwinian —  worldview would have made such a m ess o f  our inner and outer 
Umwelt, would have created a world in which the survival o f  most living  
species is under threat and anti-depressive drugs are increasingly given to 
children from the age o f  two.
Working in the World Bank som e years ago, the Right Livelihood Award 
recipient Prof. Herman Daly was asked to comm ent on a planned publication 
by a colleague. In it he found an illustration show ing the natural environment 
as a subsystem (box within a box) o f  the human econom y. D aly pointed out 
that it is o f  course the other way round but the author disagreed and the book  
appeared without the illustration.
Now, the belief that our natural environment is a subset o f  the human 
economy may strike you as on par with the belief that the earth is flat.
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W orryingly, the author holding this belief was Lawrence Summers, President 
Clinton s econom ic supreme and later President o f  Harvard University! I 
could g ive many other exam ples illustrating the extent o f  to which our 
decision-m akers have lost touch with their U m w e lt...
The sem ioticians here may know that the US Government called their 
colleague Prof. Thomas Sebeok for advice on what signs to out on the sealed  
entrances o f  nuclear waste depositories, which future generations in 10,000  
years and more w ould still understand to signify “danger”. Prof. Sebeok did 
not think that such signs could be developed and proposed instead the 
creation o f  a hereditary priesthood charged with guarding these poisonous 
wastes, which w e have created for a few  decades o f  nuclear-energy-based  
comfort. I am sure Prof. Sebeok was w ell aware that no hereditary priesthood  
has lasted so long...
The priesthood propagating Darwinism w ill no doubt have a much shorter 
lifetime. His pioneering work has fossilized  into an ideology. It is an ideology  
which serves the present global elite confirming as “natural” the com petitive 
individualism which underpins their often ill-begotten wealth and power —  
and as “unnatural” (i.e. inferior) all our higher human values o f  generosity, 
solidarity, reciprocity, fairness, kindness, etc.
The ongoing human, social and environmental costs o f  this ideology are 
huge. For as Abraham M aslow, the founder o f  Transpersonal Psychology, 
noted it is difficult to practise love, generosity and solidarity in a society  
w hose institutions, rules and information streams are geared to promoting 
lesser human qualities. The im mense power o f  this ideology becam e apparent 
when even the Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox hierarchies felt obliged a 
few years ago to accept Darwinism as a “fact” . When I asked one o f  the 
foremost Orthodox intellectuals, Metropolitan John o f  Pergamon, what had 
led his church to this conclusion, he replied that it was necessary to be 
“optimistic” and that his church has accepted evolutionism  for ecological 
reasons, i.e. to remind humans o f  their links with, and responsibilities for, the 
animal world! But, he added, his Church accepted evolutionism  only in “ its 
serious, rather than its risible aspects” —  like the descent o f  humans from 
a p e s ...
One difference between an ideology and a science is that the former is 
only paid lip service to. Even its most prominent proponents rarely really 
believe in it. Thus, the high-level Soviet bureaucrats whom I met as an МЕР 
in M oscow  in 1989 hastened to emphasise that, w hile they were members o f  
the Communist Party, this did not mean that they were com m unists... 
Similarly, even the most prominent representatives o f  the ruling global 
econom ic order often sound like anti-globalisation activists as soon as they  
have retired or been fired.
It w ould be interesting to investigate if  the same discrepancy between  
public and private view s can be found among the prominent promoters o f  
“accidental” evolution.
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Some years ago I came across the biography o f  the “M agus o f  Strovolos”, 
the Cypriot religious mystic and spiritual healer also known as Daskalos. 
There I found quotes from deeply respectful letters, revealing widespread  
agreement, to Daskalos from an (unnamed) “famous British philosopher who  
had the reputation o f  being an atheist”. The biographer confirmed to me that 
the writer was Bertrand Russell ... (Markides 1990: 64 -6 5 ).
As anyone familiar with my grandfather’s writings knows, his private and 
“official” worldview coincided. He had no hesitation for exam ple in stating 
publicly that the survival o f  the human soul was “beyond any doubt”. Today, 
carefully controlled studies, such as the SCOLE experim ents in the U K  and 
the work on Consciousness Survival o f  Prof. Gary Schwartz at the University  
o f Arizona in Tucson are beginning to provide verifiable evidence for this 
claim. Naturally, w e should be sceptical —  but it is also tim e to becom e 
sceptical vis-ä-vis the sceptics’ increasingly strident but poorly documented  
rebuttals.
Throwing away the crutches o f  Darwinism brings more new  questions 
than answers. But admitting ignorance is preferable to propagating false 
knowledge. My grandfather showed that there is strong evidence that w e are 
much more than machines and that w e are parts o f  a living intelligent plan. 
The mechanists and evolutionists respond that you cannot have a plan without 
a planner —  forgetting that you cannot have a machine without a builder. 
And, o f  course, machines do not recreate them selves.
Let me say in conclusion that, as a generalist, I do not claim the 
knowledge to provide specific answers on these issues. But I do understand 
enough about the state o f  our inner and outer worlds to know that w e must 
start to ask different questions, guided by our highest values.
I warmly thank the University o f  Hamburg and especially its President, 
Dr. Lüthje, for the timely and courageous initiative o f  re-opening the Jakob 
von Uexküll archive.
370 Jakob von Uexüll, j r
References
Behe, Michael 1996. Darwin s Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to 
Evolution. New York: The Free Press.
Darwin, Charles 1874. The Descent o f  Man. Vol. 1. 2nd edition. London: John 
Murray.
1966 [1859]. The Origin o f Species. (Facsimile reprint o f  1st edition). 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Dawkins, Richard 1979. The Selfish Gene. London: Paladin.
Foerster, Heinz von 2003. Understanding Understanding: Essays on Cybernetics 
and Cognition. New York: Springer.
Kohl, Judith; Kohl, Herbert 2000 [1977]. The View from the Oak: The Private 
Worlds o f Other Creatures. New York: The New Press.
Loye, David 2000. Darwin's Lost Theory o f  Love. New York: ToExel.
Markides, Kynacos C. 1990. The Magus o f Strovolos: The Extraordinary World 
o f  a Spiritual Healer. Arkana: Penguin Books.
Midgley, Mary 1985. Evolution as a Religion: Strange Hopes and Stranger Fears. 
London: Methuen.
Russell, Bertrand 1957. Why I am not a Christian. New York: George Allen and 
Unwin.
Stove, David 1995. Darwinian Fairytales. Aldershot: Avebury Press.
Jakob von Uexküll and Right Livelihood 371
Sign Systems Studies 32.1/2, 2004
Eye witnessing Jakob von Uexküll’s 
Umwelttheory
Thure von Uexküll1
For people interested in the work and the theory o f  Jakob von U exküll it may 
be charming to learn, how I have experienced his way o f  observing nature 
when I was a child and also to hear which consequences have arisen from this 
for me in my profession as a doctor.
I remember that when I was about six years old and w e spent a tim e in the 
countryside my father asked us: “What does the world look like for the 
earthworm? The earthworm doesn’t have any ears. He can hear nothing. He 
doesn’t have any eyes either and can see nothing. He nevertheless finds the 
way in the nature surrounding him ”.
At that time fairytales about animals and their world, like the book by 
Bonsel about the B ee Maja,‘ were popular. Instead o f  relying on these books, 
my father suggested to go into the garden and to watch earthworms orienting 
them selves in the surrounding nature.
In the garden he showed us, how  earthworms grasp leaves —  their 
fo o d —  at their tip and pull them into their holes. In order to do this, 
earthworms must be able to distinguish the taste o f  the tips from that o f  the 
leaves basis; because the basis w ould block the attempt to draw the leave into 
the hole. Experiments with leaves cut into p ieces have proved that
1 This article, “Jakob von Uexküll’s Umwelt-Theorie miterlebt” (read at the 
International symposium Signs and The design o f Life —  Uexküll Significance 
Today, Jan. 9, 2004, in the University o f Hamburg), has been accompanied by the 
following letter (dated Freiburg, 1st January 2004): “Dear Mr. Rüting, I am sorry 
to tell you that the condition o f my health has not improved as I had hoped it 
would in order to be able to stand the stress o f a journey. So to my dismay I have 
to give up my plan to come to your celebration in Hamburg. As a substitute for 
my personal talk I send to you the following small sketch about my father and the 
significance o f  his theory for medicine. With my best regards, Yours Thure von 
Uexküll.” The article is translated by Torsten Rüting.
2 Bonsel, Waldemar [1912], Die Biene Maja und ihre Abenteuer.
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earthworms do indeed orientate them selves this way. The world o f  the 
earthworm is the world o f  a gourmet.
This observation gives us an answer to the central question o f  bio logy  
about the relation o f  living organisms to the surrounding world: Living  
systems are not related to their Um welt by causes and effects in a causal- 
mechanical way, but connected by signs that have meaning for them. Instead 
o f by the two parameters ‘cause’ and ‘effect’, this relation can only be 
described by three parameters: by ‘signs’ which are grasped by the organism  
and which designate certain phenomena as ‘objects’, and as the third 
parameter the ‘interpretant’ which creates the relation o f  meaning between  
‘sign’ and ‘object’ —  and —  which controlles the appropriateness [Zutreffen] 
o f this relation.
Jakob o f  Uexküll recognized that this act o f  relating is a circular event for 
which he invented the formula “function circle”, which is described as a 
‘cybernetic m odel’ today. In this function circle a ‘noticing sign ’ [Merk­
zeichen] induces a behaviour which sets a ‘working sign ’ [Wirkzeichen]. If 
the meaning is appropriate, the effect sign deletes the noticing sign —  and 
with that the experience ends (the circle is closed and a new  cycle starts).
Epistemologically this is o f  a threefold meaning:
(1) Living beings do not discover their Um welten. They have to construct 
it out o f  the signs found. Philosophically this position and its consequences 
have been described by ‘constructivism’.
(2) Living beings are not related to the surrounding world m echanically  
by ‘effects’ and ‘causes’. They grasp “signs” and interpret them due to the 
meaning these signs have for them. Philosophically this leads us to the 
teaching o f  the signs, to semiotics.
(3) Constructivism and sem iotics presuppose the concept o f  “system ”, the 
concept o f the ordered whole, in which the parts have a significance for the 
whole and for each other. System theory is therefore the third limb o f  a 
biological description o f  nature.
The significance o f  these insights for m edicine reveals itse lf at m edicine’s 
psycho-physical problem or —  in other words —  in the difficulty o f  having to 
relate either to soulless bodies in physiology or to bodiless souls in 
psychology, but never to inspired bodies.
This deficiency can only be overcom e by com pleting the indispensable 
mechanistic view on the sick person’s body and organs —  by a view  that is 
interested in the ‘reality’ in which the patient lives him self. This com plem ent 
is also the prerequisite for communicating with the sick person which fails 
without the construction o f  a common reality.
The significance o f  these considerations show s up in the dangerous fact 
that in the context o f  modem rationalising efforts and related pressure for 
economical measures, medicine stops to be “humane m edicine”. “D RG ” 
(diagnostic related groups) and “DM P” (disease management programs) can 
just as well be introduced to veterinary medicine.
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Jakob von Uexküll Centre, since 1993
Riin Magnus \  Timo Maran 2, Kalevi K u ll3
N o doubt, great intellectual heritage serves to be studied, repeatedly. Estonian 
local traditions in valuation o f  nature and the scientific fields o f  theoretical 
biology and sem iotics provide a creative context for the principal study areas 
o f  Jakob von Uexküll Centre —  biosem iotics, ecosem iotics and the 
philosophy o f  nature. Roots, schools and different periods o f  those discourses 
in Estonia have been analysed elsewhere (Kull 1999; 2001; Maran, Tüür 
2001, Sebeok 1998; Sutrop, Kull 1985), in this brief review w e focus only on 
the activities o f  the Uexküll Centre o f  the last dozen years. It should also be 
mentioned that this has been a decade o f  a new  w ave o f  academic contacts 
between eastern Europe (including Estonia) and western scientific 
communities. Extensive dialogues between different fields o f  science about 
various aspects o f  nature-culture relations have also taken place throughout 
this period (about these relations and dialogues in Estonia, see Lehari, Sarapik 
2000; Sarapik et al. 2002).
Founding. The m otives for the founding o f  Jakob von U exküll Centre in 
Tartu included (a) the formation o f  an international network o f  biosem iotics 
in the beginning o f  1990s, (b) the need to organize several m eetings on 
semiotic biology, and (c) the lack o f  any organisation dealing with the 
heritage o f  Jakob von Uexküll until that time. The Centre was established on 
November 16, 1993 by a group o f  scientists and students in Tartu. M ost o f  the 
students involved were those attending a course in biosem iotics, which was 
lectured for the first time at Tartu University in the same fall semester o f  
1993. The Centre was established as a branch-organisation o f  Estonian  
Naturalists’ Society, one o f  the oldest academic societies in the Baltic States. 
From the beginning until today, U exküll Centre has been in close contacts 
with the section o f  Theoretical B iology o f  Estonian Naturalists’ Society and
1 Author’s address: Riin Magnus, Department of Semiotics, University of Tartu, 
Tiigi St. 78, Tartu, Estonia; e-mail: rmagnus@ut.ee.
2 Author’s address: Timo Maran, Department of Semiotics, University of Tartu, 
Tiigi St. 78, Tartu, Estonia; e-mail: timo_m@ut.ee.
3 Author’s address: Kalevi Kull, Department of Semiotics, University of Tartu, Tiigi 
St. 78, Tartu, Estonia; e-mail: kalevi@zbi.ee.
Department o f  Sem iotics o f  Tartu University. The nominated international 
committee with advisory function included Thomas A. Sebeok (after w hose  
death Torsten Rüting was elected as a new member), Jesper Hoffm eyer, late 
Thure von Uexküll, Jakob von Uexküll jr., Peeter Torop, and Kalevi Kull. 
Everyday activities are maintained by a Board o f  seven members.
Concurrently with the establishment o f  the Centre the outstanding 
environmentalist Jakob von Uexküll jr. became interested in his Estonian 
roots, making several visits to the University o f  Tartu and participating in the 
activities o f  the just-founded Centre (U exküll 1994). A s a co-operation  
between Jakob von Uexküll jr. and the Centre, Estonian Renaissance Award 
was annually given in the years 1993-1997  to persons with serious com m it­
ment to rebuild Estonia and to solve the problems Estonia was facing by 
cultural and academic means. The statute o f  the award and the overview  o f  
the winners' activities have been also published by U exküll Centre (T iivel et 
al. 2000).
Archive. One o f  the Centre’s main goals is to keep and maintain Jakob 
von Uexküll’s legacy. The archive-library contains a collection o f  U exküll’s 
publications, manuscripts as w ell as publications about U exküll, and som e o f  
Jakob von U exküll’s personal correspondence (e.g., between U exküll and F. 
Brock, H. S. Chamberlain, F. Huth, H. von Keyserling, К. Lorenz). The 
library also keeps a small number o f  publications by the contemporaries o f  
Uexküll and works from fields related to U exküll’s studies. The library is 
open to researchers from Estonia as well as from abroad and the Centre tries 
to foster and support Uexküll-studies both on local and international level. 
Many scholars o f  special interest in study Uexküll-materials have visited the 
Centre, among them Myrdene Anderson, Sabine Brauckmann, Sergey 
Chebanov, Tobias Cheung, Jui-Pi C hien, Barend van Heusden, Kari Lager- 
spetz, Florian Mildenberger, Aldona Pobojewska, Torsten Rüting, Morten 
Tonnessen, and others. The library has been a great help in the period o f  
preparations o f  the large special issue o f  Semiotica (vol. 134, 2001): Jakob 
\vn  Uexküll: A Paradigm for Biology and Semiotics, including an U exküll- 
bibliography (Kull 2001).
Events and publications. The Centre’s activities have also been shaped 
by orientations towards international science as w ell as to the local cultural 
sphere. In co-operation with different academic institutions, U exküll Centre 
has organized various seminars, conferences and work-shops. Together with 
the University o f  Tartu, Department o f  Sem iotics and Aarhus University the 
conference on sem iotics, social anthropology and phenom enological ethno­
graphy Uses o f  Nature— towards an anthropology o f  the environment” was 
held in 1998. The presentations o f  the conference were published as a 
collection o f articles (see Roepstorff et al. 2003). Several international 
conferences or workshops have taken place in the field o f  b iosem iotics in 
recent years in Tartu: “ Uexküll and the Living Environment” (July 7 -9 ,
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1999), “ Gatherings in Biosemiotics 2 ” (June 14-17 , 2002) and “Cassirer, 
Lotman, Uexküll —  between biology and semiotics o f  culture” (M ay 13, 
2004).
Since Jakob von Uexküll was, after all, a theoretical biologist, his Centre 
should certainly have this field in attention. Accordingly, it has been a co­
organizer o f  Estonian spring schools in theoretical biology, particularly the 
ones on the topic o f  “M ethodology o f  life sciences” (1994), “Theory o f  
recognition” (1995), “Languages o f  life” (1996), “Theory o f  lie” (2005) (the 
papers o f  these m eetings being published in the series Schola Biotheoretica, 
vols. 20, 21, 22, 31, accordingly).
At the same tim e the Centre has also paid attention to the promotion o f  
nature-related discourses in Estonian culture, for instance in the forms o f  the 
youth nature photography contest (w hich has grown by now  into the largest 
contest o f  nature photography in Estonia), local seminars on culture-nature 
studies and som e translation projects o f  ecophilosophic literature. On the 
local academic level one-day spring work-shops (“Estonian culture and 
nature” 2001, “Staging nature” 2002, “M ediated natures” 2003) and summer 
outdoor seminars on theoretical b iology (Kaplinski 1995) and ecosem iotics  
have taken place. The favourable place for outdoor events has been the 
historical Puhtu peninsula in western Estonia, where Jakob von U exküll with  
his family spent the summers between 1927 and 1939. The former U exkü ll’s 
house in Puhtu houses the Puhtu B iological Station o f  the Estonian University  
o f  Life Sciences now.
Beginning from 1995, regular seminar series under the general title “Text 
and Nature” have been held together with Estonian Literary Society. The 
seminars have set an aim to develop discussions between humanities and 
natural sciences and to provide a comm on dialogue ground for different 
perspectives on the role o f  culture in our understandings o f  natural pheno­
mena. Different aspects o f  culture-nature studies e.g textuality o f  the natural 
world, communication between humans and animals, representation o f  nature 
have been observed. The collected papers o f  the seminars were published by 
Estonian Literary Society in 2000 (Maran, Tüür 2000).
Uexküll Centre and Department o f  Sem iotics often share the respon­
sibility for inviting w ell-known scientists to Tartu in order to vitalise intel­
lectual debate in Estonia and make Tartu the meeting place o f  different view s 
in culture-nature studies. Am ong others w e have been honoured by the visits 
o f  Norwegian eco-philosopher Arne N aess, anthropologist Tim Ingold, 
sem ioticans Thure von Uexküll, Thomas Sebeok, Jesper Hoffmeyer, W infied  
Nöth and John D eely.
D espite the small number o f  members and som e periods o f  minor activity, 
Jakob von Uexküll Centre has continued its activities in order to contribute to 
the developm ent o f  biosem iotics on international level. In Estonia our
48
intention remains to provoke interest in local nature and to discuss its various 
connections with cultural sphere.
Tartu as the town o f  U exkiill’s student years and Estonia as his birth- 
country, with what he remained connected throughout his life, has kept not 
just the memory o f  Uexküll, but has retained the research fields and his 
ecological thought in a lively manner. The opening o f  the U exküll archive 
also in Hamburg (in January 2004, organised by Torsten Rüting; see also  
Rüting 2004) provides a supportive proof for the continuing importance o f  
research on U exküll’s legacy and his place in today’s scientific thought.
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Signs and the design of life -  
Uexküll’s significance today: A symposium, 
its significant history and future
Torsten R üting1
One may find many reasons to commemorate and celebrate Jakob von 
Uexküll in 2004: the 140th anniversary o f  his birth, the 60th anniversary o f  
his death or 70 years since the publication o f  his fam ous book A Stroll 
through the Umwelten o f  Animals and Men (U exküll, Kriszat 1934). Hamburg 
University may celebrate that it had called Uexküll to Hamburg 80 years ago. 
However the plan to organise an international sym posium  taking place on 
January 9th to 1 1th 2004 at the University o f  Hamburg was not driven by the 
wish to venerate biographical history. Though taking place at the Centre fo r  
the History o f  Science, Mathematics and Technology, the sym posium  
celebrated primarily a very recent occasion and its agenda demonstrated the 
contemporary interest in Jakob von Uexküll among international academia: 
The inauguration o f  a Jakob von Uexküll Archive fo r  Umweltforschung and 
Biosemiotics at the University o f  Hamburg, housing and maintaining a part o f  
the scientific Nachlass o f  Uexküll and the library o f  the former Institut fu r  
Umweltforschung was the foremost reason to celebrate. It had taken many 
years and problems until this plan was finally realised. It had been projected 
in 1983 by Thure von Uexküll (1 9 08 -2004 ), who had therefore gifted the 
scientific library o f  his father to Hamburg. So the successful realisation o f  the 
maintenance o f  an essential element o f  the fam ous tradition o f  the still young 
University o f  Hamburg is already an episode o f  the university’s history itself. 
The story o f  the N achlass seem s to reveal and repeat the difficulties that 
Uexküll had to face, when he tried to institutionalise his b iology at the 
university. U exkü lls’s approach, that would be called “interdisciplinary” 
today, was untimely and did not fit into the schem e o f  institutions. After 35 
years o f  struggling in a no-m an’s-land between faculties the Institute für  
Umweltforschung was closed in 1960. The wealth o f  U exküll’s work and the
1 Author’s address: Torsten Rüting, Jakob von Uexküll-Archiv fur Umwelt­
forschung und Biosemiotik, Fachbereich 11, Universität Hamburg, Bundesstr. 55, 
20146 Hamburg, Germany; e-mail: rueting@math.uni-hamburg.de.
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tradition that had formed in Hamburg remained unacknowledged by most o f  
the established biologists there. The Nachlass o f  the Institut fü r  Umwelt­
forschung was seen more or less as a collection o f  curiosities and the plan for 
an archive was long neglected. It was through the comm itm ent o f  colleagues 
and students o f  Tartu University that Hamburg University cam e to acknow ­
ledge the significance o f  its own famous biologist. The founding and the 
engaged activities o f  the Jakob von Uexküll Centre in Tartu (described by 
Magnus et al. 2004) convinced Thure von Uexküll to suggest to send the 
collected materials to Tartu, where the tradition o f  his father and his b io­
semiotic approach had found obvious follow ers and fruitful continuation. The 
following request to send the Nachlass to Tartu provoked a heated debate 
among officials at Hamburg University. A s an effect, scholars like Eckart 
Krause, head o f  the Hamburger Bibliothek für Universitätsgeschichte, who  
were aware o f  the significance o f  Uexküll and the Institute fü r Umwelt­
forschung for their university spoke out against the transfer o f  the Nachlass. It 
was emphasised that the materials were part o f  the university’s possessions, 
represented its tradition and were to be kept and presented to its academia.
During the 2nd Gatherings in Biosemiotics taking place in 2002 in Tartu, 
a founder o f  the Jakob von Uexküll Centre, Kalevi Kull, from Tartu U ni­
versity and Torsten Rüting from the Centre fo r  the History o f  Science, Mathe­
matics and Technology o f  Hamburg University met and agreed to cooperate 
in the further maintenance o f  the Nachlass in order to make it available to the 
international community, interested in the history o f  U exküll and the 
development o f  alternative approaches in the interdisciplinary fields between  
biology and the humanities that he had encompassed. These plans were 
presented to officials o f  Hamburg University. The director o f  the Zoological 
Institute and Museum, Olav Giere, proposed to give the materials to the 
Centre fo r  the History o f  Science Mathematics and Technology. The head o f  
the Centre, Karin Reich and the head o f  the department o f  mathematics, 
Alexander Kreuzer, agreed to house and to maintain the archive in their 
building. It was decided to celebrate the opening o f  the archive and to hold an 
international symposium, which was generously funded by the department 
and different foundations. All o f  the invited scholars agreed to g ive a talk in 
Hamburg and others, like Myrdene Anderson from Purdue University and 
Wolfgang Alt from Bonn came just to attend the sym posium . Unfortunately 
Thure von Uexküll, who was pleased to see his plans realised becam e ill and 
the paper that he had prepared had to be read to the audience. But another 
prominent member o f  the U exküll-fam ily, Jakob von U exküll’s grandson, 
Jakob von Uexküll Jr., founder o f  the Right Livelihood Award, the so called  
Alternative Nobel Prize , came in from London to explain what the 
visionary ideas o f  his grandfather might mean for the struggle for right 
livelihood in a world threatened by the destruction o f  the environment and the 
diversity o f  Umwelten in a globalised world.
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s already indicated by its name the archive’s agenda is to integrate the 
tra ition o f  Uexküllian Umweltforschung and the conception o f  biosem iotics.
this sense the work o f  the archive should primarily contribute to studies 
about ep istem ology and ethics in the life-sciences that are integrating studies 
o f  nature and studies o f  culture. This means on the one hand to continue the 
lifework o f  U exküll, w hose prime m otive at the outset o f  his profession was 
to ground biology on a sound epistem ological and ethical basis and make it a 
modern experimental science (Rüting 2004). On the other hand it means to 
catch up with the recent progress in an interdisciplinary m ovem ent that 
gathers under the label o f  biosemiotics and represents a broad initiative o f  
developments that are integrating biological, cognitive and cultural scientific  
approaches.
To many o f  the German audience o f  Jakob von Uexküll and those who  
see him primarily in the context o f  ethological and ecological research it 
might be necessary to explain how  U exküll cam e to be recognized as a 
pioneer o f  biosem iotics. In 1977, after Thomas A. Sebeok (1 9 2 0 -2 0 0 1 ) had 
described U exküll as a “N eglected figure in the history o f  sem iotic Inquiry” 
on a conference in Vienna (Sebeok 1989), Sebeok and Jakob von U exküll’s 
son Thure, professor at Ulm and founder o f  psycho-som atic m edicine in 
Germany, met and the work o f  the elder U exküll was introduced to a wider 
circle o f  scholars interested in the sem iotic analyses o f  life. The further story 
has already been published by Sebeok (1998) and Kull (1989 , 1999, 2001) 
and will also be addressed by D eely  in this volum e. The new  approach o f  
Biosemiotics flourished especially in Tartu and finally led to the foundation o f  
the Jakob von Uexküll Centre there in 1993. Inspired by the tradition o f  the 
Tartu sem iotic school o f  Juri Lotman, the concerned intellectual scope o f  
Thomas A. Sebeok (D eely  2004) and backed by a new discovery o f  the 
semiotic contents o f  the philosophy o f  Charles S. Peirce mainly by Danish 
scholars, the rediscovery o f  Jakob von U exküll was pushed forward for 
modem academia.
These exciting developm ents have at least now  reached Hamburg. The 
Symposium w as a starting point for a rediscovery o f  one o f  its members as a 
pioneer thinker for the international developm ent o f  science. This volum e 
also show s that the university o f  Hamburg has a rich tradition which can be 
seen as a part o f  the vanguard in m odem  thought that might constitute new  
foundations for science and research in the 21st century. The exceptional 
cooperation and communication o f  scientists like Emst Cassirer, W illiam  
Stem, Heinz W em er and Jakob von Uexküll in the 1920ies and early 1930ies 
led to innovative ideas (Steckner and Krois, this volum e) and after inspiring 
postmodern philosophy (Chien, Weber, this volum e) the seeds o f  these unti­
mely developm ents might now help to overcom e the stasis o f  postmodemity.
Already a look at the program o f  the sym posium and the table o f  contents o f  
this special issue documenting it, show that Uexküll has again becom e a focal 
point for international academia and links scholars in different parts o f  the
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world covering very different fields o f  research. Han-liang Chang from  
National Taiwan University traced the traditions o f  phenom enology and 
hermeneutics as a field o f  context and influence around Uexküll. The second  
scholar from National Taiwan University, Juipi Chien, discussed U exk ü ll’s 
concept o f form by examining the different contexts in w hich he reasons with  
expressions like Schema, Form , Gestalt and com es to situate U exkülls theory 
near the paradigm o f  structural linguistics. Tobias Cheung who had com e 
from the University o f  Paris and now  teaches at Humboldt U niversity in 
Berlin emphasised how deeply U exküll’s theorising was founded in contem ­
porary research and debate about biological self-organisation in developing  
cells and organisms.
John Deely, professor from the University o f  St Thomas in Houston, who  
witnessed how Thomas A. Sebeok introduced Thure von Uexküll to the 
Semiotic Society o f  America in the early 1980ies and since then accompanied  
the development o f  biosem iotics from the critical stance o f  Thomist philo­
sophy, gave an account o f  his understanding o f  the significance o f  U exküll’s 
concept o f Umwelt in this process. Matthias Gutmann, professor for 
philosophy in Marburg, started with a critical revaluation o f  U exküll’s theory 
o f organism and gave an elaborated constructivist reinterpretation and refor­
mulation o f  it, which may be used to systematise and to structure future 
biological research. Another critical evaluation was presented by Jesper 
Hoffmeyer, professor at the Institute o f  Molecular B iology o f  the University  
o f Copenhagen. In order to save the initiative o f  biosem iotics from unfruitful 
discussions, he conversed the problem o f  U exküll’s notion o f  design or 
Planmäßigkeit and their inherent impression o f  teleology and determinacy. 
The paper by John Michael Krois, professor at the Institute o f  Philosophy at 
Humboldt University o f  Berlin, who is currently editing the correspondence 
and unpublished works o f  Ernst Cassirer, documented how  deeply Cassirer’s 
later works were influenced by Uexküll, his collegue at Hamburg University. 
Also tracing the influence o f  Uexküll on Cassirer, Andreas W eber then tried 
to formulate a comprehensive sem iotic anthropology for the integrative 
understanding o f  human nature and culture. Seeing U exküll as an early 
pioneer overcoming o f  neodarwinian theories, Anton Markos, professor at 
Charles University in Prague, explained the ideas o f  the biophysicist Stuart 
Kauffman and semiotic linguist Juri Lotman, who according to him best 
described the continuous negotiation (sem iosis) o f  ‘law s’ that govern the 
evolution o f  organisms, minds and cultures, driving them to ever larger 
autonomy. The paper by Magnus, Maran & Kull described the decade long  
activities on the fields o f  biosem iotics, ecosem iotics and the philosophy o f  
nature that were organised and promoted by the Jakob von U exküll Centre in 
Tartu. The art historian Cornelius Steckner from C ologne described the 
context o f  artistic and philosophical studies around the concept o f  Uexküll 
and Cassirer in the 1920ies and 30ies. Torsten Rüting brought to memory the
historical and biographical developm ents that led to the historical and present 
significance o f  Jakob von U exküll.2
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